RESEARCH ARTICLE

What God Does Not Do

Abelard's Actualism, Its Medieval Answer, and John Milbank's Genealogy of Possibility

ABSTRACT

John Milbank's *Beyond Secular Order* (2013) holds that modern thought rests partly on "the priority of possibility", a doctrine he traces to late-medieval Franciscan theology and above all to Duns Scotus, and against which he sets an Aquinas for whom God is "compelled" in creating by the glory of his own intellect. This article tests that genealogy against the Latin of a debate it omits. Milbank's possibilism has two parts: a ground of the possible, a range of "given" possibilities that God considers before he decides; and a contingency of the actual, redefined as "a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated". In the twelfth century Peter Abelard argued, on premises Milbank shares and against what he knew to be the common view, that God can do only what he does at some time. Hugh of St Victor, the *Summa sententiarum* and Peter Lombard answered the thesis by distinctions granting that God never acts beyond his wisdom and denying that his wisdom fixes a single world, and Bonaventure, Aquinas and Bradwardine inherited that answer. The narrower reading of Abelard given here rests in part on a text Migne does not print, the Monte Cassino fragments of the *Theologia christiana* (Tosti 1851, reprinted by Cousin 1859), which as printed place the necessity in God's doing and deny it to the thing done. Read from his own text, Aquinas rejects the claim that the order of creatures is commensurate with God's goodness, and rejects explicitly a creation from necessity of knowledge, which this article judges the nearest medieval form of Milbank's "compelled". That answers the defence on the creation articles; the Trinitarian texts on which Milbank's "uttering of the Verbum" would rest are not on this shelf. Scotus's *Lectura* I d.39, the one medieval text Milbank cites in his account of possibilism, bears out his account of a real alternative of the will at the same instant as the actual (which Milbank glosses as a persisting possibility), and his charge that Scotus loosed the divine will from a prior judgment of the best: the divine intellect offers contingent propositions to the will as neutral. But Scotus grounds contingency in the divine will as Aquinas's *Summa* does and states it with the composite and divided senses that Aquinas also uses; what is new in him is an alternative of the *will* at the same instant, where Aquinas has an alternative of God's *power*. Ockham, read in the *Ordinatio* and the *Quodlibeta*, carries the will-first strand further: a possibility that belongs to the creature "from itself", a better world measured without reference to the maker's wisdom, and a merit that rests on God's acceptance under laws he has instituted. His absolute power is one power, which does "nothing inordinately", and he takes it from Lombard's reply to Abelard; but it is also the ground on which he admits an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object, which comes near Milbank's claim that absolute power can sever the mind from things, though Ockham denies that God can make an absent thing evidently appear present. And Ockham rejects any power for opposites without succession, which limits any modal lineage a reader might draw from Scotus to him. Wyclif, the necessitarian among these authors, still affirmed God's power over what never comes to be. The contingency of the actual was the common teaching of the twelfth-century schools, held against a named actualist, and Milbank's dating of its redefinition does not stand, except so far as his word "pure" carries the ground of the possible; a range of possibles that God considers as given is not found before Scotus, and what begins with Scotus is narrower than the genealogy requires.

KEYWORDS Peter Abelard · Peter Lombard · Thomas Aquinas · John Duns Scotus · William of Ockham · divine power · possibility and actuality · John Milbank · Thomas Bradwardine · John Wyclif

PROVENANCE

Question: put by Wilson Pruitt (human-prompted): to read John Milbank's *Beyond Secular Order* against the Latin sources on hand for uncited allies and the tradition's replies. The question of an "early offender" (section 10) was added by the orchestrating model (Claude Fable 5.2). *Scope and hunt brief:* Claude Fable 5.2. *Source search:* four instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one shelf each. *Source check, dossier and draft:* Claude Opus 5.5. *Orchestration:* Claude Fable 5.2, then Claude Opus 5.5. *Check of the draft after the writer:* Claude Fable 5.2, with a verification pass over the flagged notes by Claude Sonnet 5.5. *Scotus page images (Vatican ed.) and Ockham Quodlibeta:* supplied by Wilson Pruitt. *Monte Cassino fragments (transcribed from page images) and De potentia q.3 a.15:* added by Claude Opus 5.5. *Quotation verification:* script: every Latin run in the notes was tested against the file its note names;

runs transcribed from page images were checked by eye against the image. *Editorial review:* an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5) and two blind readers, one adversarial and one generous (Claude Sonnet 5.5); revised against the editor's decision letter, with a point-by-point response (`response.md`). *Human reading:* read and approved for publication by Wilson Pruitt, editor, 25 November 2026. *Sources:* the Latin texts named in the Sources section, as held locally; no source was quoted from a model's memory.

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1. Introduction

In *Beyond Secular Order* John Milbank names a set of assumptions that, on his account, modern philosophy shares with the late-medieval theology that prepared it. The third is "the priority of possibility". Its rival is the "traditional theological sense that there can be a kind of necessity in actuality as such which is a beautiful, harmonious, grace-imbued good order" (p. 108).[1] The change from the one to the other was made, he argues, by a religious attitude that wished to protect divine freedom "beyond even the scope of its generosity" (p. 109), and it reached its settled form in Duns Scotus, for whom every actual state is shadowed by the real possibility of another (pp. 36–37). Against it Milbank sets an Aquinas for whom God "is himself 'compelled' in creating by the aesthetic glory of his own intellect" (p. 109).

The genealogy begins too late. Whether God can do what he does not do was argued at length in the schools of Paris more than a century before Scotus was born, when Peter Abelard defended, in his own name and against what he knew to be the common view, the thesis that God can do only what he does at some time.[2] Abelard's arguments rest on premises Milbank holds. His opponents, Hugh of St Victor, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* and Peter Lombard, answered the thesis with distinctions that passed through Lombard's *Sentences* to Bonaventure and Aquinas and were still argued over by Thomas Bradwardine and John Wyclif in the fourteenth century. In the pages where Milbank gives the history of possibilism (pp. 34–37 and 108–110), he grounds the primacy of the actual in Aristotle, and the one medieval text he cites is Scotus's *Lectura*. None of the authors on either side of the twelfth-century debate appears there.

This article sets that debate against Milbank's claim. After a statement of the claim (section 2), it takes Abelard, the twelfth-century reply and Bonaventure (sections 3–5), Aquinas, read from his own text and through Bradwardine, who quotes him (6), Scotus, read in the *Lectura* that Milbank cites (7), Ockham, whom Milbank names as Scotus's heir (8), Bradwardine and Wyclif (9), and two monastic texts (10). The argument is built from the Latin: each quotation was taken from a copy of the text and checked against it, the notes give the Latin, and where the available texts do not reach, the article says so.

Milbank's possibilism has two parts, and the sources treat them differently. The first is a claim about the ground of the possible: the possibilist God "mainly considers a range of 'given' possibilities" and then decides which to actualise (p. 109). The second is a claim about the contingency of the actual: contingency was "redefined … as a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated at all, or else instantiated otherwise" (pp. 36–37). Milbank grants Aquinas a contingency of the created world, grounded in its dependence on the creative act (p. 35); his complaint is with a contingency of bare possibility. The article's position is this. The second part, that what is actual might not have been, or might have been otherwise, was the common teaching of the twelfth-century schools, and so Milbank's dating of the redefinition does not stand, except for what his word "pure" adds. It was held against a named actualist, by authors who denied as firmly as Milbank that God's

1. John Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 108. Later references to this book are given by page in the text.

2. Peter Abelard, *Introductio ad theologiam* III, PL 178:1098C. The Latin is given in section 3. Migne's editor dates the Council of Sens, which condemned propositions drawn from Abelard, to 1140 (PL 182:1049, *Admonitio*). The dates of Abelard's teaching at Paris and of Scotus's birth (c. 1265) are general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

will could act apart from his wisdom. The first part, a range of possibles given to God, is not found among these authors before Scotus. Aquinas stands with the twelfth century. In the articles where he treats God's will and power, he rejects the claim that the order of creatures is commensurate with God's goodness, and he rejects explicitly a creation from necessity of knowledge, which is, in this article's judgment, the nearest medieval form of Milbank's "compelled". Those articles concern creation; the texts in which Aquinas joins the procession of the Word to the making of the world are not on this shelf, and the reply to Milbank's "Paternal uttering of the Verbum" stops at that line. Scotus, read in the text Milbank cites, holds a synchronic contingency of the will, which Milbank glosses as a persisting possibility, and in one respect does what Milbank says: he takes from the divine intellect any judgment of what is to be done before the will determines it. His grounding of contingency in the divine will, and the logic of composite and divided senses in which he states it, he shares with Aquinas. What is new in him is narrower than the genealogy requires. Ockham carries the will-first strand further, into a possibility the creature has from itself and a merit that rests on God's acceptance. He takes absolute power from Lombard and holds it to be one power that does nothing inordinately; yet on that power he grounds an intuitive cognition of what does not exist, which comes near what Milbank says of him. He rejects the synchronic alternative Milbank finds in Scotus.

2. Milbank's Actualism

Possibilism, Milbank argues, cannot explain what sways a choice, since "in reality there is no 'pure will'" (p. 108), only desire drawn by a reason or a lure. It reads reality "in 'cold' terms as doubly 'given'", first as possibility and then as instantiation, where the religious mind reads existence as a gift (p. 109). The historical claim is made in one paragraph. The shift "from interpreting being as created gift to interpreting it as the elective instantiation of uncreated possibility" came from an attitude which pictured God as one who "mainly considers a range of 'given' possibilities, and then, 'as a matter of fact', makes a certain decision as to which ones will be actualised" (p. 109). Against this stands "Aquinas's alternative religious vision, according to which God is himself 'compelled' in creating by the aesthetic glory of his own intellect in the Paternal uttering of the Verbum", together with "the discriminating 'aesthetic' judgements which he makes as to the contents of the created world" (pp. 109–110). He cites no text of Aquinas for the claim.

An earlier chapter, a survey of modern ontology, names the culprits. Possibilism is "a matter of stressing the potentia absoluta as God's primary attribute" (p. 34), with the will raised above the intellect and formally distinguished from it, so that willing comes to be "sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35). Aquinas, by contrast, is said to have held the regular "necessities" of the created order "to be just as contingent" as its accidents, because both depend on the divine act (p. 35). The Franciscans, "pre-eminently Duns Scotus", preferred "the sheer arbitrary electedness of every aspect of the created order". Milbank's stated mechanism for the shift is exegetical: a move "from a more allegorical to a more literalist apprehension of biblical content", for which he rests on Henri de Lubac's *Exégèse médiévale* (pp. 35–36, with his notes 41–42); that thesis is tested in JMT 1.4 and is not examined here. And so contingency was "redefined, with archiepiscopal backing at Paris and Canterbury, as a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated at all, or else instantiated otherwise" (pp. 36–37). The contrast is then drawn at its finest point. For Aquinas, "an actuality realises a possibility, but does not continue to be synchronically shadowed by a real possibility that is a hypostasised logical possibility", since an actuality "fulfils in some measure a divinely intended good and therefore 'cancels out', through its very fulfilment, the genuinely possible". For Scotus, the contingency of an actual moment is guaranteed "by the persistence in some sense of the real possibility of an alternative actuality which is therefore synchronous with that actuality" (p. 37).

Three historical claims can be tested: that the tradition knew a necessity in the actual order as such; that the opposite view arose from a wish to protect divine freedom beyond its generosity, against which Aquinas stood;

and that the late-medieval error lay in sundering will from the rationally best, stressing absolute power, and redefining contingency as a possibility that might not have been realised.

The sources Milbank gives for this history are, with two exceptions, modern. The survey of ontology cites Frédéric Nef throughout, with Olivier Boulnois, André de Muralt, Henri de Lubac, David Burrell and David Piché's edition of the Paris condemnation of 1277, from which a list of articles is given. The exceptions are Aristotle, for the primacy of the actual "in terms of definition, time and substance" (p. 35), and Scotus's *Lectura* I d.39, the one medieval text cited in these pages (pp. 34–37, with his notes 37–45). Elsewhere in the book Milbank cites medieval texts often, Scotus among them, on other questions. Abelard appears once, on moral intention (p. 212). Wyclif appears only in political contexts (pp. 63, 210, 250), and Bonaventure as an offender on other counts, among them univocity and the doctrine of the Trinity (index: pp. 26 n. 21, 45 with nn. 62–63, 61, 141, 162 n. 108). Hugh of St Victor appears once, in another connection: a note on the arts quotes him (p. 218, note 224). Lombard, the *Summa sententiarum*, Peter Damian and Bradwardine do not appear.[3] The debate that ran from Abelard's *Introductio* through the forty-third and forty-fourth distinctions of Lombard's first book to Bradwardine and Wyclif is absent from the account.

3. Abelard

The plainest medieval statement of the position Milbank calls actualism is Peter Abelard's, in the third book of the *Introductio ad theologiam*. Abelard argues both sides before he gives his judgment, and the case for his thesis rests on a principle Milbank would accept. God does not act like the tyrant in Juvenal, for whom it is enough to say "let my will stand for a reason"; God "is rather to be said to will each thing to be done because he saw that it was good that it be done".[4] It follows, Abelard argues, that a choice between equal goods would be empty: "if what he left undone when he chose this had been equally good, there was surely no reason why he should leave that and choose this".[5] This is Milbank's premise that there is no pure will, only a will drawn by a reason, applied to God. Abelard draws from it a conclusion Milbank does not state.

He then gives the other side. A man who will be damned can be saved; if he can be saved by God, God can save him; therefore "God can do what he will never do". On the contrary view, the objector adds, no thanks would be owed to God, since he would act "compelled by a certain necessity of his own nature rather than led by free will".[6] The judgment follows the objection, in the first person. God does not make rain now because the time is not fitting, "for some reasonable cause, though hidden from us"; and so, "since God can do only what it befits him to do, and it does not befit him to do anything that he leaves undone, I hold that he can do only what he does at some time". He adds that "this opinion of ours has few or no supporters" and seems to

3. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 34–37 with notes 37–45, 108–112 with notes 214–220, and the index s.vv. "Abelard", "Bonaventure", "Wyclif". In pp. 34–37 the one medieval citation is note 44, "Duns Scotus, Lectura I, 39"; note 40 reads "Aristotle, Metaphysics 1049b4–5". Medieval citations elsewhere in the book include, for example, Scotus, *Ordinatio* II d.3 and *Opus Oxoniense* IV d.1 q.1 §7 (p. 48, notes 70 and 72), Bonaventure (p. 45, notes 62–63), Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III q.1 a.2 (p. 218, note 222), and Hugh of St Victor, "Didascalion, 2:1 'the arts are concerned . . . to restore within us the divine likeness'" (p. 218, note 224). The index entry for Bonaventure reads "26n.21, 45, 45nn.62–63, 61, 141, 162n.108".

4. Peter Abelard, *Introductio ad theologiam* III, PL 178:1095C. «Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.» and «Sed magis velle dicendus est singula ut fiant quia bonum esse ut fierent, vidit.» Translations of Latin in this article are the author's own, except those of Bonaventure, which are quoted from the Wroot Press translation (see n. 37).

5. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1095D. «Atqui si illud aeque bonum esset quod dimisit facere quando istud elegit, nulla ratio profecto fuit cur illud dimitteret, atque istud eligeret.»

6. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1096D–1097B. «Potest itaque facere Deus quod nequaquam facturus est.» and «necessitate magis quadam propriae naturae compulsus, quam gratuita voluntate ad haec facienda inductus agat.» The paragraph states the case against Abelard's thesis, which he answers at cols. 1101A–D.

7. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1098C. «quadam utique rationabili de causa, licet nobis occulta.» and «Quantum igitur aestimo, cum id tantum Deus facere possit quod eum facere convenit, nec eum quidquam facere convenit quod facere praetermittat, profecto id solum eum

disagree "greatly with the sayings of the saints and a little with reason".[7] Abelard knew he stood against the tradition.

The replies to the objections set guards on the thesis. To the argument from the damned man Abelard answers that "possible" is said in two ways: in one place it "is taken with respect to the nature of God, here with respect to the nature of creatures". Even if God could not have been without the will to create, "we are not therefore compelled to say that the world, or the things created, could not have been lacking".[8] The creature remains contingent in its own nature, though the divine will is not contingent. To the argument from thanks he answers that the necessity of God's goodness "is not separated from his will, and is not to be called coercion", as God is necessarily immortal and wills to be what he necessarily is.[9] He likens God's goodness to the pity that moves a good man to help, "that very pity compelling him to it".[10] Then he restates the thesis in its widest form: from these reasons and the answers to objections, "it is plain to all, I think, that God can do or leave undone only what he does or leaves undone at some time, and only in the way and at the time at which he does it, not otherwise".[11] The replies add a theory of necessity without coercion, and of creaturely contingency without divine contingency. The thesis survives them.

The fifth book of the *Theologia christiana* goes further. Abelard repeats Plato's "most true argument" that God could in no way have made a better world than he made.[12] He says that God, in all he does, looks to the good so far "that he is said to be inclined to each thing by the very worth of the good rather than by the pleasure of his own will".[13] He sets out the authorities against him, among them Augustine's "he could, but he would not", and confesses himself "gravely entangled on both sides of the dilemma".[14] He offers his own view "without any obstinacy of assertion".[15] The view is stronger than in the *Introductio*. God's goodness is so great "that it compels him necessarily to the goods he can do", so that he cannot refrain from doing them, as well and as soon as he can.[16] "Whatever he does, then, as he necessarily wills it, so he necessarily does it", and "therefore God necessarily willed and made the world, and he was not idle, who could not make it before he made it, because before he made it, it was not fitting that it be made".[17] Here the verb "compel" is Abelard's own, used of goodness, and it carries no scare quotes.

The *Theologia christiana*, as Migne prints it, ends in this paragraph, three lines after that sentence, with the words "which is reserved to his high counsel".[18] Cousin's text of 1859 ends at the same words. In that form no

posse facere arbitror quod quandoque facit, licet haec nostra opinio paucos aut nullos habeat assentatores, et plurimum dictis sanctorum, et aliquantulum a ratione dissentire videatur.»

8. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101B. «Etsi eum sine voluntate creandi mundum, vel voluntate miserandi ponamus non potuisse non esse, non ideo cogendi sumus vel mundum, vel ea quae creata sunt, non potuisse deesse. Ibi quippe, sicut jam determinatum est, ad naturam Dei; hic ad naturam creaturarum possibile sumitur.»

9. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101C. «quaedam naturae vel bonitatis ejus necessitas ab ejus voluntate non est separata, nec coactio dicenda est, qua etiam nolens id facere cogatur.»

10. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101D. «a subveniendo abstinere non posset, ipsa eum scilicet pietate ad hoc compellente.»

11. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101D. «Praedictis itaque rationibus, vel objectorum solutionibus, liquere omnibus reor, ea solummodo Deum posse facere vel dimittere, quae quandoque facit vel dimittit, et eo modo tantum vel eo tempore quo facit, non alio.»

12. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1324C. «Hinc est illa Platonis verissima ratio, qua videlicet probat Deum nullatenus mundum meliorem potuisse facere quam fecit.»

13. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1327B. «In tantum autem, in omnibus quae Deus facit, quod bonum est attendit, ut ipso boni pretio potius quam voluntatis suae libito ad singula facienda inclinari dicatur.»

14. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1329A–B. «Potuit ergo, sed noluit.» and «His itaque tam rationibus quam auctoritatibus, graviter in utraque parte complexionis impliciti, quo nos explicare possimus non facile aditum invenio». The first sentence is Augustine (*De natura et gratia*), quoted among the authorities for the contrary view.

15. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1329C. «quid et nobis super hoc visum sit sine aliqua obstinationis assertione proferamus.»

16. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1330B. «Tanta quippe est ejus bonitas ut cum necessario ad bona quae potest facienda compellat, nec omnino possit abstinere quin bona quae potest efficiat et quo melius potest vel citius potest.»

17. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1330B–C. «Quidquid itaque facit, sicut necessario vult, ita et necessario facit.» and «Necessario itaque Deus mundum esse voluit ac fecit, nec otiosus» and «exstitit, qui eum, priusquam fecit, facere non potuit; quia priusquam fecit, fieri eum non oportuit.»

18. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1330C, the last words of the text as printed. «imo nisi optimum, id est tam bonum quantumcunque convenit, quod suo alto reservatur consilio.»

replies to objections follow, and none of the guards of the *Introductio*. But the printed text is not the whole of the work in every witness. A manuscript of Monte Cassino, compared with Cousin's edition at the abbey and first printed in part by Luigi Tosti in 1851, carries the fifth book further, and Cousin reprinted Tosti's fragments at the end of his second volume, with what was already in print set in brackets. Tosti describes one of his two fragments as the end of the treatise, long wanted.[19] In this witness the solution is preceded by difficulties on both horns that the printed text lacks. If God can save one who is not to be saved, he can do what it is not good for him to do. Of two beggars equally worthy, one receives the alms, which cannot be divided, and "there is no reason why it should be given to him rather than to the other". And "if God can prevent some evil which he does not prevent, he seems to be consenting".[20] Then comes the solution as Migne prints it, down to "his high counsel", and after those words, outside Cousin's brackets, the counsel is named as that "in which he established eternally and unchangeably the being and the reasons of all natures".[21]

The continuation, some nineteen hundred words, answers two questions, in Abelard's voice as Tosti and Cousin print it. The first is why the world is not eternal, and Abelard answers that God had to precede every creature by existence as well as by nature.[22] He meets an objection from God's goodness, that it would not befit that goodness ever to will to be alone, by appeal to God's honour and to providence, which is foreknowledge of things to come.[23] The answer does not bear on the argument here, and it is given in full in the notes.

