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RESEARCH ARTICLE

What God Does Not Do

Abelard's Actualism, Its Medieval Answer, and John Milbank's Genealogy of Possibility

ABSTRACT

John Milbank's *Beyond Secular Order* (2013) holds that modern thought rests partly on "the priority of possibility", a doctrine he traces to late-medieval Franciscan theology and above all to Duns Scotus, and against which he sets an Aquinas for whom God is "compelled" in creating by the glory of his own intellect. This article tests that genealogy against the Latin of a debate it omits. Milbank's possibilism has two parts: a ground of the possible, a range of "given" possibilities that God considers before he decides; and a contingency of the actual, redefined as "a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated". In the twelfth century Peter Abelard argued, on premises Milbank shares and against what he knew to be the common view, that God can do only what he does at some time. Hugh of St Victor, the *Summa sententiarum* and Peter Lombard answered the thesis by distinctions granting that God never acts beyond his wisdom and denying that his wisdom fixes a single world, and Bonaventure, Aquinas and Bradwardine inherited that answer. The narrower reading of Abelard given here rests in part on a text Migne does not print, the Monte Cassino fragments of the *Theologia christiana* (Tosti 1851, reprinted by Cousin 1859), which as printed place the necessity in God's doing and deny it to the thing done. Read from his own text, Aquinas rejects the claim that the order of creatures is commensurate with God's goodness, and rejects explicitly a creation from necessity of knowledge, which this article judges the nearest medieval form of Milbank's "compelled". That answers the defence on the creation articles; the Trinitarian texts on which Milbank's "uttering of the Verbum" would rest are not on this shelf. Scotus's *Lectura* I d.39, the one medieval text Milbank cites in his account of possibilism, bears out his account of a real alternative of the will at the same instant as the actual (which Milbank glosses as a persisting possibility), and his charge that Scotus loosed the divine will from a prior judgment of the best: the divine intellect offers contingent propositions to the will as neutral. But Scotus grounds contingency in the divine will as Aquinas's *Summa* does and states it with the composite and divided senses that Aquinas also uses; what is new in him is an alternative of the *will* at the same instant, where Aquinas has an alternative of God's *power*. Ockham, read in the *Ordinatio* and the *Quodlibeta*, carries the will-first strand further: a possibility that belongs to the creature "from itself", a better world measured without reference to the maker's wisdom, and a merit that rests on God's acceptance under laws he has instituted. His absolute power is one power, which does "nothing inordinately", and he takes it from Lombard's reply to Abelard; but it is also the ground on which he admits an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object, which comes near Milbank's claim that absolute power can sever the mind from things, though Ockham denies that God can make an absent thing evidently appear present. And Ockham rejects any power for opposites without succession, which limits any modal lineage a reader might draw from Scotus to him. Wyclif, the necessitarian among these authors, still affirmed God's power over what never comes to be. The contingency of the actual was the common teaching of the twelfth-century schools, held against a named actualist, and Milbank's dating of its redefinition does not stand, except so far as his word "pure" carries the ground of the possible; a range of possibles that God considers as given is not found before Scotus, and what begins with Scotus is narrower than the genealogy requires.

KEYWORDS Peter Abelard · Peter Lombard · Thomas Aquinas · John Duns Scotus · William of Ockham · divine power · possibility and actuality · John Milbank · Thomas Bradwardine · John Wyclif

PROVENANCE

Question: put by Wilson Pruitt (human-prompted): to read John Milbank's *Beyond Secular Order* against the Latin sources on hand for uncited allies and the tradition's replies. The question of an "early offender" (section 10) was added by the orchestrating model (Claude Fable 5.2). *Scope and hunt brief:* Claude Fable 5.2. *Source search:* four instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one shelf each. *Source check, dossier and draft:* Claude Opus 5.5. *Orchestration:* Claude Fable 5.2, then Claude Opus 5.5. *Check of the draft after the writer:* Claude Fable 5.2, with a verification pass over the flagged notes by Claude Sonnet 5.5. *Scotus page images (Vatican ed.) and Ockham Quodlibeta:* supplied by Wilson Pruitt. *Monte Cassino fragments (transcribed from page images) and De potentia q.3 a.15:* added by Claude Opus 5.5. *Quotation verification:* script: every Latin run in the notes was tested against the file its note names;

runs transcribed from page images were checked by eye against the image. *Editorial review:* an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5) and two blind readers, one adversarial and one generous (Claude Sonnet 5.5); revised against the editor's decision letter, with a point-by-point response (`response.md`). *Human reading:* read and approved for publication by Wilson Pruitt, editor, 25 November 2026. *Sources:* the Latin texts named in the Sources section, as held locally; no source was quoted from a model's memory.

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1. Introduction

In *Beyond Secular Order* John Milbank names a set of assumptions that, on his account, modern philosophy shares with the late-medieval theology that prepared it. The third is "the priority of possibility". Its rival is the "traditional theological sense that there can be a kind of necessity in actuality as such which is a beautiful, harmonious, grace-imbued good order" (p. 108).[1] The change from the one to the other was made, he argues, by a religious attitude that wished to protect divine freedom "beyond even the scope of its generosity" (p. 109), and it reached its settled form in Duns Scotus, for whom every actual state is shadowed by the real possibility of another (pp. 36–37). Against it Milbank sets an Aquinas for whom God "is himself 'compelled' in creating by the aesthetic glory of his own intellect" (p. 109).

The genealogy begins too late. Whether God can do what he does not do was argued at length in the schools of Paris more than a century before Scotus was born, when Peter Abelard defended, in his own name and against what he knew to be the common view, the thesis that God can do only what he does at some time.[2] Abelard's arguments rest on premises Milbank holds. His opponents, Hugh of St Victor, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* and Peter Lombard, answered the thesis with distinctions that passed through Lombard's *Sentences* to Bonaventure and Aquinas and were still argued over by Thomas Bradwardine and John Wyclif in the fourteenth century. In the pages where Milbank gives the history of possibilism (pp. 34–37 and 108–110), he grounds the primacy of the actual in Aristotle, and the one medieval text he cites is Scotus's *Lectura*. None of the authors on either side of the twelfth-century debate appears there.

This article sets that debate against Milbank's claim. After a statement of the claim (section 2), it takes Abelard, the twelfth-century reply and Bonaventure (sections 3–5), Aquinas, read from his own text and through Bradwardine, who quotes him (6), Scotus, read in the *Lectura* that Milbank cites (7), Ockham, whom Milbank names as Scotus's heir (8), Bradwardine and Wyclif (9), and two monastic texts (10). The argument is built from the Latin: each quotation was taken from a copy of the text and checked against it, the notes give the Latin, and where the available texts do not reach, the article says so.

Milbank's possibilism has two parts, and the sources treat them differently. The first is a claim about the ground of the possible: the possibilist God "mainly considers a range of 'given' possibilities" and then decides which to actualise (p. 109). The second is a claim about the contingency of the actual: contingency was "redefined … as a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated at all, or else instantiated otherwise" (pp. 36–37). Milbank grants Aquinas a contingency of the created world, grounded in its dependence on the creative act (p. 35); his complaint is with a contingency of bare possibility. The article's position is this. The second part, that what is actual might not have been, or might have been otherwise, was the common teaching of the twelfth-century schools, and so Milbank's dating of the redefinition does not stand, except for what his word "pure" adds. It was held against a named actualist, by authors who denied as firmly as Milbank that God's

1. John Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 108. Later references to this book are given by page in the text.

2. Peter Abelard, *Introductio ad theologiam* III, PL 178:1098C. The Latin is given in section 3. Migne's editor dates the Council of Sens, which condemned propositions drawn from Abelard, to 1140 (PL 182:1049, *Admonitio*). The dates of Abelard's teaching at Paris and of Scotus's birth (c. 1265) are general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

will could act apart from his wisdom. The first part, a range of possibles given to God, is not found among these authors before Scotus. Aquinas stands with the twelfth century. In the articles where he treats God's will and power, he rejects the claim that the order of creatures is commensurate with God's goodness, and he rejects explicitly a creation from necessity of knowledge, which is, in this article's judgment, the nearest medieval form of Milbank's "compelled". Those articles concern creation; the texts in which Aquinas joins the procession of the Word to the making of the world are not on this shelf, and the reply to Milbank's "Paternal uttering of the Verbum" stops at that line. Scotus, read in the text Milbank cites, holds a synchronic contingency of the will, which Milbank glosses as a persisting possibility, and in one respect does what Milbank says: he takes from the divine intellect any judgment of what is to be done before the will determines it. His grounding of contingency in the divine will, and the logic of composite and divided senses in which he states it, he shares with Aquinas. What is new in him is narrower than the genealogy requires. Ockham carries the will-first strand further, into a possibility the creature has from itself and a merit that rests on God's acceptance. He takes absolute power from Lombard and holds it to be one power that does nothing inordinately; yet on that power he grounds an intuitive cognition of what does not exist, which comes near what Milbank says of him. He rejects the synchronic alternative Milbank finds in Scotus.

2. Milbank's Actualism

Possibilism, Milbank argues, cannot explain what sways a choice, since "in reality there is no 'pure will'" (p. 108), only desire drawn by a reason or a lure. It reads reality "in 'cold' terms as doubly 'given'", first as possibility and then as instantiation, where the religious mind reads existence as a gift (p. 109). The historical claim is made in one paragraph. The shift "from interpreting being as created gift to interpreting it as the elective instantiation of uncreated possibility" came from an attitude which pictured God as one who "mainly considers a range of 'given' possibilities, and then, 'as a matter of fact', makes a certain decision as to which ones will be actualised" (p. 109). Against this stands "Aquinas's alternative religious vision, according to which God is himself 'compelled' in creating by the aesthetic glory of his own intellect in the Paternal uttering of the Verbum", together with "the discriminating 'aesthetic' judgements which he makes as to the contents of the created world" (pp. 109–110). He cites no text of Aquinas for the claim.

An earlier chapter, a survey of modern ontology, names the culprits. Possibilism is "a matter of stressing the potentia absoluta as God's primary attribute" (p. 34), with the will raised above the intellect and formally distinguished from it, so that willing comes to be "sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35). Aquinas, by contrast, is said to have held the regular "necessities" of the created order "to be just as contingent" as its accidents, because both depend on the divine act (p. 35). The Franciscans, "pre-eminently Duns Scotus", preferred "the sheer arbitrary electedness of every aspect of the created order". Milbank's stated mechanism for the shift is exegetical: a move "from a more allegorical to a more literalist apprehension of biblical content", for which he rests on Henri de Lubac's *Exégèse médiévale* (pp. 35–36, with his notes 41–42); that thesis is tested in JMT 1.4 and is not examined here. And so contingency was "redefined, with archiepiscopal backing at Paris and Canterbury, as a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated at all, or else instantiated otherwise" (pp. 36–37). The contrast is then drawn at its finest point. For Aquinas, "an actuality realises a possibility, but does not continue to be synchronically shadowed by a real possibility that is a hypostasised logical possibility", since an actuality "fulfils in some measure a divinely intended good and therefore 'cancels out', through its very fulfilment, the genuinely possible". For Scotus, the contingency of an actual moment is guaranteed "by the persistence in some sense of the real possibility of an alternative actuality which is therefore synchronous with that actuality" (p. 37).

Three historical claims can be tested: that the tradition knew a necessity in the actual order as such; that the opposite view arose from a wish to protect divine freedom beyond its generosity, against which Aquinas stood;

and that the late-medieval error lay in sundering will from the rationally best, stressing absolute power, and redefining contingency as a possibility that might not have been realised.

The sources Milbank gives for this history are, with two exceptions, modern. The survey of ontology cites Frédéric Nef throughout, with Olivier Boulnois, André de Muralt, Henri de Lubac, David Burrell and David Piché's edition of the Paris condemnation of 1277, from which a list of articles is given. The exceptions are Aristotle, for the primacy of the actual "in terms of definition, time and substance" (p. 35), and Scotus's *Lectura* I d.39, the one medieval text cited in these pages (pp. 34–37, with his notes 37–45). Elsewhere in the book Milbank cites medieval texts often, Scotus among them, on other questions. Abelard appears once, on moral intention (p. 212). Wyclif appears only in political contexts (pp. 63, 210, 250), and Bonaventure as an offender on other counts, among them univocity and the doctrine of the Trinity (index: pp. 26 n. 21, 45 with nn. 62–63, 61, 141, 162 n. 108). Hugh of St Victor appears once, in another connection: a note on the arts quotes him (p. 218, note 224). Lombard, the *Summa sententiarum*, Peter Damian and Bradwardine do not appear.[3] The debate that ran from Abelard's *Introductio* through the forty-third and forty-fourth distinctions of Lombard's first book to Bradwardine and Wyclif is absent from the account.

3. Abelard

The plainest medieval statement of the position Milbank calls actualism is Peter Abelard's, in the third book of the *Introductio ad theologiam*. Abelard argues both sides before he gives his judgment, and the case for his thesis rests on a principle Milbank would accept. God does not act like the tyrant in Juvenal, for whom it is enough to say "let my will stand for a reason"; God "is rather to be said to will each thing to be done because he saw that it was good that it be done".[4] It follows, Abelard argues, that a choice between equal goods would be empty: "if what he left undone when he chose this had been equally good, there was surely no reason why he should leave that and choose this".[5] This is Milbank's premise that there is no pure will, only a will drawn by a reason, applied to God. Abelard draws from it a conclusion Milbank does not state.

He then gives the other side. A man who will be damned can be saved; if he can be saved by God, God can save him; therefore "God can do what he will never do". On the contrary view, the objector adds, no thanks would be owed to God, since he would act "compelled by a certain necessity of his own nature rather than led by free will".[6] The judgment follows the objection, in the first person. God does not make rain now because the time is not fitting, "for some reasonable cause, though hidden from us"; and so, "since God can do only what it befits him to do, and it does not befit him to do anything that he leaves undone, I hold that he can do only what he does at some time". He adds that "this opinion of ours has few or no supporters" and seems to

3. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 34–37 with notes 37–45, 108–112 with notes 214–220, and the index s.vv. "Abelard", "Bonaventure", "Wyclif". In pp. 34–37 the one medieval citation is note 44, "Duns Scotus, Lectura I, 39"; note 40 reads "Aristotle, Metaphysics 1049b4–5". Medieval citations elsewhere in the book include, for example, Scotus, *Ordinatio* II d.3 and *Opus Oxoniense* IV d.1 q.1 §7 (p. 48, notes 70 and 72), Bonaventure (p. 45, notes 62–63), Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III q.1 a.2 (p. 218, note 222), and Hugh of St Victor, "Didascalion, 2:1 'the arts are concerned . . . to restore within us the divine likeness'" (p. 218, note 224). The index entry for Bonaventure reads "26n.21, 45, 45nn.62–63, 61, 141, 162n.108".

4. Peter Abelard, *Introductio ad theologiam* III, PL 178:1095C. «Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.» and «Sed magis velle dicendus est singula ut fiant quia bonum esse ut fierent, vidit.» Translations of Latin in this article are the author's own, except those of Bonaventure, which are quoted from the Wroot Press translation (see n. 37).

5. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1095D. «Atqui si illud aeque bonum esset quod dimisit facere quando istud elegit, nulla ratio profecto fuit cur illud dimitteret, atque istud eligeret.»

6. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1096D–1097B. «Potest itaque facere Deus quod nequaquam facturus est.» and «necessitate magis quadam propriae naturae compulsus, quam gratuita voluntate ad haec facienda inductus agat.» The paragraph states the case against Abelard's thesis, which he answers at cols. 1101A–D.

7. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1098C. «quadam utique rationabili de causa, licet nobis occulta.» and «Quantum igitur aestimo, cum id tantum Deus facere possit quod eum facere convenit, nec eum quidquam facere convenit quod facere praetermittat, profecto id solum eum

disagree "greatly with the sayings of the saints and a little with reason".[7] Abelard knew he stood against the tradition.

The replies to the objections set guards on the thesis. To the argument from the damned man Abelard answers that "possible" is said in two ways: in one place it "is taken with respect to the nature of God, here with respect to the nature of creatures". Even if God could not have been without the will to create, "we are not therefore compelled to say that the world, or the things created, could not have been lacking".[8] The creature remains contingent in its own nature, though the divine will is not contingent. To the argument from thanks he answers that the necessity of God's goodness "is not separated from his will, and is not to be called coercion", as God is necessarily immortal and wills to be what he necessarily is.[9] He likens God's goodness to the pity that moves a good man to help, "that very pity compelling him to it".[10] Then he restates the thesis in its widest form: from these reasons and the answers to objections, "it is plain to all, I think, that God can do or leave undone only what he does or leaves undone at some time, and only in the way and at the time at which he does it, not otherwise".[11] The replies add a theory of necessity without coercion, and of creaturely contingency without divine contingency. The thesis survives them.

The fifth book of the *Theologia christiana* goes further. Abelard repeats Plato's "most true argument" that God could in no way have made a better world than he made.[12] He says that God, in all he does, looks to the good so far "that he is said to be inclined to each thing by the very worth of the good rather than by the pleasure of his own will".[13] He sets out the authorities against him, among them Augustine's "he could, but he would not", and confesses himself "gravely entangled on both sides of the dilemma".[14] He offers his own view "without any obstinacy of assertion".[15] The view is stronger than in the *Introductio*. God's goodness is so great "that it compels him necessarily to the goods he can do", so that he cannot refrain from doing them, as well and as soon as he can.[16] "Whatever he does, then, as he necessarily wills it, so he necessarily does it", and "therefore God necessarily willed and made the world, and he was not idle, who could not make it before he made it, because before he made it, it was not fitting that it be made".[17] Here the verb "compel" is Abelard's own, used of goodness, and it carries no scare quotes.

The *Theologia christiana*, as Migne prints it, ends in this paragraph, three lines after that sentence, with the words "which is reserved to his high counsel".[18] Cousin's text of 1859 ends at the same words. In that form no

posse facere arbitror quod quandoque facit, licet haec nostra opinio paucos aut nullos habeat assentatores, et plurimum dictis sanctorum, et aliquantulum a ratione dissentire videatur.»

8. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101B. «Etsi eum sine voluntate creandi mundum, vel voluntate miserandi ponamus non potuisse non esse, non ideo cogendi sumus vel mundum, vel ea quae creata sunt, non potuisse deesse. Ibi quippe, sicut jam determinatum est, ad naturam Dei; hic ad naturam creaturarum possibile sumitur.»

9. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101C. «quaedam naturae vel bonitatis ejus necessitas ab ejus voluntate non est separata, nec coactio dicenda est, qua etiam nolens id facere cogatur.»

10. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101D. «a subveniendo abstinere non posset, ipsa eum scilicet pietate ad hoc compellente.»

11. Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101D. «Praedictis itaque rationibus, vel objectorum solutionibus, liquere omnibus reor, ea solummodo Deum posse facere vel dimittere, quae quandoque facit vel dimittit, et eo modo tantum vel eo tempore quo facit, non alio.»

12. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1324C. «Hinc est illa Platonis verissima ratio, qua videlicet probat Deum nullatenus mundum meliorem potuisse facere quam fecit.»

13. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1327B. «In tantum autem, in omnibus quae Deus facit, quod bonum est attendit, ut ipso boni pretio potius quam voluntatis suae libito ad singula facienda inclinari dicatur.»

14. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1329A–B. «Potuit ergo, sed noluit.» and «His itaque tam rationibus quam auctoritatibus, graviter in utraque parte complexionis impliciti, quo nos explicare possimus non facile aditum invenio». The first sentence is Augustine (*De natura et gratia*), quoted among the authorities for the contrary view.

15. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1329C. «quid et nobis super hoc visum sit sine aliqua obstinationis assertione proferamus.»

16. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1330B. «Tanta quippe est ejus bonitas ut cum necessario ad bona quae potest facienda compellat, nec omnino possit abstinere quin bona quae potest efficiat et quo melius potest vel citius potest.»

17. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1330B–C. «Quidquid itaque facit, sicut necessario vult, ita et necessario facit.» and «Necessario itaque Deus mundum esse voluit ac fecit, nec otiosus» and «exstitit, qui eum, priusquam fecit, facere non potuit; quia priusquam fecit, fieri eum non oportuit.»

18. Abelard, *Theologia christiana* V, PL 178:1330C, the last words of the text as printed. «imo nisi optimum, id est tam bonum quantumcunque convenit, quod suo alto reservatur consilio.»

replies to objections follow, and none of the guards of the *Introductio*. But the printed text is not the whole of the work in every witness. A manuscript of Monte Cassino, compared with Cousin's edition at the abbey and first printed in part by Luigi Tosti in 1851, carries the fifth book further, and Cousin reprinted Tosti's fragments at the end of his second volume, with what was already in print set in brackets. Tosti describes one of his two fragments as the end of the treatise, long wanted.[19] In this witness the solution is preceded by difficulties on both horns that the printed text lacks. If God can save one who is not to be saved, he can do what it is not good for him to do. Of two beggars equally worthy, one receives the alms, which cannot be divided, and "there is no reason why it should be given to him rather than to the other". And "if God can prevent some evil which he does not prevent, he seems to be consenting".[20] Then comes the solution as Migne prints it, down to "his high counsel", and after those words, outside Cousin's brackets, the counsel is named as that "in which he established eternally and unchangeably the being and the reasons of all natures".[21]

The continuation, some nineteen hundred words, answers two questions, in Abelard's voice as Tosti and Cousin print it. The first is why the world is not eternal, and Abelard answers that God had to precede every creature by existence as well as by nature.[22] He meets an objection from God's goodness, that it would not befit that goodness ever to will to be alone, by appeal to God's honour and to providence, which is foreknowledge of things to come.[23] The answer does not bear on the argument here, and it is given in full in the notes.

19. V. Cousin and C. Jourdain, *Petri Abaelardi opera hactenus seorsim edita*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1859), 804–809, "Magistri Petri Abaelardi Fragmenta Theologiae christianae", transcribed from the page images (archive.org, operahactenusseoooabeluoft); first printed by Luigi Tosti, *Storia di Abelardo e dei suoi tempi* (Naples, 1851), 286 ff. Cousin, 804: «Cum pars ultima voluminis hujus jamdudum typis mandata erat, inciderunt in manus fragmenta quaedam, et illa quidem non mediocris pretii, Theologiae Christianae nostri Abaelardi, quae apud bibliothecam Cassinensem reperta vir clar. Luigi Tosti primus in lucem edidit» and, in his note, «Quae uncis intercluduntur jam edita erant.» At the join (805) his note refers back to his own text of the *Theologia christiana*: «Vide supra, pag. 565 hujus voluminis.» Tosti's introduction (pp. 281 ff.), read only in a rough OCR and not quoted, reports a Cassino manuscript in quarto numbered 174, containing Augustine's *Enchiridion* and *Retractationes* and then the *Theologia christiana*, which Montfaucon had listed as Augustine's; that the comparison with Cousin's edition was made at the abbey, and the unpublished fragments extracted by Father Kalefati (so the OCR reads the name); and that he prints two fragments of the *Theologia christiana*, one of them much wanted as the end of the treatise. Neither editor says more of the manuscript's date or of its relation to the other witnesses, and nothing more is claimed here. The preface Migne reprints says nothing of other forms of the *Theologia christiana*; of the *Introductio* its editor writes that «mutila est in editis, nec perfectam invenimus in manuscriptis» (PL 178, *Observationes praeviae*). Ligatures are resolved in the transcriptions from Cousin.

20. Cousin II, 804–805 (Tosti 1851), unbracketed, after the bracketed «Sed rursus singulis istis difficillimae occurrunt objectiones, ut utroque cornu graviter fidem nostram oppugnet complexio» (804; Cousin refers it to his p. 561). «Potest facere Deus ut ille salvetur qui non est salvandus, vel quem non est bonum salvari; ergo potest facere id quod non est bonum eum facere.» and «Duo sunt egentes, quorum uterque aeque dignus eleemosyna; alteri illa datur, quia dividi non potest, nec utrisque sufficere potest: sed nequaquam ratio est cur illi detur potius quam isti» (804) and «Si potest disturbare malum aliquod Deus, quod non disturbat, videtur consentiens esse.» (805). The bracketed «Quis autem negare audeat, quod non possit Deus eum qui damnandus est salvare» follows. These difficulties are put against both sides and are not Abelard's position.

21. Cousin II, 805 (Tosti 1851). «quod suo alto reservatur consilio,] in quo omnium naturarum esse et rationes aeternaliter atque incommutabiliter constituit.» The bracket is Cousin's and closes the text already in print. Within the bracketed solution the Cassino text differs from Migne's in small readings, for instance «Quidquid itaque facit, sicut necessario vult, ita necessario facit.» against Migne's «ita et necessario facit» (n. 17).

22. Cousin II, 805–806 (Tosti 1851). "If anyone asks for a reason here too, why God ought not to have willed or made the world to be always with him", Abelard answers that "it was fitting that he should precede every creature not only by nature but also by existence, so that he might appear the more worthy". «Si quis tamen et de hoc rationem exigat quare Deum velle non oportuerit aut facere ut semper cum eo mundus esset» (805) and «Oportebat enim ut non solum per naturam, verum et per existentiam praecederet omnem creaturam, ut tanto dignior appareret» (806). Cousin marks a reading in the next lines as corrupt («Sic Tosti; at locus certe depravatus», 806 n. 1).

23. Cousin II, 806 and 808 (Tosti 1851). The objection Abelard puts to himself comes from God's goodness: "how would it befit his immense goodness and honour never to will to be alone", and not to share his blessedness, when Boethius says that "every good, when it is brought into common, shines out more beautifully"? Abelard replies that God "willed to exist in himself, perfect in his majesty", without the things he made, that he ought to look to his own honour more than to our profit, and that "Providence would not be at all, unless God went before all things by existence also", since providence is foreknowledge of things to come. The objection: «Sed dicis: Quomodo immensae ejus bonitati honorique congrueret, ut nullatenus unquam solus esse vellet» and «Omne, inquit, bonum cum in commune deducitur, pulchrius elucescit» (806). The reply: «sine quibus omnino in se, in sua perfectus majestate, voluit existere» and «quem tamen amplius plus honorem suum quam nostrum oportet attendere profectum» (806) and «Quae quidem Providentia omnino non esset, nisi Deus cunctis per existentiam quoque praeiret. Non enim Providentia nisi de futuris esse potest, cum sit Providentia futurorum praescientia.» (808). Between these Abelard answers a further objection, that to seek one's own glory is pride, by distinguishing love of one's own glory from ambition (806–807).

The second question is the one Migne's text leaves open. Abelard first restates the thesis of the printed text as a bare necessity: "hence it is necessary that he do all things that he can do, and as good as he can". The next sentence sets the limit: "yet it is not therefore necessary that all things which are done by him be done".[24] He works it out as a distinction of subjects. "We hold, then, following the force of the arguments above, that God does necessarily all that he does; and yet, as has been said, that what is done by him is not done necessarily." When we say that God must save this man, "we refer the force of the necessity to the nature of the subject, which is God", as if God "is by his very nature so compelled to do it that his nature in no way permits him not to do it as he does". It is not necessary that the man be saved by God, for the nature of the one saved "is changeable, and fixed of necessity in none of its states". The result is put as a formula: "It is necessary, then, that God do what it is not necessary should be done by him." In the first clause necessity "is applied to the unchangeable nature of God, in the second to the changeable outcome of his working".[25] Possibility is divided in the same way. "It is possible that this man be saved by God" refers possibility to the man's nature, and is true, since his nature does not resist; "it is possible that God save this man" refers it to God's nature, and that "is in no way true, as we have already confirmed above". A voice is called audible, open of itself to being heard, though no one yet exists who could hear it, and a field fit to be tilled before anyone is created who could till it. The fragment ends: "but though they are fit to be heard or tilled, it is not yet necessary that there be someone fit to hear or till it".[26]

The fuller text, as printed, restores two of the three guards of the *Introductio*. The first does not depend on the Cassino witness: possibility is said with respect to creatures already in the *Introductio*'s "here with respect to the nature of creatures" (n. 8), and the fragments add only examples. The second rests on the Tosti and Cousin printing: what God makes is contingent in its own nature, so that the world God necessarily made is not itself necessary. The third guard does not return. The *Introductio* denied that the necessity of God's goodness is to be called coercion (n. 9); the Cassino text says without qualification that God is "compelled" by his nature to what he does. On God's side the necessity is not softened: God must do all he can, as well as he can, as the printed text already said, and it is "in no way true" that he can save a man he does not save. What the continuation adds is a place where the necessity stops. On this witness, Abelard holds the necessity of God's doing and denies the necessity of the thing done. The conclusion is the article's, and it holds as far as the fragments Tosti printed and Cousin reprinted are Abelard's text, which neither editor's report of the manuscript settles (n. 19).

The early-modern editor whose preface Migne reprints, reading the shorter text, took the passage as Abelard's settled view: "he imposes so great a necessity on God that on his account God cannot act otherwise than he acts", and recorded that the teaching was censured at Sens and by Innocent II.[27] The censure can be read in its own words. The list of Abelard's errors that Denzinger prints under the council of Sens gives as its seventh article, in the words of the third of the *Capitula* (section 4), "that God can do or leave undone only those things,

24. Cousin II, 809 (Tosti 1851). «sicut id ei derogaret, si posset facere bona quae non faceret, aut non tantum bona quantum posset. Unde eum omnia quae potest facere necesse est, et tam bona quantum potest. Nec tamen ideo omnia quae ab eo fiunt necesse est fieri.» The sentence these words complete begins at the foot of p. 808, «Neque hoc bonitati ejus in aliquo derogare, si voluerit», and continues «secum aeternaliter aliqua permanere» (809); as printed, its conditional clause is hard to construe, and it is not translated here.

25. Cousin II, 809 (Tosti 1851). «Ponimus itaque, juxta superiorum rationum acumina, Deum omnia quae facit necessario facere; nec tamen, ut dictum est, quae ab eo fiunt necessario fieri» and «vim ipsam necessitudinis ad subjecti naturam reducimus, quod est Deus, ac si videlicet diceremus quod Deus reipsa sua natura ita id facere compellitur, ut nullo modo ejus natura permittat, ut id ita non faciat, sicuti facit.» and «natura quippe ejus mutabilis est, et in nullo suo statu necessario fixa.» and «Necesse est itaque Deum id facere, quod non est necesse ab eo fieri. Ibi quippe vis necessitudinis ad immutabilem Dei naturam applicatur, hic ad operationis ejus commutabilem eventum».

26. Cousin II, 809 (Tosti 1851), the last words of the fragments. «Similiter cum dicimus, possibile est hunc salvari per Deum, et possibile est Deum hunc salvare; ibi ad naturam hujus, hic ad naturam Dei possibilitas refertur.» and «quod nequaquam verum est, ut supra jam confirmavimus.» and «Sic et vocem audibilem dicimus, hoc est apertam ex se ipsa audiri, quamvis nullus adhuc esset qui eam audire sufficeret; et agrum aptum excoli, antequam etiam crearetur qui eum excolere valeret.» and «Sed quamvis apta sint ad hoc ut audiantur vel colantur, non jam tamen necesse est aptum esse aliquem ut hoc audiat vel colat.»

27. Editor's preface to the *Theologia christiana*, PL 178:1121–1123. «Tantam Deo necessitatem imponit, ut secundum ipsum aliter agere non possit quam agat.» and «postmodum ejus doctrina Ecclesiae censuris affecta in Senonensi et ab Innocentio II.»

or only in that way, or only at that time, at which he does, and not otherwise".[28] Innocent II, writing to the archbishops of Sens and Reims and to Bernard, who had sent him "the chapters of errors", condemned "the chapters sent to us by your discretion, and all the teachings of Peter himself, ... together with their author", and imposed on him "perpetual silence, as on a heretic"; a second letter ordered Abelard and Arnold of Brescia shut up in religious houses and their books burned.[29]

Two short confessions qualify the thesis. The *Apologia* reads: "I believe that God can do only what it befits him to do; and that he can do many things which he will never do."[30] A variant in a *Responsio* printed in the Patrologia says that God *does* only what befits him and could do many things he does not do; its editor allows that it may have been written by another in Abelard's name.[31] Neither should displace the two treatises, but they show that the accused, or someone speaking for him, kept the principle of fittingness ("convenit") and gave up the conclusion.

4. The Twelfth-Century Reply

The reply came within a generation, if the dates of n. 2 and n. 32, which rest partly on general knowledge, hold. Hugh of St Victor gives it in the *De sacramentis*; that he was the first to give it is not shown by the sources used here. He opens with a rebuke ("let them go now and glory in their own sense, who think they can examine God's works by reason, and confine his power under a measure") and reports the opponents' argument from the best: if God could make better what he makes, "in that very thing he does not do well".[32] He calls their teaching "something new, and truly new, not so much true as new", which places them among his contemporaries.[33] Hugh names no opponent, and nothing in this chapter ties the thesis to Abelard by name; what follows calls it Abelard's on the evidence of Lombard's wording and Bonaventure's report, below. His answer is a single sentence: "we say that it is possible that what will be should not come about". From it he infers that "God can make other than he makes, yet in making otherwise he would not be another".[34] Hugh's possibility here is of a future that may fail to arrive. Whether it is the possibility Milbank ascribes to Scotus, an alternative standing beside the actual at the same instant, is taken up in section 7.

28. H. Denzinger and C. Bannwart, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, 11th ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911), 169–170, no. 374, transcribed from the page image. «Quod ea solummodo possit Deus facere vel dimittere, vel eo modo tantum, vel eo tempore, quo facit et non alio.» Denzinger heads the list «Conc. Senonense 1140», names the author «Petrus Abaelard (Baiolardus)», the form of the name Bonaventure uses (n. 37), and gives Mansi XXI 568 C as his source; Mansi was not consulted. The same thesis is the third of the *Capitula haeresum* (n. 50).

29. Innocent II, *Epistolae* 447 and 448, PL 179:515C–517C, both headed by the editor «(Anno 1140, Jul. 16.)», with references to Mansi XXI 564–565. «missis a fraternitate vestra nobis errorum capitulis» (516C) and «destinata nobis a vestra discretione capitula, et universa ipsius Petri dogmata, sanctorum canonum auctoritate, cum suo auctore damnavimus, eique tanquam haeretico perpetuum silentium imposuimus.» (517A) and, from the second letter, «in religiosis locis, ubi vobis melius visum fuerit, separatim faciatis includi, et libros erroris eorum, ubicunque reperti fuerint, igne comburi.» (517C). The first letter ends «Datum Laterani XII Kal. Augusti», the second «Data Laterani XVII Kalendas Augusti». Denzinger prints the sentence of condemnation as no. 387 and dates the letter «16. Iulii 1141» (p. 170, transcribed from the page image), citing «ML 179, 517 A»; PL 179 heads it 1140. The sources used here do not settle the year.

30. Abelard, *Apologia* (confession of faith), PL 178:107. «Deum ea solummodo posse facere credo quae ipsum facere convenit; et quod multa facere potest, quae nunquam faciet.»

31. *Responsio* attributed to Abelard, PL 180:330C. «Deum ea solummodo facere credo, quae ipsum facere convenit, et quod multa facere posset, quae non facit.»

32. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis* I.2.22, PL 176:214C–D. «Eant ergo nunc et de suo sensu glorientur qui opera divina ratione se putant» and «discutere, et ejus potentiam sub mensura coarctare.» and «Amplius quidquid facit Deus, si melius potest facere quam facit, in hoc ipso non bene facit, quod optime quidem non facit quod facit.» The third sentence is the opponents' argument, which Hugh answers. Hugh died in the late 1130s or early 1140s: the testimonia Migne prints give 1138 (Siffridus) and 1140 (Robert de Monte and Baronius), without agreement (PL 175, *Testimonia*). That Lombard's *Sentences* were composed after Hugh's death and drew on him is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here; the near-identity of their opening sentences is visible in the texts.

33. Hugh, *De sacramentis* I.2.22, PL 176:215D. «Hic illi nostri scrutatores qui defecerunt scrutantes scrutationes, novum aliquid et vere novum, nec tam verum quam novum afferre se dicunt.»

34. Hugh, *De sacramentis* I.2.22, PL 176:215B–D. «Et dicimus quod possibile est non fieri quod futurum est.» and «Ergo Deus aliud potest facere quam facit, ut tamen ipse aliud faciendo alius non sit.»

A short tract printed under Hugh's name in Migne, *De potestate et voluntate Dei*, sets out the actualist argument from the identity of power and will and answers it. The argument is put first: if to be able and to will are the same in God, and he wills all he does and does all he wills, "it is plain beyond doubt that he cannot do more than he does". The tract then states what follows, as a consequence it will not accept: "if this is received, that God can do nothing other or otherwise than he does, he works all things by necessity, and is bound and constrained by the law of his works, so that the condition of his work rules him; but this it is wicked to confess". The opponents' reply is reported ("how then, they say …") and met ("see what they say"). The answer is a distinction: "there are three things, affection, effect and respect. Will and power in God are one in affection and in effect, but in respect they are not one", since his power reaches things that his will does not, and his will reaches nothing his power does not.[35] The file's header gives no note on the attribution, and the tract is cited here as printed under Hugh's name, not as his. Its "constrained" and "rules him" name, in order to reject it, a God compelled by his own works.