19. V. Cousin and C. Jourdain, *Petri Abaelardi opera hactenus seorsim edita*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1859), 804–809, "Magistri Petri Abaelardi Fragmenta Theologiae christianae", transcribed from the page images (archive.org, operahactenusseoooabeluoft); first printed by Luigi Tosti, *Storia di Abelardo e dei suoi tempi* (Naples, 1851), 286 ff. Cousin, 804: «Cum pars ultima voluminis hujus jamdudum typis mandata erat, inciderunt in manus fragmenta quaedam, et illa quidem non mediocris pretii, Theologiae Christianae nostri Abaelardi, quae apud bibliothecam Cassinensem reperta vir clar. Luigi Tosti primus in lucem edidit» and, in his note, «Quae uncis intercluduntur jam edita erant.» At the join (805) his note refers back to his own text of the *Theologia christiana*: «Vide supra, pag. 565 hujus voluminis.» Tosti's introduction (pp. 281 ff.), read only in a rough OCR and not quoted, reports a Cassino manuscript in quarto numbered 174, containing Augustine's *Enchiridion* and *Retractationes* and then the *Theologia christiana*, which Montfaucon had listed as Augustine's; that the comparison with Cousin's edition was made at the abbey, and the unpublished fragments extracted by Father Kalefati (so the OCR reads the name); and that he prints two fragments of the *Theologia christiana*, one of them much wanted as the end of the treatise. Neither editor says more of the manuscript's date or of its relation to the other witnesses, and nothing more is claimed here. The preface Migne reprints says nothing of other forms of the *Theologia christiana*; of the *Introductio* its editor writes that «mutila est in editis, nec perfectam invenimus in manuscriptis» (PL 178, *Observationes praeviae*). Ligatures are resolved in the transcriptions from Cousin.

20. Cousin II, 804–805 (Tosti 1851), unbracketed, after the bracketed «Sed rursus singulis istis difficillimae occurrunt objectiones, ut utroque cornu graviter fidem nostram oppugnet complexio» (804; Cousin refers it to his p. 561). «Potest facere Deus ut ille salvetur qui non est salvandus, vel quem non est bonum salvari; ergo potest facere id quod non est bonum eum facere.» and «Duo sunt egentes, quorum uterque aeque dignus eleemosyna; alteri illa datur, quia dividi non potest, nec utrisque sufficere potest: sed nequaquam ratio est cur illi detur potius quam isti» (804) and «Si potest disturbare malum aliquod Deus, quod non disturbat, videtur consentiens esse.» (805). The bracketed «Quis autem negare audeat, quod non possit Deus eum qui damnandus est salvare» follows. These difficulties are put against both sides and are not Abelard's position.

21. Cousin II, 805 (Tosti 1851). «quod suo alto reservatur consilio,] in quo omnium naturarum esse et rationes aeternaliter atque incommutabiliter constituit.» The bracket is Cousin's and closes the text already in print. Within the bracketed solution the Cassino text differs from Migne's in small readings, for instance «Quidquid itaque facit, sicut necessario vult, ita necessario facit.» against Migne's «ita et necessario facit» (n. 17).

22. Cousin II, 805–806 (Tosti 1851). "If anyone asks for a reason here too, why God ought not to have willed or made the world to be always with him", Abelard answers that "it was fitting that he should precede every creature not only by nature but also by existence, so that he might appear the more worthy". «Si quis tamen et de hoc rationem exigat quare Deum velle non oportuerit aut facere ut semper cum eo mundus esset» (805) and «Oportebat enim ut non solum per naturam, verum et per existentiam praecederet omnem creaturam, ut tanto dignior appareret» (806). Cousin marks a reading in the next lines as corrupt («Sic Tosti; at locus certe depravatus», 806 n. 1).

23. Cousin II, 806 and 808 (Tosti 1851). The objection Abelard puts to himself comes from God's goodness: "how would it befit his immense goodness and honour never to will to be alone", and not to share his blessedness, when Boethius says that "every good, when it is brought into common, shines out more beautifully"? Abelard replies that God "willed to exist in himself, perfect in his majesty", without the things he made, that he ought to look to his own honour more than to our profit, and that "Providence would not be at all, unless God went before all things by existence also", since providence is foreknowledge of things to come. The objection: «Sed dicis: Quomodo immensae ejus bonitati honorique congrueret, ut nullatenus unquam solus esse vellet» and «Omne, inquit, bonum cum in commune deducitur, pulchrius elucescit» (806). The reply: «sine quibus omnino in se, in sua perfectus majestate, voluit existere» and «quem tamen amplius plus honorem suum quam nostrum oportet attendere profectum» (806) and «Quae quidem Providentia omnino non esset, nisi Deus cunctis per existentiam quoque praeiret. Non enim Providentia nisi de futuris esse potest, cum sit Providentia futurorum praescientia.» (808). Between these Abelard answers a further objection, that to seek one's own glory is pride, by distinguishing love of one's own glory from ambition (806–807).

The second question is the one Migne's text leaves open. Abelard first restates the thesis of the printed text as a bare necessity: "hence it is necessary that he do all things that he can do, and as good as he can". The next sentence sets the limit: "yet it is not therefore necessary that all things which are done by him be done".[24] He works it out as a distinction of subjects. "We hold, then, following the force of the arguments above, that God does necessarily all that he does; and yet, as has been said, that what is done by him is not done necessarily." When we say that God must save this man, "we refer the force of the necessity to the nature of the subject, which is God", as if God "is by his very nature so compelled to do it that his nature in no way permits him not to do it as he does". It is not necessary that the man be saved by God, for the nature of the one saved "is changeable, and fixed of necessity in none of its states". The result is put as a formula: "It is necessary, then, that God do what it is not necessary should be done by him." In the first clause necessity "is applied to the unchangeable nature of God, in the second to the changeable outcome of his working".[25] Possibility is divided in the same way. "It is possible that this man be saved by God" refers possibility to the man's nature, and is true, since his nature does not resist; "it is possible that God save this man" refers it to God's nature, and that "is in no way true, as we have already confirmed above". A voice is called audible, open of itself to being heard, though no one yet exists who could hear it, and a field fit to be tilled before anyone is created who could till it. The fragment ends: "but though they are fit to be heard or tilled, it is not yet necessary that there be someone fit to hear or till it".[26]

The fuller text, as printed, restores two of the three guards of the *Introductio*. The first does not depend on the Cassino witness: possibility is said with respect to creatures already in the *Introductio*'s "here with respect to the nature of creatures" (n. 8), and the fragments add only examples. The second rests on the Tosti and Cousin printing: what God makes is contingent in its own nature, so that the world God necessarily made is not itself necessary. The third guard does not return. The *Introductio* denied that the necessity of God's goodness is to be called coercion (n. 9); the Cassino text says without qualification that God is "compelled" by his nature to what he does. On God's side the necessity is not softened: God must do all he can, as well as he can, as the printed text already said, and it is "in no way true" that he can save a man he does not save. What the continuation adds is a place where the necessity stops. On this witness, Abelard holds the necessity of God's doing and denies the necessity of the thing done. The conclusion is the article's, and it holds as far as the fragments Tosti printed and Cousin reprinted are Abelard's text, which neither editor's report of the manuscript settles (n. 19).

The early-modern editor whose preface Migne reprints, reading the shorter text, took the passage as Abelard's settled view: "he imposes so great a necessity on God that on his account God cannot act otherwise than he acts", and recorded that the teaching was censured at Sens and by Innocent II.[27] The censure can be read in its own words. The list of Abelard's errors that Denzinger prints under the council of Sens gives as its seventh article, in the words of the third of the *Capitula* (section 4), "that God can do or leave undone only those things,

24. Cousin II, 809 (Tosti 1851). «sicut id ei derogaret, si posset facere bona quae non faceret, aut non tantum bona quantum posset. Unde eum omnia quae potest facere necesse est, et tam bona quantum potest. Nec tamen ideo omnia quae ab eo fiunt necesse est fieri.» The sentence these words complete begins at the foot of p. 808, «Neque hoc bonitati ejus in aliquo derogare, si voluerit», and continues «secum aeternaliter aliqua permanere» (809); as printed, its conditional clause is hard to construe, and it is not translated here.

25. Cousin II, 809 (Tosti 1851). «Ponimus itaque, juxta superiorum rationum acumina, Deum omnia quae facit necessario facere; nec tamen, ut dictum est, quae ab eo fiunt necessario fieri» and «vim ipsam necessitudinis ad subjecti naturam reducimus, quod est Deus, ac si videlicet diceremus quod Deus reipsa sua natura ita id facere compellitur, ut nullo modo ejus natura permittat, ut id ita non faciat, sicuti facit.» and «natura quippe ejus mutabilis est, et in nullo suo statu necessario fixa.» and «Necesse est itaque Deum id facere, quod non est necesse ab eo fieri. Ibi quippe vis necessitudinis ad immutabilem Dei naturam applicatur, hic ad operationis ejus commutabilem eventum».

26. Cousin II, 809 (Tosti 1851), the last words of the fragments. «Similiter cum dicimus, possibile est hunc salvari per Deum, et possibile est Deum hunc salvare; ibi ad naturam hujus, hic ad naturam Dei possibilitas refertur.» and «quod nequaquam verum est, ut supra jam confirmavimus.» and «Sic et vocem audibilem dicimus, hoc est apertam ex se ipsa audiri, quamvis nullus adhuc esset qui eam audire sufficeret; et agrum aptum excoli, antequam etiam crearetur qui eum excolere valeret.» and «Sed quamvis apta sint ad hoc ut audiantur vel colantur, non jam tamen necesse est aptum esse aliquem ut hoc audiat vel colat.»

27. Editor's preface to the *Theologia christiana*, PL 178:1121–1123. «Tantam Deo necessitatem imponit, ut secundum ipsum aliter agere non possit quam agat.» and «postmodum ejus doctrina Ecclesiae censuris affecta in Senonensi et ab Innocentio II.»

or only in that way, or only at that time, at which he does, and not otherwise".[28] Innocent II, writing to the archbishops of Sens and Reims and to Bernard, who had sent him "the chapters of errors", condemned "the chapters sent to us by your discretion, and all the teachings of Peter himself, ... together with their author", and imposed on him "perpetual silence, as on a heretic"; a second letter ordered Abelard and Arnold of Brescia shut up in religious houses and their books burned.[29]

Two short confessions qualify the thesis. The *Apologia* reads: "I believe that God can do only what it befits him to do; and that he can do many things which he will never do."[30] A variant in a *Responsio* printed in the Patrologia says that God *does* only what befits him and could do many things he does not do; its editor allows that it may have been written by another in Abelard's name.[31] Neither should displace the two treatises, but they show that the accused, or someone speaking for him, kept the principle of fittingness ("convenit") and gave up the conclusion.

4. The Twelfth-Century Reply

The reply came within a generation, if the dates of n. 2 and n. 32, which rest partly on general knowledge, hold. Hugh of St Victor gives it in the *De sacramentis*; that he was the first to give it is not shown by the sources used here. He opens with a rebuke ("let them go now and glory in their own sense, who think they can examine God's works by reason, and confine his power under a measure") and reports the opponents' argument from the best: if God could make better what he makes, "in that very thing he does not do well".[32] He calls their teaching "something new, and truly new, not so much true as new", which places them among his contemporaries.[33] Hugh names no opponent, and nothing in this chapter ties the thesis to Abelard by name; what follows calls it Abelard's on the evidence of Lombard's wording and Bonaventure's report, below. His answer is a single sentence: "we say that it is possible that what will be should not come about". From it he infers that "God can make other than he makes, yet in making otherwise he would not be another".[34] Hugh's possibility here is of a future that may fail to arrive. Whether it is the possibility Milbank ascribes to Scotus, an alternative standing beside the actual at the same instant, is taken up in section 7.

28. H. Denzinger and C. Bannwart, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, 11th ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911), 169–170, no. 374, transcribed from the page image. «Quod ea solummodo possit Deus facere vel dimittere, vel eo modo tantum, vel eo tempore, quo facit et non alio.» Denzinger heads the list «Conc. Senonense 1140», names the author «Petrus Abaelard (Baiolardus)», the form of the name Bonaventure uses (n. 37), and gives Mansi XXI 568 C as his source; Mansi was not consulted. The same thesis is the third of the *Capitula haeresum* (n. 50).

29. Innocent II, *Epistolae* 447 and 448, PL 179:515C–517C, both headed by the editor «(Anno 1140, Jul. 16.)», with references to Mansi XXI 564–565. «missis a fraternitate vestra nobis errorum capitulis» (516C) and «destinata nobis a vestra discretione capitula, et universa ipsius Petri dogmata, sanctorum canonum auctoritate, cum suo auctore damnavimus, eique tanquam haeretico perpetuum silentium imposuimus.» (517A) and, from the second letter, «in religiosis locis, ubi vobis melius visum fuerit, separatim faciatis includi, et libros erroris eorum, ubicunque reperti fuerint, igne comburi.» (517C). The first letter ends «Datum Laterani XII Kal. Augusti», the second «Data Laterani XVII Kalendas Augusti». Denzinger prints the sentence of condemnation as no. 387 and dates the letter «16. Iulii 1141» (p. 170, transcribed from the page image), citing «ML 179, 517 A»; PL 179 heads it 1140. The sources used here do not settle the year.

30. Abelard, *Apologia* (confession of faith), PL 178:107. «Deum ea solummodo posse facere credo quae ipsum facere convenit; et quod multa facere potest, quae nunquam faciet.»

31. *Responsio* attributed to Abelard, PL 180:330C. «Deum ea solummodo facere credo, quae ipsum facere convenit, et quod multa facere posset, quae non facit.»

32. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis* I.2.22, PL 176:214C–D. «Eant ergo nunc et de suo sensu glorientur qui opera divina ratione se putant» and «discutere, et ejus potentiam sub mensura coarctare.» and «Amplius quidquid facit Deus, si melius potest facere quam facit, in hoc ipso non bene facit, quod optime quidem non facit quod facit.» The third sentence is the opponents' argument, which Hugh answers. Hugh died in the late 1130s or early 1140s: the testimonia Migne prints give 1138 (Siffridus) and 1140 (Robert de Monte and Baronius), without agreement (PL 175, *Testimonia*). That Lombard's *Sentences* were composed after Hugh's death and drew on him is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here; the near-identity of their opening sentences is visible in the texts.

33. Hugh, *De sacramentis* I.2.22, PL 176:215D. «Hic illi nostri scrutatores qui defecerunt scrutantes scrutationes, novum aliquid et vere novum, nec tam verum quam novum afferre se dicunt.»

34. Hugh, *De sacramentis* I.2.22, PL 176:215B–D. «Et dicimus quod possibile est non fieri quod futurum est.» and «Ergo Deus aliud potest facere quam facit, ut tamen ipse aliud faciendo alius non sit.»

A short tract printed under Hugh's name in Migne, *De potestate et voluntate Dei*, sets out the actualist argument from the identity of power and will and answers it. The argument is put first: if to be able and to will are the same in God, and he wills all he does and does all he wills, "it is plain beyond doubt that he cannot do more than he does". The tract then states what follows, as a consequence it will not accept: "if this is received, that God can do nothing other or otherwise than he does, he works all things by necessity, and is bound and constrained by the law of his works, so that the condition of his work rules him; but this it is wicked to confess". The opponents' reply is reported ("how then, they say …") and met ("see what they say"). The answer is a distinction: "there are three things, affection, effect and respect. Will and power in God are one in affection and in effect, but in respect they are not one", since his power reaches things that his will does not, and his will reaches nothing his power does not.[35] The file's header gives no note on the attribution, and the tract is cited here as printed under Hugh's name, not as his. Its "constrained" and "rules him" name, in order to reject it, a God compelled by his own works.

Lombard's *Sentences* I d.43 copies Hugh's opening almost word for word ("certain men, glorying in their own sense, have tried to confine God's power under a measure") and sets out the opponents' thesis in three clauses: "God cannot make anything other than he makes, nor make better what he makes, nor omit any of the things he makes."[36] Lombard does not name them; Bonaventure, writing about a century later (a date from general knowledge), says the position "is said to have belonged to Master Peter Baialardus", a form of Abelard's name that his Quaracchi editors gloss "or Abaelardus", referring to the *Introductio* III.[37] The wording bears them out. One of the opponents' arguments in Lombard runs that God does nothing "except for the best and a reasonable cause, though it be hidden from us", which repeats Abelard's phrase about the rain.[38]

The form of Lombard's answer matters more for Milbank's case than its conclusion. He offers no counter-thesis about will. He will answer, he says, "by opening the double sense of the words", and he grants more than half of what they claim.[39] That God can do only what is good and just, meaning what would be good and just if he did it, "is true".[40] That the best reason or cause is with God, by which he does what he does and omits what he omits, is "true indeed, because in him is the most equitable and most right will", against which and apart from which he cannot act. What Lombard denies is that this reason fixes a single outcome: "the same reason and cause remaining, he could have made other things and left these aside".[41] The point of

35. *De potestate et voluntate Dei*, PL 176:839B–840B, printed among the works of Hugh of St Victor; the file's header gives only the author name and no note on the attribution. The argument: «Si ergo amplius non potest Deus facere quam vult, neque amplius facere vult quam facit, constat procul dubio quod amplius facere non potest quam facit.» The consequence rejected: «Sed si hoc recepitur quod Deus aliud vel aliter nihil facere possit quam facit, necessitate operatur omnia, et alligatur atque constringitur lege operum suorum ut dominetur ei conditio operis sui; sed hoc nefas est confiteri.» The opponents: «Quomodo ergo, inquiunt, idem est Deo velle et posse, si major est potestas ejus quam voluntas? Videte quid dicunt.» The answer: «Tria sunt, affectus, effectus et respectus. Voluntas ergo et potestas in Deo et affectu et effectu unum sunt, sed respectu ad unum non sunt.» and «ideo ad quaedam respicit potestas ejus ad quae non respicit voluntas ejus. Ad omnia autem ad quae respicit voluntas ejus, respicit potestas ejus.» The argument, the consequence and the opponents stand at 839B, the answer at 839C and 840B. «recepitur» is the text's reading.

36. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.1, PL 192:637. «Quidam tamen de suo sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam sub mensura coarctare conati sunt.» and «Aiunt enim: Non potest Deus aliud facere quam facit, nec melius facere id quod facit, nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit.»

37. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* d.43 a.un. q.4, resp., in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882), 1:775, with the editors' note 1. «Sed haec positio est erronea, sicut ostendit Magister in littera, quia nobilitati divinae potentiae derogat eius immensitatem limitando; et dicitur fuisse Magistri Petri Baialardi» and, in the editors' note, «Sive Abaelardi, cuius opinionem vide in eius». English translations of Bonaventure here and below are from Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences*, trans. Wroot Press, bonaventure.wrootpress.com.

38. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4, PL 192:638; compare Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1098C (n. 7). «Addunt quoque illi dicentes: Nihil facit aut dimittit, nisi optima et rationabili causa, licet nobis occulta sit» and «quae ratio aeterna est et semper manens, praeter quam non potest aliquid facere vel dimittere.»

39. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.3, PL 192:638. «His autem respondemus duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes, et ab eis involuta evolventes sic».

40. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.3, PL 192:638. «Non potest facere Deus nisi quod bonum est et justum, id est, non potest facere nisi illud quod si faceret bonum et justum esset, verum est».

41. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4, PL 192:638–639. «Cum enim dicitur: Ratio vel causa optima penes Deum est, qua facit cuncta quae facit, et dimittit ea quae dimittit, verum quidem est, quia in eo voluntas est aequissima et rectissima, qua facit et dimittit quae vult, contra quam facere non potest, nec praeter eam facere potest.» and «sed, eadem manente ratione et causa, alia potuit facere, et ista dimittere».

the whole distinction is in one sentence. If "he cannot do except what it is reasonable for him to do" means that he can do only reasonable things, "the sense is true"; "but if you take it that he cannot do other reasonable and good things except those he wills and does, the understanding is false".[42] Lombard defends possibilities of rational goods, measured by the same eternal reason as the actual, and no repertoire of bare logical options set before God.

Power and will are "one and the same thing, namely God himself", and yet "more things are subject to his power than to his will"; "let us confess, then, that God can do many things he does not will".[43] On the better world (d.44) Lombard turns the opponents' argument round. If the universe cannot be better because it cannot receive a greater good, "that very inability is a defect, not a consummation", and so "God can make a better thing than he makes".[44] "If the manner of working is referred to the wisdom of the maker, there can be neither another nor a better manner", since God can make nothing more wisely than he makes; "if it is referred to the very thing God makes, we say that another and a better manner is possible".[45] Augustine supplies the case: another way of our liberation was possible to God, but none was more fitting for the healing of our misery.[46]

The *Summa sententiarum*, printed among Hugh's works, gives the same reply with one addition that cuts toward Milbank. It too reports "certain men puffed up with knowledge" who say God cannot do other than he does, and it finds "poison" hidden in the word "ought".[47] It then distinguishes two senses of the divine will, the effect of the will and the will "which is in God, which is God himself", and of the second it says: "if we speak of the will of God itself, which is what he is, he can do nothing except what he wills, and can will nothing except what he wills. For to will is the same as to be; to will is also the same as to be able."[48] Here an opponent of Abelard asserts in his own voice the identity of will and power, which every author examined here accepts as a consequence of divine simplicity, and holds it together with Augustine's "God can do many things he does not will" by a distinction of senses. The same chapter says that God "does nothing from debt but from goodness alone", and divides "God can do better" as Lombard does.[49]

The charge against Abelard survives in the *Capitula haeresum*, whose third heading reads: "That God can do or omit only those things, or only in that way, or only at that time at which he does, not otherwise." The compilers quote both treatises.[50] Bernard of Clairvaux's letter against the *capitula* does not answer this one.

42. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4, PL 192:639. «Si enim, cum dicitur: Non potest facere nisi quod ratio est eum facere, intelligas eum non posse facere nisi ea quae rationabilia sunt, et ea quae si fierent rationabilia essent, verus est sensus. Si autem intelligas eum non posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, nisi ea quae vult et facit, falsus est intellectus.»

43. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.5, PL 192:639. «quia una et eadem res est potentia et voluntas, scilicet ipse Deus» and «Nec hac auctoritate negatur Deum plura posse quam velle, quia plura sunt subjecta ejus potentiae quam voluntati. Fateamur itaque Deum plura posse facere quae non vult, et posse dimittere quae facit.»

44. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.44 c.1–2, PL 192:640. «jam hoc ipsum non posse defectionis est, non consummationis» and «Potest ergo Deus meliorem rem facere quam facit.»

45. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.44 c.3, PL 192:640. «Si modus operationis ad sapientiam opificis referatur, nec alius, nec melior modus esse potest. Non enim potest facere aliquid aliter vel melius quam facit, id est, alia sapientia vel majori sapientia; nihil enim sapientius potest facere quam facit. Si vero referatur modus ad rem ipsam quam facit Deus, dicimus quia et alius, et melior potest esse modus.»

46. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.44 c.3, PL 192:640. «Unde Aug., in lib. 13 de Trin., dicit quod fuit et alius modus nostrae liberationis possibilis Deo, qui omnia potest; sed nullus alius nostrae miseriae sanandae fuit convenientior.»

47. *Summa sententiarum* I c.14, PL 176:69B–C. «Non est praemittendum hic quosdam scientia inflatos dicere Deum non posse facere aliud quam facit» and «Sed ut mihi videtur, sub hoc verbo latet venenum.»

48. *Summa sententiarum* I c.14, PL 176:69A–B. «Cum Augustinus dicit, multa potest facere Deus quae non vult, ad effectum respexit» and «Aliquando pro effectu divinae voluntatis; aliquando pro ea quae in Deo est, quae est ipse Deus.» and «Sed si de ipsa Dei voluntate loquimur quae est hoc quod ipse, nihil potest facere nisi quod vult et nihil potest velle nisi quod vult. Idem enim est velle quod esse; idem etiam velle quod posse.»

49. *Summa sententiarum* I c.14, PL 176:69C–70B. «nihil ipse ex debito sed sola bonitate facit.» and «Illa tamen locutio est ambigua: Deus potest melius facere. Si enim ita opponatur, potest melius, id est majori sapientia aliquid facere, falsa est, quia non potest augeri sapientia ejus; sed hoc modo vera»

50. *Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi* III, PL 182:1049C–1050A. «III. Quod ea Deus solummodo possit facere, vel dimittere, vel eo modo tantum, vel eo tempore quo facit, non alio.»

The nearest passage grants that "other and still other ways of our redemption" lay to the Almighty's hand.[51] William of St-Thierry's *Disputatio* does not take up the point either; it too grants many ways of salvation.[52] On this article of the charge Abelard's best-known accusers were silent. So, in the end, was the pope: Innocent II's letter does not set out the chapters, and it condemns them, with all of Abelard's teachings and their author, in a single sentence (n. 29).

5. Bonaventure

Bonaventure's commentary on these distinctions is the Franciscan reply, and Milbank's history would not predict it. He names the position and rejects it: "this position is erroneous, as the Master shows in the text, because by limiting it, it derogates from the immensity of the nobility of divine power".[53] His diagnosis is that the authors of "this foolish position" did "not know how to distinguish the ground of power from its act". With respect to the act that is *posse*, "the ground is taken as a habit, namely the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness: and this ground extends to infinite things"; with respect to *facere*, it is taken in act, as the divine disposition and foreknowledge.[54] The range of the possible is the range of God's knowledge and of the fittingness of his goodness; nothing presents it to him from outside. "although God can [do] more things than he wills, nevertheless he cannot operate without willing", since his power in execution must be equal to his disposition and will.[55] The Quaracchi editors, in a note to this question, set beside Abelard the Megarians whom Aristotle answers in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*, "who say that someone is able only when he is acting, and when he is not acting, is not able".[56] Abelard's God can do only what he does at some time, as the Megarian builder can build only while he builds.

Elsewhere Bonaventure stands nearer Milbank than Milbank's history places him. God, "since he is supremely good, cannot make anything except what is good, and so cannot make anything except a thing ordered to himself".[57] On the order of the world Bonaventure concedes the case for the best: "the universe is like a most beautiful song which proceeds according to the best consonances", a figure the editors trace to Augustine's *City of God*, and "the arguments proving that things are most well ordered are therefore to be conceded".[58] And in one place he says what Milbank charges the Franciscans with saying. Asked why God did not make a better world, when there is no upper limit to better worlds, he answers that the question is irrational, "and no solution can be given except this: that he willed, and he himself knows the reason. Yet even if he did not make it, no one can argue [against him], because this whole that he made was grace; nor was there

51. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Epistola* 190 (*Contra quaedam capitula errorum Abaelardi*) 8.19, PL 182:1068D–1069A. «Quis negat Omnipotenti ad manum fuisse alios et alios modos nostrae redemptionis, justificationis, liberationis?» A search of the whole letter for *solummodo*, *eo tempore*, *nisi quod facit*, *possit facere* and *posse facere* found no discussion of the third *capitulum*.

52. William of St-Thierry, *Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum*, PL 180:282D. «Quinimo cum multi praesto essent modi salvationis humanae, omnipotenti et sapienti Deo». The same search of William's text found no discussion of the point.

53. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 a.un. q.4, resp., in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882), 1:775. «Sed haec positio est erronea, sicut ostendit Magister in littera, quia nobilitati divinae potentiae derogat eius immensitatem limitando».

54. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, resp., 1:774–775. «Ratio autem huius stultae positionis fuit, quia nescierunt distinguere rationem potentiae nec actus eius.» and «accipitur ratio in habitu, scilicet divina scientia et divinae bonitatis condecentia: et haec ratio se extendit ad infinita».

55. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, ad 3–4, 1:775. «Quamvis enim Deus possit plura, quam velit, tamen non potest operari sine voluntate».

56. Quaracchi editors, note 1 to Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, 1:775, citing «Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 5. (VIII. c. 3.)»: «Sunt autem quidam, ut Megarici, qui dicunt, tunc solum posse [aliquem], cum agat; cum vero non agat, non posse». Aristotle's own text was not among the sources used here. Aquinas, expounding the passage (*Sententia Metaphysicae* IX l.3 n.1), reports the thesis without naming its holders, «quidam dixerunt quod tunc solum est aliquid in potentia, quando est in actu», and gives their reason: «opinabantur quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent secundum aliquam commixtionem causarum».

57. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 a.un. q.3, resp., 1:772. «cum enim summe bonus sit, non potest aliquid facere nisi bonum, et ita non potest facere nisi rem ad se ordinatam.»

58. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.44 a.1 q.3, resp., 1:786. «quia universum est tanquam pulcherrimum carmen, quod decurrit secundum optimas consonantias» and «Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes quod res sunt optime ordinatae, quia respiciunt utrumque ordinem.» The editors' note cites Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI.18.

any exigency".[59] The setting limits the claim. It answers an endless series of possible improvements, where any answer from fittingness would have to be repeated at every stage; it is not a general account of the ground of creation.

On this shelf the vocabulary of absolute power, which Milbank makes the mark of possibilism, appears earliest in Bonaventure, by the usual dating of his commentary before Aquinas's *Summa* (an order taken from general knowledge, not from these files), and he uses it in his own voice. "First" means first among these texts: his own "some distinguish" (n. 61) shows that others used the pair before him. In the second book of his commentary, asked whether a demon's will can be set right, he meets the objection that a pardon of mercy is possible, and answers that it is possible "by absolute power; but by ordained power, which works according to the order of wisdom … it neither ought to be nor can be".[60] In the first book he meets one application of the pair and declines it. On whether God could save Judas and damn Peter, "some distinguish here God's power twofold, saying that God can do something either by absolute power, and thus he can save Judas and damn Peter; or by ordained power, and thus he cannot. But this distinction does not seem fitting, because God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly. For to be able to do something disorderedly is not to be able, as to be able to sin and to be able to lie."[61] His editors read the sentence as an objection to the way "some" understood and applied the distinction, and not to the distinction itself.[62] None of the twelfth-century texts discussed above uses the pair, and no text in the Patrologia Latina as transcribed on disk uses it.[63] The pair was in use, then, before Bonaventure wrote, and the Franciscan who uses it holds that God's absolute power never outruns his ordering. The editors set Aquinas's *Summa* I q.25 a.5 beside Bonaventure's answer, against Abelard, and against Wyclif, whom they charge with "a worse error".[64]

6. Aquinas

Milbank gives no locus for his Aquinas. The texts that ask whether God wills of necessity whatever he wills, and whether God can do what he does not do, are *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 and q.25 aa.5–6, the disputed question *De potentia* q.1 a.5, and two runs of chapters in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (I cc.81–88, II cc.23–30). In the disputed articles the actualist case is put in the objections; only the body of the article and the replies are quoted here as Aquinas's view.

59. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.44 a.1 q.1, ad 4, 1:783. «et ideo talis quaestio est irrationalis, et solutio non potest dari nisi haec, quia voluit, et rationem ipse novit. Attamen si non fecit, nemo potest arguere, quia hoc totum, quod fecit, fuit gratia; nec erat aliqua exigentia, ratione cuius possit poni in eo fuisse invidia.»

60. Bonaventure, *In II Sent*. d.7 p.1 a.1 q.1 ad 1, in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1885), 2:177. «dicendum, quod potest de potentia absoluta; sed de potentia ordinata, quae operatur secundum ordinem sapientiae — et illum ordinem Deus non corrumpit, immo inviolabiliter servat — non debet esse nec potest esse; quia consilium Dei et dispositio non potest mutari aliqua ratione.»

61. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 dub. 7, 1:778. «Aliqui distinguunt hic potentiam Dei dupliciter, dicentes, Deum posse aut de potentia absoluta, et sic potest Iudam salvare et Petrum damnare; aut de potentia ordinata, et sic non potest.» and «Sed haec distinctio non videtur esse conveniens, quia nihil potest Deus, quod non possit ordinate. Posse enim inordinate facere est non posse, sicut posse peccare et posse mentiri.»

62. Quaracchi editors, note 17 to Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 dub. 7, 1:778. «Distinctionem ipsam inter potentiam absolutam et ordinatam S. Doctor non improbat.» and «S. Doctor hoc loco modum tantum impugnat, quo haec distinctio ab aliquibus intelligebatur et applicabatur». They cite *In II Sent*. d.7 p.1 a.1 q.1 ad 1 (n. 60) and *Breviloquium* I c.7, which says «Potentiam autem ordinatam contingit tripliciter dici» but does not use the word *absoluta* (Bonaventure, *Opera omnia* 5:216).

63. A search for *potentia absoluta*, *potentia ordinata*, *absoluta potentia*, *ordinata potentia* and their oblique forms in Abelard's *Introductio* and *Theologia christiana*, Hugh's *De sacramentis*, the *Summa sententiarum*, the whole of Lombard's *Sentences*, Peter Damian's *De divina omnipotentia* and the anonymous *Disputatio altera* found no instance. The search was then run over all 5,276 TEI files of the Patrologia Latina on disk, for *potentia*, *potentiae* and *potentiam* with *absoluta* or *ordinata* in the same case, in either order and with one word allowed between them. It found four passages and no instance of the distinction: three copies of one sentence in which philosophy is said not to be ordained by the power of God (*a potentia Dei ordinata est*), and one on the powers of the soul *absolutae a corpore*. This is a statement about the transcriptions searched.

64. Quaracchi editors, *Scholion* to Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, 1:775. «Aliis rationibus motus, Wicleffus peiorem errorem docuit, scil. quod Deus non possit facere alia, quam facit» and «S. Thom., (quoad principia) S. 1. q. 25. a. 5; S. c. Gent. II. c. 26. 27.» Their account of Wyclif is stronger than Wyclif's own texts allow (section 9).

Bradwardine's witness

Bradwardine quotes the *De potentia* article in *De causa Dei* III c.52, naming "Saint Thomas" and the question "whether God can do what he does not do, and leave undone what he does".[65] That is the title of the fifth article of the first question, and Bradwardine's "question 5" means that article. Set against the text of Corpus Thomisticum, which here reproduces the Marietti edition, his two long runs of quotation follow Aquinas's corpus nearly word for word.[66] The variants are small ("contractus" for "confractus", "voluntatis" for "bonitatis", "facit" for "fecit"), and the quotation stops before the last clause of the corpus, which confines the impossibility "by supposition" to the composite sense.[67] Bradwardine quoted Aquinas faithfully.

One variant matters. Where Bradwardine's text reads "and this error is imputed to Master Peter Abelard", the Corpus Thomisticum text reads "and this error is imputed to Master Peter Almalareus".[68] The printed editions divide, and the reading is not settled here.[69] Bradwardine, writing in the 1340s, read the passage as naming Abelard.[70] The argument does not depend on the name. The position Aquinas describes, that of "certain theologians who considered the order of divine justice and wisdom according to which things are made by God, which they said God could not pass beyond", is the thesis Abelard states in the *Introductio* and Lombard reports in d.43. In the *Summa theologiae* the same position appears without a name: "others said that the divine power is determined to this course of things because of the order of the divine wisdom and justice, without which God does nothing".[71]

65. Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei contra Pelagium* III c.52, corollary, ed. Henry Savile (London, 1618), 850B–C. «Similes quoque errores imponit Sanctus Thomas quibusdam Philosophis et etiam Theologis, puta Petro Abelardo, in quaestionibus de potentia Dei, quaestione 5. quaerente, Vtrum» and «Deus possit facere quae non facit, et dimittere quae facit, vbi respondendo sic ait». The title of the article in Aquinas: «Quinto quaeritur utrum Deus possit facere quae non facit et dimittere quae facit» (Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 tit.).

66. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850C and 851B–D; Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co. Bradwardine's quotation resumes at 851B with «Quare et Sanctus Thomas vbi prius,» and «recitato errore Philosophorum et Abelardi, et primo redarguto, subiungit, Nunc autem restat inuestigare de secunda positione».

67. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 851B and 851D: «vt si pes sit contractus, homo non potest ambulare» and «et ideo diuina voluntas absque praeiudicio voluntatis, iustitiae, sapientiae potest se extendere in alia quam quae facit». Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co.: «ut si pes sit confractus, homo non potest ambulare» and «et ideo divina voluntas absque praeiudicio bonitatis, iustitiae et sapientiae, potest se extendere in alia quam quae facit». The clause Bradwardine does not quote: «supposito enim quod ipse non velit alia facere, vel quod praesciverit se non alia facturum, non potest alia facere, ut intelligatur composite, non divisim.»

68. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850C. «Secundo fuit quorundam Theologorum considerantium ordinem diuinae iustitiae et sapientiae, secundum quem fiunt a Deo res, quem Deum praeterire non posse dicebant, et ideo incidebant in hoc, vt dicerent, Deum non posse facere nisi quae facit: et imponitur hic error Magistro Petro Abelardo.» Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co.: «Secundo fuit quorumdam theologorum considerantium ordinem divinae iustitiae et sapientiae, secundum quem res fiunt a Deo, quem Deum praeterire non posse dicebant; et incidebant in hoc, ut dicerent, quod Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit. Et imponitur hic error magistro Petro Almalareo.»

69. The Marietti edition of 1883 reads "Almalareo", as the Parma edition of 1856 does on the report of a later editor; the Vivès edition of 1871 prints "Albaialareo" and records the Parma reading as a departure from its own. Bonaventure, commenting on the same distinction of Lombard, ascribes the position to "Master Peter Baialardus", which his editors gloss as Abelard (n. 37). "Albaialareo" is a form of that name, and the forename "Peter" fits Abelard and does not fit Amalric of Bène, the Paris master whom "Almalareus" might otherwise suggest (an identification from general knowledge). The Leonine text and the manuscripts were not consulted; every witness on disk that is not the Parma–Marietti line of printing points to Abelard. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co.: Vivès, *Opera omnia* 13 (Paris, 1871), with the editor's note that the Parma edition reads *Almalareo* (checked on the page image; see `source/aquinas/editions/vives1871-t13-p21-name-and-note.png`); *Quaestiones disputatae* 1 (Turin: Marietti, 1883), *Almalareo* (archive.org OCR); Corpus Thomisticum, *Almalareo*. The Parma volume was not fetched, and the Leonine edition was not consulted. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* d.43 a.un. q.4, 1:775, «et dicitur fuisse Magistri Petri Baialardi», glossed by the editors «Sive Abaelardi». A seventeenth-century testimony in Migne names «Almarici Carnotensis» as the master of a heretic disputed at the Lateran council of 1215 (PL 210:33D); it is not a witness to the *De potentia*. That Amalric of Bène taught at Paris, died c. 1206, and had followers condemned there in 1210 for teachings on the presence of God in all things and the age of the Spirit is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

70. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850C–D. «Patetigitur quod iste Petrus intelligit ea solummodo Deum posse facere vel dimittere quae facit» (so the text, for «Patet igitur»). Bradwardine then quotes the *Capitula* from Bernard: «Recitat enim Bernardus, vbi fuerat allegatus, dicta eius similia in haec verba». That *De causa Dei* dates from the 1340s is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

71. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 co. «Alii vero dixerunt quod potentia divina determinatur ad hunc cursum rerum, propter ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae divinae, sine quo Deus nihil operatur.»

Necessity absolute and by supposition

"Something is said to be necessary in two ways, namely absolutely and by supposition." That Socrates sits is not necessary absolutely, but "supposing that he sits, he must sit while he sits". "The divine will has a necessary relation to his goodness, which is its proper object. Hence God wills his own goodness of necessity." Other things he wills as ordered to that goodness as their end, and a will wills of necessity only the means without which its end cannot be. "Since the goodness of God is perfect, and can be without other things, since nothing of perfection accrues to it from them, it follows that his willing things other than himself is not absolutely necessary. And yet it is necessary by supposition: for, supposing that he wills, he cannot not will, because his will cannot change."[72] To the objection that God wills other things in willing his goodness, Aquinas replies that "his goodness can be without other things".[73] The absence of necessity comes "not from a defect of the divine will, but from a defect that belongs to the thing willed", namely that the perfect goodness of God can be without it.[74]

The *De potentia* article sets this out through the three principles of a voluntary act. "The intellect directs the will, and the will commands the power, which executes. But the intellect does not move except in so far as it proposes its desirable object to the will; so the whole moving of the intellect lies in the will."[75] "The natural end of the divine will is his goodness, which he cannot not will. But creatures are not commensurate with this end, so that without them the divine goodness could not be manifested ... For as the divine goodness is manifested through these things that now are and through this order of things, so it can be manifested through other creatures and ordered in another way." The error lay here: "they supposed the order of creatures to be as it were commensurate with the divine goodness, as if without it that goodness could not be". "It is clear, then, that absolutely God can do other things than he has done." By supposition he cannot, if he wills or foreknows otherwise, "understood in the composite sense, not the divided".[76]

The *Contra Gentiles* adds that the divine goodness, being infinite, "can be participated in infinite ways, and in other ways than it is participated by these creatures that now are".[77] And it draws the distinction that bears most directly on Milbank's "compelled". God knows other things of necessity and does not will them of necessity, because "the divine perfection requires of necessity that all things be in God, so that they can be understood in him; but the divine goodness does not of necessity require that other things be".[78] The *Summa*

72. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 co. «Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et ex suppositione.» and «Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse est eum sedere dum sedet.» and «Voluntas enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex necessitate vult» and «Unde, cum bonitas Dei sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest voluntas eius mutari.»

73. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 ad 2, answering arg. 2 («Deus vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam»). «licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.»

74. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 ad 4. «non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei.»

75. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co. «Intellectus ergo voluntatem dirigit, voluntas vero potentiae imperat quae exequitur. Sed intellectus non movet nisi in quantum proponit voluntati suum appetibile; unde totum movere intellectum est in voluntate.» Bradwardine's text reads «totum mouere intellectus» (851B).

76. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co. «Finis ergo naturalis divinae voluntatis est eius bonitas, quam non velle non potest. Sed fini huic non commensurantur creaturae, ita quod sine his divina bonitas manifestari non possit; quod Deus intendit ex creaturis. Sicut enim manifestatur divina bonitas per has res quae nunc sunt et per hunc rerum ordinem, ita potest manifestari per alias creaturas et alio modo ordinatas» and «aestimaverunt enim ordinem creaturarum esse quasi commensuratum divinae bonitati quasi absque eo esse non posset. Patet ergo quod absolute Deus potest facere alia quam quae fecit.» and «supposito enim quod ipse non velit alia facere, vel quod praesciverit se non alia facturum, non potest alia facere, ut intelligatur composite, non divisim.»

77. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.81 n.4. «Cum autem divina bonitas sit infinita, est infinitis modis participabilis, et aliis modis quam ab his creaturis quae nunc sunt participetur.»

78. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.81 n.7. «Est ergo considerandum quare Deus alia a se ex necessitate sciat, non autem ex necessitate velit: cum tamen, ex hoc quod intelligit et vult se, intelligat et velit alia.» and «Esse autem omnia in Deo, ut in eo intelligi possent, ex necessitate requirit divina perfectio: non autem divina bonitas ex necessitate requirit alia esse, quae in ipsam ordinantur ut in finem. Et ob hoc necesse est Deum alia scire, non autem velle.»

gives the same reason: things "have necessary being as they are in God", but not as they are in themselves, "and so God knows of necessity whatever he knows, but does not will of necessity whatever he wills".[79] For Aquinas necessity holds in God's knowledge of creatures and fails in the passage from that knowledge to the world, which is where Milbank places the compulsion.

Aquinas also names the view that God creates from a necessity of knowledge, and rejects it. Having shown that God does not act from necessity of nature, he goes on, "lest it seem to anyone that his intellect or knowledge can extend only to determinate effects, and so that he acts from a necessity of knowledge".[80] Since God understands also what never is, nor will be, nor was, "God does not act from a necessity of his intellect or knowledge"; and the chapter excludes "the position of certain philosophers who say that from the fact that God understands himself, such a disposition of things flows from him of necessity", as if he did not dispose each thing by his own judgment, "as the Catholic faith professes".[81] Two chapters later he gathers the result: God produces things "not from necessity of nature, nor from necessity of knowledge, nor of will, nor of justice".[82] The rejection is explicit, though it names no person: it names a kind of necessity and "certain philosophers".

Set beside Milbank's sentence, the rejected position has his shape. Milbank's God is "compelled" in creating "by the aesthetic glory of his own intellect" (p. 109). The second of the three errors that Bradwardine lists from Henry of Ghent (section 9) is that God acts "from the necessity of his knowledge, because by his knowledge he comprehends the best possible order in things, to which he necessarily conforms himself in acting" (n. 146). That is the necessity Aquinas's chapter excludes. That this is the nearest medieval form of Milbank's "compelled" is the article's judgment, and it has a limit. Milbank's compulsion comes through "the Paternal uttering of the Verbum" (p. 109), and these articles do not connect the procession of the Word with the making of the world. Aquinas's texts on the Word and creation are not on this shelf (section 11). What can be said is that the nearest position the creation articles contain, Aquinas rejects as contrary to the faith.

The disputed question on creation states the conclusion with a force the other texts do not use. Asked whether things proceeded from God by necessity of nature or by choice of will, Aquinas answers that "it is to be held without any doubt that God brought creatures into being by the free choice of his will, with no natural necessity", and gives four reasons "for the present": a universe has an end, and only a will sets itself an end; nature is determined to one and makes its equal, so that only the Son proceeds from God by nature; what is in an intellect is produced only through a will; and God's action, being his essence, does not pass out of him, so that whatever he does outside himself he does by understanding and willing.[83] The replies meet Abelard's argument from goodness, though they do not name him. God works in so far as he is good, and goodness is in him of necessity, "yet it does not follow that he works of necessity", for goodness works through the will, and the will is not necessarily related to what is for the end. Were God to communicate his goodness to none, "nothing would be lost to his goodness". As in God there is nothing but good, so there is nothing

79. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 ad 6. «Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque vult, ex necessitate vult.»

80. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.26 n.1. «ne cui forte videatur quod eius intellectus vel scientia ad determinatos effectus solummodo possit extendi, et sic agat ex necessitate scientiae, quamvis non ex necessitate naturae: restat ostendere quod eius scientia vel intellectus nullis effectuum limitibus coartatur.»

81. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.26 nn.5, 8. «cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus intelligit etiam quae nunquam sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. Non igitur Deus agit ex necessitate sui intellectus vel scientiae.» and «Per haec autem excluditur quorundam philosophorum positio dicentium quod ex hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit, fluit ab ipso de necessitate talis rerum dispositio: quasi non suo arbitrio limitet singula et universa disponat, sicut fides Catholica profitetur.»

82. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.28 n.10. «Ostensum est quod Deus producit res in esse non ex necessitate naturae, neque ex necessitate scientiae, neque voluntatis, neque iustitiae.»

83. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.3 a.15 co. «absque omni dubio, tenendum est quod Deus ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis creaturas in esse produxit nulla naturali necessitate. Quod potest esse manifestum ad praesens quatuor rationibus» and «Unde hoc solum ab eo procedit naturaliter quod est sibi aequale, scilicet filius.» and «Quod autem est in intellectu, non producitur nisi mediante voluntate» and «Per hoc igitur Deus agit quidquid extra se agit, quod intelligit et vult.» The article's twenty objections argue for a necessity of nature and are not Aquinas's position.

but necessity, "yet it does not follow that whatever is from him proceeds by necessity". Possibility has no place in God himself, but "with respect to the creature possibility can be considered there", according to an active power "not limited to one".[84] The last two replies are close to the Cassino Abelard's two formulas (section 3): necessity in God and none required in what he makes, possibility referred to the creature. They part at the point on which the twelfth-century debate turned. Abelard's God must do all he can, as well as he can; Aquinas's will "is not determined to this or that good", and his goodness loses nothing by goods left undone.

Wisdom, order and a better world

On the second error, that God's power is determined to this course of things by the order of his wisdom, Aquinas grants the premise and denies the inference. "Since the power of God, which is his essence, is nothing other than God's wisdom, it can fittingly be said that there is nothing in God's power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom comprehends the whole capacity of the power." But the order placed in things "does not equal the divine wisdom, so that the divine wisdom should be limited to this order". A wise maker's wisdom is limited to one order only when the end is proportioned to the things made, and "the divine goodness is an end exceeding created things beyond all proportion ... Hence it must be said simply that God can make other things than he makes."[85] This is Lombard's answer in Aquinas's terms.

On the better world he distinguishes as Lombard did. "Speaking simply, for anything he has made God can make another better."[86] If "better" qualifies the maker, God cannot make anything better than he does, "because he cannot make from greater wisdom and goodness"; if it qualifies the thing made, he can.[87] To the objection from the beauty of the whole he gives the answer nearest Milbank's aesthetic: "the universe, supposing these things, cannot be better, because of the most fitting order given to these things by God ... as, if one string were stretched more than it should be, the melody of the lyre would be spoiled." The next sentence keeps the possible: "Yet God could make other things, or add others to these things made, and then that universe would be better."[88] The same holds of the course of the world: though "for these things that now are no other course would be good and fitting", God "could make other things, and impose another order on them".[89]

84. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.3 a.15 ad 10, 12, 15, 11 and 16. «licet Deus operetur in quantum est bonus, et bonitas ei necessario insit, non tamen sequitur quod de necessitate operetur. Bonitas enim mediante voluntate operatur, in quantum est eius obiectum vel finis; voluntas autem non necessario se habet ad ea quae sunt ad finem» (ad 10) and «Non autem hoc sequeretur, si etiam nulli bonitatem suam communicaret. Suae enim bonitati nihil deperiret, si communicata non esset.» (ad 12) and «sicut in Deo nihil est nisi bonum, ita in eo nihil est nisi necessarium. Non tamen oportet quod quidquid est ab eo, procedat per necessitatem.» (ad 15) and «respectu vero creaturae potest ibi considerari possibilitas, non secundum potentiam passivam, sed secundum potentiam activam, quae non limitatur ad unum.» (ad 11) and «non tamen determinatur ad hoc vel illud bonum» (ad 16).

85. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 co. «Cum autem potentia Dei, quae est eius essentia, non sit aliud quam Dei sapientia, convenienter quidem dici potest quod nihil sit in Dei potentia, quod non sit in ordine divinae sapientiae, nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit. Sed tamen ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus, in quo ratio iustitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, non adaequat divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem.» and «Sed divina bonitas est finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit.»

86. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.6 co. «Simpliciter autem loquendo, qualibet re a se facta potest Deus facere aliam meliorem.»

87. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.6 ad 1. «Si vero ly melius sit adverbium, et importet modum ex parte facientis, sic Deus non potest facere melius quam sicut facit, quia non potest facere ex maiori sapientia et bonitate. Si autem importet modum ex parte facti, sic potest facere melius».

88. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.6 ad 3, answering arg. 3, which cites Augustine, *Enchiridion*, on the «universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo». «Ad tertium dicendum quod universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse melius; propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo, in quo bonum universi consistit. Quorum si unum aliquod esset melius, corrumperetur proportio ordinis, sicut, si una chorda plus debito intenderetur, corrumperetur citharae melodia. Posset tamen Deus alias res facere, vel alias addere istis rebus factis, et sic esset illud universum melius.»

89. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 ad 3. «Unde, licet istis rebus quae nunc sunt, nullus alius cursus esset bonus et conveniens, tamen Deus posset alias res facere, et alium eis imponere ordinem.»

Absolute power

In the same article Aquinas uses the pair as Bonaventure does in his second book. Because God's will is not determined of necessity to these things, "unless perhaps by supposition", and his wisdom is not determined to this order, "nothing prevents there being something in God's power which he does not will, and which is not contained under the order he has established for things". What belongs to power considered in itself God can do "by absolute power"; what belongs to it as it executes a just will, "by ordained power". "God does something because he wills it; yet he is not able to do it because he wills it, but because he is such in his nature."[90] The *De potentia* qualifies the pair at once: absolute and regulated "are attributed to the divine power only by our consideration", and "the power of God is never in reality without wisdom".[91] Two of its objections show the respondent at the disputation appealing to absolute power.[92] Against Milbank's "stressing the potentia absoluta" (p. 34), Aquinas uses the term freely and makes it a distinction of reason within a power identical with wisdom. Bonaventure's "God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly" and Aquinas's "never in reality without wisdom" guard the same point.

Milbank's best texts

Aquinas's own text also holds the passages that serve Milbank best, and Bradwardine does not quote them. First, he refuses a will that elects without reason. The reason of the divine will "can be assigned": "God wills man to have reason, so that man may be; he wills man to be, so that the universe may be complete; he wills the good of the universe to be, because it befits his goodness". Sometimes that reason "contains only fittingness".[93] He excludes "the error of certain men who say that all things proceed from God according to simple will, so that no reason need be given for anything except that God wills it".[94] The second book sets this error beside the actualist's, as "a double error": that of those who, "limiting the divine power, said that God can do only what he does, because he ought so to do", and that of those "who say that all things follow simple will, without any other reason".[95] Here Aquinas stands with Milbank against Bonaventure's "he willed, and he himself knows the reason", were that sentence taken as a general account of creation.

Second, Aquinas allows, in a concessive reply, that the divine will may be said to be determined by the intellect. The reply opens with a denial: "although the divine will is not determined to its effects, it need not be said that it wills none of them, or that it is determined to willing by something outside it". It goes on in a conditional: "if the will of God is determined to will something by the knowledge of his intellect, the determination

90. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 ad 1. «Tamen, quia voluntas non determinatur ex necessitate ad haec vel illa, nisi forte ex suppositione, ut supra dictum est; neque sapientia Dei et iustitia determinantur ad hunc ordinem, ut supra dictum est; nihil prohibet esse aliquid in potentia Dei, quod non vult, et quod non continetur sub ordine quem statuit rebus.» and «quod attribuitur potentiae secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam absolutam.» and «Quod autem attribuitur potentiae divinae secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis iustae, hoc dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata.» and «Ideo enim Deus aliquid facit, quia vult, non tamen ideo potest, quia vult, sed quia talis est in sua natura.»

91. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 ad 5–6. «absolutum et regulatum non attribuuntur divinae potentiae nisi ex nostra consideratione» and «potentia Dei numquam est in re sine sapientia: sed a nobis consideratur sine ratione sapientiae.»

92. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 arg. 2 and arg. 4 (objections, not Aquinas's position). «Sed dicit respondens, quod ratio ista procedit de potentia in ordine ad praescientiam, non de potentia absoluta.» and «Sed dicet respondens, quod ratio ista procedit de potentia regulata per sapientiam, non de potentia absoluta.»

93. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.86 nn.1, 5, 6. «Colligere autem ex praedictis possumus quod divinae voluntatis ratio assignari potest.» and «Deus vult hominem habere rationem ad hoc quod homo sit; vult autem hominem esse ad hoc quod completio universi sit; vult autem bonum universi esse quia decet bonitatem ipsius.» and «Aliquando igitur ratio divinae voluntatis continet solum decentiam; aliquando utilitatem; aliquando autem necessitatem quae est ex suppositione; necessitatem vero absolutam, solum cum vult seipsum.»

94. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.87 n.5. «Per praedicta autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium omnia procedere a Deo secundum simplicem voluntatem: ut de nullo oporteat rationem reddere nisi quia Deus vult.»

95. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.24 n.7 and c.28 n.17. «Per haec autem excluditur quorundam error qui dicebant omnia ex simplici divina voluntate dependere, absque aliqua ratione.» and «Sic igitur per praedicta excluditur duplex error. Eorum scilicet qui, divinam potentiam limitantes, dicebant Deum non posse facere nisi quae facit, quia sic facere debet; et eorum qui dicunt quod omnia sequuntur simplicem voluntatem, absque aliqua alia ratione vel quaerenda in rebus vel assignanda.» The *Summa theologiae* allows that the first effects, which cannot be referred to further created ends, depend «ex simplici voluntate Dei» (I q.19 a.5 ad 3), while holding that «voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud» (I q.19 a.5 ad 1).

of the divine will will not be made through anything extraneous", for the intellect apprehends other goods "as certain likenesses of the divine goodness".[96] Aquinas's own formula, where he gathers the result, is weaker: in what it is not determined to by its nature, the divine will "is inclined in some way by its intellect".[97] Even so, this comes nearer Milbank's "compelled" than anything in Bradwardine's quotation. Third, creation may be called owed to God's goodness "by way of a certain befittingness", and, given God's disposition, "the production of things proceeds from the necessity of the divine disposition".[98] Fourth, Aquinas affirms a necessity in the created order: "absolute necessity is not for that reason excluded from things, so that we must confess all things to be contingent", and some creatures, having no potency to non-being, it is "simply and absolutely necessary to be".[99] This is the nearest these texts come to Milbank's "necessity in actuality as such". Aquinas would not call such necessities contingent, and to that extent Milbank's gloss (p. 35), that he held the necessities of the created order "just as contingent" as its accidents, does not match his vocabulary. But Aquinas agrees with the reason Milbank gives for the gloss, their dependence on the divine creative act. The same chapter places in the creator "the power to give them being or to cease to pour being into them" (n. 99), and goes on to say that the production of such natures "was voluntary" (n. 100). The disagreement is over a word, not over the dependence. Fifth, all things "have necessary being as they are in God" (n. 79), and a defender of Milbank could read the "aesthetic glory" of God's intellect as that necessary knowledge.

None of this gives Milbank his "compelled". The intellect determines the will to goods "befitting" God's goodness, "not as necessary to its goodness"; the created necessity follows a free act, since "that such natures of things were produced by God was voluntary";[100] and the necessity of God's knowledge does not pass into his will.

What the articles do not contain

Milbank's Aquinas also holds that an actuality "'cancels out', through its very fulfilment, the genuinely possible" (p. 37). The nearest statement in these articles is the Socrates example.[101] The *Contra Gentiles* repeats it, "even things contingent to either side are rendered necessary by supposition", but uses it to keep contingency, in a chapter headed that the divine will "does not take contingency from things": "it does not follow, if God wills something, that it comes about of necessity, but that this conditional is true and necessary … The consequent, however, need not be necessary."[102] God has "reasons as it were thought out" of all he can do, including "those which neither are, nor will be, nor were",[103] and the *Summa* says the same of the ideas taken

96. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.82 n.11, answering the objections of c.82 nn.2–5. «Quamvis autem divina voluntas ad sua causata non determinetur, non tamen oportet dicere quod nihil eorum velit, aut quod ad volendum ab aliquo exteriori determinetur.» and «si voluntas Dei ad aliquid volendum per sui intellectus cognitionem determinetur, non erit determinatio voluntatis divinae per aliquid extraneum facta.» and «Quae quidem apprehendit ut similitudines quasdam divinae bonitatis et essentiae, non ut eius principia. Et sic voluntas divina in illa tendit ut suae bonitati convenientia, non ut ad suam bonitatem necessaria.» and «Unde nec divina voluntas tendit in sua causata necessario.»

97. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.88 n.3. «Voluntas divina in his ad quae secundum suam naturam non determinatur, inclinatur quodammodo per suum intellectum, ut supra ostensum est.»

98. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.28 nn.11–12. «Potest tamen dici esse sibi debitum per modum cuiusdam condecentiae.» and «Si vero divinam dispositionem consideremus qua Deus disposuit suo intellectu et voluntate res in esse producere, sic rerum productio ex necessitate divinae dispositionis procedit».

99. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.30 nn.1, 3. «non tamen propter hoc absoluta necessitas a rebus excluditur, ut sit necessarium nos fateri omnia contingentia esse» and «Sunt enim quaedam in rebus creatis quae simpliciter et absolute necesse est esse.» and «Sic igitur et rebus creatis non inest potentia ad non esse: sed creatori inest potentia ut eis det esse vel eis desinat esse influere».

100. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.30 n.7. «Similiter autem quod tales rerum naturae a Deo producerentur, voluntarium fuit: quod autem, eis sic statutis, aliquid proveniat vel existat, absolutam necessitatem habet.»

101. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 co.; see n. 72.

102. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.85 tit. and nn.5–6. «Quod divina voluntas non tollit contingentiam a rebus, neque eis necessitatem absolutam imponit» and «nam etiam contingentia ad utrumlibet redduntur ex suppositione necessaria; sicut Socratem moveri, si currit, est necessarium.» and «Non igitur sequitur, si Deus vult aliquid, quod illud de necessitate eveniat: sed quod haec conditionalis sit vera et necessaria, si Deus aliquid vult, illud erit. Consequens tamen non oportet esse necessarium.»

103. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 ad 11. «utrum eorum quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt, quae tamen Deus facere potest, sit idea.» and «Ipse enim novit totam potentiam suam, et quidquid potest: unde omnium quae potest habet rationes quasi excogitatas.»

as reasons of knowledge.[104] What is possible and never actual has standing in God's knowledge. These articles do not contain the doctrine that the actual cancels the possible. The commentary on the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* expounds Aristotle against the Megarians, who held that a thing has a power only when it acts. Their thesis, Aquinas says, takes away motion and generation: one who sits will never afterwards stand. He concludes that "something can be which yet is not, and something can not-be which yet is", with the example of one who can walk and does not, and one who walks and can not-walk.[105] The passage concerns potency for change, a power present now for a later act. It is not evidence for an alternative at the same instant, and it is not used as such below. Whether Aquinas's divided sense amounts to the synchronic alternative Milbank ascribes to Scotus is the question of section 7.

7. Duns Scotus

In the pages on possibilism (pp. 34–37), Milbank's one medieval citation is to Scotus's *Lectura* I d.39, given without a paragraph number, for the claim that in Scotus "the contingency of a finite actual moment is only guaranteed by the persistence in some sense of the real possibility of an alternative actuality which is therefore synchronous with that actuality" (p. 37).[106] The distinction treats God's knowledge of future contingents in five questions. Scotus answers them in two parts, how there is contingency in things and how God's certain knowledge stands with it (n.31); the answer is preceded by two opinions he rejects and followed by objections he meets. Only his own determination and his replies are quoted here as his view. The *Ordinatio* and the *Reportata Parisiensia*, in Wadding's text as reprinted by Vivès, are used where they confirm the *Lectura*, and the forty-fourth distinction of the *Ordinatio* for absolute power.

The cause of contingency

Scotus first rejects the view that "contingency is in beings with respect to their proximate causes, but necessity with respect to the first cause" (n.32). The Vatican editors cite for it Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* (I d.38), the *Summa theologiae* (I q.14 a.13 ad 1) and the *Contra Gentiles* (I c.67).[107] The identification holds. In each place Aquinas meets the argument that God's knowledge, being necessary and the cause of what it knows, makes what it knows necessary, and in each he answers it in his own voice with the view Scotus describes. The commentary says in the body of the article that "the last effect follows, in necessity and contingency, not the first cause but the proximate cause", and in the reply that an effect "draws necessity not from the first cause, but only from the proximate cause"; the *Summa* replies that "things known by God are contingent because of their proximate causes, though God's knowledge, which is the first cause, is necessary"; and the *Contra Gentiles* calls God's knowledge, though it is the cause of the things known, "a remote cause".[108] Against it Scotus argues

104. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.15 a.3 ad 2. «eorum quae neque sunt neque erunt neque fuerunt, Deus non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu eorum non est idea in Deo, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, sed solum secundum quod significat rationem.»

105. Aquinas, *Sententia Metaphysicae* IX l.3 nn.8–9, in his exposition of Aristotle. «Et ita ista potentia tollet motum et generationem; quia stans semper stabit, et sedens semper sedebit. Si enim aliquis sedet, nunquam postea stabit» (n.8) and «Tollunt enim motum et generationem, ut dictum est. Unde, cum hoc non possit sustineri, manifestum est quod aliquid est possibile esse quod tamen non est, quod aliquid est possibile non esse, et tamen est.» and «quia possibile est aliquem vadere et non vadit, et e converso non vadere qui vadit.» (n.9). The holders of the thesis are named in the Quaracchi editors' note (n. 56).

106. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 37 n. 44. The Latin of the *Lectura* in this section is transcribed from page images of the Vatican edition: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera omnia*, vol. 17, *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum, a distinctione octava ad quadragesimam quintam* (Vatican City, 1966), 481–510, cited by the edition's paragraph number (n.) and page. The voice of each passage is the one the edition's headings assign.

107. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 qq.1–5 n.32, 17:488, the opinion of others, which Scotus rejects. «Quantum ad primum dicunt quidam quod contingentia est in entibus quantum ad causas proximas, sed necessitas quantum ad causam primam.» The editors' apparatus cites Thomas, *Sent*. I d.38 q.1 a.5, *Summa theologiae* I q.14 a.13 ad 1 and *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.67.

108. Aquinas, *In I Sent*. d.38 q.1 a.5 co. and ad 1: «effectus ultimus non sequitur causam primam in necessitate et contingentia, sed causam proximam» and «a causa prima non trahit effectus necessitatem, sed solum a causa proxima». *Summa theologiae* I q.14 a.13 ad 1, answering

that if the first cause moved the second necessarily, the whole order of causes would move necessarily, and that souls, created by God immediately and with no proximate cause, are not on that account created necessarily.[109] His own answer follows: "the cause of contingency in beings is that the first cause moves contingently, and not necessarily", and what in God causes this contingency is "his will".[110] Contingency does not arise from the divine intellect, "because whatever it knows before the act of the will, it knows necessarily and naturally".[111]

Neither claim divides Scotus from the authors already examined. That contingency comes from God's will, and not from the weakness of secondary causes, is the twelfth-century reply in a new idiom: Hugh's future that may not come about, and Lombard's "the same reason remaining, he could have made other things", both place the alternative in God's power and will. Aquinas says the same in a later question of the *Summa*, and says it against the account given in the texts Scotus attacks. Some, he writes, assigned the reason from the intermediate causes, "but this does not seem sufficiently said": no defect of a secondary cause can prevent God's will from producing its effect, and if the distinction of contingent from necessary were referred to secondary causes alone, it would fall outside God's intention and will. Effects willed by God "come about contingently" not because their proximate causes are contingent; "because God willed them to come about contingently, he prepared contingent causes for them".[112] And the division between a necessary knowledge and a contingent will is the one the *Contra Gentiles* draws when it says that God knows other things necessarily and does not will them necessarily (n. 78). Scotus's attack is fair to the texts the editors name, and his argument from souls created without a proximate cause meets them where they are weakest, since on their account such an effect would have nothing to make it contingent. But the first cause those texts call necessary is God's knowledge, and Aquinas, treating God's will, had already judged the account from proximate causes insufficient, for a reason close to Scotus's. Scotus's quarrel on this point is with one strand of Aquinas, and the *Summa*'s question on the divine will stands with Scotus.

Intellect, will and law

The second part of the answer is where Milbank's reading finds its support. If the divine intellect apprehended something "as to be done" before the act of the will, Scotus argues, the will would either will it necessarily, and so be necessitated to produce it, or will against the dictate of the intellect, "and then it would be bad, since that dictate could only be right".[113] He therefore denies the divine intellect any practical judgment, prior to the will, about contingent things. It "offers to its will some complex as neutral, not apprehending it as true or false", as one apprehends "that the stars are even in number"; "the will determines itself to one part, ... and then the intellect apprehends the truth of it".[114] The *Ordinatio* draws the consequence for law. General laws

the objection «A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus necessarius»: «Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit necessaria.» *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.67 n.6: «Si igitur proxima fuerit contingens, eius effectum contingentem oportet esse, etiam si causa remota necessaria sit» and «Scientia autem Dei, etsi sit causa rerum scitarum per ipsam, est tamen causa remota.»

109. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 nn.35, 37, 17:489–490. «Praeterea, animae immediate creantur a Deo et non ab aliqua causa proxima, non tamen necessario causantur; igitur nihil est dicere quod effectus in comparatione ad causam primam sint necessarii.»

110. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.41, 17:492, and n.61, 17:500 (his own determination). «Et ideo causa contingentiae in entibus est ex hoc quod prima causa contingenter, et non necessario, movet.» and «Sic igitur apparet primum, quomodo est contingentia in rebus, quia a Deo, — et quid est in Deo quod est causa huius contingentiae, quia voluntas eius.»

111. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.43, 17:492. «Sed ista contingentia non est ex parte intellectus divini in quantum ostendit aliquid voluntati, quia quidquid cognoscit ante actum voluntatis, necessario cognoscit et naturaliter, ita quod non sit ibi contingentia ad opposita.»

112. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.8 co. «Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex causis mediis» and «Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo.» and «Nullus autem defectus causae secundae impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat.» and «si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens.» and «Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad eos praeparavit.»

113. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.43, 17:492–493. «Si necessario, igitur necessitatur ad producendum illud; si non necessario vult, igitur vult contra dictamen intellectus, et tunc esset mala, cum illud dictamen non posset esse nisi rectum.»

114. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.44, 17:493, and nn.62–63, 17:500. «Unde quando intellectus divinus apprehendit 'hoc esse faciendum' ante voluntatis actum, apprehendit ut neutram» and «Et dico quod intellectus divinus offert voluntati suae aliquam complexionem ut neutram,

that rightly direct what is to be done "are fixed beforehand by the divine will, and not by the divine intellect as it precedes the act of the divine will", and "no law is right except so far as it is accepted by the divine will".[115] In the contingent order, then, the divine will is determined by no prior judgment of the best, and Milbank's "willing, sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35) describes what Scotus says. The contrast with Aquinas is real. For Aquinas the divine will "is inclined in some way by its intellect" toward goods befitting God's goodness (n. 97); for Scotus the intellect's knowledge of a contingent truth follows the will's determination.

Two features of the text limit the charge. The neutrality belongs to contingent propositions alone. What the intellect knows before the will it knows necessarily, and the intellect fixes the range of the possible, since a thing is logically possible when its terms "are not repugnant to one another" (n.49). And Scotus's reason for denying a prior dictate is that a will acting against a right dictate would be a bad will; he gives the divine will no power to act against right reason. The forty-fourth distinction of the *Ordinatio* makes the same point about power. Absolute power is to be distinguished from ordained power "in every agent acting by intellect and will that is able to act in conformity with a right law, and yet does not of necessity act in conformity with a right law". Where the law is in the agent's own power, as it is for God, his absolute power "does not extend to anything other than what would be done in an orderly way, if it were done", in another order that his will could establish.[116] Scotus's absolute power is a power to establish another order, and it keeps the condition Bonaventure set, that God can do nothing he cannot do orderedly (n. 61).

Every aspect elected

Milbank's third claim is that the Franciscans, "pre-eminently Duns Scotus", preferred "the sheer arbitrary electedness of every aspect of the created order" (p. 36). An objection near the end of the distinction puts the point to Scotus: if contingency in things comes only from the divine will, "nothing will be necessary in the universe, but everything will be contingent" (n.88). Scotus accepts the conclusion with one qualification: "nothing is simply necessary in the universe, but only in a certain respect", in that secondary causes, so far as they themselves are concerned, have a necessary relation to their effects, "as fire to heating".[117] The *Lectura* supports "every aspect". It does not say "arbitrary", and the qualified necessity of secondary causes remains. The reply also bears on Milbank's account of Aquinas, who on his reading held the regular necessities of the created order "just as contingent" as its accidents, because both depend on the divine act (p. 35). In vocabulary that description fits Scotus's reply better than it fits the *Contra Gentiles*, which holds that some creatures it is "simply and absolutely necessary to be" (n. 99). In substance Aquinas agrees with Milbank's reason, since he too makes those necessities depend on the creative act (section 6).

non apprehendens ut veram vel falsam (sicut cum apprehendo 'astra esse paria')» and «voluntas autem determinat se ad unam partem, ponendo in esse vel non in esse, et tunc intellectus apprehendit veritatem illius.» The editors gloss *neutram*: «scilicet nec veram nec falsam».

115. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d.44 q. un. nn.1–2, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1891–1895), 10:745, transcribed from the page image. «quia nulla lex est recta, nisi quatenus a voluntate divina acceptatur» and «dico, quod leges aliquae generales recte de operabilibus dictantes, praefixae sunt a voluntate divina, et non quidem ab intellectu divino, ut praecedit actum voluntatis divinae, ut dictum est dist. 39.» In the same place: «si placet voluntati suae quae libera est, recta est lex». The scholium printed with the question is Wadding's, and the letters in Scotus's text refer to the commentary of Lychetus printed around it; neither is quoted here.

116. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d.44 q. un. n.1, Vivès 10:744–745, transcribed from the page images. «Respondeo in omni agente per intellectum et voluntatem potentem conformiter agere legi rectae, et tamen non necessario agere conformiter legi rectae, est distinguere potentiam ordinatam a potentia absoluta.» and «Et tunc potentia ejus absoluta non se extendit ad aliquid aliud, quam ad illud quod ordinate fieret, si fieret. Non quidem fieret ordinate secundum istum ordinem, sed fieret ordinate secundum alium ordinem, quem alium ordinem ita posset voluntas divina statuere».

117. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.88, 17:508 (objection), and n.91, 17:509 (reply). «contra: secundum hoc videtur quod nihil erit necessarium in universo, sed totum erit contingens» and «et ideo, sicut ibi dictum est, nihil est simpliciter necessarium in universo, sed secundum quid tantum, scilicet quia causae secundae — quantum est ex parte earum — habent necessariam habitudinem ad suas causas (sicut ignis ad calefaciendum quantum est ex parte sui), non tamen simpliciter». The reply refers back to d.8 (the editors' note).

Synchronic contingency

On the claim Milbank documents from the *Lectura*, his reading is right. Scotus distinguishes in our will a freedom toward opposite acts, toward opposite objects, and toward opposite effects. The first "is of imperfection", because it makes the will receptive and so mutable, "since it does not have opposite acts at once"; the second "is of perfection".[118] Two possibilities follow from that freedom. One is successive, and "this possibility and contingency follows its mutability".[119] The other "is not according as the will has acts successively, but in the same instant": "for that instant and in that instant in which it wills *a*, it can not-will *a*". To this logical possibility "a real power corresponds", because every cause is understood before its effect, so that the will, in the instant in which it elicits its volition, "precedes its volition by nature and is related to it freely". The proposition "the will willing in *a* can not-will in *a*" is false in the composite sense and true in the divided sense, "not because the extremes are understood for different times", but because "there are two propositions there".[120] Then Scotus turns to God. The freedom toward opposite acts "the divine will cannot have, because this is of imperfection and argues mutability"; it has a single volition, by which it can will opposite objects.[121] That single volition "wills in eternity that the stone be, and can in eternity will that the stone not be", so that the divine will "can in the same instant of eternity, and for the same instant of eternity, will and not will something". Here too the divided sense is true without different measures, "because there is no succession in relation to the divine volition".[122] An objection from Aristotle, "everything that is, when it is, is necessarily", Scotus answers by the same distinction: true in the composite sense, false in the divided, "because a contingent thing is not necessary when it is".[123] The *Ordinatio* and the *Reportata* make the same division between the imperfect freedom toward acts and the perfect freedom toward objects.[124]

Milbank's description holds at the points he names: a real possibility, of an alternative, at the same instant as the actual. One phrase in his contrast does not hold. The real possibility is no "hypostasised logical possibility" (p. 37). Of logical possibility Scotus says that before the world was, "the world can be" was true, "and yet there was no reality in the thing corresponding to the extremes" (n.49); the real power he places in the will that causes, and in no possible being set beside the actual. And the doctrine was built to keep change out of God. Scotus denies God the freedom of opposite acts as an imperfection, for the same reason that leads Aquinas to ground the suppositional necessity of God's will in the fact that "his will cannot change" (n. 72).

118. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.46, 17:493. «quia quod habeat libertatem ad actus oppositos, hoc est imperfectionis, quia secundum hoc necessario est receptiva, et mutabilis per consequens (cum non simul habeat actus oppositos); libertas autem ad obiecta opposita est perfectionis».

119. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.48, 17:494. «Una contingentia et possibilitas, ut voluntas successive feratur in obiecta opposita: et haec possibilitas et contingentia consequitur eius mutabilitatem.»

120. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 nn.49–51, 17:494–495. «Haec autem possibilitas logica non est secundum quod voluntas habet actus successive, sed in eodem instanti» and «et tamen pro illo instanti et in illo instanti in quo vult a, potest nolle a» and «Et huic possibilitati logicae correspondet potentia realis, nam omnis causa praeintelligitur suo effectui» and «praecedit natura volitionem suam et libere se habet ad eam» and «in sensu autem divisionis est propositio vera, non quia extrema intelliguntur pro diversis temporibus (ille enim sensus habet locum quia est successio in actibus), sed est vera in sensu divisionis quia sunt ibi duae propositiones». Of logical possibility, n.49, 17:494: «et sic fuit haec vera antequam mundus esset 'mundus potest esse'» and «et tamen nulla fuit realitas in re correspondens extremis.»

121. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.53, 17:496. «primam autem libertatem, quae est in nobis (quae est respectu actuum oppositorum), non potest voluntas divina habere, quia haec est imperfectionis et arguit mutabilitatem, — voluntas autem divina non potest habere nisi unicam volitionem, et ideo unica volitione potest velle opposita obiecta».

122. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.54, 17:497. «tamen voluntas divina unica volitione vult in aeternitate lapidem esse et potest in aeternitate velle lapidem non esse vel potest nolle lapidem esse» and «potest in eodem instanti aeternitatis et pro eodem instanti aeternitatis velle et nolle aliquid» and «quia non est successio in comparatione ad volitionem divinam».

123. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.55, 17:498 (objection), and n.58, 17:499 (reply). «quia dicit Philosophus in I Perihermeneias: "Omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse"» and «in sensu divisionis falsa» and «et hoc falsum est, quia contingens non est necessarium quando est.»

124. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d.39 q. un. n.21, Vivès 10:636, transcribed from the page image: «Quantum ad primum dico, quod voluntas divina non est indifferens ad diversos actus nolendi et volendi, quia hoc in voluntate mea non erat sine imperfectione voluntatis.» *Reportata Parisiensia* I d.39–40, Vivès 22:475, from the OCR: «Sciendum est igitur, quod voluntas nostra est indifferens ad actus diversos, et etiam per actus ad objecta diversa, et ad effectus diversos, et prima et tertia indifferentia est imperfectionis, secunda vero est perfectionis, et ponenda est in Deo.» That the *Ordinatio* text of d.39 printed by Wadding is not the one the Vatican editors accept as Scotus's is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

Hugh, Aquinas and Scotus

The question left open in sections 4 and 6 can now be answered as far as these texts allow, if three senses of "synchronic" are kept apart. The first is an alternative of God's *power*, stated in the divided sense. The logical instrument is older than Scotus. Aquinas uses the composite and divided senses in the *De potentia* for the case Scotus treats: supposing that God does not will to make other things, he cannot make them, "understood in the composite sense, not the divided" (n. 76). In the divided sense God can make other things than those he eternally wills to make, and since there is no time in which God's will could change, that possibility is not one of succession. The *Contra Gentiles* holds that the conditional "if God wills something, it will be" is necessary while its consequent need not be (n. 102). This alternative belongs to God's power. Of the will, given that it wills, Aquinas says the opposite: "supposing that he wills, he cannot not will, because his will cannot change" (n. 72). The second sense is an alternative of the *will* itself, a real power for the opposite act in the very instant of willing. That is Scotus's (n.51), and neither the twelfth-century authors nor Aquinas hold it. The third is Milbank's, "the persistence in some sense of the real possibility of an alternative actuality", which shadows each actual moment (p. 37). Hugh's sentence concerns a future that may fail to come, and Lombard's "could have made other things" looks back; both, with Aquinas, place the alternative in God's power at the point where he acts. The commentary on the *Metaphysics* treats potency for change and is not evidence here (section 6).

Three things in Scotus are new, and they are what Milbank's genealogy should have named. The first is the extension of the divided sense from God's power and its effects to the act of willing itself: the will, in the instant in which it wills, has a real power for the opposite act, grounded in its priority by nature to its own volition (nn.51, 60). The second is the separation of necessity from immutability. Aquinas says that God, supposing he wills, cannot not will, "because his will cannot change", and his commentary on the *Sentences*, rejecting one answer to the argument from foreknowledge, gives God's inward acts, "such as willing and understanding", no necessity of coercion but "a necessity of immobility";[125] Scotus, answering the argument that God knows immutably and therefore necessarily, says that "immutability is not a cause of necessity, because immutability takes away only succession".[126] For Aquinas the unchangeableness of the eternal will yields a necessity by supposition; for Scotus it leaves the eternal will open, in the same instant, to the opposite. The third is the neutral complex, which takes from the divine intellect any prior judgment of what is to be done in the contingent order. The first two refine an analysis Aquinas shared, and they would have to be argued on their merits. The third changes the relation of will to reason, and on it Milbank is right.

The three senses show what Milbank's formulation costs. His contrast sets an Aquinas for whom the actual "cancels out" the possible against a Scotus for whom an alternative persists beside the actual. On these texts the alternative of power, at the point of God's act, is common to Aquinas and Scotus, and only the alternative of will is Scotus's own. Milbank's third sense, a possibility that persists beside each actual moment, is a gloss on the second, and Scotus does not state it in that form: he grounds the real possibility in the will's priority by nature to its own volition (n.51), and he gives logical possibility "no reality in the thing" (n.49). What Milbank's contrast can claim from the *Lectura* is a doctrine of the will, not a new standing of the possible beside the actual.

8. William of Ockham

Milbank places Ockham in the lineage he describes, as its heir. From Scotus "through to Ockham", he writes, the switch from knowledge by identity to knowledge by representation was encouraged by "the increasing

125. Aquinas, *In I Sent.* d.38 q.1 a.5 ad 4, in his judgment on the answer of those who say that God can not have foreknown: «Sed istud etiam non solvit; quia quamvis actus divinus non habeat necessitatem coactionis, habet tamen necessitatem immobilitatis, loquendo de actibus intrinsecis, ut velle, intelligere, et hujusmodi». The article of 1277 quoted in section 9 condemns a *necessitate inmutabilitatis* of God's outward acts, not of his inward ones.

126. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.77, 17:505, replying to the argument of the fourth question. «sed immutabilitas non est causa necessitatis, quia immutabilitas non privat nisi successionem.»

consideration that God, through exercise of his potentia absoluta, can sever the normal link between our mind's understanding of things and the way they are in themselves" (p. 32). The same phrase, extended "to Suárez", names the theologians who abandoned a participatory metaphysics (p. 36). And Descartes's voluntarism was "more radical even than that of Ockham", since it overcame "any essentialist possibilism, which supposes that God is presented with an a priori range of essential possibilities that he has not merely 'made up'" (p. 37). The notes to these pages cite modern studies and no work of Ockham's.[127] Two of his works are read here: the *Ordinatio* on the first book of the *Sentences*, distinctions 38 to 45; and, in the *Quodlibeta*, the first, second and sixth questions of the sixth quodlibet and the fifth question of the fifth. Both proceed by disputed questions, and only Ockham's determinations and replies are quoted as his view.

The result is divided, and it can be stated at the outset. On the modal question Ockham is no heir of the Scotus whom Milbank cites: he rejects any power for opposites without succession, in God as in creatures. Milbank does not run his line from Scotus to Ockham through that doctrine, but the rejection limits any modal lineage a reader might draw between them. On absolute power the texts give Milbank part of what he claims. Ockham's absolute power is one power that does nothing inordinately, and he takes its extent from Lombard; but on that power he grounds an intuitive cognition of a thing that does not exist, which comes near the severing Milbank describes, and he sets a limit to it.

Absolute power

The *Quodlibeta* give Ockham's fullest statement of the distinction. Asked whether a man can be saved without created charity, he first sets out "a distinction about the power of God". It is not to be understood "that there are really two powers in God, one of which is ordained and the other absolute, because there is a single power in God toward outward things, which is in every way God himself". Nor is it to be understood that God can do some things in an ordered way and others absolutely and not in an ordered way, "because God can do nothing inordinately".[128] "To be able" is taken in two senses. In one it is taken "according to the laws ordained and instituted by God", and what God can do in this sense he is said to be able to do by ordained power. In the other it is taken for being able to do "everything that does not include a contradiction, whether God has ordained that he will do it or not, because God can do many things that he does not will to do", as the Master of the *Sentences* teaches in the forty-third distinction of his first book; and this God is said to be able to do by absolute power. "As the pope cannot do some things according to the laws he has established, which he can nevertheless do absolutely."[129]

Absolute power here is not a second power, nor a power to act outside order, nor an attribute set above the others; it is the one power that is God, considered without regard to what God has ordained. "God can do nothing inordinately" is Bonaventure's "God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly" (n. 61) almost word for word, and a single power that "is in every way God himself" keeps the point of Aquinas's "only by our consideration" (n. 91). Ockham's editors draw the consequence in their own introduction: it is "impossible"

127. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 32 and 37. Ockham is quoted from *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, dd. 19–48, ed. G. I. Etzkorn and F. E. Kelley, *Opera theologica* 4 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1979), cited as OT 4, and *Quodlibeta septem*, ed. J. C. Wey, *Opera theologica* 9 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1980), cited as OT 9, both by printed page. The bracketed headings in these editions, which assign passages to Ockham or to the opinions he answers, are the editors'.

128. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.1, OT 9:585–586. «Hic primo ponam unam distinctionem de potentia Dei» (585) and «non est sic intelligenda quod in Deo sint realiter duae potentiae quarum una sit ordinata et alia absoluta, quia unica potentia est in Deo ad extra, quae omni modo est ipse Deus.» and «Nec sic est intelligenda quod aliqua potest Deus ordinate facere, et aliqua potest absolute et non ordinate, quia Deus nihil potest facere inordinate.» (586).

129. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.1, OT 9:586. «Sed est sic intelligenda quod 'posse aliquid' quandoque accipitur secundum leges ordinatas et institutas a Deo, et illa dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata.» and «Aliter accipitur 'posse' pro posse facere omne illud quod non includit contradictionem fieri, sive Deus ordinaverit se hoc facturum sive non, quia multa potest Deus facere quae non vult facere» and «Sententiarum, lib. I, d. 43» and «et illa dicitur Deus posse de potentia absoluta. Sicut Papa aliqua non potest secundum iura statuta ab eo, quae tamen absolute potest.» The words before «Sententiarum», "secundum Magistrum", are printed in spaced type and are garbled in the text layer used here. The editors refer the citation to Lombard, *Sent.* I d.43 (n. 43 above).

that God should do anything by absolute power, as impossible as that he should act without intellect and will.[130] And the authority Ockham names for absolute power is the twelfth-century reply to Abelard. "God can do many things he does not will" is Lombard's sentence (n. 43). This tells against reading Ockham's absolute power as "God's primary attribute" (p. 34). It does not answer the claim of p. 32, which concerns knowledge; the question that does is read below.

The citation shows less than it seems to. It shows that Ockham took the extent of absolute power from the proposition the schools had held against Abelard; it does not show that he kept Lombard's measure. Lombard's alternatives were "other reasonable and good things" (n. 42). Ockham's are whatever "does not include a contradiction". That measure was not new with him: Scotus calls the world possible before it was because its terms are not repugnant (n.49), and Bradwardine calls God omnipotent from his "absolute power and non-repugnance" (n. 150). But Ockham states it with no reference to wisdom or goodness, and his comparison makes the ordained order a body of law that God has instituted, as a pope institutes his own.

Absolute power and knowledge

The sixth question of the same quodlibet asks whether there can be an intuitive cognition of an object that does not exist, and it is the text that bears on p. 32. Ockham puts two conclusions. The first is that "intuitive cognition can be, by divine power, of an object that does not exist". He proves it from the article of the creed, "I believe in God the Father almighty", which he takes to mean that whatever "does not include a manifest contradiction" is to be attributed to divine power, and then from the principle of the theologians that what God produces through secondary causes he can produce and conserve without them.[131] The second conclusion is that "naturally, intuitive cognition cannot be caused or conserved when the object does not exist". The case of one who has looked at the sun and still sees it in a dark place he explains by a quality impressed on the eye: if the mind assents to the proposition that the light is seen in the same place, it "is deceived".[132]

Here Milbank's sentence finds support. The ground of the first conclusion is God's power to do whatever includes no contradiction, the measure the first question calls absolute power (n. 129), and by it a cognition of the kind that normally joins the mind to a present thing can exist without the thing. That is near what Milbank calls severing "the normal link between our mind's understanding of things and the way they are in themselves" (p. 32). Ockham sets two limits, and Milbank's sentence names neither. On Ockham's own account in the fifth quodlibet, intuitive cognition is the cognition by which one judges "not only that a thing is when it is, but also that it is not when it is not", so that an intuitive cognition of what does not exist yields, so far as it is intuitive, the judgment that it does not exist. And God "cannot cause in us a cognition by which it evidently appears to us that a thing is present when it is absent, because this includes a contradiction". He can cause an act of belief by which "I believe a thing to be present which is absent", but that act is abstractive, not intuitive, and it is not evident.[133] Absolute power can produce a false belief; it cannot produce false evidence. Whether that suffices

130. Etzkorn and Kelley, introduction, OT 4:8*, the editors' summary, not Ockham's words. «Impossibile tamen est ut Deus aliquid de potentia absoluta faciat, tam impossibile quam esset impossibile ut Deus aliquid sine intellectu et voluntate seu sine praescientia et praeordinatione faceret.» The sentence gives no reference; the sentence before it refers to the editors' notes at OT 4:36 n. 1 and 611 n. 1, which were not read.

131. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.6, OT 9:604–605, his determination. «In ista quaestione pono duas conclusiones: prima est quod» and «cognitio intuitiva potest esse per potentiam divinam de obiecto non existente» and «est divinae potentiae attribuendum quod non includit manifestam contradictionem; sed istud fieri a Deo non includit contradictionem». The creed and the theologians' principle are given in English because the text layer interrupts them with apparatus. The editors refer the question to Ockham's *Ordinatio*, Prologue q.1, which was not on disk.

132. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.6, OT 9:606. «Secunda conclusio est quod naturaliter cognitio intuitiva non potest causari nec conservari, obiecto non existente.» and, replying to the case of the sun, «non manet visio solis, sed manet aliqua qualitas, puta lux impressa oculo, et illa qualitas videtur.» and «et sibi assentiat, decipitur propter illam qualitatem impressam visam.»

133. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* V q.5, OT 9:496 (determination) and 498 (reply to the first instance). «per notitiam intuitivam non tantum iudico rem esse quando est, sed etiam non esse quando non est» (496) and «Deus non potest causare in nobis cognitionem talem per quam evidenter apparet nobis rem esse praesentem quando est absens, quia hoc includit contradictionem.» and «Tamen Deus potest causare actum creditivum per quem credo rem esse praesentem quae est absens. Et dico quod illa cognitio creditiva erit abstractiva, non intuitiva» (498).

for Milbank's switch "from knowledge by identity to knowledge by representation" (p. 32) is a question about Ockham's theory of cognition as a whole, which these two questions do not settle and this article does not take up. On the narrower point the verdict is split. Ockham's absolute power is the one power that does nothing inordinately, as the first question shows, and it is also a power by which God can bring about in the mind what nature does not.

Where Ockham gives Milbank his reading

The same quodlibet shows what work the distinction does. Ockham concludes that "a man can be saved without created charity by God's absolute power", and that no one will be saved or merit "according to the laws now ordained by God without created grace".[134] To the charge that the first conclusion is Pelagius's error he answers that Pelagius held grace not to be required in fact, while he himself holds that an act elicited from purely natural powers "is meritorious only through God's absolute power accepting it".[135] The second question applies the distinction of necessity. "Necessity is twofold, namely absolute and by supposition", and God accepts an act of charity necessarily only in the second way, "because this consequence is necessary: God has ordained and instituted by laws already given that such an act so elicited is to be accepted, therefore God accepts that act already elicited", "and yet both antecedent and consequent are simply contingent".[136] Here the worth of a meritorious act lies in its acceptance under laws God has given. Scotus's law that is right because the divine will accepts it (n. 115) is carried into merit and grace, and Milbank's willing "sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35) fits these questions at least as well as it fits the *Lectura*.

The *Ordinatio* gives Milbank two more texts. In the forty-third distinction Ockham asks Abelard's question, "whether God can do things which he does not do nor will do". One objection runs as Abelard's did: God can do only what is right to be done by him, and "nothing is right or just to be done by him except what he does". Ockham's reply begins with Lombard's distinction and then turns it: "although God cannot do except what is just to be done, yet something can be just to be done if God did it, which yet now is not just to be done because it is not done by God".[137] Lombard had measured God's possible acts by the justice they would have if he did them (n. 40). Ockham grants this and adds that what God does not do is not now just to be done "because it is not done by God". He calls the objector's fault a mixing of possible and assertoric premises and leaves its cause to logic, so the clause is not worked into a doctrine of justice; but it runs from God's doing to the justice of the deed, where Lombard's ran the other way.

In the same question Ockham denies that natural reason can prove God a free cause. It "cannot be proved by natural reason that God is a cause of things acting contingently", because it cannot be proved that, as many effects follow naturally from the perfection of the sun, many beings do not follow from the perfection of the divine being which could not be otherwise. That God acts contingently "is to be held", and from it "the solution

The instance answered, that on Ockham's view God could not cause a cognition by which an absent thing appears present, is an objection and not his position.

134. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.2, OT 9:587–588. «homo potest salvari sine caritate creata de potentia Dei absoluta» (587) and «secundum leges a Deo nunc ordinatas sine gratia creata» (588).

135. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.2, OT 9:588–589, replying to the charge of Pelagianism. «Pelagius posuit quod de facto non requiritur gratia ad vitam aeternam habendam» and «quod actus ex puris naturalibus elicitus est meritorius vitae aeternae de condigno» (Pelagius's view, as Ockham reports it) and «Ego autem pono quod solum est meritorius per potentiam Dei absolutam acceptantem.»

136. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.2, OT 9:590–591. «duplex est necessitas: scilicet absoluta, et ex suppositione.» and «Deus nihil agit ad extra de necessitate, nec aliquid aliud a se vult necessario» (590) and «quia haec consequentia est necessaria: Deus ordinavit et instituit per leges iam datas quod talis actus sic elicitus sit acceptandus, igitur Deus illum actum iam elicitum acceptat» and «et tamen tam antecedens quam consequens est simpliciter contingens.» (591). For the distinction of necessity and for the second sentence, which Ockham gives "according to the saints", the editors cite Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 (OT 9:590 nn. 4, 7; see n. 72).

137. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.1, OT 4:622, 623 (objection) and 640 (reply). «quaero utrum Deus possit facere aliqua quae non facit nec faciet» and «Deus non potest facere nisi quod rectum est fieri ab eo; sed nihil est rectum sive iustum fieri ab eo nisi quod facit» and «quamvis Deus non possit facere nisi quod iustum est fieri, aliquid tamen potest esse iustum fieri si Deus faceret illud, quod tamen modo non est iustum fieri quia non fit a Deo.» and «Et ideo talis mixtio ex possibili et inesse non valet. Causam tamen non oportet modo discutere, quia hoc magis pertinet ad logicam».

of the question is plain, that God can do things which he does not do".[138] The arguments he finds wanting are, on his editors' identification, the four reasons of Aquinas's *De potentia* q.3 a.15, which he sets out, three of them nearly in Aquinas's words, and he says the philosophers could easily answer them. Aquinas had offered the reasons as making the conclusion plain "for the present" (n. 83); Ockham keeps the conclusion, and the words "is to be held" are Aquinas's as well as his, but he denies the reasons the force of proof. Ockham reaches the twelfth-century conclusion, and reaches it by faith.

The second question of the distinction comes nearest to Milbank's "priority of possibility". It asks whether God's inability to make the impossible is prior to the impossible's inability to be made by God. Ockham answers that neither is prior, and that God's being able to make the possible is not prior to the creature's being able to be made by God, "but they are at once by nature". To the objection that whatever a creature has it has from God, he replies that possibility belongs to the creature "from itself", "not really as something inhering in it, but it is truly possible" from itself, "as a man is from himself not-an-ass".[139] Here Milbank's description of an essentialist possibilism holds. The possible is not grounded in God, as it was for Bonaventure in "the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness" (n. 54), or for Aquinas in reasons of all that God can do, "as it were thought out" (n. 103); it is given with the creature, and God has not "made it up". One phrase of Milbank's fails here as it failed with Scotus. Ockham gives the possible no being of its own: it is more proper to say "that the creature is possible, not because of anything that belongs to it, but because it can be in the nature of things" (n. 139).

On the better world, the editors of the *Ordinatio* summarise Ockham in a sentence of their own: "This universe is not the best."[140] His determination is more guarded. He sets out three opinions on whether God could make a world better in species and judges it "probable" that he could; he holds that God "can make a world better than this one, and distinct from this world in number only", since he could produce infinitely many individuals of the kinds that now exist, and that he could make it "better by accidental goodness". To the argument that every better world would then admit a better without end, he reports two answers and chooses neither.[141] Lombard and Aquinas measured the better world against two terms, the wisdom of the maker, which cannot be greater, and the thing made, which can (nn. 45, 87). Ockham's question keeps only the second. A better world is more individuals, more perfect accidents or a higher species, and the wisdom of the maker does not enter it.

138. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.1, OT 4:636–637. «Ideo quantum ad istum articulum dico quod non potest ratione naturali probari quod Deus est causa rerum contingenter» and «agens, quia non potest probari quin sicut ex perfectione solis naturaliter sequuntur effectus multi, ita ex perfectione entitatis divinae sequuntur multae entitates quae aliter esse non possent.» and «Circa secundum articulum dico quod tenendum est quod Deus est causa contingenter agens» and «Ex istis patet solutio quaestionis quod Deus potest facere aliqua quae non facit» (636) and «Ad rationes igitur adductas contra philosophos, quantumcumque conclusio sit vera, ipsi tamen philosophi faciliter responderent.» (637). The editors head the arguments, in brackets, as Aquinas's opinion and refer them to Aquinas, *De potentia* q.3 a.15 (OT 4:623 n. 3). Ockham introduces them «Circa primum dicunt aliqui quod sic. Et nituntur aliqui probare quod Deus sit causa libera.» (623) and gives the four reasons at 623–624, the second, third and fourth in quotation marks and close to the Corpus Thomisticum text (compare n. 83).

139. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.2, OT 4:640 and 649–650. «utrum prius conveniat Deo non posse facere impossibile quam impossibili non posse fieri a Deo» (640) and «non prius convenit Deo posse facere possibile vel creaturam quam creaturae posse fieri a Deo; sed simul natura» and «convenit creaturae ex se, non realiter tamquam aliquid sibi inhaerens, sed vere est possibilis» (649) and «ex se, sicut homo ex se est non-asinus» and «Nec est proprius modus loquendi dicere quod esse possibile convenit creaturae, sed magis proprie debet dici quod creatura est possibilis, non propter aliquid quod sibi conveniat sed quia potest esse in rerum natura.» and, replying to the principal argument, «non prius est Deus factivus quam creatura est factibilis, immo ita primo est creatura factibilis sicut Deus est factivus» (650).

140. Etzkorn and Kelley, introduction, OT 4:8*. «Hoc universum non est optimum. Sine dubio Deus potuisset, si voluisset, universum melius facere; exempli gratia universum in quo homo peccare non potuisset (651-655).» The example is Augustine's, quoted by Lombard, which Ockham uses to argue for a world of another species: «Talem potuit Deus fecisse hominem, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet» (OT 4:652).

141. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.44 q. un., OT 4:655, 660–661. «Sic igitur patet quod circa istum articulum possent poni tres opiniones. Probabile autem reputo quod Deus posset facere alium mundum meliorem isto distinctum ab isto specie» and «dico quod Deus potest facere mundum meliorem isto, et distinctum solo numero ab isto mundo» and «Cuius ratio est quia infinita individua eiusdem rationis cum illis quae modo sunt, posset Deus producere.» (655) and «dico quod Deus posset facere mundum meliorem bonitate accidentali» (660) and «diversi diversimode dicerent» and «dicerent quod Deus posset facere mundum meliorem in infinitum, non tamen infinitum» and «Alii dicerent quod posset fieri mundus quo non posset fieri melior.» (661).

Synchronic contingency

On the claim Milbank documents from Scotus, Ockham is against Scotus. In the thirty-eighth distinction he sets out an opinion that his editors trace to a compiled text of Scotus's commentary on distinctions 38 and 39, and argues against it.[142] The "power for opposites, not manifest, which is for opposites without succession" is not to be posited, because "a power which by no power, even infinite, can be reduced to act is not to be posited", and this one, reduced to act, would make contradictories true together. "In creatures it is universally true that there is never a power for opposite objects without succession, any more than for opposite acts." The will causes contingently because, "freely, without any variation coming to itself or to another", it "can cease from its act in another instant", "not that in the same instant it is not causing"; "and this, and nothing else, is for the will to cause contingently". Of God he says that it is not well said that the divine will, as prior by nature, so posits its effect in an instant that it can not posit it in the same instant, "because there are no such instants of nature as he imagines". His conclusion is general: "universally there is never a power such that opposites are verified without succession".[143]

Milbank uses "from Scotus through to Ockham" of the epistemic switch (p. 32) and of the abandonment of participation (p. 36), not of synchronic contingency, and this result does not break a thread he drew. It limits a thread a reader might draw. At the point where Milbank's one citation of Scotus carries the weight, the real possibility of an alternative synchronous with the actual, Ockham rejected Scotus's doctrine, and he placed the contingency of a free cause where Hugh had placed the possibility of the future, in what can come about or cease. Ockham kept from Scotus, and widened, the law that is right because it is willed; he refused the power for the opposite in the same instant. And on the relation of knowledge to will he answers as the *Contra Gentiles* does (n. 78): "God, understanding himself, understands other things necessarily, but God, willing himself, wills other things contingently".[144]

9. Bradwardine and Wyclif

Bradwardine, for all his doctrine of necessity, stands with the twelfth-century reply. His teaching, he says, lets a reader avoid "the error of Abelard, and the Paris article condemned".[145] He lists three errors about necessity in God's outward acts, which he says Henry of Ghent reports: that God acts from the necessity of his essence, as fire heats; from the necessity of his knowledge, "because by his knowledge he comprehends the best possible order in things, to which he necessarily conforms himself in acting"; and from the necessity of his will, which conforms itself to that knowledge.[146] The second and third come as near as any text examined here to Milbank's

142. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.38 q. un., OT 4:573 n. 2 and 578. The editors refer the opinion to a compiled text (*textus compositus*) of Scotus on *Sentences* I d.38 p.2 and d.39 qq.1–5, printed in an appendix to vol. 6 of the Vatican Scotus, and head Ockham's reply, in brackets, as against Scotus's opinion. That compiled text was not consulted, and its relation to the *Lectura* quoted in section 7 is not established here; Ockham's phrases answer the *Lectura*'s freedom toward opposite objects (n.46), its possibility "in the same instant" (n.50) and its priority of the will by nature to its volition (n.51).

143. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.38 q. un., OT 4:578–581. «secundam libertatem voluntatis consequitur una potentia ad opposita non manifesta quae est ad opposita sine successione» and «illa potentia quae per nullam potentiam, etiam infinitam, potest reduci ad actum, non est ponenda» (578) and «Et ita in creaturis est universaliter verum quod numquam est potentia ad opposita obiecta sine successione, non magis quam ad oppositos actus.» (579) and «libere, sine omni variatione adveniente sibi vel alteri et non per cessationem alterius causae, potest cessare ab actu in alio instanti, ita quod in alio instanti sit non causans, non quod in eodem instanti sit non causans» (580) and «Et hoc, et non aliud, est voluntatem contingenter causare.» and «Ex isto patet quod non est convenienter dictum» and «quod voluntas divina, ut prior naturaliter, ita ponit suum effectum in esse in a quod potest eum non ponere in esse in eodem instanti. Quia non sunt talia instantia naturae sicut iste imaginatur» and «Ideo dico quod universaliter numquam est potentia ita quod opposita verificentur sine successione. Immo impossibile est quod Deus respiceret obiectum et non respiceret illud, nisi esset aliqua successio» (581).

144. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.1, ad 1, OT 4:639. «Quia Deus intelligendo se intelligit alia necessario, sed Deus volendo se vult alia contingenter, et ideo non est simile.»

145. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850A. «Per nanc etiam potest vitari error Abelardi, et articulus Parisiensis damnatus» (the text reads «nanc» for «hanc»).

146. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850B. «Alij posuerunt quod quicquid Deus agit ad extra, agit ex necessitate suae scientiae, eo quod per suam scientiam comprehendit ordinem meliorem possibilem in rebus, cui necessario se conformat secundum suam scientiam

God "compelled" by his intellect, and Bradwardine counts both as errors. The same list stands in Aquinas's *Contra Gentiles* (n. 82).[147]

Bradwardine's own position is a necessity that follows God's act. He reads Abelard as holding that God wills all creatures "from a necessary order of goodness", and asks, "Who then will accuse me of this error?" God, "so far as concerns the nature of his volitive power, can most contingently and most freely, according to contradiction, not will what he wills and will what he does not will", and yet wills what he does by "a certain necessity following on the act of the divine will already posited".[148] The Paris article condemns, on his reading, "a natural, simple, absolute and preceding necessity", and that was the necessity Abelard placed in God's outward acts.[149] Absolute power, for Bradwardine, is the power that implies no contradiction, and it is from this power that God "is truly called omnipotent".[150]

In c.29, and again at the start of the c.52 corollary, Bernard's judgment that Abelard's thesis was heretical, the Paris article, and an Oxford condemnation under Archbishop Robert of Canterbury stand in the objections raised against Bradwardine's own doctrine of necessity.[151] By the 1340s the condemnation of Abelard's actualism was a weapon for Bradwardine's opponents. The thesis Bernard judged heretical is the seventh article in the list of errors that Denzinger prints under the council of Sens, and Innocent II condemned the chapters sent to him "together with their author" (nn. 28–29).

Two things about the later condemnations are secure. The Paris article, as Bradwardine quotes it, condemns the proposition that "God necessarily does whatever is done immediately by him". In the *Chartularium* of the University of Paris it is the fifty-third of the 219 articles of 1277, and it condemns the proposition on either reading of the necessity, "whether it be understood of the necessity of coercion, because it takes away freedom, or of the necessity of immutability, because it posits an inability to act otherwise".[152] And the Oxford error that

operando.» and «Hos autem tres errores de ista necessitate recitat Henricus de Gandauo 5. de quodlib. quaestione quarta». Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V q.4, *Utrum Deus necessario producat quicquid exterius immediate producit* (the heading, corrected from the OCR), in the Venice edition of 1613 (*Aurea quodlibeta*, t.1), argues in turn that God does not act from the necessity of his nature, of his knowledge or of his will, and among the arguments for the opposite cites the condemned Paris article *Quod Deum necesse est facere quicquid immediate fit ab ipso* (wording corrected from the OCR). The only copy used here is an uncorrected OCR of that edition, so Henry's argument is not quoted, and the Latin in italics in this sentence is not checked by script.

147. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.28 n.10: God produces things not from necessity of nature, knowledge, will or justice (n. 82). That the *Summa contra Gentiles* (c. 1259–1265) is earlier than Henry's fifth *Quodlibet*, so that the list is older than Henry, is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

148. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 851A. «autem dicere Abelardus, quod sicut Deus necessario absolute vult finem vltimum, suam scilicet propriam bonitatem; sic et necessario absolute vult ea quae sunt ad finem, omnes scilicet creaturas; Itaque quod omnia ista eadem numero, omnibus suis modis ex necessario ordine bonitatis emanant ab illo» and «Quis ergo arguet me de isto errore? Dico enim quod Deus, quantum est de ratione suae potentiae volutiuae, contingentissime et liberrime secundum contradictionem potest non velle quod vult, et velle quod non vult» and «qui tamen irrepugnanter quadam necessitate sequente actum voluntatis diuinae positum iam in esse».

149. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 853C–D. «Damnatur ergo in articulo recitato necessitas naturalis, simplex, absoluta, et praecedens respectu volutionis et factionis diuinae ad extra, non autem necessitas sequens praedicta.» and «talem necessitatem immutabilitatis posuit Petrus Abelardus in Deo ad extra, qualis et in articulo condemnatur.»

150. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 837D. «Ab hac autem potentia absoluta et non repugnantiae, puto Deum dici omnipotentem veraciter atque esse.»

151. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.29, 727B, and c.52 cor., 834C. «Quare et Robertus Cantuatiensis Archiepiscopus» and «condemnauit Oxoniae quendam errorem dicentem, quod Omnis propositio de futuro vera est necessaria» and «et Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus damnauit Parisijs quendam alium errorem ponentem, quod nihil sit a casu, sed omnia de necessitate veniunt» and «Item alium sub hac forma, quod Deum necesse est facere, quicquid immediate fit ab ipso: Error, siue intelligatur de necessitate coactionis, quia tollit libertatem; siue de necessitate immutabilitatis, quia ponit impossibilitatem aliter faciendi. Bernardus etiam epistola sua decima ad Papam Innocentium reputat dictum Petri Abelardi haereticum» and «Obijciunt siquidem aliqui contra necessitatem sequentem». Chapter 29 is headed «Obijcit et respondet.», and these sentences belong to the objections, which Bradwardine answers. Bradwardine's «epistola sua decima» is Bernard's letter to Innocent II against Abelard's errors, numbered 190 in Migne's edition and printed there as *Opusculum* XI (PL 182:1053–1072); the words his objectors go on to quote, that God can do or omit only what he does, stand in the *Capitula haeresum*, PL 182:1049C–1050A, which Migne's editor takes to be the *capitula* of that letter (n. 50). Why Bradwardine calls the letter the tenth is not shown by the sources used here.

152. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), 546, art. 53, transcribed from the page image: *Quod Deum necesse est facere, quicquid inmediate fit ab ipso. — Error, sive intelligatur de necessitate coactionis, quia tollit libertatem, sive de necessitate inmutabilitatis, quia ponit impotentiam aliter faciendi.* The editors attach a note to *impotentiam* that was not read. Bradwardine's text reads «impossibilitatem aliter faciendi» (n. 151). Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 36 n. 43, cites arts. 58–60, 96, 99, 103, 107, 111, 130, 135–136, 140–141, 159 and 186 in Piché's numbering; the correspondence of those numbers with the *Chartularium*'s was judged by content (59, celestial

Bradwardine's objectors cite, that "every true proposition about the future is necessary", is also necessitarian; in the same sentence they name the condemner at Paris as Stephen, "bishop of Paris" (n. 151). Both condemn a necessity, and neither affirms a possibility. The rest is inference. Milbank's "archiepiscopal backing at Paris and Canterbury" for the redefinition of contingency (p. 36) presumably refers to the Paris condemnation of 1277, whose articles his note lists from Piché's edition, and to an English one. The Oxford condemnation under Archbishop Robert that Bradwardine's objectors cite would fit "Canterbury", though Milbank gives no source for it, and Bradwardine calls the condemner at Paris a bishop. Milbank's own note concedes that the articles of 1277 "frequently targeted positions held by nearly everyone to be heterodox, generally Averroistic perspectives", while reaching also positions "such as those entertained by Aquinas" (his note 43). Of the articles in his list that can be matched by content with the *Chartularium*, three condemn a necessity or an eternity (59, that God is the necessary cause of the motion of the heavens; 99, that the world, though made from nothing, was not made anew; 159, that the human will is necessitated by its knowledge as a brute's appetite is), and two condemn a limit set on God's power by the course of nature (141, that God cannot make an accident without a subject; 186, that the heavens never rest). None of them affirms a pure possibility. What they back is the contingency of the actual and God's power over the natural order, not a pure possibility, which is the part of Milbank's claim that the twelfth century already held. His list does not include article 53.