Lombard's *Sentences* I d.43 copies Hugh's opening almost word for word ("certain men, glorying in their own sense, have tried to confine God's power under a measure") and sets out the opponents' thesis in three clauses: "God cannot make anything other than he makes, nor make better what he makes, nor omit any of the things he makes."[36] Lombard does not name them; Bonaventure, writing about a century later (a date from general knowledge), says the position "is said to have belonged to Master Peter Baialardus", a form of Abelard's name that his Quaracchi editors gloss "or Abaelardus", referring to the *Introductio* III.[37] The wording bears them out. One of the opponents' arguments in Lombard runs that God does nothing "except for the best and a reasonable cause, though it be hidden from us", which repeats Abelard's phrase about the rain.[38]

The form of Lombard's answer matters more for Milbank's case than its conclusion. He offers no counter-thesis about will. He will answer, he says, "by opening the double sense of the words", and he grants more than half of what they claim.[39] That God can do only what is good and just, meaning what would be good and just if he did it, "is true".[40] That the best reason or cause is with God, by which he does what he does and omits what he omits, is "true indeed, because in him is the most equitable and most right will", against which and apart from which he cannot act. What Lombard denies is that this reason fixes a single outcome: "the same reason and cause remaining, he could have made other things and left these aside".[41] The point of

35. *De potestate et voluntate Dei*, PL 176:839B–840B, printed among the works of Hugh of St Victor; the file's header gives only the author name and no note on the attribution. The argument: «Si ergo amplius non potest Deus facere quam vult, neque amplius facere vult quam facit, constat procul dubio quod amplius facere non potest quam facit.» The consequence rejected: «Sed si hoc recepitur quod Deus aliud vel aliter nihil facere possit quam facit, necessitate operatur omnia, et alligatur atque constringitur lege operum suorum ut dominetur ei conditio operis sui; sed hoc nefas est confiteri.» The opponents: «Quomodo ergo, inquiunt, idem est Deo velle et posse, si major est potestas ejus quam voluntas? Videte quid dicunt.» The answer: «Tria sunt, affectus, effectus et respectus. Voluntas ergo et potestas in Deo et affectu et effectu unum sunt, sed respectu ad unum non sunt.» and «ideo ad quaedam respicit potestas ejus ad quae non respicit voluntas ejus. Ad omnia autem ad quae respicit voluntas ejus, respicit potestas ejus.» The argument, the consequence and the opponents stand at 839B, the answer at 839C and 840B. «recepitur» is the text's reading.

36. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.1, PL 192:637. «Quidam tamen de suo sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam sub mensura coarctare conati sunt.» and «Aiunt enim: Non potest Deus aliud facere quam facit, nec melius facere id quod facit, nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit.»

37. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* d.43 a.un. q.4, resp., in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882), 1:775, with the editors' note 1. «Sed haec positio est erronea, sicut ostendit Magister in littera, quia nobilitati divinae potentiae derogat eius immensitatem limitando; et dicitur fuisse Magistri Petri Baialardi» and, in the editors' note, «Sive Abaelardi, cuius opinionem vide in eius». English translations of Bonaventure here and below are from Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences*, trans. Wroot Press, bonaventure.wrootpress.com.

38. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4, PL 192:638; compare Abelard, *Introductio* III, PL 178:1098C (n. 7). «Addunt quoque illi dicentes: Nihil facit aut dimittit, nisi optima et rationabili causa, licet nobis occulta sit» and «quae ratio aeterna est et semper manens, praeter quam non potest aliquid facere vel dimittere.»

39. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.3, PL 192:638. «His autem respondemus duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes, et ab eis involuta evolventes sic».

40. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.3, PL 192:638. «Non potest facere Deus nisi quod bonum est et justum, id est, non potest facere nisi illud quod si faceret bonum et justum esset, verum est».

41. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4, PL 192:638–639. «Cum enim dicitur: Ratio vel causa optima penes Deum est, qua facit cuncta quae facit, et dimittit ea quae dimittit, verum quidem est, quia in eo voluntas est aequissima et rectissima, qua facit et dimittit quae vult, contra quam facere non potest, nec praeter eam facere potest.» and «sed, eadem manente ratione et causa, alia potuit facere, et ista dimittere».

the whole distinction is in one sentence. If "he cannot do except what it is reasonable for him to do" means that he can do only reasonable things, "the sense is true"; "but if you take it that he cannot do other reasonable and good things except those he wills and does, the understanding is false".[42] Lombard defends possibilities of rational goods, measured by the same eternal reason as the actual, and no repertoire of bare logical options set before God.

Power and will are "one and the same thing, namely God himself", and yet "more things are subject to his power than to his will"; "let us confess, then, that God can do many things he does not will".[43] On the better world (d.44) Lombard turns the opponents' argument round. If the universe cannot be better because it cannot receive a greater good, "that very inability is a defect, not a consummation", and so "God can make a better thing than he makes".[44] "If the manner of working is referred to the wisdom of the maker, there can be neither another nor a better manner", since God can make nothing more wisely than he makes; "if it is referred to the very thing God makes, we say that another and a better manner is possible".[45] Augustine supplies the case: another way of our liberation was possible to God, but none was more fitting for the healing of our misery.[46]

The *Summa sententiarum*, printed among Hugh's works, gives the same reply with one addition that cuts toward Milbank. It too reports "certain men puffed up with knowledge" who say God cannot do other than he does, and it finds "poison" hidden in the word "ought".[47] It then distinguishes two senses of the divine will, the effect of the will and the will "which is in God, which is God himself", and of the second it says: "if we speak of the will of God itself, which is what he is, he can do nothing except what he wills, and can will nothing except what he wills. For to will is the same as to be; to will is also the same as to be able."[48] Here an opponent of Abelard asserts in his own voice the identity of will and power, which every author examined here accepts as a consequence of divine simplicity, and holds it together with Augustine's "God can do many things he does not will" by a distinction of senses. The same chapter says that God "does nothing from debt but from goodness alone", and divides "God can do better" as Lombard does.[49]

The charge against Abelard survives in the *Capitula haeresum*, whose third heading reads: "That God can do or omit only those things, or only in that way, or only at that time at which he does, not otherwise." The compilers quote both treatises.[50] Bernard of Clairvaux's letter against the *capitula* does not answer this one.

42. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4, PL 192:639. «Si enim, cum dicitur: Non potest facere nisi quod ratio est eum facere, intelligas eum non posse facere nisi ea quae rationabilia sunt, et ea quae si fierent rationabilia essent, verus est sensus. Si autem intelligas eum non posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, nisi ea quae vult et facit, falsus est intellectus.»

43. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.5, PL 192:639. «quia una et eadem res est potentia et voluntas, scilicet ipse Deus» and «Nec hac auctoritate negatur Deum plura posse quam velle, quia plura sunt subjecta ejus potentiae quam voluntati. Fateamur itaque Deum plura posse facere quae non vult, et posse dimittere quae facit.»

44. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.44 c.1–2, PL 192:640. «jam hoc ipsum non posse defectionis est, non consummationis» and «Potest ergo Deus meliorem rem facere quam facit.»

45. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.44 c.3, PL 192:640. «Si modus operationis ad sapientiam opificis referatur, nec alius, nec melior modus esse potest. Non enim potest facere aliquid aliter vel melius quam facit, id est, alia sapientia vel majori sapientia; nihil enim sapientius potest facere quam facit. Si vero referatur modus ad rem ipsam quam facit Deus, dicimus quia et alius, et melior potest esse modus.»

46. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.44 c.3, PL 192:640. «Unde Aug., in lib. 13 de Trin., dicit quod fuit et alius modus nostrae liberationis possibilis Deo, qui omnia potest; sed nullus alius nostrae miseriae sanandae fuit convenientior.»

47. *Summa sententiarum* I c.14, PL 176:69B–C. «Non est praemittendum hic quosdam scientia inflatos dicere Deum non posse facere aliud quam facit» and «Sed ut mihi videtur, sub hoc verbo latet venenum.»

48. *Summa sententiarum* I c.14, PL 176:69A–B. «Cum Augustinus dicit, multa potest facere Deus quae non vult, ad effectum respexit» and «Aliquando pro effectu divinae voluntatis; aliquando pro ea quae in Deo est, quae est ipse Deus.» and «Sed si de ipsa Dei voluntate loquimur quae est hoc quod ipse, nihil potest facere nisi quod vult et nihil potest velle nisi quod vult. Idem enim est velle quod esse; idem etiam velle quod posse.»

49. *Summa sententiarum* I c.14, PL 176:69C–70B. «nihil ipse ex debito sed sola bonitate facit.» and «Illa tamen locutio est ambigua: Deus potest melius facere. Si enim ita opponatur, potest melius, id est majori sapientia aliquid facere, falsa est, quia non potest augeri sapientia ejus; sed hoc modo vera»

50. *Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi* III, PL 182:1049C–1050A. «III. Quod ea Deus solummodo possit facere, vel dimittere, vel eo modo tantum, vel eo tempore quo facit, non alio.»

The nearest passage grants that "other and still other ways of our redemption" lay to the Almighty's hand.[51] William of St-Thierry's *Disputatio* does not take up the point either; it too grants many ways of salvation.[52] On this article of the charge Abelard's best-known accusers were silent. So, in the end, was the pope: Innocent II's letter does not set out the chapters, and it condemns them, with all of Abelard's teachings and their author, in a single sentence (n. 29).

5. Bonaventure

Bonaventure's commentary on these distinctions is the Franciscan reply, and Milbank's history would not predict it. He names the position and rejects it: "this position is erroneous, as the Master shows in the text, because by limiting it, it derogates from the immensity of the nobility of divine power".[53] His diagnosis is that the authors of "this foolish position" did "not know how to distinguish the ground of power from its act". With respect to the act that is *posse*, "the ground is taken as a habit, namely the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness: and this ground extends to infinite things"; with respect to *facere*, it is taken in act, as the divine disposition and foreknowledge.[54] The range of the possible is the range of God's knowledge and of the fittingness of his goodness; nothing presents it to him from outside. "although God can [do] more things than he wills, nevertheless he cannot operate without willing", since his power in execution must be equal to his disposition and will.[55] The Quaracchi editors, in a note to this question, set beside Abelard the Megarians whom Aristotle answers in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*, "who say that someone is able only when he is acting, and when he is not acting, is not able".[56] Abelard's God can do only what he does at some time, as the Megarian builder can build only while he builds.

Elsewhere Bonaventure stands nearer Milbank than Milbank's history places him. God, "since he is supremely good, cannot make anything except what is good, and so cannot make anything except a thing ordered to himself".[57] On the order of the world Bonaventure concedes the case for the best: "the universe is like a most beautiful song which proceeds according to the best consonances", a figure the editors trace to Augustine's *City of God*, and "the arguments proving that things are most well ordered are therefore to be conceded".[58] And in one place he says what Milbank charges the Franciscans with saying. Asked why God did not make a better world, when there is no upper limit to better worlds, he answers that the question is irrational, "and no solution can be given except this: that he willed, and he himself knows the reason. Yet even if he did not make it, no one can argue [against him], because this whole that he made was grace; nor was there

51. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Epistola* 190 (*Contra quaedam capitula errorum Abaelardi*) 8.19, PL 182:1068D–1069A. «Quis negat Omnipotenti ad manum fuisse alios et alios modos nostrae redemptionis, justificationis, liberationis?» A search of the whole letter for *solummodo*, *eo tempore*, *nisi quod facit*, *possit facere* and *posse facere* found no discussion of the third *capitulum*.

52. William of St-Thierry, *Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum*, PL 180:282D. «Quinimo cum multi praesto essent modi salvationis humanae, omnipotenti et sapienti Deo». The same search of William's text found no discussion of the point.

53. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 a.un. q.4, resp., in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882), 1:775. «Sed haec positio est erronea, sicut ostendit Magister in littera, quia nobilitati divinae potentiae derogat eius immensitatem limitando».

54. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, resp., 1:774–775. «Ratio autem huius stultae positionis fuit, quia nescierunt distinguere rationem potentiae nec actus eius.» and «accipitur ratio in habitu, scilicet divina scientia et divinae bonitatis condecentia: et haec ratio se extendit ad infinita».

55. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, ad 3–4, 1:775. «Quamvis enim Deus possit plura, quam velit, tamen non potest operari sine voluntate».

56. Quaracchi editors, note 1 to Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, 1:775, citing «Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 5. (VIII. c. 3.)»: «Sunt autem quidam, ut Megarici, qui dicunt, tunc solum posse [aliquem], cum agat; cum vero non agat, non posse». Aristotle's own text was not among the sources used here. Aquinas, expounding the passage (*Sententia Metaphysicae* IX l.3 n.1), reports the thesis without naming its holders, «quidam dixerunt quod tunc solum est aliquid in potentia, quando est in actu», and gives their reason: «opinabantur quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent secundum aliquam commixtionem causarum».

57. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 a.un. q.3, resp., 1:772. «cum enim summe bonus sit, non potest aliquid facere nisi bonum, et ita non potest facere nisi rem ad se ordinatam.»

58. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.44 a.1 q.3, resp., 1:786. «quia universum est tanquam pulcherrimum carmen, quod decurrit secundum optimas consonantias» and «Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes quod res sunt optime ordinatae, quia respiciunt utrumque ordinem.» The editors' note cites Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI.18.

any exigency".[59] The setting limits the claim. It answers an endless series of possible improvements, where any answer from fittingness would have to be repeated at every stage; it is not a general account of the ground of creation.

On this shelf the vocabulary of absolute power, which Milbank makes the mark of possibilism, appears earliest in Bonaventure, by the usual dating of his commentary before Aquinas's *Summa* (an order taken from general knowledge, not from these files), and he uses it in his own voice. "First" means first among these texts: his own "some distinguish" (n. 61) shows that others used the pair before him. In the second book of his commentary, asked whether a demon's will can be set right, he meets the objection that a pardon of mercy is possible, and answers that it is possible "by absolute power; but by ordained power, which works according to the order of wisdom … it neither ought to be nor can be".[60] In the first book he meets one application of the pair and declines it. On whether God could save Judas and damn Peter, "some distinguish here God's power twofold, saying that God can do something either by absolute power, and thus he can save Judas and damn Peter; or by ordained power, and thus he cannot. But this distinction does not seem fitting, because God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly. For to be able to do something disorderedly is not to be able, as to be able to sin and to be able to lie."[61] His editors read the sentence as an objection to the way "some" understood and applied the distinction, and not to the distinction itself.[62] None of the twelfth-century texts discussed above uses the pair, and no text in the Patrologia Latina as transcribed on disk uses it.[63] The pair was in use, then, before Bonaventure wrote, and the Franciscan who uses it holds that God's absolute power never outruns his ordering. The editors set Aquinas's *Summa* I q.25 a.5 beside Bonaventure's answer, against Abelard, and against Wyclif, whom they charge with "a worse error".[64]

6. Aquinas

Milbank gives no locus for his Aquinas. The texts that ask whether God wills of necessity whatever he wills, and whether God can do what he does not do, are *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 and q.25 aa.5–6, the disputed question *De potentia* q.1 a.5, and two runs of chapters in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (I cc.81–88, II cc.23–30). In the disputed articles the actualist case is put in the objections; only the body of the article and the replies are quoted here as Aquinas's view.

59. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.44 a.1 q.1, ad 4, 1:783. «et ideo talis quaestio est irrationalis, et solutio non potest dari nisi haec, quia voluit, et rationem ipse novit. Attamen si non fecit, nemo potest arguere, quia hoc totum, quod fecit, fuit gratia; nec erat aliqua exigentia, ratione cuius possit poni in eo fuisse invidia.»

60. Bonaventure, *In II Sent*. d.7 p.1 a.1 q.1 ad 1, in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi, 1885), 2:177. «dicendum, quod potest de potentia absoluta; sed de potentia ordinata, quae operatur secundum ordinem sapientiae — et illum ordinem Deus non corrumpit, immo inviolabiliter servat — non debet esse nec potest esse; quia consilium Dei et dispositio non potest mutari aliqua ratione.»

61. Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 dub. 7, 1:778. «Aliqui distinguunt hic potentiam Dei dupliciter, dicentes, Deum posse aut de potentia absoluta, et sic potest Iudam salvare et Petrum damnare; aut de potentia ordinata, et sic non potest.» and «Sed haec distinctio non videtur esse conveniens, quia nihil potest Deus, quod non possit ordinate. Posse enim inordinate facere est non posse, sicut posse peccare et posse mentiri.»

62. Quaracchi editors, note 17 to Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 dub. 7, 1:778. «Distinctionem ipsam inter potentiam absolutam et ordinatam S. Doctor non improbat.» and «S. Doctor hoc loco modum tantum impugnat, quo haec distinctio ab aliquibus intelligebatur et applicabatur». They cite *In II Sent*. d.7 p.1 a.1 q.1 ad 1 (n. 60) and *Breviloquium* I c.7, which says «Potentiam autem ordinatam contingit tripliciter dici» but does not use the word *absoluta* (Bonaventure, *Opera omnia* 5:216).

63. A search for *potentia absoluta*, *potentia ordinata*, *absoluta potentia*, *ordinata potentia* and their oblique forms in Abelard's *Introductio* and *Theologia christiana*, Hugh's *De sacramentis*, the *Summa sententiarum*, the whole of Lombard's *Sentences*, Peter Damian's *De divina omnipotentia* and the anonymous *Disputatio altera* found no instance. The search was then run over all 5,276 TEI files of the Patrologia Latina on disk, for *potentia*, *potentiae* and *potentiam* with *absoluta* or *ordinata* in the same case, in either order and with one word allowed between them. It found four passages and no instance of the distinction: three copies of one sentence in which philosophy is said not to be ordained by the power of God (*a potentia Dei ordinata est*), and one on the powers of the soul *absolutae a corpore*. This is a statement about the transcriptions searched.

64. Quaracchi editors, *Scholion* to Bonaventure, *In I Sent*. d.43 q.4, 1:775. «Aliis rationibus motus, Wicleffus peiorem errorem docuit, scil. quod Deus non possit facere alia, quam facit» and «S. Thom., (quoad principia) S. 1. q. 25. a. 5; S. c. Gent. II. c. 26. 27.» Their account of Wyclif is stronger than Wyclif's own texts allow (section 9).

Bradwardine's witness

Bradwardine quotes the *De potentia* article in *De causa Dei* III c.52, naming "Saint Thomas" and the question "whether God can do what he does not do, and leave undone what he does".[65] That is the title of the fifth article of the first question, and Bradwardine's "question 5" means that article. Set against the text of Corpus Thomisticum, which here reproduces the Marietti edition, his two long runs of quotation follow Aquinas's corpus nearly word for word.[66] The variants are small ("contractus" for "confractus", "voluntatis" for "bonitatis", "facit" for "fecit"), and the quotation stops before the last clause of the corpus, which confines the impossibility "by supposition" to the composite sense.[67] Bradwardine quoted Aquinas faithfully.

One variant matters. Where Bradwardine's text reads "and this error is imputed to Master Peter Abelard", the Corpus Thomisticum text reads "and this error is imputed to Master Peter Almalareus".[68] The printed editions divide, and the reading is not settled here.[69] Bradwardine, writing in the 1340s, read the passage as naming Abelard.[70] The argument does not depend on the name. The position Aquinas describes, that of "certain theologians who considered the order of divine justice and wisdom according to which things are made by God, which they said God could not pass beyond", is the thesis Abelard states in the *Introductio* and Lombard reports in d.43. In the *Summa theologiae* the same position appears without a name: "others said that the divine power is determined to this course of things because of the order of the divine wisdom and justice, without which God does nothing".[71]

65. Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei contra Pelagium* III c.52, corollary, ed. Henry Savile (London, 1618), 850B–C. «Similes quoque errores imponit Sanctus Thomas quibusdam Philosophis et etiam Theologis, puta Petro Abelardo, in quaestionibus de potentia Dei, quaestione 5. quaerente, Vtrum» and «Deus possit facere quae non facit, et dimittere quae facit, vbi respondendo sic ait». The title of the article in Aquinas: «Quinto quaeritur utrum Deus possit facere quae non facit et dimittere quae facit» (Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 tit.).

66. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850C and 851B–D; Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co. Bradwardine's quotation resumes at 851B with «Quare et Sanctus Thomas vbi prius,» and «recitato errore Philosophorum et Abelardi, et primo redarguto, subiungit, Nunc autem restat inuestigare de secunda positione».

67. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 851B and 851D: «vt si pes sit contractus, homo non potest ambulare» and «et ideo diuina voluntas absque praeiudicio voluntatis, iustitiae, sapientiae potest se extendere in alia quam quae facit». Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co.: «ut si pes sit confractus, homo non potest ambulare» and «et ideo divina voluntas absque praeiudicio bonitatis, iustitiae et sapientiae, potest se extendere in alia quam quae facit». The clause Bradwardine does not quote: «supposito enim quod ipse non velit alia facere, vel quod praesciverit se non alia facturum, non potest alia facere, ut intelligatur composite, non divisim.»

68. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850C. «Secundo fuit quorundam Theologorum considerantium ordinem diuinae iustitiae et sapientiae, secundum quem fiunt a Deo res, quem Deum praeterire non posse dicebant, et ideo incidebant in hoc, vt dicerent, Deum non posse facere nisi quae facit: et imponitur hic error Magistro Petro Abelardo.» Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co.: «Secundo fuit quorumdam theologorum considerantium ordinem divinae iustitiae et sapientiae, secundum quem res fiunt a Deo, quem Deum praeterire non posse dicebant; et incidebant in hoc, ut dicerent, quod Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit. Et imponitur hic error magistro Petro Almalareo.»

69. The Marietti edition of 1883 reads "Almalareo", as the Parma edition of 1856 does on the report of a later editor; the Vivès edition of 1871 prints "Albaialareo" and records the Parma reading as a departure from its own. Bonaventure, commenting on the same distinction of Lombard, ascribes the position to "Master Peter Baialardus", which his editors gloss as Abelard (n. 37). "Albaialareo" is a form of that name, and the forename "Peter" fits Abelard and does not fit Amalric of Bène, the Paris master whom "Almalareus" might otherwise suggest (an identification from general knowledge). The Leonine text and the manuscripts were not consulted; every witness on disk that is not the Parma–Marietti line of printing points to Abelard. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co.: Vivès, *Opera omnia* 13 (Paris, 1871), with the editor's note that the Parma edition reads *Almalareo* (checked on the page image; see `source/aquinas/editions/vives1871-t13-p21-name-and-note.png`); *Quaestiones disputatae* 1 (Turin: Marietti, 1883), *Almalareo* (archive.org OCR); Corpus Thomisticum, *Almalareo*. The Parma volume was not fetched, and the Leonine edition was not consulted. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* d.43 a.un. q.4, 1:775, «et dicitur fuisse Magistri Petri Baialardi», glossed by the editors «Sive Abaelardi». A seventeenth-century testimony in Migne names «Almarici Carnotensis» as the master of a heretic disputed at the Lateran council of 1215 (PL 210:33D); it is not a witness to the *De potentia*. That Amalric of Bène taught at Paris, died c. 1206, and had followers condemned there in 1210 for teachings on the presence of God in all things and the age of the Spirit is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

70. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850C–D. «Patetigitur quod iste Petrus intelligit ea solummodo Deum posse facere vel dimittere quae facit» (so the text, for «Patet igitur»). Bradwardine then quotes the *Capitula* from Bernard: «Recitat enim Bernardus, vbi fuerat allegatus, dicta eius similia in haec verba». That *De causa Dei* dates from the 1340s is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

71. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 co. «Alii vero dixerunt quod potentia divina determinatur ad hunc cursum rerum, propter ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae divinae, sine quo Deus nihil operatur.»

Necessity absolute and by supposition

"Something is said to be necessary in two ways, namely absolutely and by supposition." That Socrates sits is not necessary absolutely, but "supposing that he sits, he must sit while he sits". "The divine will has a necessary relation to his goodness, which is its proper object. Hence God wills his own goodness of necessity." Other things he wills as ordered to that goodness as their end, and a will wills of necessity only the means without which its end cannot be. "Since the goodness of God is perfect, and can be without other things, since nothing of perfection accrues to it from them, it follows that his willing things other than himself is not absolutely necessary. And yet it is necessary by supposition: for, supposing that he wills, he cannot not will, because his will cannot change."[72] To the objection that God wills other things in willing his goodness, Aquinas replies that "his goodness can be without other things".[73] The absence of necessity comes "not from a defect of the divine will, but from a defect that belongs to the thing willed", namely that the perfect goodness of God can be without it.[74]

The *De potentia* article sets this out through the three principles of a voluntary act. "The intellect directs the will, and the will commands the power, which executes. But the intellect does not move except in so far as it proposes its desirable object to the will; so the whole moving of the intellect lies in the will."[75] "The natural end of the divine will is his goodness, which he cannot not will. But creatures are not commensurate with this end, so that without them the divine goodness could not be manifested ... For as the divine goodness is manifested through these things that now are and through this order of things, so it can be manifested through other creatures and ordered in another way." The error lay here: "they supposed the order of creatures to be as it were commensurate with the divine goodness, as if without it that goodness could not be". "It is clear, then, that absolutely God can do other things than he has done." By supposition he cannot, if he wills or foreknows otherwise, "understood in the composite sense, not the divided".[76]

The *Contra Gentiles* adds that the divine goodness, being infinite, "can be participated in infinite ways, and in other ways than it is participated by these creatures that now are".[77] And it draws the distinction that bears most directly on Milbank's "compelled". God knows other things of necessity and does not will them of necessity, because "the divine perfection requires of necessity that all things be in God, so that they can be understood in him; but the divine goodness does not of necessity require that other things be".[78] The *Summa*

72. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 co. «Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et ex suppositione.» and «Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse est eum sedere dum sedet.» and «Voluntas enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex necessitate vult» and «Unde, cum bonitas Dei sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest voluntas eius mutari.»

73. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 ad 2, answering arg. 2 («Deus vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam»). «licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.»

74. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 ad 4. «non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei.»

75. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co. «Intellectus ergo voluntatem dirigit, voluntas vero potentiae imperat quae exequitur. Sed intellectus non movet nisi in quantum proponit voluntati suum appetibile; unde totum movere intellectum est in voluntate.» Bradwardine's text reads «totum mouere intellectus» (851B).

76. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 co. «Finis ergo naturalis divinae voluntatis est eius bonitas, quam non velle non potest. Sed fini huic non commensurantur creaturae, ita quod sine his divina bonitas manifestari non possit; quod Deus intendit ex creaturis. Sicut enim manifestatur divina bonitas per has res quae nunc sunt et per hunc rerum ordinem, ita potest manifestari per alias creaturas et alio modo ordinatas» and «aestimaverunt enim ordinem creaturarum esse quasi commensuratum divinae bonitati quasi absque eo esse non posset. Patet ergo quod absolute Deus potest facere alia quam quae fecit.» and «supposito enim quod ipse non velit alia facere, vel quod praesciverit se non alia facturum, non potest alia facere, ut intelligatur composite, non divisim.»

77. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.81 n.4. «Cum autem divina bonitas sit infinita, est infinitis modis participabilis, et aliis modis quam ab his creaturis quae nunc sunt participetur.»

78. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.81 n.7. «Est ergo considerandum quare Deus alia a se ex necessitate sciat, non autem ex necessitate velit: cum tamen, ex hoc quod intelligit et vult se, intelligat et velit alia.» and «Esse autem omnia in Deo, ut in eo intelligi possent, ex necessitate requirit divina perfectio: non autem divina bonitas ex necessitate requirit alia esse, quae in ipsam ordinantur ut in finem. Et ob hoc necesse est Deum alia scire, non autem velle.»

gives the same reason: things "have necessary being as they are in God", but not as they are in themselves, "and so God knows of necessity whatever he knows, but does not will of necessity whatever he wills".[79] For Aquinas necessity holds in God's knowledge of creatures and fails in the passage from that knowledge to the world, which is where Milbank places the compulsion.

Aquinas also names the view that God creates from a necessity of knowledge, and rejects it. Having shown that God does not act from necessity of nature, he goes on, "lest it seem to anyone that his intellect or knowledge can extend only to determinate effects, and so that he acts from a necessity of knowledge".[80] Since God understands also what never is, nor will be, nor was, "God does not act from a necessity of his intellect or knowledge"; and the chapter excludes "the position of certain philosophers who say that from the fact that God understands himself, such a disposition of things flows from him of necessity", as if he did not dispose each thing by his own judgment, "as the Catholic faith professes".[81] Two chapters later he gathers the result: God produces things "not from necessity of nature, nor from necessity of knowledge, nor of will, nor of justice".[82] The rejection is explicit, though it names no person: it names a kind of necessity and "certain philosophers".

Set beside Milbank's sentence, the rejected position has his shape. Milbank's God is "compelled" in creating "by the aesthetic glory of his own intellect" (p. 109). The second of the three errors that Bradwardine lists from Henry of Ghent (section 9) is that God acts "from the necessity of his knowledge, because by his knowledge he comprehends the best possible order in things, to which he necessarily conforms himself in acting" (n. 146). That is the necessity Aquinas's chapter excludes. That this is the nearest medieval form of Milbank's "compelled" is the article's judgment, and it has a limit. Milbank's compulsion comes through "the Paternal uttering of the Verbum" (p. 109), and these articles do not connect the procession of the Word with the making of the world. Aquinas's texts on the Word and creation are not on this shelf (section 11). What can be said is that the nearest position the creation articles contain, Aquinas rejects as contrary to the faith.

The disputed question on creation states the conclusion with a force the other texts do not use. Asked whether things proceeded from God by necessity of nature or by choice of will, Aquinas answers that "it is to be held without any doubt that God brought creatures into being by the free choice of his will, with no natural necessity", and gives four reasons "for the present": a universe has an end, and only a will sets itself an end; nature is determined to one and makes its equal, so that only the Son proceeds from God by nature; what is in an intellect is produced only through a will; and God's action, being his essence, does not pass out of him, so that whatever he does outside himself he does by understanding and willing.[83] The replies meet Abelard's argument from goodness, though they do not name him. God works in so far as he is good, and goodness is in him of necessity, "yet it does not follow that he works of necessity", for goodness works through the will, and the will is not necessarily related to what is for the end. Were God to communicate his goodness to none, "nothing would be lost to his goodness". As in God there is nothing but good, so there is nothing

79. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 ad 6. «Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque vult, ex necessitate vult.»

80. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.26 n.1. «ne cui forte videatur quod eius intellectus vel scientia ad determinatos effectus solummodo possit extendi, et sic agat ex necessitate scientiae, quamvis non ex necessitate naturae: restat ostendere quod eius scientia vel intellectus nullis effectuum limitibus coartatur.»

81. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.26 nn.5, 8. «cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus intelligit etiam quae nunquam sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. Non igitur Deus agit ex necessitate sui intellectus vel scientiae.» and «Per haec autem excluditur quorundam philosophorum positio dicentium quod ex hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit, fluit ab ipso de necessitate talis rerum dispositio: quasi non suo arbitrio limitet singula et universa disponat, sicut fides Catholica profitetur.»

82. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.28 n.10. «Ostensum est quod Deus producit res in esse non ex necessitate naturae, neque ex necessitate scientiae, neque voluntatis, neque iustitiae.»

83. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.3 a.15 co. «absque omni dubio, tenendum est quod Deus ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis creaturas in esse produxit nulla naturali necessitate. Quod potest esse manifestum ad praesens quatuor rationibus» and «Unde hoc solum ab eo procedit naturaliter quod est sibi aequale, scilicet filius.» and «Quod autem est in intellectu, non producitur nisi mediante voluntate» and «Per hoc igitur Deus agit quidquid extra se agit, quod intelligit et vult.» The article's twenty objections argue for a necessity of nature and are not Aquinas's position.

but necessity, "yet it does not follow that whatever is from him proceeds by necessity". Possibility has no place in God himself, but "with respect to the creature possibility can be considered there", according to an active power "not limited to one".[84] The last two replies are close to the Cassino Abelard's two formulas (section 3): necessity in God and none required in what he makes, possibility referred to the creature. They part at the point on which the twelfth-century debate turned. Abelard's God must do all he can, as well as he can; Aquinas's will "is not determined to this or that good", and his goodness loses nothing by goods left undone.

Wisdom, order and a better world

On the second error, that God's power is determined to this course of things by the order of his wisdom, Aquinas grants the premise and denies the inference. "Since the power of God, which is his essence, is nothing other than God's wisdom, it can fittingly be said that there is nothing in God's power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom comprehends the whole capacity of the power." But the order placed in things "does not equal the divine wisdom, so that the divine wisdom should be limited to this order". A wise maker's wisdom is limited to one order only when the end is proportioned to the things made, and "the divine goodness is an end exceeding created things beyond all proportion ... Hence it must be said simply that God can make other things than he makes."[85] This is Lombard's answer in Aquinas's terms.

On the better world he distinguishes as Lombard did. "Speaking simply, for anything he has made God can make another better."[86] If "better" qualifies the maker, God cannot make anything better than he does, "because he cannot make from greater wisdom and goodness"; if it qualifies the thing made, he can.[87] To the objection from the beauty of the whole he gives the answer nearest Milbank's aesthetic: "the universe, supposing these things, cannot be better, because of the most fitting order given to these things by God ... as, if one string were stretched more than it should be, the melody of the lyre would be spoiled." The next sentence keeps the possible: "Yet God could make other things, or add others to these things made, and then that universe would be better."[88] The same holds of the course of the world: though "for these things that now are no other course would be good and fitting", God "could make other things, and impose another order on them".[89]

84. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.3 a.15 ad 10, 12, 15, 11 and 16. «licet Deus operetur in quantum est bonus, et bonitas ei necessario insit, non tamen sequitur quod de necessitate operetur. Bonitas enim mediante voluntate operatur, in quantum est eius obiectum vel finis; voluntas autem non necessario se habet ad ea quae sunt ad finem» (ad 10) and «Non autem hoc sequeretur, si etiam nulli bonitatem suam communicaret. Suae enim bonitati nihil deperiret, si communicata non esset.» (ad 12) and «sicut in Deo nihil est nisi bonum, ita in eo nihil est nisi necessarium. Non tamen oportet quod quidquid est ab eo, procedat per necessitatem.» (ad 15) and «respectu vero creaturae potest ibi considerari possibilitas, non secundum potentiam passivam, sed secundum potentiam activam, quae non limitatur ad unum.» (ad 11) and «non tamen determinatur ad hoc vel illud bonum» (ad 16).

85. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 co. «Cum autem potentia Dei, quae est eius essentia, non sit aliud quam Dei sapientia, convenienter quidem dici potest quod nihil sit in Dei potentia, quod non sit in ordine divinae sapientiae, nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit. Sed tamen ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus, in quo ratio iustitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, non adaequat divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem.» and «Sed divina bonitas est finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit.»

86. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.6 co. «Simpliciter autem loquendo, qualibet re a se facta potest Deus facere aliam meliorem.»

87. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.6 ad 1. «Si vero ly melius sit adverbium, et importet modum ex parte facientis, sic Deus non potest facere melius quam sicut facit, quia non potest facere ex maiori sapientia et bonitate. Si autem importet modum ex parte facti, sic potest facere melius».

88. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.6 ad 3, answering arg. 3, which cites Augustine, *Enchiridion*, on the «universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo». «Ad tertium dicendum quod universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse melius; propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo, in quo bonum universi consistit. Quorum si unum aliquod esset melius, corrumperetur proportio ordinis, sicut, si una chorda plus debito intenderetur, corrumperetur citharae melodia. Posset tamen Deus alias res facere, vel alias addere istis rebus factis, et sic esset illud universum melius.»

89. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 ad 3. «Unde, licet istis rebus quae nunc sunt, nullus alius cursus esset bonus et conveniens, tamen Deus posset alias res facere, et alium eis imponere ordinem.»

Absolute power

In the same article Aquinas uses the pair as Bonaventure does in his second book. Because God's will is not determined of necessity to these things, "unless perhaps by supposition", and his wisdom is not determined to this order, "nothing prevents there being something in God's power which he does not will, and which is not contained under the order he has established for things". What belongs to power considered in itself God can do "by absolute power"; what belongs to it as it executes a just will, "by ordained power". "God does something because he wills it; yet he is not able to do it because he wills it, but because he is such in his nature."[90] The *De potentia* qualifies the pair at once: absolute and regulated "are attributed to the divine power only by our consideration", and "the power of God is never in reality without wisdom".[91] Two of its objections show the respondent at the disputation appealing to absolute power.[92] Against Milbank's "stressing the potentia absoluta" (p. 34), Aquinas uses the term freely and makes it a distinction of reason within a power identical with wisdom. Bonaventure's "God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly" and Aquinas's "never in reality without wisdom" guard the same point.

Milbank's best texts

Aquinas's own text also holds the passages that serve Milbank best, and Bradwardine does not quote them. First, he refuses a will that elects without reason. The reason of the divine will "can be assigned": "God wills man to have reason, so that man may be; he wills man to be, so that the universe may be complete; he wills the good of the universe to be, because it befits his goodness". Sometimes that reason "contains only fittingness".[93] He excludes "the error of certain men who say that all things proceed from God according to simple will, so that no reason need be given for anything except that God wills it".[94] The second book sets this error beside the actualist's, as "a double error": that of those who, "limiting the divine power, said that God can do only what he does, because he ought so to do", and that of those "who say that all things follow simple will, without any other reason".[95] Here Aquinas stands with Milbank against Bonaventure's "he willed, and he himself knows the reason", were that sentence taken as a general account of creation.

Second, Aquinas allows, in a concessive reply, that the divine will may be said to be determined by the intellect. The reply opens with a denial: "although the divine will is not determined to its effects, it need not be said that it wills none of them, or that it is determined to willing by something outside it". It goes on in a conditional: "if the will of God is determined to will something by the knowledge of his intellect, the determination

90. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 ad 1. «Tamen, quia voluntas non determinatur ex necessitate ad haec vel illa, nisi forte ex suppositione, ut supra dictum est; neque sapientia Dei et iustitia determinantur ad hunc ordinem, ut supra dictum est; nihil prohibet esse aliquid in potentia Dei, quod non vult, et quod non continetur sub ordine quem statuit rebus.» and «quod attribuitur potentiae secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam absolutam.» and «Quod autem attribuitur potentiae divinae secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis iustae, hoc dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata.» and «Ideo enim Deus aliquid facit, quia vult, non tamen ideo potest, quia vult, sed quia talis est in sua natura.»

91. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 ad 5–6. «absolutum et regulatum non attribuuntur divinae potentiae nisi ex nostra consideratione» and «potentia Dei numquam est in re sine sapientia: sed a nobis consideratur sine ratione sapientiae.»

92. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 arg. 2 and arg. 4 (objections, not Aquinas's position). «Sed dicit respondens, quod ratio ista procedit de potentia in ordine ad praescientiam, non de potentia absoluta.» and «Sed dicet respondens, quod ratio ista procedit de potentia regulata per sapientiam, non de potentia absoluta.»

93. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.86 nn.1, 5, 6. «Colligere autem ex praedictis possumus quod divinae voluntatis ratio assignari potest.» and «Deus vult hominem habere rationem ad hoc quod homo sit; vult autem hominem esse ad hoc quod completio universi sit; vult autem bonum universi esse quia decet bonitatem ipsius.» and «Aliquando igitur ratio divinae voluntatis continet solum decentiam; aliquando utilitatem; aliquando autem necessitatem quae est ex suppositione; necessitatem vero absolutam, solum cum vult seipsum.»

94. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.87 n.5. «Per praedicta autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium omnia procedere a Deo secundum simplicem voluntatem: ut de nullo oporteat rationem reddere nisi quia Deus vult.»

95. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.24 n.7 and c.28 n.17. «Per haec autem excluditur quorundam error qui dicebant omnia ex simplici divina voluntate dependere, absque aliqua ratione.» and «Sic igitur per praedicta excluditur duplex error. Eorum scilicet qui, divinam potentiam limitantes, dicebant Deum non posse facere nisi quae facit, quia sic facere debet; et eorum qui dicunt quod omnia sequuntur simplicem voluntatem, absque aliqua alia ratione vel quaerenda in rebus vel assignanda.» The *Summa theologiae* allows that the first effects, which cannot be referred to further created ends, depend «ex simplici voluntate Dei» (I q.19 a.5 ad 3), while holding that «voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud» (I q.19 a.5 ad 1).

of the divine will will not be made through anything extraneous", for the intellect apprehends other goods "as certain likenesses of the divine goodness".[96] Aquinas's own formula, where he gathers the result, is weaker: in what it is not determined to by its nature, the divine will "is inclined in some way by its intellect".[97] Even so, this comes nearer Milbank's "compelled" than anything in Bradwardine's quotation. Third, creation may be called owed to God's goodness "by way of a certain befittingness", and, given God's disposition, "the production of things proceeds from the necessity of the divine disposition".[98] Fourth, Aquinas affirms a necessity in the created order: "absolute necessity is not for that reason excluded from things, so that we must confess all things to be contingent", and some creatures, having no potency to non-being, it is "simply and absolutely necessary to be".[99] This is the nearest these texts come to Milbank's "necessity in actuality as such". Aquinas would not call such necessities contingent, and to that extent Milbank's gloss (p. 35), that he held the necessities of the created order "just as contingent" as its accidents, does not match his vocabulary. But Aquinas agrees with the reason Milbank gives for the gloss, their dependence on the divine creative act. The same chapter places in the creator "the power to give them being or to cease to pour being into them" (n. 99), and goes on to say that the production of such natures "was voluntary" (n. 100). The disagreement is over a word, not over the dependence. Fifth, all things "have necessary being as they are in God" (n. 79), and a defender of Milbank could read the "aesthetic glory" of God's intellect as that necessary knowledge.

None of this gives Milbank his "compelled". The intellect determines the will to goods "befitting" God's goodness, "not as necessary to its goodness"; the created necessity follows a free act, since "that such natures of things were produced by God was voluntary";[100] and the necessity of God's knowledge does not pass into his will.

What the articles do not contain

Milbank's Aquinas also holds that an actuality "'cancels out', through its very fulfilment, the genuinely possible" (p. 37). The nearest statement in these articles is the Socrates example.[101] The *Contra Gentiles* repeats it, "even things contingent to either side are rendered necessary by supposition", but uses it to keep contingency, in a chapter headed that the divine will "does not take contingency from things": "it does not follow, if God wills something, that it comes about of necessity, but that this conditional is true and necessary … The consequent, however, need not be necessary."[102] God has "reasons as it were thought out" of all he can do, including "those which neither are, nor will be, nor were",[103] and the *Summa* says the same of the ideas taken

96. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.82 n.11, answering the objections of c.82 nn.2–5. «Quamvis autem divina voluntas ad sua causata non determinetur, non tamen oportet dicere quod nihil eorum velit, aut quod ad volendum ab aliquo exteriori determinetur.» and «si voluntas Dei ad aliquid volendum per sui intellectus cognitionem determinetur, non erit determinatio voluntatis divinae per aliquid extraneum facta.» and «Quae quidem apprehendit ut similitudines quasdam divinae bonitatis et essentiae, non ut eius principia. Et sic voluntas divina in illa tendit ut suae bonitati convenientia, non ut ad suam bonitatem necessaria.» and «Unde nec divina voluntas tendit in sua causata necessario.»

97. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.88 n.3. «Voluntas divina in his ad quae secundum suam naturam non determinatur, inclinatur quodammodo per suum intellectum, ut supra ostensum est.»

98. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.28 nn.11–12. «Potest tamen dici esse sibi debitum per modum cuiusdam condecentiae.» and «Si vero divinam dispositionem consideremus qua Deus disposuit suo intellectu et voluntate res in esse producere, sic rerum productio ex necessitate divinae dispositionis procedit».

99. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.30 nn.1, 3. «non tamen propter hoc absoluta necessitas a rebus excluditur, ut sit necessarium nos fateri omnia contingentia esse» and «Sunt enim quaedam in rebus creatis quae simpliciter et absolute necesse est esse.» and «Sic igitur et rebus creatis non inest potentia ad non esse: sed creatori inest potentia ut eis det esse vel eis desinat esse influere».

100. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.30 n.7. «Similiter autem quod tales rerum naturae a Deo producerentur, voluntarium fuit: quod autem, eis sic statutis, aliquid proveniat vel existat, absolutam necessitatem habet.»

101. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 co.; see n. 72.

102. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.85 tit. and nn.5–6. «Quod divina voluntas non tollit contingentiam a rebus, neque eis necessitatem absolutam imponit» and «nam etiam contingentia ad utrumlibet redduntur ex suppositione necessaria; sicut Socratem moveri, si currit, est necessarium.» and «Non igitur sequitur, si Deus vult aliquid, quod illud de necessitate eveniat: sed quod haec conditionalis sit vera et necessaria, si Deus aliquid vult, illud erit. Consequens tamen non oportet esse necessarium.»

103. Aquinas, *De potentia* q.1 a.5 ad 11. «utrum eorum quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt, quae tamen Deus facere potest, sit idea.» and «Ipse enim novit totam potentiam suam, et quidquid potest: unde omnium quae potest habet rationes quasi excogitatas.»

as reasons of knowledge.[104] What is possible and never actual has standing in God's knowledge. These articles do not contain the doctrine that the actual cancels the possible. The commentary on the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* expounds Aristotle against the Megarians, who held that a thing has a power only when it acts. Their thesis, Aquinas says, takes away motion and generation: one who sits will never afterwards stand. He concludes that "something can be which yet is not, and something can not-be which yet is", with the example of one who can walk and does not, and one who walks and can not-walk.[105] The passage concerns potency for change, a power present now for a later act. It is not evidence for an alternative at the same instant, and it is not used as such below. Whether Aquinas's divided sense amounts to the synchronic alternative Milbank ascribes to Scotus is the question of section 7.

7. Duns Scotus

In the pages on possibilism (pp. 34–37), Milbank's one medieval citation is to Scotus's *Lectura* I d.39, given without a paragraph number, for the claim that in Scotus "the contingency of a finite actual moment is only guaranteed by the persistence in some sense of the real possibility of an alternative actuality which is therefore synchronous with that actuality" (p. 37).[106] The distinction treats God's knowledge of future contingents in five questions. Scotus answers them in two parts, how there is contingency in things and how God's certain knowledge stands with it (n.31); the answer is preceded by two opinions he rejects and followed by objections he meets. Only his own determination and his replies are quoted here as his view. The *Ordinatio* and the *Reportata Parisiensia*, in Wadding's text as reprinted by Vivès, are used where they confirm the *Lectura*, and the forty-fourth distinction of the *Ordinatio* for absolute power.

The cause of contingency

Scotus first rejects the view that "contingency is in beings with respect to their proximate causes, but necessity with respect to the first cause" (n.32). The Vatican editors cite for it Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* (I d.38), the *Summa theologiae* (I q.14 a.13 ad 1) and the *Contra Gentiles* (I c.67).[107] The identification holds. In each place Aquinas meets the argument that God's knowledge, being necessary and the cause of what it knows, makes what it knows necessary, and in each he answers it in his own voice with the view Scotus describes. The commentary says in the body of the article that "the last effect follows, in necessity and contingency, not the first cause but the proximate cause", and in the reply that an effect "draws necessity not from the first cause, but only from the proximate cause"; the *Summa* replies that "things known by God are contingent because of their proximate causes, though God's knowledge, which is the first cause, is necessary"; and the *Contra Gentiles* calls God's knowledge, though it is the cause of the things known, "a remote cause".[108] Against it Scotus argues

104. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.15 a.3 ad 2. «eorum quae neque sunt neque erunt neque fuerunt, Deus non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu eorum non est idea in Deo, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, sed solum secundum quod significat rationem.»

105. Aquinas, *Sententia Metaphysicae* IX l.3 nn.8–9, in his exposition of Aristotle. «Et ita ista potentia tollet motum et generationem; quia stans semper stabit, et sedens semper sedebit. Si enim aliquis sedet, nunquam postea stabit» (n.8) and «Tollunt enim motum et generationem, ut dictum est. Unde, cum hoc non possit sustineri, manifestum est quod aliquid est possibile esse quod tamen non est, quod aliquid est possibile non esse, et tamen est.» and «quia possibile est aliquem vadere et non vadit, et e converso non vadere qui vadit.» (n.9). The holders of the thesis are named in the Quaracchi editors' note (n. 56).

106. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 37 n. 44. The Latin of the *Lectura* in this section is transcribed from page images of the Vatican edition: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera omnia*, vol. 17, *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum, a distinctione octava ad quadragesimam quintam* (Vatican City, 1966), 481–510, cited by the edition's paragraph number (n.) and page. The voice of each passage is the one the edition's headings assign.

107. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 qq.1–5 n.32, 17:488, the opinion of others, which Scotus rejects. «Quantum ad primum dicunt quidam quod contingentia est in entibus quantum ad causas proximas, sed necessitas quantum ad causam primam.» The editors' apparatus cites Thomas, *Sent*. I d.38 q.1 a.5, *Summa theologiae* I q.14 a.13 ad 1 and *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.67.

108. Aquinas, *In I Sent*. d.38 q.1 a.5 co. and ad 1: «effectus ultimus non sequitur causam primam in necessitate et contingentia, sed causam proximam» and «a causa prima non trahit effectus necessitatem, sed solum a causa proxima». *Summa theologiae* I q.14 a.13 ad 1, answering

that if the first cause moved the second necessarily, the whole order of causes would move necessarily, and that souls, created by God immediately and with no proximate cause, are not on that account created necessarily.[109] His own answer follows: "the cause of contingency in beings is that the first cause moves contingently, and not necessarily", and what in God causes this contingency is "his will".[110] Contingency does not arise from the divine intellect, "because whatever it knows before the act of the will, it knows necessarily and naturally".[111]

Neither claim divides Scotus from the authors already examined. That contingency comes from God's will, and not from the weakness of secondary causes, is the twelfth-century reply in a new idiom: Hugh's future that may not come about, and Lombard's "the same reason remaining, he could have made other things", both place the alternative in God's power and will. Aquinas says the same in a later question of the *Summa*, and says it against the account given in the texts Scotus attacks. Some, he writes, assigned the reason from the intermediate causes, "but this does not seem sufficiently said": no defect of a secondary cause can prevent God's will from producing its effect, and if the distinction of contingent from necessary were referred to secondary causes alone, it would fall outside God's intention and will. Effects willed by God "come about contingently" not because their proximate causes are contingent; "because God willed them to come about contingently, he prepared contingent causes for them".[112] And the division between a necessary knowledge and a contingent will is the one the *Contra Gentiles* draws when it says that God knows other things necessarily and does not will them necessarily (n. 78). Scotus's attack is fair to the texts the editors name, and his argument from souls created without a proximate cause meets them where they are weakest, since on their account such an effect would have nothing to make it contingent. But the first cause those texts call necessary is God's knowledge, and Aquinas, treating God's will, had already judged the account from proximate causes insufficient, for a reason close to Scotus's. Scotus's quarrel on this point is with one strand of Aquinas, and the *Summa*'s question on the divine will stands with Scotus.

Intellect, will and law

The second part of the answer is where Milbank's reading finds its support. If the divine intellect apprehended something "as to be done" before the act of the will, Scotus argues, the will would either will it necessarily, and so be necessitated to produce it, or will against the dictate of the intellect, "and then it would be bad, since that dictate could only be right".[113] He therefore denies the divine intellect any practical judgment, prior to the will, about contingent things. It "offers to its will some complex as neutral, not apprehending it as true or false", as one apprehends "that the stars are even in number"; "the will determines itself to one part, ... and then the intellect apprehends the truth of it".[114] The *Ordinatio* draws the consequence for law. General laws

the objection «A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus necessarius»: «Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit necessaria.» *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.67 n.6: «Si igitur proxima fuerit contingens, eius effectum contingentem oportet esse, etiam si causa remota necessaria sit» and «Scientia autem Dei, etsi sit causa rerum scitarum per ipsam, est tamen causa remota.»

109. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 nn.35, 37, 17:489–490. «Praeterea, animae immediate creantur a Deo et non ab aliqua causa proxima, non tamen necessario causantur; igitur nihil est dicere quod effectus in comparatione ad causam primam sint necessarii.»

110. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.41, 17:492, and n.61, 17:500 (his own determination). «Et ideo causa contingentiae in entibus est ex hoc quod prima causa contingenter, et non necessario, movet.» and «Sic igitur apparet primum, quomodo est contingentia in rebus, quia a Deo, — et quid est in Deo quod est causa huius contingentiae, quia voluntas eius.»

111. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.43, 17:492. «Sed ista contingentia non est ex parte intellectus divini in quantum ostendit aliquid voluntati, quia quidquid cognoscit ante actum voluntatis, necessario cognoscit et naturaliter, ita quod non sit ibi contingentia ad opposita.»

112. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.8 co. «Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex causis mediis» and «Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo.» and «Nullus autem defectus causae secundae impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat.» and «si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens.» and «Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad eos praeparavit.»

113. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.43, 17:492–493. «Si necessario, igitur necessitatur ad producendum illud; si non necessario vult, igitur vult contra dictamen intellectus, et tunc esset mala, cum illud dictamen non posset esse nisi rectum.»

114. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.44, 17:493, and nn.62–63, 17:500. «Unde quando intellectus divinus apprehendit 'hoc esse faciendum' ante voluntatis actum, apprehendit ut neutram» and «Et dico quod intellectus divinus offert voluntati suae aliquam complexionem ut neutram,

that rightly direct what is to be done "are fixed beforehand by the divine will, and not by the divine intellect as it precedes the act of the divine will", and "no law is right except so far as it is accepted by the divine will".[115] In the contingent order, then, the divine will is determined by no prior judgment of the best, and Milbank's "willing, sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35) describes what Scotus says. The contrast with Aquinas is real. For Aquinas the divine will "is inclined in some way by its intellect" toward goods befitting God's goodness (n. 97); for Scotus the intellect's knowledge of a contingent truth follows the will's determination.

Two features of the text limit the charge. The neutrality belongs to contingent propositions alone. What the intellect knows before the will it knows necessarily, and the intellect fixes the range of the possible, since a thing is logically possible when its terms "are not repugnant to one another" (n.49). And Scotus's reason for denying a prior dictate is that a will acting against a right dictate would be a bad will; he gives the divine will no power to act against right reason. The forty-fourth distinction of the *Ordinatio* makes the same point about power. Absolute power is to be distinguished from ordained power "in every agent acting by intellect and will that is able to act in conformity with a right law, and yet does not of necessity act in conformity with a right law". Where the law is in the agent's own power, as it is for God, his absolute power "does not extend to anything other than what would be done in an orderly way, if it were done", in another order that his will could establish.[116] Scotus's absolute power is a power to establish another order, and it keeps the condition Bonaventure set, that God can do nothing he cannot do orderedly (n. 61).

Every aspect elected

Milbank's third claim is that the Franciscans, "pre-eminently Duns Scotus", preferred "the sheer arbitrary electedness of every aspect of the created order" (p. 36). An objection near the end of the distinction puts the point to Scotus: if contingency in things comes only from the divine will, "nothing will be necessary in the universe, but everything will be contingent" (n.88). Scotus accepts the conclusion with one qualification: "nothing is simply necessary in the universe, but only in a certain respect", in that secondary causes, so far as they themselves are concerned, have a necessary relation to their effects, "as fire to heating".[117] The *Lectura* supports "every aspect". It does not say "arbitrary", and the qualified necessity of secondary causes remains. The reply also bears on Milbank's account of Aquinas, who on his reading held the regular necessities of the created order "just as contingent" as its accidents, because both depend on the divine act (p. 35). In vocabulary that description fits Scotus's reply better than it fits the *Contra Gentiles*, which holds that some creatures it is "simply and absolutely necessary to be" (n. 99). In substance Aquinas agrees with Milbank's reason, since he too makes those necessities depend on the creative act (section 6).

non apprehendens ut veram vel falsam (sicut cum apprehendo 'astra esse paria')» and «voluntas autem determinat se ad unam partem, ponendo in esse vel non in esse, et tunc intellectus apprehendit veritatem illius.» The editors gloss *neutram*: «scilicet nec veram nec falsam».

115. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d.44 q. un. nn.1–2, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1891–1895), 10:745, transcribed from the page image. «quia nulla lex est recta, nisi quatenus a voluntate divina acceptatur» and «dico, quod leges aliquae generales recte de operabilibus dictantes, praefixae sunt a voluntate divina, et non quidem ab intellectu divino, ut praecedit actum voluntatis divinae, ut dictum est dist. 39.» In the same place: «si placet voluntati suae quae libera est, recta est lex». The scholium printed with the question is Wadding's, and the letters in Scotus's text refer to the commentary of Lychetus printed around it; neither is quoted here.

116. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d.44 q. un. n.1, Vivès 10:744–745, transcribed from the page images. «Respondeo in omni agente per intellectum et voluntatem potentem conformiter agere legi rectae, et tamen non necessario agere conformiter legi rectae, est distinguere potentiam ordinatam a potentia absoluta.» and «Et tunc potentia ejus absoluta non se extendit ad aliquid aliud, quam ad illud quod ordinate fieret, si fieret. Non quidem fieret ordinate secundum istum ordinem, sed fieret ordinate secundum alium ordinem, quem alium ordinem ita posset voluntas divina statuere».

117. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.88, 17:508 (objection), and n.91, 17:509 (reply). «contra: secundum hoc videtur quod nihil erit necessarium in universo, sed totum erit contingens» and «et ideo, sicut ibi dictum est, nihil est simpliciter necessarium in universo, sed secundum quid tantum, scilicet quia causae secundae — quantum est ex parte earum — habent necessariam habitudinem ad suas causas (sicut ignis ad calefaciendum quantum est ex parte sui), non tamen simpliciter». The reply refers back to d.8 (the editors' note).

Synchronic contingency

On the claim Milbank documents from the *Lectura*, his reading is right. Scotus distinguishes in our will a freedom toward opposite acts, toward opposite objects, and toward opposite effects. The first "is of imperfection", because it makes the will receptive and so mutable, "since it does not have opposite acts at once"; the second "is of perfection".[118] Two possibilities follow from that freedom. One is successive, and "this possibility and contingency follows its mutability".[119] The other "is not according as the will has acts successively, but in the same instant": "for that instant and in that instant in which it wills *a*, it can not-will *a*". To this logical possibility "a real power corresponds", because every cause is understood before its effect, so that the will, in the instant in which it elicits its volition, "precedes its volition by nature and is related to it freely". The proposition "the will willing in *a* can not-will in *a*" is false in the composite sense and true in the divided sense, "not because the extremes are understood for different times", but because "there are two propositions there".[120] Then Scotus turns to God. The freedom toward opposite acts "the divine will cannot have, because this is of imperfection and argues mutability"; it has a single volition, by which it can will opposite objects.[121] That single volition "wills in eternity that the stone be, and can in eternity will that the stone not be", so that the divine will "can in the same instant of eternity, and for the same instant of eternity, will and not will something". Here too the divided sense is true without different measures, "because there is no succession in relation to the divine volition".[122] An objection from Aristotle, "everything that is, when it is, is necessarily", Scotus answers by the same distinction: true in the composite sense, false in the divided, "because a contingent thing is not necessary when it is".[123] The *Ordinatio* and the *Reportata* make the same division between the imperfect freedom toward acts and the perfect freedom toward objects.[124]

Milbank's description holds at the points he names: a real possibility, of an alternative, at the same instant as the actual. One phrase in his contrast does not hold. The real possibility is no "hypostasised logical possibility" (p. 37). Of logical possibility Scotus says that before the world was, "the world can be" was true, "and yet there was no reality in the thing corresponding to the extremes" (n.49); the real power he places in the will that causes, and in no possible being set beside the actual. And the doctrine was built to keep change out of God. Scotus denies God the freedom of opposite acts as an imperfection, for the same reason that leads Aquinas to ground the suppositional necessity of God's will in the fact that "his will cannot change" (n. 72).

118. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.46, 17:493. «quia quod habeat libertatem ad actus oppositos, hoc est imperfectionis, quia secundum hoc necessario est receptiva, et mutabilis per consequens (cum non simul habeat actus oppositos); libertas autem ad obiecta opposita est perfectionis».

119. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.48, 17:494. «Una contingentia et possibilitas, ut voluntas successive feratur in obiecta opposita: et haec possibilitas et contingentia consequitur eius mutabilitatem.»

120. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 nn.49–51, 17:494–495. «Haec autem possibilitas logica non est secundum quod voluntas habet actus successive, sed in eodem instanti» and «et tamen pro illo instanti et in illo instanti in quo vult a, potest nolle a» and «Et huic possibilitati logicae correspondet potentia realis, nam omnis causa praeintelligitur suo effectui» and «praecedit natura volitionem suam et libere se habet ad eam» and «in sensu autem divisionis est propositio vera, non quia extrema intelliguntur pro diversis temporibus (ille enim sensus habet locum quia est successio in actibus), sed est vera in sensu divisionis quia sunt ibi duae propositiones». Of logical possibility, n.49, 17:494: «et sic fuit haec vera antequam mundus esset 'mundus potest esse'» and «et tamen nulla fuit realitas in re correspondens extremis.»

121. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.53, 17:496. «primam autem libertatem, quae est in nobis (quae est respectu actuum oppositorum), non potest voluntas divina habere, quia haec est imperfectionis et arguit mutabilitatem, — voluntas autem divina non potest habere nisi unicam volitionem, et ideo unica volitione potest velle opposita obiecta».

122. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.54, 17:497. «tamen voluntas divina unica volitione vult in aeternitate lapidem esse et potest in aeternitate velle lapidem non esse vel potest nolle lapidem esse» and «potest in eodem instanti aeternitatis et pro eodem instanti aeternitatis velle et nolle aliquid» and «quia non est successio in comparatione ad volitionem divinam».

123. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.55, 17:498 (objection), and n.58, 17:499 (reply). «quia dicit Philosophus in I Perihermeneias: "Omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse"» and «in sensu divisionis falsa» and «et hoc falsum est, quia contingens non est necessarium quando est.»

124. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d.39 q. un. n.21, Vivès 10:636, transcribed from the page image: «Quantum ad primum dico, quod voluntas divina non est indifferens ad diversos actus nolendi et volendi, quia hoc in voluntate mea non erat sine imperfectione voluntatis.» *Reportata Parisiensia* I d.39–40, Vivès 22:475, from the OCR: «Sciendum est igitur, quod voluntas nostra est indifferens ad actus diversos, et etiam per actus ad objecta diversa, et ad effectus diversos, et prima et tertia indifferentia est imperfectionis, secunda vero est perfectionis, et ponenda est in Deo.» That the *Ordinatio* text of d.39 printed by Wadding is not the one the Vatican editors accept as Scotus's is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

Hugh, Aquinas and Scotus

The question left open in sections 4 and 6 can now be answered as far as these texts allow, if three senses of "synchronic" are kept apart. The first is an alternative of God's *power*, stated in the divided sense. The logical instrument is older than Scotus. Aquinas uses the composite and divided senses in the *De potentia* for the case Scotus treats: supposing that God does not will to make other things, he cannot make them, "understood in the composite sense, not the divided" (n. 76). In the divided sense God can make other things than those he eternally wills to make, and since there is no time in which God's will could change, that possibility is not one of succession. The *Contra Gentiles* holds that the conditional "if God wills something, it will be" is necessary while its consequent need not be (n. 102). This alternative belongs to God's power. Of the will, given that it wills, Aquinas says the opposite: "supposing that he wills, he cannot not will, because his will cannot change" (n. 72). The second sense is an alternative of the *will* itself, a real power for the opposite act in the very instant of willing. That is Scotus's (n.51), and neither the twelfth-century authors nor Aquinas hold it. The third is Milbank's, "the persistence in some sense of the real possibility of an alternative actuality", which shadows each actual moment (p. 37). Hugh's sentence concerns a future that may fail to come, and Lombard's "could have made other things" looks back; both, with Aquinas, place the alternative in God's power at the point where he acts. The commentary on the *Metaphysics* treats potency for change and is not evidence here (section 6).

Three things in Scotus are new, and they are what Milbank's genealogy should have named. The first is the extension of the divided sense from God's power and its effects to the act of willing itself: the will, in the instant in which it wills, has a real power for the opposite act, grounded in its priority by nature to its own volition (nn.51, 60). The second is the separation of necessity from immutability. Aquinas says that God, supposing he wills, cannot not will, "because his will cannot change", and his commentary on the *Sentences*, rejecting one answer to the argument from foreknowledge, gives God's inward acts, "such as willing and understanding", no necessity of coercion but "a necessity of immobility";[125] Scotus, answering the argument that God knows immutably and therefore necessarily, says that "immutability is not a cause of necessity, because immutability takes away only succession".[126] For Aquinas the unchangeableness of the eternal will yields a necessity by supposition; for Scotus it leaves the eternal will open, in the same instant, to the opposite. The third is the neutral complex, which takes from the divine intellect any prior judgment of what is to be done in the contingent order. The first two refine an analysis Aquinas shared, and they would have to be argued on their merits. The third changes the relation of will to reason, and on it Milbank is right.

The three senses show what Milbank's formulation costs. His contrast sets an Aquinas for whom the actual "cancels out" the possible against a Scotus for whom an alternative persists beside the actual. On these texts the alternative of power, at the point of God's act, is common to Aquinas and Scotus, and only the alternative of will is Scotus's own. Milbank's third sense, a possibility that persists beside each actual moment, is a gloss on the second, and Scotus does not state it in that form: he grounds the real possibility in the will's priority by nature to its own volition (n.51), and he gives logical possibility "no reality in the thing" (n.49). What Milbank's contrast can claim from the *Lectura* is a doctrine of the will, not a new standing of the possible beside the actual.

8. William of Ockham

Milbank places Ockham in the lineage he describes, as its heir. From Scotus "through to Ockham", he writes, the switch from knowledge by identity to knowledge by representation was encouraged by "the increasing

125. Aquinas, *In I Sent.* d.38 q.1 a.5 ad 4, in his judgment on the answer of those who say that God can not have foreknown: «Sed istud etiam non solvit; quia quamvis actus divinus non habeat necessitatem coactionis, habet tamen necessitatem immobilitatis, loquendo de actibus intrinsecis, ut velle, intelligere, et hujusmodi». The article of 1277 quoted in section 9 condemns a *necessitate inmutabilitatis* of God's outward acts, not of his inward ones.

126. Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 n.77, 17:505, replying to the argument of the fourth question. «sed immutabilitas non est causa necessitatis, quia immutabilitas non privat nisi successionem.»

consideration that God, through exercise of his potentia absoluta, can sever the normal link between our mind's understanding of things and the way they are in themselves" (p. 32). The same phrase, extended "to Suárez", names the theologians who abandoned a participatory metaphysics (p. 36). And Descartes's voluntarism was "more radical even than that of Ockham", since it overcame "any essentialist possibilism, which supposes that God is presented with an a priori range of essential possibilities that he has not merely 'made up'" (p. 37). The notes to these pages cite modern studies and no work of Ockham's.[127] Two of his works are read here: the *Ordinatio* on the first book of the *Sentences*, distinctions 38 to 45; and, in the *Quodlibeta*, the first, second and sixth questions of the sixth quodlibet and the fifth question of the fifth. Both proceed by disputed questions, and only Ockham's determinations and replies are quoted as his view.

The result is divided, and it can be stated at the outset. On the modal question Ockham is no heir of the Scotus whom Milbank cites: he rejects any power for opposites without succession, in God as in creatures. Milbank does not run his line from Scotus to Ockham through that doctrine, but the rejection limits any modal lineage a reader might draw between them. On absolute power the texts give Milbank part of what he claims. Ockham's absolute power is one power that does nothing inordinately, and he takes its extent from Lombard; but on that power he grounds an intuitive cognition of a thing that does not exist, which comes near the severing Milbank describes, and he sets a limit to it.

Absolute power

The *Quodlibeta* give Ockham's fullest statement of the distinction. Asked whether a man can be saved without created charity, he first sets out "a distinction about the power of God". It is not to be understood "that there are really two powers in God, one of which is ordained and the other absolute, because there is a single power in God toward outward things, which is in every way God himself". Nor is it to be understood that God can do some things in an ordered way and others absolutely and not in an ordered way, "because God can do nothing inordinately".[128] "To be able" is taken in two senses. In one it is taken "according to the laws ordained and instituted by God", and what God can do in this sense he is said to be able to do by ordained power. In the other it is taken for being able to do "everything that does not include a contradiction, whether God has ordained that he will do it or not, because God can do many things that he does not will to do", as the Master of the *Sentences* teaches in the forty-third distinction of his first book; and this God is said to be able to do by absolute power. "As the pope cannot do some things according to the laws he has established, which he can nevertheless do absolutely."[129]

Absolute power here is not a second power, nor a power to act outside order, nor an attribute set above the others; it is the one power that is God, considered without regard to what God has ordained. "God can do nothing inordinately" is Bonaventure's "God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly" (n. 61) almost word for word, and a single power that "is in every way God himself" keeps the point of Aquinas's "only by our consideration" (n. 91). Ockham's editors draw the consequence in their own introduction: it is "impossible"

127. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 32 and 37. Ockham is quoted from *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, dd. 19–48, ed. G. I. Etzkorn and F. E. Kelley, *Opera theologica* 4 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1979), cited as OT 4, and *Quodlibeta septem*, ed. J. C. Wey, *Opera theologica* 9 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1980), cited as OT 9, both by printed page. The bracketed headings in these editions, which assign passages to Ockham or to the opinions he answers, are the editors'.

128. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.1, OT 9:585–586. «Hic primo ponam unam distinctionem de potentia Dei» (585) and «non est sic intelligenda quod in Deo sint realiter duae potentiae quarum una sit ordinata et alia absoluta, quia unica potentia est in Deo ad extra, quae omni modo est ipse Deus.» and «Nec sic est intelligenda quod aliqua potest Deus ordinate facere, et aliqua potest absolute et non ordinate, quia Deus nihil potest facere inordinate.» (586).

129. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.1, OT 9:586. «Sed est sic intelligenda quod 'posse aliquid' quandoque accipitur secundum leges ordinatas et institutas a Deo, et illa dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata.» and «Aliter accipitur 'posse' pro posse facere omne illud quod non includit contradictionem fieri, sive Deus ordinaverit se hoc facturum sive non, quia multa potest Deus facere quae non vult facere» and «Sententiarum, lib. I, d. 43» and «et illa dicitur Deus posse de potentia absoluta. Sicut Papa aliqua non potest secundum iura statuta ab eo, quae tamen absolute potest.» The words before «Sententiarum», "secundum Magistrum", are printed in spaced type and are garbled in the text layer used here. The editors refer the citation to Lombard, *Sent.* I d.43 (n. 43 above).

that God should do anything by absolute power, as impossible as that he should act without intellect and will.[130] And the authority Ockham names for absolute power is the twelfth-century reply to Abelard. "God can do many things he does not will" is Lombard's sentence (n. 43). This tells against reading Ockham's absolute power as "God's primary attribute" (p. 34). It does not answer the claim of p. 32, which concerns knowledge; the question that does is read below.

The citation shows less than it seems to. It shows that Ockham took the extent of absolute power from the proposition the schools had held against Abelard; it does not show that he kept Lombard's measure. Lombard's alternatives were "other reasonable and good things" (n. 42). Ockham's are whatever "does not include a contradiction". That measure was not new with him: Scotus calls the world possible before it was because its terms are not repugnant (n.49), and Bradwardine calls God omnipotent from his "absolute power and non-repugnance" (n. 150). But Ockham states it with no reference to wisdom or goodness, and his comparison makes the ordained order a body of law that God has instituted, as a pope institutes his own.

Absolute power and knowledge

The sixth question of the same quodlibet asks whether there can be an intuitive cognition of an object that does not exist, and it is the text that bears on p. 32. Ockham puts two conclusions. The first is that "intuitive cognition can be, by divine power, of an object that does not exist". He proves it from the article of the creed, "I believe in God the Father almighty", which he takes to mean that whatever "does not include a manifest contradiction" is to be attributed to divine power, and then from the principle of the theologians that what God produces through secondary causes he can produce and conserve without them.[131] The second conclusion is that "naturally, intuitive cognition cannot be caused or conserved when the object does not exist". The case of one who has looked at the sun and still sees it in a dark place he explains by a quality impressed on the eye: if the mind assents to the proposition that the light is seen in the same place, it "is deceived".[132]

Here Milbank's sentence finds support. The ground of the first conclusion is God's power to do whatever includes no contradiction, the measure the first question calls absolute power (n. 129), and by it a cognition of the kind that normally joins the mind to a present thing can exist without the thing. That is near what Milbank calls severing "the normal link between our mind's understanding of things and the way they are in themselves" (p. 32). Ockham sets two limits, and Milbank's sentence names neither. On Ockham's own account in the fifth quodlibet, intuitive cognition is the cognition by which one judges "not only that a thing is when it is, but also that it is not when it is not", so that an intuitive cognition of what does not exist yields, so far as it is intuitive, the judgment that it does not exist. And God "cannot cause in us a cognition by which it evidently appears to us that a thing is present when it is absent, because this includes a contradiction". He can cause an act of belief by which "I believe a thing to be present which is absent", but that act is abstractive, not intuitive, and it is not evident.[133] Absolute power can produce a false belief; it cannot produce false evidence. Whether that suffices

130. Etzkorn and Kelley, introduction, OT 4:8*, the editors' summary, not Ockham's words. «Impossibile tamen est ut Deus aliquid de potentia absoluta faciat, tam impossibile quam esset impossibile ut Deus aliquid sine intellectu et voluntate seu sine praescientia et praeordinatione faceret.» The sentence gives no reference; the sentence before it refers to the editors' notes at OT 4:36 n. 1 and 611 n. 1, which were not read.

131. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.6, OT 9:604–605, his determination. «In ista quaestione pono duas conclusiones: prima est quod» and «cognitio intuitiva potest esse per potentiam divinam de obiecto non existente» and «est divinae potentiae attribuendum quod non includit manifestam contradictionem; sed istud fieri a Deo non includit contradictionem». The creed and the theologians' principle are given in English because the text layer interrupts them with apparatus. The editors refer the question to Ockham's *Ordinatio*, Prologue q.1, which was not on disk.

132. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.6, OT 9:606. «Secunda conclusio est quod naturaliter cognitio intuitiva non potest causari nec conservari, obiecto non existente.» and, replying to the case of the sun, «non manet visio solis, sed manet aliqua qualitas, puta lux impressa oculo, et illa qualitas videtur.» and «et sibi assentiat, decipitur propter illam qualitatem impressam visam.»

133. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* V q.5, OT 9:496 (determination) and 498 (reply to the first instance). «per notitiam intuitivam non tantum iudico rem esse quando est, sed etiam non esse quando non est» (496) and «Deus non potest causare in nobis cognitionem talem per quam evidenter apparet nobis rem esse praesentem quando est absens, quia hoc includit contradictionem.» and «Tamen Deus potest causare actum creditivum per quem credo rem esse praesentem quae est absens. Et dico quod illa cognitio creditiva erit abstractiva, non intuitiva» (498).

for Milbank's switch "from knowledge by identity to knowledge by representation" (p. 32) is a question about Ockham's theory of cognition as a whole, which these two questions do not settle and this article does not take up. On the narrower point the verdict is split. Ockham's absolute power is the one power that does nothing inordinately, as the first question shows, and it is also a power by which God can bring about in the mind what nature does not.

Where Ockham gives Milbank his reading

The same quodlibet shows what work the distinction does. Ockham concludes that "a man can be saved without created charity by God's absolute power", and that no one will be saved or merit "according to the laws now ordained by God without created grace".[134] To the charge that the first conclusion is Pelagius's error he answers that Pelagius held grace not to be required in fact, while he himself holds that an act elicited from purely natural powers "is meritorious only through God's absolute power accepting it".[135] The second question applies the distinction of necessity. "Necessity is twofold, namely absolute and by supposition", and God accepts an act of charity necessarily only in the second way, "because this consequence is necessary: God has ordained and instituted by laws already given that such an act so elicited is to be accepted, therefore God accepts that act already elicited", "and yet both antecedent and consequent are simply contingent".[136] Here the worth of a meritorious act lies in its acceptance under laws God has given. Scotus's law that is right because the divine will accepts it (n. 115) is carried into merit and grace, and Milbank's willing "sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35) fits these questions at least as well as it fits the *Lectura*.

The *Ordinatio* gives Milbank two more texts. In the forty-third distinction Ockham asks Abelard's question, "whether God can do things which he does not do nor will do". One objection runs as Abelard's did: God can do only what is right to be done by him, and "nothing is right or just to be done by him except what he does". Ockham's reply begins with Lombard's distinction and then turns it: "although God cannot do except what is just to be done, yet something can be just to be done if God did it, which yet now is not just to be done because it is not done by God".[137] Lombard had measured God's possible acts by the justice they would have if he did them (n. 40). Ockham grants this and adds that what God does not do is not now just to be done "because it is not done by God". He calls the objector's fault a mixing of possible and assertoric premises and leaves its cause to logic, so the clause is not worked into a doctrine of justice; but it runs from God's doing to the justice of the deed, where Lombard's ran the other way.