Wyclif is the one later author examined here who stands near Milbank. In the *Dialogus* Veritas, Wyclif's spokesman, concedes what Mendacium calls "your old error": "whatever will come about will come about of necessity; therefore it is necessary that men pray."[153] In *De dominio divino* he supposes, "with the second doctor" (Bradwardine, to judge from the order in which the chapter names its authorities), that everything that will happen is necessary to happen, and that God's prevenient co-action necessitates every secondary agent; and he distinguishes what is necessary "by supposition", any truth with an eternal cause from which it follows formally, "as my running follows formally from God's willing my running", from what is necessary absolutely, which "is in reality the divine essence".[154] He claims Aquinas for this way of speaking, citing the *Summa*, first part, question 19, article 3.[155] The claim holds for the distinction, on which that article turns (n. 72). What Wyclif builds on it is his own: Aquinas's suppositional necessity there is that of God's willing, given that he wills, and Wyclif extends it to every future event.

The guard has content. "Every future thing is necessary to happen from God's preordination; but just as it can be that God did not so preordain, … so it can be that what was prophesied … does not come about, and there is a parity of contingency on both sides."[156] Every creature is "most contingent to either side", "because every possibility of contingency is founded in God, who can as freely and as easily do the opposite of any

necessity; 99, eternity; 141, accident without subject; 159, will necessitated by knowledge; 186, the heavens never at rest). Piché's edition itself was not consulted. The matched articles are read in the archive.org OCR of the *Chartularium* (`source/paris1277/chartularium-1277-articles.txt`), not checked against the scan, and are reported in English. Milbank's note 43 is quoted from his p. 37. One article not in his list comes nearer his reading: article 146 of the *Chartularium* (by the OCR) condemns the proposition that what is possible or impossible simply is so according to philosophy, and Bradwardine, in the course of his own demonstration in c.5, reads it as setting possibility beyond the natural secondary causes: «Quare et Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus damnauit quendam articulum asserentem, quod possibile vel impossibile simpliciter, i. omnibus modis, est possibile vel impossibile secundum Philosophiam: haec enim vt plurimum considerat possibile et impossibile secundum causas naturales secundas.» (*De causa Dei* III c.5, 657C). It too widens God's power beyond nature; it does not make the possible a range given to God.

153. John Wyclif, *Dialogus* c.23 (London: Wyclif Society, 1886), 45–46. «innuis enim quod non valet oracio pro vivis vel mortuis, eo quod secundum tuum antiquum errorem omnia que evenient est necessarium evenire.» and «Concedo enim tibi quod omnia que evenient de necessitate evenient; ideo necesse est homines orare».

154. Wyclif, *De dominio divino* I c.14, ed. R. L. Poole (London: Wyclif Society, 1890), 115–116. «In primis quidem suppono cum doctore secundo quod omnia que evenient sit necessarium evenire.» and «quod Deus preveniendo coagat cum quolibet agente secundo ipsum necessitando ad quemlibet actum suum.» and «Necessarium ex supposicione est quecunque veritas habens causam eternam ex qua sequitur formaliter ipsam esse; ut me currere sequitur formaliter ex Deum velle me currere» and «est in re divina essencia».

155. Wyclif, *De dominio divino* I c.14, 116. «isti modo loquendi innititur sanctus Thomas, prima parte, questione xix., articulo iii.»

156. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 130. «Vere quidem concluditur quod omne futurum ex preordinancia Dei est necessarium evenire; sed sicut potest esse quod Deus non sic preordinavit» and «sic potest esse quod prophetatum a Christo vel eius discipulo non contingat, et est paritas contingencie utrobique.»

contingent".[157] Wyclif founds the world's contingency in God and places its necessity after God's preordaining. The Council of Constance condemned among the articles of Wyclif the proposition "all things come about by absolute necessity".[158] The texts of Wyclif used here deny that proposition in its own terms: they hold every future thing necessary by supposition, from God's preordaining, and place absolute necessity in the divine essence alone (n. 154).

He is nearest Milbank on the measure of the world and on reason in will. "It seems philosophical to hold" that God so placed all things "that, if he were to add, it would be a monster, and if he were to diminish, it would be a defective fabric", which does not limit infinite power, because in God "power and wisdom are the same".[159] The claim is hedged, and its setting is an argument against an infinite world. Against Bradwardine he denies that God has freedom of contradiction toward any outward act: an eternal prior volition to create Peter is one "to which it formally repugns that he not create; therefore God necessitates himself to produce any extrinsic act".[160] And "those do not fully satisfy who say that God annihilates because he wills. For it would not be possible for God to will to annihilate unless reason required it."[161] That is Milbank's complaint against a will sundered from the rationally best, and Aquinas's against the "simple will" (n. 94).

His treatment of absolute and ordained power shows what an actualist does with the term. "Though this distinction serves to reconcile authors, it seems to me that nothing powerful can act on anything unless it could act on it by ordained power";[162] and "God can do nothing by absolute power except what he can do by ordained power, because however many miracles God can do, he can ordain power to do them".[163] This widens ordained power to whatever God could ordain. It does not shrink God's power to what will be. In the same discussion Wyclif grants that God can produce "something that will never be produced",[164] and in *De ente* he says outright that "God can do many things by his absolute power which are not in his ordained power, ... as that all possible things that do not exist should exist".[165] Wyclif is Milbank's ally on the unity of power and wisdom and on reason governing will. He is no ally of the claim that the actual exhausts the possible, and his reserve about the absolute–ordained distinction repeats, on other grounds, Bonaventure's objection to one use of it: "God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly".

157. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 183. «omnem creaturam contingentissimum ad utrumlibet sit fore, existere, et fuisse, quia omne posse contingencie in Deo fundatur, qui eque libere ac faciliter potest in oppositum cuiuscunque contingentis».

158. Denzinger and Bannwart, *Enchiridion symbolorum* (1911), 226, no. 607, art. 27 of the errors of Wyclif, under the Council of Constance, transcribed from the page image. «Omnia de necessitate absoluta eveniunt.» Denzinger gives no place in Wyclif's writings for the article, and the sources used here do not show from which text it was drawn.

159. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 46–47. «philosophicum videtur ponere quod Deus omnia sic posuit in effectu: sic, videlicet, quod, si superadderet, foret monstrum, et si diminueret, foret fabrica defectiva.» and «Ex quibus probabiliter credi potest quod, si Deus mundum produxerit» and «Eadem quidem est in Deo potencia et sapiencia».

160. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 167–169. «ut si Deus creat Petrum, tunc habet eternam volicionem previam ad creandum, cui repugnat formaliter quod non creet; ideo Deus necessitat se ad quemlibet actum extrinsecum producendum.» and «Ideo videtur michi quod potissime de actibus volendi intrinsecis quos ponit eternos sed contingentes caperet sua sentencia veritatem.»

161. Wyclif, *De annihilatione* c.13 (a fragment of *De potencia productiva Dei ad extra*), in *De ente* (London: Wyclif Society, 1909), 301. «Unde non plene satisfaciunt qui dicunt ideo, quod deus adnichilat quia vult. Non enim esset possibile deum velle adnichilare, nisi racio hoc exigeret».

162. Wyclif, *De logica* II (*Logice continuacio* III) (London: Wyclif Society, 1896), 134. «Quamvis autem illa distinccio deservit pro auctoribus concordandis, videtur tamen michi quod nullum potens potest in aliud, nisi posset in ipsum de potencia ordinata.»

163. Wyclif, *De logica* II, 145. «Ymmo, iuxta dicta, deus nichil potest facere de potencia absoluta, nisi quod potest de potencia ordinata; quia quotquot miracula deus potest facere, potest ipse ordinare potenciam ad illa faciendum. Ideo stultissimum est verbum modernorum».

164. Wyclif, *De logica* II, 133. «(demonstrando unum quod nunquam producetur). Ad hoc valet prima potencia».

165. Wyclif, *De ente* II, in *De ente* (London: Wyclif Society, 1909), 101. «Hic dico quod multa potest deus de sua potencia absoluta que non sunt in potencia eius ordinate, nec in potencia cause secunde; ut omnia possibilia existere que non existunt».

10. Outside the Schools: Peter Damian and an Anonymous Abbot

Milbank's offenders argue from God's absolute power, set will above wisdom, and treat each feature of the world as arbitrarily elected. Two monastic texts come near that pattern, one on the first count and one on the second.

Peter Damian's letter *De divina omnipotentia* shows that an argument leading to actualism was answered before Abelard. Damian recalls a dinner at which his correspondent defended Jerome's saying that God cannot restore a fallen virgin and closed his argument with the thesis "that God cannot do this for no other reason than that he does not will it". Damian's reply is a reduction: if God can do nothing he does not will, and does nothing except what he wills, "then he can do nothing at all of what he does not do", and we must say that God does not send rain today because he cannot.[166] The correspondent was Desiderius, abbot of Monte Cassino, and the letter is dated, on general knowledge, to the 1060s.[167] Desiderius, on Damian's report, held one case: God cannot restore a fallen virgin, because he does not will it. The general conclusion, that God can do nothing of what he does not do, is Damian's reduction of that case to absurdity (n. 166), and it is the thesis Abelard would later hold in his own name.

Damian's own answer goes as far as any text examined here. "It is to be believed with unwavering faith that God can do all things, whether he does them or not."[168] The maker of nature "easily, when he wills, takes away the necessity of nature".[169] In the last chapter he says that God can bring it about that Rome, after it was founded, was not founded: "he could, from our standpoint; he can, from his own", because with God there is no "could" and "can" but an "immobile and perpetual can".[170] Its limits are Damian's own. God cannot do evil, "because he cannot even will it", and the reason God does not restore the virgin is that "the judgment of his most just will" is kept, not that his power fails.[171] Of the question how God can bring it about that what was done was not done, Damian says that, put in that form, it asks that "what God made, God did not make", and that whoever asserts this "is to be spat upon".[172] God created "not from any necessity of solitude or want", but because "the goodness of his own clemency alone moved him".[173] Damian holds, well before Hugh if the dates of nn. 32 and 167 are right, that God can do what he never does, without a will sundered from goodness.

The anonymous *Disputatio altera*, which Migne prints with William of St-Thierry's works, answers the thesis as Abelard's. Its author lists it as the second of three errors, that "God cannot do except what he does, nor in another way, nor at another time".[174] His answer is a counter-thesis about will. He quotes Augustine: "whoever says, why did God make heaven and earth, must be answered, because he willed." Against Abelard's

166. Peter Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.1, PL 145:596D–597B. «Deum non ob aliud hoc non posse, nisi quia non vult.» and «Si nihil, inquam, potest Deus eorum, quae non vult: nihil autem, nisi quod vult, facit; ergo nihil omnino potest eorum facere, quae non facit.» and «Deum hodie idcirco non pluere, quia non potest». The first sentence is the correspondent's conclusion as Damian recalls it; the others are Damian's reduction.

167. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia*, PL 145:595C. The letter is addressed «Domno DESIDERIO Casinensis monasterii reverentissimo rectori», and the text names the correspondent of the dinner as «unanimi tamen patri, tibi videlicet». Damian writes after resigning his see («Ego itaque episcopatu dimisso»). Migne's text gives no year for the letter; its dating to the 1060s is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

168. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.10, PL 145:610C. «Quamobrem indubitabili fide credendum est, Deum omnia posse, sive faciat, sive non faciat.»

169. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.11, PL 145:612B. «Qui enim naturae dedit originem, facile, cum vult, naturae tollit necessitatem.»

170. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.15, PL 145:619B–C. «Potest Deus ut Roma, etiam postquam facta est, facta non fuerit. Potuit secundum nos, potest secundum se.» and «sed immobile semper et perpetuum posse.»

171. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.2, PL 145:600A. «nequaquam tamen omnipotens Deus dicendus est hoc non posse, sed potius nolle, ut servetur arbitrium aequissimae voluntati, non autem ascribatur, quod absit, impotentia majestati. Quod enim malum est, non potest facere Deus, quia nec potest etiam velle».

172. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.15, PL 145:618C. «Nimirum ut, quod fecit Deus, non fecerit Deus. Ideo conspuendus est qui hoc asserit».

173. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.7, PL 145:605C. «Ad creandum igitur, quod non erat, non solitudinis eum, vel alicujus inopiae necessitas impulit, sed sola propriae clementiae bonitas provocavit.»

174. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera adversus Abaelardum* III, PL 180:310D. «Secundum est, quod Deus facere non potest, nisi quod facit, nec alio modo, nec alio tempore, nec dimittere quin faciat quod facit.»

"reasonable cause" he says that "with Augustine as witness, reason contradicts, and says that in doing or leaving undone there is no cause higher than the will of God; and he errs who seeks a higher one".[175] He calls a liar anyone who "shuts God's will or power, that is God, inside the creature", and he adds that "God neither received nor receives from things a cause of when or how he should make them".[176] This is a will-first idiom used against an actualist, in Augustine's words.[177] It falls short of Milbank's charge. The abbot denies that a creature can find a cause above God's will; he does not say that God's will acts without reason. His "this impotence of his is omnipotence" is said of God's inability to do evil, "because evil is nothing", and is no general claim about power.[178]

11. Conclusion

The sources divide Milbank's claim along the two parts set out in the introduction, the ground of the possible and the contingency of the actual, and the line falls where he does not draw it.

On the source of the possible the tradition is with him. His possibilist God "mainly considers a range of 'given' possibilities" (p. 109). No author examined here before Scotus holds anything like that, and Scotus comes near it only in part: his divine intellect presents contingent propositions to the will as neutral, but it knows them by its own necessary knowledge, and nothing presents them to it from outside. Lombard's alternatives are "other reasonable and good things", measured by the same reason as the actual; Bonaventure places the whole range of *posse* in "the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness"; Aquinas says that the divine wisdom "comprehends the whole capacity of the power" and that God has reasons of all he can make, including what never will be.[179] The possible is an extension of God's wisdom. Both sides of the twelfth-century debate deny that God's will can act apart from his wisdom, and Aquinas excludes a creation from "simple will". Milbank's complaint against a will sundered from the rationally best has no target among these authors until Scotus. In Scotus it has one. He denies the divine intellect any judgment of what is to be done before the will determines it, and he makes the rightness of God's laws depend on their acceptance by the divine will (section 7). Even there the will is never set against right reason, and absolute power reaches only what would be done in an orderly way in another order.

On the contingency of the actual the tradition is against his dating. The redefinition of contingency that he dates to Scotus and to the condemnations, "a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated at all, or else instantiated otherwise" (pp. 36–37), joins two things. Its second half, that the actual might not have been, or might have been otherwise, is the common teaching of the twelfth-century schools. Hugh says that "it is possible that what will be should not come about"; Lombard, that God "could have made other things and left these aside" and "can make a better thing than he makes". It was stated against a named actualist, and

175. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera* III, PL 180:317D–318B. «Quisquis ergo dicit, quare fecit Deum coelum et terram, respondendum est illi, quia voluit.» (the text reads «Deum» for «Deus») and «Sed, Augustino teste, ratio contradicit, et dicit, quia in rebus agendis vel dimittendis voluntate Dei nulla causa superior sit; et errat qui superiorem quaerit.» The first sentence is Augustine (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos*), quoted by the abbot.

176. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera* III, PL 180:317D and 318B. «Mendax est igitur, et fallax, qui voluntatem Dei, vel potestatem ejus, id est Deum, intra creaturam includit sicut ille facit, qui dicit Deum de creatura sua non posse facere, nisi quod facit» and «Nec accepit, nec accipit Deus a rebus causam, quando vel quomodo faceret, vel disponeret, vel eas gubernaret; quia ipse est causa omnium».

177. Editor's *Monitum* to the *Disputatio altera*, PL 180. «editum est, postquam S. Bernardus Petri Abaelardi errores insectatus est» and «Hic ergo noster abbas anonymus beatum Bernardum tuetur». Migne's editors place the Council of Sens in 1140 (PL 182:1049, *Admonitio*), and the work answers Abelard's *Apologia*, written after the council (PL 178, *Observationes praeviae*); it is therefore later than 1140. The sources used here give no later limit.

178. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera* III, PL 180:318C–D. «Et cum dicitur: Deus malum facere non potest, verum dicitur, quia malum nihil est» and «Et haec ejus impotentia omnipotentia est.»

179. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4 (n. 42); Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* d.43 q.4, resp. (n. 54); Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 co. (n. 85) and *De potentia* q.1 a.5 ad 11 (n. 103). The further quotations in this and the next two paragraphs are documented in nn. 34, 41 and 44 (Hugh, Lombard), nn. 76 and 85 (Aquinas), nn. 80–82 (necessity of knowledge), nn. 8, 16 and 17 (Abelard), nn. 99–100 (Aquinas on created necessity), and nn. 148 and 156 (Bradwardine, Wyclif).

the actualist lost. Aquinas gives the same answer in his own terms. The order of creatures "does not equal" the divine wisdom; creatures are not "commensurate" with the divine goodness; "simply", God can make other things than he makes. The word "pure" is another matter. If a pure possibility is one with no ground in God's wisdom, a bare logical option, then "pure" belongs to the first part of the claim, and the twelfth century does not hold it: Lombard's alternatives are "other reasonable and good things". The dating of pp. 36–37 fails, then, for the contingency the sentence describes, and stands only so far as the word "pure" carries the ground of the possible, where the previous paragraph gives Milbank part of Scotus. The word "compelled" that Milbank credits to Aquinas stands closest, in this article's judgment, to what Aquinas explicitly rejects: a creation from necessity of knowledge, a disposition of things flowing of necessity from God's understanding of himself, an order commensurate with God's goodness. The judgment holds for the creation articles; the Trinitarian texts are not on this shelf. Among these texts, the medieval author who wrote that God's goodness "compels" him to the goods he can do was Abelard.

Milbank's "necessity in actuality as such" has one clear witness among these texts, the Abelard of the *Theologia christiana*, for whom God "necessarily willed and made the world". The witness is narrower than Migne's text makes it. In the fuller text of the Monte Cassino fragments, as Tosti and Cousin print them, the necessity lies in God's doing, and Abelard denies it to the thing done: "it is necessary that God do what it is not necessary should be done by him". On that witness what he affirms is a necessity in the divine agent, not in the actual as such. Every other necessity in creatures found here, Aquinas's, Scotus's, Ockham's, Wyclif's or Bradwardine's, follows God's free act; the necessity with which God wills his own goodness (n. 72) is in God.

Ockham divides Milbank's claim along the same line, though nearer to Milbank's side of it, and further toward it than Scotus goes: a range of the possible measured by contradiction alone, a creature possible "from itself" and not through God's knowledge or goodness, a better world counted by individuals and accidents with no reference to the wisdom of the maker, and a merit whose worth lies in God's acceptance under laws he has instituted (section 8). Milbank's account of the will-first strand fits Ockham well. On absolute power the result is divided. Ockham's absolute power is the one power that is God, which "can do nothing inordinately", and he takes its extent from Lombard's answer to Abelard. It is also the ground on which God can cause an intuitive cognition of what does not exist, which comes near the severing of mind from thing that Milbank names (p. 32), within a limit Ockham sets: God cannot make an absent thing evidently appear present, though he can cause a belief that it is. And Ockham rejects the power for opposites without succession that Scotus's synchronic alternative requires. Milbank does not run that thread from Scotus to Ockham; but a reader who draws a modal lineage between them finds it broken there, while the thread of will and law runs through both.

Milbank's best defence runs as follows. The compulsion he names is that of "the Paternal uttering of the Verbum" (p. 109), a necessity within God, which every author here allows. The contents of the world follow by "discriminating 'aesthetic' judgements", which are choices among goods, and he never writes that God could not have made another world. Aquinas's own text supports the reading at several points (section 6): a reason can always be assigned for what God wills; his will may be called "determined" by his intellect's knowledge of fitting goods, in a conditional whose sentence opens by denying it, and is "inclined in some way" by that knowledge; and the universe, given these things, cannot be better, as a lyre is not improved by tightening one string. On this reading his quarrel is with Scotus alone, and a defender would press the difference between Hugh's possibility, a future that may not arrive, and Scotus's alternative at the same instant. Scotus's text allows that difference to be measured (section 7). Aquinas already states, in the divided sense, an alternative of God's power to what God eternally wills. What is Scotus's own is a real power of the will for the opposite act in the very instant of willing, a refusal to let immutability yield necessity, and a divine intellect that judges nothing in the contingent order before the will. That gives the defence its ground and sets its price. It can keep Aquinas only by placing Milbank's quarrel with Scotus in the doctrine of the will, where section 7 found it, and not in a new standing of the possible beside the actual.

The defence saves the word, and it is hard-pressed on the thesis, because each text that saves the word affirms in the same place the contingency of the actual. Aquinas's lyre reply ends, "yet God could make other things". The will that the intellect determines tends to fitting goods "not necessarily". The befittingness is named in the chapter that denies a creation from necessity of knowledge or of will. Lombard's division of senses ends, "let us confess, then, that God can do many things he does not will". If Milbank accepts these distinctions, the tradition from Hugh to Aquinas held the contingency of the actual that his pp. 36–37 date to Scotus, and the history of that contingency cannot begin with Scotus. If he refuses them, one position remains open short of Abelard's. Milbank's compulsion is a necessity within God, in the uttering of the Word, with "discriminating" judgements about what the world contains; Abelard puts the necessity in God's outward acts (section 3). A reader could hold Aquinas's lyre reply without its last sentence: the universe, given these things, cannot be better, and God's judgement of fitness settles which things there are. That position is silent where Aquinas speaks. It neither affirms with Aquinas that God could make other things nor holds with Abelard that he must do all he can, as well as he can. Nothing on this shelf excludes it. But it gives up the sentence with which Aquinas ends the reply, and the texts that would tie it to Aquinas, on the Word and creation, are not among those read here. The defence is hard-pressed, not refuted. The genealogy can be repaired by narrowing it. What begins with Scotus, so far as these texts show, is chiefly the neutral complex and the law that is right because it is accepted (the other two novelties of section 7 refine an analysis Aquinas shared), and Milbank's charge holds against those; the proposition that what is actual might not have been, or might have been otherwise, is older and was common ground.