In the same question Ockham denies that natural reason can prove God a free cause. It "cannot be proved by natural reason that God is a cause of things acting contingently", because it cannot be proved that, as many effects follow naturally from the perfection of the sun, many beings do not follow from the perfection of the divine being which could not be otherwise. That God acts contingently "is to be held", and from it "the solution

The instance answered, that on Ockham's view God could not cause a cognition by which an absent thing appears present, is an objection and not his position.

134. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.2, OT 9:587–588. «homo potest salvari sine caritate creata de potentia Dei absoluta» (587) and «secundum leges a Deo nunc ordinatas sine gratia creata» (588).

135. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.1 a.2, OT 9:588–589, replying to the charge of Pelagianism. «Pelagius posuit quod de facto non requiritur gratia ad vitam aeternam habendam» and «quod actus ex puris naturalibus elicitus est meritorius vitae aeternae de condigno» (Pelagius's view, as Ockham reports it) and «Ego autem pono quod solum est meritorius per potentiam Dei absolutam acceptantem.»

136. Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VI q.2, OT 9:590–591. «duplex est necessitas: scilicet absoluta, et ex suppositione.» and «Deus nihil agit ad extra de necessitate, nec aliquid aliud a se vult necessario» (590) and «quia haec consequentia est necessaria: Deus ordinavit et instituit per leges iam datas quod talis actus sic elicitus sit acceptandus, igitur Deus illum actum iam elicitum acceptat» and «et tamen tam antecedens quam consequens est simpliciter contingens.» (591). For the distinction of necessity and for the second sentence, which Ockham gives "according to the saints", the editors cite Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.19 a.3 (OT 9:590 nn. 4, 7; see n. 72).

137. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.1, OT 4:622, 623 (objection) and 640 (reply). «quaero utrum Deus possit facere aliqua quae non facit nec faciet» and «Deus non potest facere nisi quod rectum est fieri ab eo; sed nihil est rectum sive iustum fieri ab eo nisi quod facit» and «quamvis Deus non possit facere nisi quod iustum est fieri, aliquid tamen potest esse iustum fieri si Deus faceret illud, quod tamen modo non est iustum fieri quia non fit a Deo.» and «Et ideo talis mixtio ex possibili et inesse non valet. Causam tamen non oportet modo discutere, quia hoc magis pertinet ad logicam».

of the question is plain, that God can do things which he does not do".[138] The arguments he finds wanting are, on his editors' identification, the four reasons of Aquinas's *De potentia* q.3 a.15, which he sets out, three of them nearly in Aquinas's words, and he says the philosophers could easily answer them. Aquinas had offered the reasons as making the conclusion plain "for the present" (n. 83); Ockham keeps the conclusion, and the words "is to be held" are Aquinas's as well as his, but he denies the reasons the force of proof. Ockham reaches the twelfth-century conclusion, and reaches it by faith.

The second question of the distinction comes nearest to Milbank's "priority of possibility". It asks whether God's inability to make the impossible is prior to the impossible's inability to be made by God. Ockham answers that neither is prior, and that God's being able to make the possible is not prior to the creature's being able to be made by God, "but they are at once by nature". To the objection that whatever a creature has it has from God, he replies that possibility belongs to the creature "from itself", "not really as something inhering in it, but it is truly possible" from itself, "as a man is from himself not-an-ass".[139] Here Milbank's description of an essentialist possibilism holds. The possible is not grounded in God, as it was for Bonaventure in "the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness" (n. 54), or for Aquinas in reasons of all that God can do, "as it were thought out" (n. 103); it is given with the creature, and God has not "made it up". One phrase of Milbank's fails here as it failed with Scotus. Ockham gives the possible no being of its own: it is more proper to say "that the creature is possible, not because of anything that belongs to it, but because it can be in the nature of things" (n. 139).

On the better world, the editors of the *Ordinatio* summarise Ockham in a sentence of their own: "This universe is not the best."[140] His determination is more guarded. He sets out three opinions on whether God could make a world better in species and judges it "probable" that he could; he holds that God "can make a world better than this one, and distinct from this world in number only", since he could produce infinitely many individuals of the kinds that now exist, and that he could make it "better by accidental goodness". To the argument that every better world would then admit a better without end, he reports two answers and chooses neither.[141] Lombard and Aquinas measured the better world against two terms, the wisdom of the maker, which cannot be greater, and the thing made, which can (nn. 45, 87). Ockham's question keeps only the second. A better world is more individuals, more perfect accidents or a higher species, and the wisdom of the maker does not enter it.

138. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.1, OT 4:636–637. «Ideo quantum ad istum articulum dico quod non potest ratione naturali probari quod Deus est causa rerum contingenter» and «agens, quia non potest probari quin sicut ex perfectione solis naturaliter sequuntur effectus multi, ita ex perfectione entitatis divinae sequuntur multae entitates quae aliter esse non possent.» and «Circa secundum articulum dico quod tenendum est quod Deus est causa contingenter agens» and «Ex istis patet solutio quaestionis quod Deus potest facere aliqua quae non facit» (636) and «Ad rationes igitur adductas contra philosophos, quantumcumque conclusio sit vera, ipsi tamen philosophi faciliter responderent.» (637). The editors head the arguments, in brackets, as Aquinas's opinion and refer them to Aquinas, *De potentia* q.3 a.15 (OT 4:623 n. 3). Ockham introduces them «Circa primum dicunt aliqui quod sic. Et nituntur aliqui probare quod Deus sit causa libera.» (623) and gives the four reasons at 623–624, the second, third and fourth in quotation marks and close to the Corpus Thomisticum text (compare n. 83).

139. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.2, OT 4:640 and 649–650. «utrum prius conveniat Deo non posse facere impossibile quam impossibili non posse fieri a Deo» (640) and «non prius convenit Deo posse facere possibile vel creaturam quam creaturae posse fieri a Deo; sed simul natura» and «convenit creaturae ex se, non realiter tamquam aliquid sibi inhaerens, sed vere est possibilis» (649) and «ex se, sicut homo ex se est non-asinus» and «Nec est proprius modus loquendi dicere quod esse possibile convenit creaturae, sed magis proprie debet dici quod creatura est possibilis, non propter aliquid quod sibi conveniat sed quia potest esse in rerum natura.» and, replying to the principal argument, «non prius est Deus factivus quam creatura est factibilis, immo ita primo est creatura factibilis sicut Deus est factivus» (650).

140. Etzkorn and Kelley, introduction, OT 4:8*. «Hoc universum non est optimum. Sine dubio Deus potuisset, si voluisset, universum melius facere; exempli gratia universum in quo homo peccare non potuisset (651-655).» The example is Augustine's, quoted by Lombard, which Ockham uses to argue for a world of another species: «Talem potuit Deus fecisse hominem, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet» (OT 4:652).

141. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.44 q. un., OT 4:655, 660–661. «Sic igitur patet quod circa istum articulum possent poni tres opiniones. Probabile autem reputo quod Deus posset facere alium mundum meliorem isto distinctum ab isto specie» and «dico quod Deus potest facere mundum meliorem isto, et distinctum solo numero ab isto mundo» and «Cuius ratio est quia infinita individua eiusdem rationis cum illis quae modo sunt, posset Deus producere.» (655) and «dico quod Deus posset facere mundum meliorem bonitate accidentali» (660) and «diversi diversimode dicerent» and «dicerent quod Deus posset facere mundum meliorem in infinitum, non tamen infinitum» and «Alii dicerent quod posset fieri mundus quo non posset fieri melior.» (661).

Synchronic contingency

On the claim Milbank documents from Scotus, Ockham is against Scotus. In the thirty-eighth distinction he sets out an opinion that his editors trace to a compiled text of Scotus's commentary on distinctions 38 and 39, and argues against it.[142] The "power for opposites, not manifest, which is for opposites without succession" is not to be posited, because "a power which by no power, even infinite, can be reduced to act is not to be posited", and this one, reduced to act, would make contradictories true together. "In creatures it is universally true that there is never a power for opposite objects without succession, any more than for opposite acts." The will causes contingently because, "freely, without any variation coming to itself or to another", it "can cease from its act in another instant", "not that in the same instant it is not causing"; "and this, and nothing else, is for the will to cause contingently". Of God he says that it is not well said that the divine will, as prior by nature, so posits its effect in an instant that it can not posit it in the same instant, "because there are no such instants of nature as he imagines". His conclusion is general: "universally there is never a power such that opposites are verified without succession".[143]

Milbank uses "from Scotus through to Ockham" of the epistemic switch (p. 32) and of the abandonment of participation (p. 36), not of synchronic contingency, and this result does not break a thread he drew. It limits a thread a reader might draw. At the point where Milbank's one citation of Scotus carries the weight, the real possibility of an alternative synchronous with the actual, Ockham rejected Scotus's doctrine, and he placed the contingency of a free cause where Hugh had placed the possibility of the future, in what can come about or cease. Ockham kept from Scotus, and widened, the law that is right because it is willed; he refused the power for the opposite in the same instant. And on the relation of knowledge to will he answers as the *Contra Gentiles* does (n. 78): "God, understanding himself, understands other things necessarily, but God, willing himself, wills other things contingently".[144]

9. Bradwardine and Wyclif

Bradwardine, for all his doctrine of necessity, stands with the twelfth-century reply. His teaching, he says, lets a reader avoid "the error of Abelard, and the Paris article condemned".[145] He lists three errors about necessity in God's outward acts, which he says Henry of Ghent reports: that God acts from the necessity of his essence, as fire heats; from the necessity of his knowledge, "because by his knowledge he comprehends the best possible order in things, to which he necessarily conforms himself in acting"; and from the necessity of his will, which conforms itself to that knowledge.[146] The second and third come as near as any text examined here to Milbank's

142. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.38 q. un., OT 4:573 n. 2 and 578. The editors refer the opinion to a compiled text (*textus compositus*) of Scotus on *Sentences* I d.38 p.2 and d.39 qq.1–5, printed in an appendix to vol. 6 of the Vatican Scotus, and head Ockham's reply, in brackets, as against Scotus's opinion. That compiled text was not consulted, and its relation to the *Lectura* quoted in section 7 is not established here; Ockham's phrases answer the *Lectura*'s freedom toward opposite objects (n.46), its possibility "in the same instant" (n.50) and its priority of the will by nature to its volition (n.51).

143. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.38 q. un., OT 4:578–581. «secundam libertatem voluntatis consequitur una potentia ad opposita non manifesta quae est ad opposita sine successione» and «illa potentia quae per nullam potentiam, etiam infinitam, potest reduci ad actum, non est ponenda» (578) and «Et ita in creaturis est universaliter verum quod numquam est potentia ad opposita obiecta sine successione, non magis quam ad oppositos actus.» (579) and «libere, sine omni variatione adveniente sibi vel alteri et non per cessationem alterius causae, potest cessare ab actu in alio instanti, ita quod in alio instanti sit non causans, non quod in eodem instanti sit non causans» (580) and «Et hoc, et non aliud, est voluntatem contingenter causare.» and «Ex isto patet quod non est convenienter dictum» and «quod voluntas divina, ut prior naturaliter, ita ponit suum effectum in esse in a quod potest eum non ponere in esse in eodem instanti. Quia non sunt talia instantia naturae sicut iste imaginatur» and «Ideo dico quod universaliter numquam est potentia ita quod opposita verificentur sine successione. Immo impossibile est quod Deus respiceret obiectum et non respiceret illud, nisi esset aliqua successio» (581).

144. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I d.43 q.1, ad 1, OT 4:639. «Quia Deus intelligendo se intelligit alia necessario, sed Deus volendo se vult alia contingenter, et ideo non est simile.»

145. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850A. «Per nanc etiam potest vitari error Abelardi, et articulus Parisiensis damnatus» (the text reads «nanc» for «hanc»).

146. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 850B. «Alij posuerunt quod quicquid Deus agit ad extra, agit ex necessitate suae scientiae, eo quod per suam scientiam comprehendit ordinem meliorem possibilem in rebus, cui necessario se conformat secundum suam scientiam

God "compelled" by his intellect, and Bradwardine counts both as errors. The same list stands in Aquinas's *Contra Gentiles* (n. 82).[147]

Bradwardine's own position is a necessity that follows God's act. He reads Abelard as holding that God wills all creatures "from a necessary order of goodness", and asks, "Who then will accuse me of this error?" God, "so far as concerns the nature of his volitive power, can most contingently and most freely, according to contradiction, not will what he wills and will what he does not will", and yet wills what he does by "a certain necessity following on the act of the divine will already posited".[148] The Paris article condemns, on his reading, "a natural, simple, absolute and preceding necessity", and that was the necessity Abelard placed in God's outward acts.[149] Absolute power, for Bradwardine, is the power that implies no contradiction, and it is from this power that God "is truly called omnipotent".[150]

In c.29, and again at the start of the c.52 corollary, Bernard's judgment that Abelard's thesis was heretical, the Paris article, and an Oxford condemnation under Archbishop Robert of Canterbury stand in the objections raised against Bradwardine's own doctrine of necessity.[151] By the 1340s the condemnation of Abelard's actualism was a weapon for Bradwardine's opponents. The thesis Bernard judged heretical is the seventh article in the list of errors that Denzinger prints under the council of Sens, and Innocent II condemned the chapters sent to him "together with their author" (nn. 28–29).

Two things about the later condemnations are secure. The Paris article, as Bradwardine quotes it, condemns the proposition that "God necessarily does whatever is done immediately by him". In the *Chartularium* of the University of Paris it is the fifty-third of the 219 articles of 1277, and it condemns the proposition on either reading of the necessity, "whether it be understood of the necessity of coercion, because it takes away freedom, or of the necessity of immutability, because it posits an inability to act otherwise".[152] And the Oxford error that

operando.» and «Hos autem tres errores de ista necessitate recitat Henricus de Gandauo 5. de quodlib. quaestione quarta». Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* V q.4, *Utrum Deus necessario producat quicquid exterius immediate producit* (the heading, corrected from the OCR), in the Venice edition of 1613 (*Aurea quodlibeta*, t.1), argues in turn that God does not act from the necessity of his nature, of his knowledge or of his will, and among the arguments for the opposite cites the condemned Paris article *Quod Deum necesse est facere quicquid immediate fit ab ipso* (wording corrected from the OCR). The only copy used here is an uncorrected OCR of that edition, so Henry's argument is not quoted, and the Latin in italics in this sentence is not checked by script.

147. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II c.28 n.10: God produces things not from necessity of nature, knowledge, will or justice (n. 82). That the *Summa contra Gentiles* (c. 1259–1265) is earlier than Henry's fifth *Quodlibet*, so that the list is older than Henry, is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

148. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 851A. «autem dicere Abelardus, quod sicut Deus necessario absolute vult finem vltimum, suam scilicet propriam bonitatem; sic et necessario absolute vult ea quae sunt ad finem, omnes scilicet creaturas; Itaque quod omnia ista eadem numero, omnibus suis modis ex necessario ordine bonitatis emanant ab illo» and «Quis ergo arguet me de isto errore? Dico enim quod Deus, quantum est de ratione suae potentiae volutiuae, contingentissime et liberrime secundum contradictionem potest non velle quod vult, et velle quod non vult» and «qui tamen irrepugnanter quadam necessitate sequente actum voluntatis diuinae positum iam in esse».

149. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 853C–D. «Damnatur ergo in articulo recitato necessitas naturalis, simplex, absoluta, et praecedens respectu volutionis et factionis diuinae ad extra, non autem necessitas sequens praedicta.» and «talem necessitatem immutabilitatis posuit Petrus Abelardus in Deo ad extra, qualis et in articulo condemnatur.»

150. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.52 cor., 837D. «Ab hac autem potentia absoluta et non repugnantiae, puto Deum dici omnipotentem veraciter atque esse.»

151. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei* III c.29, 727B, and c.52 cor., 834C. «Quare et Robertus Cantuatiensis Archiepiscopus» and «condemnauit Oxoniae quendam errorem dicentem, quod Omnis propositio de futuro vera est necessaria» and «et Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus damnauit Parisijs quendam alium errorem ponentem, quod nihil sit a casu, sed omnia de necessitate veniunt» and «Item alium sub hac forma, quod Deum necesse est facere, quicquid immediate fit ab ipso: Error, siue intelligatur de necessitate coactionis, quia tollit libertatem; siue de necessitate immutabilitatis, quia ponit impossibilitatem aliter faciendi. Bernardus etiam epistola sua decima ad Papam Innocentium reputat dictum Petri Abelardi haereticum» and «Obijciunt siquidem aliqui contra necessitatem sequentem». Chapter 29 is headed «Obijcit et respondet.», and these sentences belong to the objections, which Bradwardine answers. Bradwardine's «epistola sua decima» is Bernard's letter to Innocent II against Abelard's errors, numbered 190 in Migne's edition and printed there as *Opusculum* XI (PL 182:1053–1072); the words his objectors go on to quote, that God can do or omit only what he does, stand in the *Capitula haeresum*, PL 182:1049C–1050A, which Migne's editor takes to be the *capitula* of that letter (n. 50). Why Bradwardine calls the letter the tenth is not shown by the sources used here.

152. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), 546, art. 53, transcribed from the page image: *Quod Deum necesse est facere, quicquid inmediate fit ab ipso. — Error, sive intelligatur de necessitate coactionis, quia tollit libertatem, sive de necessitate inmutabilitatis, quia ponit impotentiam aliter faciendi.* The editors attach a note to *impotentiam* that was not read. Bradwardine's text reads «impossibilitatem aliter faciendi» (n. 151). Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 36 n. 43, cites arts. 58–60, 96, 99, 103, 107, 111, 130, 135–136, 140–141, 159 and 186 in Piché's numbering; the correspondence of those numbers with the *Chartularium*'s was judged by content (59, celestial

Bradwardine's objectors cite, that "every true proposition about the future is necessary", is also necessitarian; in the same sentence they name the condemner at Paris as Stephen, "bishop of Paris" (n. 151). Both condemn a necessity, and neither affirms a possibility. The rest is inference. Milbank's "archiepiscopal backing at Paris and Canterbury" for the redefinition of contingency (p. 36) presumably refers to the Paris condemnation of 1277, whose articles his note lists from Piché's edition, and to an English one. The Oxford condemnation under Archbishop Robert that Bradwardine's objectors cite would fit "Canterbury", though Milbank gives no source for it, and Bradwardine calls the condemner at Paris a bishop. Milbank's own note concedes that the articles of 1277 "frequently targeted positions held by nearly everyone to be heterodox, generally Averroistic perspectives", while reaching also positions "such as those entertained by Aquinas" (his note 43). Of the articles in his list that can be matched by content with the *Chartularium*, three condemn a necessity or an eternity (59, that God is the necessary cause of the motion of the heavens; 99, that the world, though made from nothing, was not made anew; 159, that the human will is necessitated by its knowledge as a brute's appetite is), and two condemn a limit set on God's power by the course of nature (141, that God cannot make an accident without a subject; 186, that the heavens never rest). None of them affirms a pure possibility. What they back is the contingency of the actual and God's power over the natural order, not a pure possibility, which is the part of Milbank's claim that the twelfth century already held. His list does not include article 53.

Wyclif is the one later author examined here who stands near Milbank. In the *Dialogus* Veritas, Wyclif's spokesman, concedes what Mendacium calls "your old error": "whatever will come about will come about of necessity; therefore it is necessary that men pray."[153] In *De dominio divino* he supposes, "with the second doctor" (Bradwardine, to judge from the order in which the chapter names its authorities), that everything that will happen is necessary to happen, and that God's prevenient co-action necessitates every secondary agent; and he distinguishes what is necessary "by supposition", any truth with an eternal cause from which it follows formally, "as my running follows formally from God's willing my running", from what is necessary absolutely, which "is in reality the divine essence".[154] He claims Aquinas for this way of speaking, citing the *Summa*, first part, question 19, article 3.[155] The claim holds for the distinction, on which that article turns (n. 72). What Wyclif builds on it is his own: Aquinas's suppositional necessity there is that of God's willing, given that he wills, and Wyclif extends it to every future event.

The guard has content. "Every future thing is necessary to happen from God's preordination; but just as it can be that God did not so preordain, … so it can be that what was prophesied … does not come about, and there is a parity of contingency on both sides."[156] Every creature is "most contingent to either side", "because every possibility of contingency is founded in God, who can as freely and as easily do the opposite of any

necessity; 99, eternity; 141, accident without subject; 159, will necessitated by knowledge; 186, the heavens never at rest). Piché's edition itself was not consulted. The matched articles are read in the archive.org OCR of the *Chartularium* (`source/paris1277/chartularium-1277-articles.txt`), not checked against the scan, and are reported in English. Milbank's note 43 is quoted from his p. 37. One article not in his list comes nearer his reading: article 146 of the *Chartularium* (by the OCR) condemns the proposition that what is possible or impossible simply is so according to philosophy, and Bradwardine, in the course of his own demonstration in c.5, reads it as setting possibility beyond the natural secondary causes: «Quare et Stephanus Parisiensis Episcopus damnauit quendam articulum asserentem, quod possibile vel impossibile simpliciter, i. omnibus modis, est possibile vel impossibile secundum Philosophiam: haec enim vt plurimum considerat possibile et impossibile secundum causas naturales secundas.» (*De causa Dei* III c.5, 657C). It too widens God's power beyond nature; it does not make the possible a range given to God.

153. John Wyclif, *Dialogus* c.23 (London: Wyclif Society, 1886), 45–46. «innuis enim quod non valet oracio pro vivis vel mortuis, eo quod secundum tuum antiquum errorem omnia que evenient est necessarium evenire.» and «Concedo enim tibi quod omnia que evenient de necessitate evenient; ideo necesse est homines orare».

154. Wyclif, *De dominio divino* I c.14, ed. R. L. Poole (London: Wyclif Society, 1890), 115–116. «In primis quidem suppono cum doctore secundo quod omnia que evenient sit necessarium evenire.» and «quod Deus preveniendo coagat cum quolibet agente secundo ipsum necessitando ad quemlibet actum suum.» and «Necessarium ex supposicione est quecunque veritas habens causam eternam ex qua sequitur formaliter ipsam esse; ut me currere sequitur formaliter ex Deum velle me currere» and «est in re divina essencia».

155. Wyclif, *De dominio divino* I c.14, 116. «isti modo loquendi innititur sanctus Thomas, prima parte, questione xix., articulo iii.»

156. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 130. «Vere quidem concluditur quod omne futurum ex preordinancia Dei est necessarium evenire; sed sicut potest esse quod Deus non sic preordinavit» and «sic potest esse quod prophetatum a Christo vel eius discipulo non contingat, et est paritas contingencie utrobique.»

contingent".[157] Wyclif founds the world's contingency in God and places its necessity after God's preordaining. The Council of Constance condemned among the articles of Wyclif the proposition "all things come about by absolute necessity".[158] The texts of Wyclif used here deny that proposition in its own terms: they hold every future thing necessary by supposition, from God's preordaining, and place absolute necessity in the divine essence alone (n. 154).

He is nearest Milbank on the measure of the world and on reason in will. "It seems philosophical to hold" that God so placed all things "that, if he were to add, it would be a monster, and if he were to diminish, it would be a defective fabric", which does not limit infinite power, because in God "power and wisdom are the same".[159] The claim is hedged, and its setting is an argument against an infinite world. Against Bradwardine he denies that God has freedom of contradiction toward any outward act: an eternal prior volition to create Peter is one "to which it formally repugns that he not create; therefore God necessitates himself to produce any extrinsic act".[160] And "those do not fully satisfy who say that God annihilates because he wills. For it would not be possible for God to will to annihilate unless reason required it."[161] That is Milbank's complaint against a will sundered from the rationally best, and Aquinas's against the "simple will" (n. 94).

His treatment of absolute and ordained power shows what an actualist does with the term. "Though this distinction serves to reconcile authors, it seems to me that nothing powerful can act on anything unless it could act on it by ordained power";[162] and "God can do nothing by absolute power except what he can do by ordained power, because however many miracles God can do, he can ordain power to do them".[163] This widens ordained power to whatever God could ordain. It does not shrink God's power to what will be. In the same discussion Wyclif grants that God can produce "something that will never be produced",[164] and in *De ente* he says outright that "God can do many things by his absolute power which are not in his ordained power, ... as that all possible things that do not exist should exist".[165] Wyclif is Milbank's ally on the unity of power and wisdom and on reason governing will. He is no ally of the claim that the actual exhausts the possible, and his reserve about the absolute–ordained distinction repeats, on other grounds, Bonaventure's objection to one use of it: "God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly".

157. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 183. «omnem creaturam contingentissimum ad utrumlibet sit fore, existere, et fuisse, quia omne posse contingencie in Deo fundatur, qui eque libere ac faciliter potest in oppositum cuiuscunque contingentis».

158. Denzinger and Bannwart, *Enchiridion symbolorum* (1911), 226, no. 607, art. 27 of the errors of Wyclif, under the Council of Constance, transcribed from the page image. «Omnia de necessitate absoluta eveniunt.» Denzinger gives no place in Wyclif's writings for the article, and the sources used here do not show from which text it was drawn.

159. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 46–47. «philosophicum videtur ponere quod Deus omnia sic posuit in effectu: sic, videlicet, quod, si superadderet, foret monstrum, et si diminueret, foret fabrica defectiva.» and «Ex quibus probabiliter credi potest quod, si Deus mundum produxerit» and «Eadem quidem est in Deo potencia et sapiencia».

160. Wyclif, *De dominio divino*, 167–169. «ut si Deus creat Petrum, tunc habet eternam volicionem previam ad creandum, cui repugnat formaliter quod non creet; ideo Deus necessitat se ad quemlibet actum extrinsecum producendum.» and «Ideo videtur michi quod potissime de actibus volendi intrinsecis quos ponit eternos sed contingentes caperet sua sentencia veritatem.»

161. Wyclif, *De annihilatione* c.13 (a fragment of *De potencia productiva Dei ad extra*), in *De ente* (London: Wyclif Society, 1909), 301. «Unde non plene satisfaciunt qui dicunt ideo, quod deus adnichilat quia vult. Non enim esset possibile deum velle adnichilare, nisi racio hoc exigeret».

162. Wyclif, *De logica* II (*Logice continuacio* III) (London: Wyclif Society, 1896), 134. «Quamvis autem illa distinccio deservit pro auctoribus concordandis, videtur tamen michi quod nullum potens potest in aliud, nisi posset in ipsum de potencia ordinata.»

163. Wyclif, *De logica* II, 145. «Ymmo, iuxta dicta, deus nichil potest facere de potencia absoluta, nisi quod potest de potencia ordinata; quia quotquot miracula deus potest facere, potest ipse ordinare potenciam ad illa faciendum. Ideo stultissimum est verbum modernorum».

164. Wyclif, *De logica* II, 133. «(demonstrando unum quod nunquam producetur). Ad hoc valet prima potencia».

165. Wyclif, *De ente* II, in *De ente* (London: Wyclif Society, 1909), 101. «Hic dico quod multa potest deus de sua potencia absoluta que non sunt in potencia eius ordinate, nec in potencia cause secunde; ut omnia possibilia existere que non existunt».

10. Outside the Schools: Peter Damian and an Anonymous Abbot

Milbank's offenders argue from God's absolute power, set will above wisdom, and treat each feature of the world as arbitrarily elected. Two monastic texts come near that pattern, one on the first count and one on the second.

Peter Damian's letter *De divina omnipotentia* shows that an argument leading to actualism was answered before Abelard. Damian recalls a dinner at which his correspondent defended Jerome's saying that God cannot restore a fallen virgin and closed his argument with the thesis "that God cannot do this for no other reason than that he does not will it". Damian's reply is a reduction: if God can do nothing he does not will, and does nothing except what he wills, "then he can do nothing at all of what he does not do", and we must say that God does not send rain today because he cannot.[166] The correspondent was Desiderius, abbot of Monte Cassino, and the letter is dated, on general knowledge, to the 1060s.[167] Desiderius, on Damian's report, held one case: God cannot restore a fallen virgin, because he does not will it. The general conclusion, that God can do nothing of what he does not do, is Damian's reduction of that case to absurdity (n. 166), and it is the thesis Abelard would later hold in his own name.

Damian's own answer goes as far as any text examined here. "It is to be believed with unwavering faith that God can do all things, whether he does them or not."[168] The maker of nature "easily, when he wills, takes away the necessity of nature".[169] In the last chapter he says that God can bring it about that Rome, after it was founded, was not founded: "he could, from our standpoint; he can, from his own", because with God there is no "could" and "can" but an "immobile and perpetual can".[170] Its limits are Damian's own. God cannot do evil, "because he cannot even will it", and the reason God does not restore the virgin is that "the judgment of his most just will" is kept, not that his power fails.[171] Of the question how God can bring it about that what was done was not done, Damian says that, put in that form, it asks that "what God made, God did not make", and that whoever asserts this "is to be spat upon".[172] God created "not from any necessity of solitude or want", but because "the goodness of his own clemency alone moved him".[173] Damian holds, well before Hugh if the dates of nn. 32 and 167 are right, that God can do what he never does, without a will sundered from goodness.

The anonymous *Disputatio altera*, which Migne prints with William of St-Thierry's works, answers the thesis as Abelard's. Its author lists it as the second of three errors, that "God cannot do except what he does, nor in another way, nor at another time".[174] His answer is a counter-thesis about will. He quotes Augustine: "whoever says, why did God make heaven and earth, must be answered, because he willed." Against Abelard's

166. Peter Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.1, PL 145:596D–597B. «Deum non ob aliud hoc non posse, nisi quia non vult.» and «Si nihil, inquam, potest Deus eorum, quae non vult: nihil autem, nisi quod vult, facit; ergo nihil omnino potest eorum facere, quae non facit.» and «Deum hodie idcirco non pluere, quia non potest». The first sentence is the correspondent's conclusion as Damian recalls it; the others are Damian's reduction.

167. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia*, PL 145:595C. The letter is addressed «Domno DESIDERIO Casinensis monasterii reverentissimo rectori», and the text names the correspondent of the dinner as «unanimi tamen patri, tibi videlicet». Damian writes after resigning his see («Ego itaque episcopatu dimisso»). Migne's text gives no year for the letter; its dating to the 1060s is general knowledge, not verified against the sources used here.

168. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.10, PL 145:610C. «Quamobrem indubitabili fide credendum est, Deum omnia posse, sive faciat, sive non faciat.»

169. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.11, PL 145:612B. «Qui enim naturae dedit originem, facile, cum vult, naturae tollit necessitatem.»

170. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.15, PL 145:619B–C. «Potest Deus ut Roma, etiam postquam facta est, facta non fuerit. Potuit secundum nos, potest secundum se.» and «sed immobile semper et perpetuum posse.»

171. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.2, PL 145:600A. «nequaquam tamen omnipotens Deus dicendus est hoc non posse, sed potius nolle, ut servetur arbitrium aequissimae voluntati, non autem ascribatur, quod absit, impotentia majestati. Quod enim malum est, non potest facere Deus, quia nec potest etiam velle».

172. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.15, PL 145:618C. «Nimirum ut, quod fecit Deus, non fecerit Deus. Ideo conspuendus est qui hoc asserit».

173. Damian, *De divina omnipotentia* c.7, PL 145:605C. «Ad creandum igitur, quod non erat, non solitudinis eum, vel alicujus inopiae necessitas impulit, sed sola propriae clementiae bonitas provocavit.»

174. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera adversus Abaelardum* III, PL 180:310D. «Secundum est, quod Deus facere non potest, nisi quod facit, nec alio modo, nec alio tempore, nec dimittere quin faciat quod facit.»

"reasonable cause" he says that "with Augustine as witness, reason contradicts, and says that in doing or leaving undone there is no cause higher than the will of God; and he errs who seeks a higher one".[175] He calls a liar anyone who "shuts God's will or power, that is God, inside the creature", and he adds that "God neither received nor receives from things a cause of when or how he should make them".[176] This is a will-first idiom used against an actualist, in Augustine's words.[177] It falls short of Milbank's charge. The abbot denies that a creature can find a cause above God's will; he does not say that God's will acts without reason. His "this impotence of his is omnipotence" is said of God's inability to do evil, "because evil is nothing", and is no general claim about power.[178]

11. Conclusion

The sources divide Milbank's claim along the two parts set out in the introduction, the ground of the possible and the contingency of the actual, and the line falls where he does not draw it.

On the source of the possible the tradition is with him. His possibilist God "mainly considers a range of 'given' possibilities" (p. 109). No author examined here before Scotus holds anything like that, and Scotus comes near it only in part: his divine intellect presents contingent propositions to the will as neutral, but it knows them by its own necessary knowledge, and nothing presents them to it from outside. Lombard's alternatives are "other reasonable and good things", measured by the same reason as the actual; Bonaventure places the whole range of *posse* in "the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness"; Aquinas says that the divine wisdom "comprehends the whole capacity of the power" and that God has reasons of all he can make, including what never will be.[179] The possible is an extension of God's wisdom. Both sides of the twelfth-century debate deny that God's will can act apart from his wisdom, and Aquinas excludes a creation from "simple will". Milbank's complaint against a will sundered from the rationally best has no target among these authors until Scotus. In Scotus it has one. He denies the divine intellect any judgment of what is to be done before the will determines it, and he makes the rightness of God's laws depend on their acceptance by the divine will (section 7). Even there the will is never set against right reason, and absolute power reaches only what would be done in an orderly way in another order.

On the contingency of the actual the tradition is against his dating. The redefinition of contingency that he dates to Scotus and to the condemnations, "a pure possibility that might not have been instantiated at all, or else instantiated otherwise" (pp. 36–37), joins two things. Its second half, that the actual might not have been, or might have been otherwise, is the common teaching of the twelfth-century schools. Hugh says that "it is possible that what will be should not come about"; Lombard, that God "could have made other things and left these aside" and "can make a better thing than he makes". It was stated against a named actualist, and

175. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera* III, PL 180:317D–318B. «Quisquis ergo dicit, quare fecit Deum coelum et terram, respondendum est illi, quia voluit.» (the text reads «Deum» for «Deus») and «Sed, Augustino teste, ratio contradicit, et dicit, quia in rebus agendis vel dimittendis voluntate Dei nulla causa superior sit; et errat qui superiorem quaerit.» The first sentence is Augustine (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos*), quoted by the abbot.

176. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera* III, PL 180:317D and 318B. «Mendax est igitur, et fallax, qui voluntatem Dei, vel potestatem ejus, id est Deum, intra creaturam includit sicut ille facit, qui dicit Deum de creatura sua non posse facere, nisi quod facit» and «Nec accepit, nec accipit Deus a rebus causam, quando vel quomodo faceret, vel disponeret, vel eas gubernaret; quia ipse est causa omnium».

177. Editor's *Monitum* to the *Disputatio altera*, PL 180. «editum est, postquam S. Bernardus Petri Abaelardi errores insectatus est» and «Hic ergo noster abbas anonymus beatum Bernardum tuetur». Migne's editors place the Council of Sens in 1140 (PL 182:1049, *Admonitio*), and the work answers Abelard's *Apologia*, written after the council (PL 178, *Observationes praeviae*); it is therefore later than 1140. The sources used here give no later limit.

178. Anonymous abbot, *Disputatio altera* III, PL 180:318C–D. «Et cum dicitur: Deus malum facere non potest, verum dicitur, quia malum nihil est» and «Et haec ejus impotentia omnipotentia est.»

179. Lombard, *Sententiae* I d.43 c.4 (n. 42); Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* d.43 q.4, resp. (n. 54); Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 co. (n. 85) and *De potentia* q.1 a.5 ad 11 (n. 103). The further quotations in this and the next two paragraphs are documented in nn. 34, 41 and 44 (Hugh, Lombard), nn. 76 and 85 (Aquinas), nn. 80–82 (necessity of knowledge), nn. 8, 16 and 17 (Abelard), nn. 99–100 (Aquinas on created necessity), and nn. 148 and 156 (Bradwardine, Wyclif).

the actualist lost. Aquinas gives the same answer in his own terms. The order of creatures "does not equal" the divine wisdom; creatures are not "commensurate" with the divine goodness; "simply", God can make other things than he makes. The word "pure" is another matter. If a pure possibility is one with no ground in God's wisdom, a bare logical option, then "pure" belongs to the first part of the claim, and the twelfth century does not hold it: Lombard's alternatives are "other reasonable and good things". The dating of pp. 36–37 fails, then, for the contingency the sentence describes, and stands only so far as the word "pure" carries the ground of the possible, where the previous paragraph gives Milbank part of Scotus. The word "compelled" that Milbank credits to Aquinas stands closest, in this article's judgment, to what Aquinas explicitly rejects: a creation from necessity of knowledge, a disposition of things flowing of necessity from God's understanding of himself, an order commensurate with God's goodness. The judgment holds for the creation articles; the Trinitarian texts are not on this shelf. Among these texts, the medieval author who wrote that God's goodness "compels" him to the goods he can do was Abelard.

Milbank's "necessity in actuality as such" has one clear witness among these texts, the Abelard of the *Theologia christiana*, for whom God "necessarily willed and made the world". The witness is narrower than Migne's text makes it. In the fuller text of the Monte Cassino fragments, as Tosti and Cousin print them, the necessity lies in God's doing, and Abelard denies it to the thing done: "it is necessary that God do what it is not necessary should be done by him". On that witness what he affirms is a necessity in the divine agent, not in the actual as such. Every other necessity in creatures found here, Aquinas's, Scotus's, Ockham's, Wyclif's or Bradwardine's, follows God's free act; the necessity with which God wills his own goodness (n. 72) is in God.

Ockham divides Milbank's claim along the same line, though nearer to Milbank's side of it, and further toward it than Scotus goes: a range of the possible measured by contradiction alone, a creature possible "from itself" and not through God's knowledge or goodness, a better world counted by individuals and accidents with no reference to the wisdom of the maker, and a merit whose worth lies in God's acceptance under laws he has instituted (section 8). Milbank's account of the will-first strand fits Ockham well. On absolute power the result is divided. Ockham's absolute power is the one power that is God, which "can do nothing inordinately", and he takes its extent from Lombard's answer to Abelard. It is also the ground on which God can cause an intuitive cognition of what does not exist, which comes near the severing of mind from thing that Milbank names (p. 32), within a limit Ockham sets: God cannot make an absent thing evidently appear present, though he can cause a belief that it is. And Ockham rejects the power for opposites without succession that Scotus's synchronic alternative requires. Milbank does not run that thread from Scotus to Ockham; but a reader who draws a modal lineage