His philosophical argument meets the same fork. That there is no "pure will" is the premise of Abelard's argument from equal goods. Lombard asserted that "the same reason and cause remaining" God could have made other things (n. 41), but that does not meet the case the Cassino difficulties put, of two beggars equally worthy and one alms that cannot be divided (n. 20). The answer comes with Aquinas. A power can be open to either of two things from its own imperfection, as the mind of one in doubt; or it can be open to either "when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, but either can be, as an art which can use diverse instruments to perfect the same work equally", and this belongs "not to the imperfection of the power, but rather to its eminence".[180] Such is God's will toward things other than himself. Milbank's "discriminating judgements" name the place where an election falls among goods none of which is required. Aquinas had given an account of that election, and it is the account Milbank needs.

The results can be set out claim by claim. The table summarises sections 3–11; each entry is documented in the notes cited.

Milbank's claim	Best text for it	Best text against it	Sections
(a) The ground of the possible: God "considers a range of 'given' possibilities" (p. 109)	Ockham: possibility belongs to the creature "from itself" (n. 139); Scotus's neutral complex (n. 114)	Bonaventure: the range of *posse* is "the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness" (n. 54); Aquinas: reasons of all God can do, "as it were thought out" (n. 103)	5, 6, 7, 8
(b) The contingency of the actual, redefined as "a pure possibility" (pp. 36–37)	Scotus: an alternative of the will in the same instant (n. 120)	Hugh (n. 34), Lombard (nn. 41, 44) and Aquinas (nn. 76, 85): what is or will be might not have been, measured by God's wisdom	4, 6, 7, 11
Willing "sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35)	Scotus: no prior dictate, and law right as accepted (nn. 114–115); Ockham: merit by acceptance (nn. 135–136)	Aquinas against "simple will" (nn. 94–95); Lombard: the will "most equitable and most right" (n. 41)	4, 6, 7, 8

180. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.82 nn.7–8, answering the objections of c.82 nn.2–5. «Ex parte autem eius ad quod dicitur, invenitur aliqua virtus ad utrumlibet esse quando perfecta operatio virtutis a neutro dependet, sed tamen utrumque esse potest: sicut ars, quae diversis instrumentis uti potest ad idem opus aequaliter perficiendum. Hoc autem ad imperfectionem virtutis non pertinet, sed magis ad eius eminentiam» and «Sic autem est in divina voluntate respectu aliorum a se».

Milbank's claim	Best text for it	Best text against it	Sections
Stress on *potentia absoluta* (p. 34); absolute power severs mind from thing (p. 32)	Ockham: intuitive cognition of a non-existent object by divine power (n. 131)	Bonaventure (n. 61), Aquinas (n. 91), Scotus (n. 116), Ockham (n. 128): one power, never without order; Ockham: no evident cognition of the absent as present (n. 133)	5, 6, 7, 8
Aquinas's God "compelled" by his intellect (p. 109)	*Contra Gentiles* I c.82, conditional, and c.88, "inclined in some way" (nn. 96–97); the lyre (n. 88)	*Contra Gentiles* II c.26, no creation from necessity of knowledge (nn. 80–81), the error in Bradwardine's list (n. 146); the Verbum texts are not on the shelf	6, 9, 11
"Necessity in actuality as such" (p. 108)	Abelard, *Theologia christiana* (n. 17); created necessities, *Contra Gentiles* II c.30 (n. 99)	Cassino fragments as printed: necessity in God's doing, none in the thing done (n. 25); created necessity follows a voluntary act (n. 100)	3, 6
"Archiepiscopal backing at Paris and Canterbury" (p. 36)	Art. 146, possibility beyond philosophy, not in his list (n. 152)	Art. 53 and the Oxford error condemn necessity (nn. 151–152); the matched articles in his list back contingency and God's power over nature (by the OCR, n. 152)	9
Ockham as Scotus's heir (pp. 32, 36–37)	Will and law (nn. 135–136); possibility "from itself" (n. 139); intuitive cognition (n. 131)	No power for opposites without succession (n. 143); absolute power from Lombard (n. 129)	8

The points given to Milbank are in the second column: Scotus's neutral complex and his law accepted by the will, Ockham's possibility from the creature and merit by acceptance, Ockham's use of absolute power in the theory of cognition, Aquinas's lyre and his intellect that inclines the will, and Abelard's necessary God.

A fuller study would need what the sources used here do not hold: a corrected text of Henry of Ghent's fifth *Quodlibet*, which Bradwardine names as his source; Piché's edition of the articles of 1277; Scotus's other discussions of the divine will, read in the Vatican text, and the compiled text of Scotus against which Ockham argues; Ockham's *Ordinatio*, Prologue q.1, to which the *Quodlibeta* editors refer at VI q.6, and his works outside the two volumes used; Aquinas's texts on the Word and creation, on which the defence of Milbank's "Paternal uttering of the Verbum" would rest; the rest of Aquinas's *De potentia* q.3; a critical text of the *Theologia christiana*, with the Monte Cassino manuscript read in the original and not only in Tosti's and Cousin's printing. The name in Aquinas's *De potentia* still needs the Leonine text and the manuscripts (n. 69).

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Appendix A: Method and Verification

The shelf. The study used only texts held locally: the *Patrologia Latina* in TEI transcription for Abelard, Hugh, the *Summa sententiarum*, Lombard, Damian, Bernard, William of St-Thierry, the *Disputatio altera* and the *Capitula*; the Quaracchi Bonaventure, re-set from page images with the Wroot Press English beside it; Savile's 1618 Bradwardine from a keyed text, divided into units by page and section letter; the Wyclif Society volumes in transcription; and, for the final draft, the Corpus Thomisticum texts of Aquinas named above. Milbank was read from a text of the 2013 edition. For the revision further texts were added. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 qq.1–5, nn.1–93, in the Vatican edition (vol. 17, 1966), pp. 481–510: Wilson Pruitt supplied page images from an archive.org loan, and every quotation from them was transcribed from the image, with a rough OCR used only to find passages. Scotus's *Ordinatio* I dd.39 and 44 and *Reportata Parisiensia* I dd.39–40 in the Vivès reprint of Wadding (Paris, 1891–1895), from archive.org scans and a column-aware OCR; quotations from the *Ordinatio* were transcribed from the page images, the one quotation from the *Reportata* is from the OCR, and Lychetus's commentary and Wadding's scholia, printed around Scotus's text, are not quoted. The *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I (1889), for the articles of 1277, from an archive.org scan; article 53 was transcribed from the page image. Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta* in the Venice edition of 1613, in an uncorrected OCR, used to locate *Quodlibet* V q.4 and not quoted. The Vivès (1871) and Marietti (1883) printings of the *De potentia*, for the name in q.1 a.5, from archive.org scans and OCR. Aquinas's commentaries on the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* and on *Sentences* I dd.42–44 from Corpus Thomisticum; Bonaventure's commentary on book II of the *Sentences* and his *Breviloquium* in the Quaracchi text. For the final source pass four further sources were added. William of Ockham's *Quodlibeta septem* in Wey's edition (*Opera theologica* 9, 1980), which Wilson Pruitt supplied from an archive.org loan, read in its text layer, and his *Ordinatio* I dd.19–48 in the edition of Etzkorn and Kelley (*Opera theologica* 4, 1979), from an archive.org text; dd.38 and 42–45 were read, and VI qq.1–2 of the *Quodlibeta* in full; in the editorial revision VI q.6 and V q.5 were read in full. Both editions are in copyright and are quoted briefly. The two incunable prints of Ockham fetched with them (*Quodlibeta*, Strasbourg 1488; *Sentences*, Lyon 1495) have an OCR too poor to use and were not used. Innocent II's letters against Abelard, nos. 447–448, in PL 179. The *Enchiridion symbolorum* of Denzinger and Bannwart (11th ed., 1911), from an archive.org scan and its OCR; the OCR was used only to find passages, and every quotation from it was transcribed from the page images (pp. 169–170 and 226). And Aquinas's *Scriptum super Sententiis* I d.38, *Summa theologiae* I q.14 and *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.67 from Corpus Thomisticum, to test the Vatican editors' identification of Scotus's opponent. For the Cassino revision two sources were added. The fragments of the *Theologia christiana* from a Monte Cassino manuscript were read in Cousin and Jourdain's *Petri Abaelardi opera hactenus seorsim edita* II (Paris, 1859), 804–809, from archive.org page images: an uncorrected OCR was used only to find passages, and every quotation was transcribed from the image, with ligatures resolved. Tosti's first printing (Naples, 1851) was read in a rough OCR for what he says of the manuscript, and is reported in English and not quoted. *De potentia* q.3 a.15 was read in Corpus Thomisticum.

Passes, in order. (1) Search: four instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one per shelf (Abelard and his accusers; Lombard, Hugh and Damian; Wyclif; Bonaventure and Bradwardine), returned candidate passages, each with locus, file, a verbatim Latin run and a judgment of voice. (2) Second reading and dossier: Claude Opus 5.5 re-read every passage the argument uses in its source file, with enough of the surrounding text to settle whose voice it is. (3) First draft, by Claude Opus 5.5, with Aquinas read afresh from Corpus Thomisticum; for each Aquinas passage the draft records whether it stands in an objection, the *sed contra*, the body of the article or a reply, and only the body, the replies and Aquinas's own exposition in the *Contra Gentiles* are quoted as his view. (4) Revision: a verification pass by Claude Sonnet 5.5 over the notes the draft had flagged, whose findings were checked against the sources before use, and the addition of Scotus. (5) The pass called "final" at the time: Ockham's *Ordinatio* and *Quodlibeta* VI qq.1–2, Innocent II's letters, Denzinger, and the Aquinas texts named by the Vatican editors of Scotus; at its close the article had 167 notes. (6) The Cassino revision, which followed

it: the Monte Cassino fragments and *De potentia* q.3 a.15, bringing the notes to 176. (7) The editorial revision, against the decision letter of the editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5), which combined the reports of two blind readers (Claude Sonnet 5.5): Ockham's *Quodlibeta* VI q.6 and V q.5, the tract printed under Hugh's name, *Contra Gentiles* I c.82 n.11, the commentary on the *Metaphysics* IX l.3 nn.8–9, Bradwardine III c.29 (727B) and c.5 (657C), Milbank pp. 32, 35–37, 109 and 218, the *Chartularium* OCR for the articles in Milbank's list, and a search of all the Patrologia Latina transcriptions for the absolute–ordained pair. Orchestration throughout was by Claude Fable 5.2, then Claude Opus 5.5. The Ockham runs added in pass 5, and those added in pass 7, are all among the runs tested by script.

Scripts. A script tests every Latin run in the notes, the text between « and », against its source file: TEI files with tags stripped and whitespace collapsed; the Bradwardine units in both their normalised and diplomatic fields; Markdown files with footnote markers, emphasis marks and page comments removed; the Aquinas files as plain text. It also checks that every note marker has one definition, that every definition has a marker, and that notes are numbered in order of first appearance. In pass 4 the script was extended: runs in notes drawn from page images (the Vatican *Lectura* and the Vivès scans) are listed and not tested, and runs from the Vivès OCR are tested against that text with words broken at line ends rejoined. In pass 5 it was extended to the Ockham editions, whose text layers are tested with the line numbers of the edition removed from the ends and starts of lines and words broken at line ends rejoined; runs were chosen so as not to cross a page, and words garbled in the text layer (the spaced type of "secundum Magistrum" in *Quodlibeta* VI q.1, some bracketed headings) are given in English or without guillemets. At the close of pass 5 the article had 167 notes, 157 of them quoting Latin, with 333 Latin runs: 292 passed against their source files, and 41 were transcribed from page images and checked by eye against the image (35 from the Vatican *Lectura* and the Vivès scans, compared for the *Lectura* with its OCR; 6 from the Denzinger scan). At the close of pass 6 it had 176 notes, 166 of them quoting Latin, with 373 Latin runs: 303 passed, and 70 were transcribed from page images, 29 of them from the Cousin scans of the Cassino fragments. After pass 7 the script was rerun over the whole apparatus: the article has 180 notes, every one anchored in the text and numbered in order of first appearance, 170 of them quoting Latin, with 393 Latin runs; 323 pass against their source files, and 70 were transcribed from page images, as before. The 20 runs added in pass 7 all pass by script.

Corrections. Pass 2 found that the search had placed Abelard's statement of the contrary case after his judgment (it stands before it); had missed the *Theologia christiana*'s goodness that "compels" God and the *Introductio*'s "that very pity compelling him"; had cited the abbot's "this impotence of his is omnipotence" as a will-first claim (it is said of evil); had given Damian's inline numbers as Migne columns; had put the identity of Lombard's opponents off the shelf (Bonaventure, his editors and Lombard's echo of Abelard's wording supply it); had taken Wyclif's distinction of necessity for his second supposition (it is his third) and read *De logica* as making the non-actual impossible, which Wyclif denies; had read Bradwardine's reports of the condemnations as his own voice (they stand in objections against him); and had reported no absolute–ordained pair in Bonaventure's distinctions 42–44 (it is in d.43 dub. 7). Pass 3 found that Bradwardine's "question 5" is *De potentia* q.1 a.5, quoted faithfully apart from small variants, the omitted composite-sense clause and the name ("Abelardo" against "Almalareo"); that Aquinas uses the absolute–ordained pair in his own voice (*Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 ad 1), so that the dossier's "first in Bonaventure" held only for the texts it searched; that Wyclif's appeal to *Summa* I q.19 a.3 holds for the distinction he borrows; and that *Contra Gentiles* I c.82 comes nearer Milbank's "compelled" than any text in the dossier. Pass 4 corrected Hugh's death (1138 and 1140 in the testimonia Migne prints, not 1141; n. 32); Bonaventure's use of the pair (in his own voice in *In II Sent.* d.7, with an objection to one application of it in *In I Sent.* d.43 dub. 7; nn. 60–62); an unsupported claim that the *Theologia christiana* survives in several redactions; the dating of the *Contra Gentiles* before Henry's fifth *Quodlibet*, marked as general knowledge (n. 147); Henry's question, located in the 1613 OCR (n. 146); Bernard's "tenth letter", identified with Ep. 190 and its *capitula* (n. 151); and the readings of the name in the *De potentia*,

extended to the Vivès and Marietti printings and to Bonaventure's "Baialardus" (n. 69). It also found two faults in the Scotus files: the page markers in the OCR of the *Ordinatio* do not always match the printed pages (the passage of n. 124 is marked p. 632 in the file and stands on p. 636 of the scan), and the OCR file for *Ordinatio* I d.44 holds commentary from later pages, so the question was read from the scans of pp. 744–745. Pass 5 tested the Vatican editors' identification of Scotus's opponent, which holds (n. 108); replaced the statement that the *Summa* stood with Scotus by the finding that I q.19 a.8 rejects as insufficient the account that I q.14 a.13 ad 1 gives (n. 112); backed the reports of the condemnation at Sens and by Innocent II with the texts (nn. 28–29), reporting Migne's 1140 and Denzinger's 1141 for Innocent's letter side by side; quoted the Constance article against Wyclif (n. 158); and quoted the Ockham editors' "this universe is not the best" as theirs, with Ockham's own more guarded determination beside it (nn. 140–141). Pass 6 found that the *Theologia christiana* does not end, in every witness, where Migne's text ends: the fragments restore two of the guards of the *Introductio* while giving up none of the necessity on God's side (section 3, nn. 19–26), and the early-modern editor's reading of the thesis as settled is now reported as a reading of the shorter text; it also added *De potentia* q.3 a.15 (nn. 83–84, 138). Pass 7 made the changes set out point by point in `response.md`: chiefly, the division of possibilism into the ground of the possible and the contingency of the actual; the verdict on Ockham's absolute power, rewritten from *Quodlibeta* VI q.6 and V q.5; the withdrawal of the commentary on the *Metaphysics* as evidence of a synchronic alternative; Damian's reduction restored to Damian; the reading of "Paris and Canterbury" marked as an inference; and the Cassino conclusion marked as resting on the Tosti and Cousin printing.

Not available. A corrected text of Henry of Ghent's fifth *Quodlibet*; Scotus's other works and the Vatican text of the *Ordinatio*, and the compiled text of Scotus that Ockham's editors name; Ockham's works other than the two volumes named above; Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* except I dd.38 and 42–44, and his *De potentia* except qq.1–2 and q.3 a.15; the Leonine edition, the Parma edition and the manuscripts of the *De potentia*; Piché's edition of the 1277 articles (1999), and the *Chartularium* scan for any article but 53, which are read in OCR only; Aquinas's texts that join the procession of the Word to creation; Mansi's conciliar collection, from which Denzinger and Migne take the documents of Sens; the critical edition of the *Theologia christiana*, and the Monte Cassino manuscript itself, known here only from Tosti's and Cousin's printing; and Aristotle and Augustine except as quoted by the authors above. Facts drawn from general knowledge are marked as such in the notes.

Appendix B: Verification Table

"Editorial revision" means the run was added in pass 7 (Appendix A), against the decision letter, and tested by script against the file named. "Cassino revision" means the run was added in the revision that brought in the Monte Cassino fragments and *De potentia* q.3 a.15. "Final pass" means the run was added in the final source pass and tested by script against the file named; for Ockham the file is the text layer of the edition (OT 9) or a clean OCR of it (OT 4). "Dossier" means the passage was re-read in its source by the second reader; "this draft" means the run was tested by script against the file named in the first draft; "this revision" means the run was added in the revision and tested by script. "Page image (transcribed)" means the Latin was transcribed from a page image and checked by eye, since the script cannot test it; "OCR" means the run is quoted from an uncorrected OCR text and tested by script against it. Every run in a text file was tested in the final run.

Note	Source file	Checked by
4	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
5	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
6	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
7	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
8	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
9	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both

Note	Source file	Checked by
10	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
11	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
12	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
13	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
14	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
15	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
16	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
17	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
18	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
19	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml; archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 804–805); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate; ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/tosti-bub_gb_xaU4yLzvXmcC.txt (OCR, read for the report in English; not quoted)	this revision (PL run); page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
20	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 804–805); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
21	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, p. 805); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml (Migne reading)	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision; Migne run tested by script
22	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 805–806); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
23	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 806, 808); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
24	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 808–809); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
25	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, p. 809); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
26	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, p. 809); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
27	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
28	archive.org enchiridionsymboo1denz page images (Denzinger 1911, pp. 169–170); ~/milbank-reverse/source/constance/denzinger-1911.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed)
29	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11142.xml; archive.org enchiridionsymboo1denz page images (Denzinger 1911, p. 170)	final pass; page image (transcribed) for the Denzinger runs
30	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11113.xml	both
31	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11175.xml	both (dossier: search reading only)
32	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11082.xml	both
33	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11082.xml	both
34	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11082.xml	both
35	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11079.xml	editorial revision
36	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
37	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both; this revision
38	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
39	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
40	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
41	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
42	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
43	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
44	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
45	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
46	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
47	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11091.xml	both
48	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11091.xml	both
49	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11091.xml	both
50	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11207.xml	both
51	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11191.xml	both
52	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11165.xml	both
53	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both

Note	Source file	Checked by
54	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both
55	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both
56	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/cmp09.txt	both; this revision
57	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q3.md	both
58	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q3.md	both
59	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q1.md	both
60	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol2/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a1-q1.md	this revision
61	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-dubia.md	both
62	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-dubia.md; ~/bonaventure-sentences/vol5/bon-brev-p1-c7.md	both; this revision
64	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both
65	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	both
66	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	both
67	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
68	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	both
69	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11770.xml	this revision
70	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
71	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
72	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
73	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
74	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
75	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt; ~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	this draft
76	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
77	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
78	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
79	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
80	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
81	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
82	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
83	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp3.txt	Cassino revision
84	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp3.txt	Cassino revision
85	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
86	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
87	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
88	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
89	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
90	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
91	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
92	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
93	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
94	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
95	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
96	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft; editorial revision (the *quamvis* clause)
97	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
98	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
99	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
100	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
102	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
103	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
104	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
105	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/cmp09.txt	this revision; editorial revision (n.8 and the walking example)
107	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p488.jpg	page image (transcribed)
108	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/snp1035.txt; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1003.txt; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1044.txt	final pass

Note	Source file	Checked by
109	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p489.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p490.jpg	page image (transcribed)
110	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p492.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p500.jpg	page image (transcribed)
111	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p492.jpg	page image (transcribed)
112	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this revision; final pass
113	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p492.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p493.jpg	page image (transcribed)
114	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p493.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p500.jpg	page image (transcribed)
115	archive.org operaomni10duns page/n751–n752 (Vivès 10:744–745)	page image (transcribed)
116	archive.org operaomni10duns page/n751–n752 (Vivès 10:744–745)	page image (transcribed)
117	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p508.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p509.jpg	page image (transcribed)
118	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p493.jpg	page image (transcribed)
119	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p494.jpg	page image (transcribed)
120	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p494.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p495.jpg	page image (transcribed)
121	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p496.jpg	page image (transcribed)
122	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p497.jpg	page image (transcribed)
123	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p498.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p499.jpg	page image (transcribed)
124	archive.org operaomni10duns page/n643 (Vivès 10:636); ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/rep-I-d39-40.txt	page image (transcribed); OCR
125	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/snp1035.txt	final pass
126	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p505.jpg	page image (transcribed)
127	~/milbank-reverse/source/bso.txt	final pass (no Latin run; read in source)
128	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
129	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
130	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
131	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	editorial revision (text layer of OT 9)
132	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	editorial revision (text layer of OT 9)
133	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	editorial revision (text layer of OT 9)
134	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
135	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
136	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
137	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
138	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4); Cassino revision (run at 623)
139	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
140	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
141	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
142	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (no Latin run; read in source)
143	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
144	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
145	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
146	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
148	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
149	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
150	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
151	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both; this revision; editorial revision (the Paris run at 727B)

Note	Source file	Checked by
152	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/paris1277/chartularium-1277-articles.txt (OCR, read for the matched articles; not quoted)	this revision; editorial revision (657C)
153	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/Dialogus.md	both
154	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
155	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
156	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
157	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
158	archive.org enchiridionsymboo1denz page images (Denzinger 1911, p. 226)	page image (transcribed)
159	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
160	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
161	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Annihilatione.md	both
162	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Logica_Vol_II.md	both
163	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Logica_Vol_II.md	both
164	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Logica_Vol_II.md	both
165	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Ente_Libri_Secundi.md	both
166	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
167	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both; this revision
168	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
169	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
170	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
171	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
172	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
173	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
174	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
175	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
176	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
177	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
178	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
180	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft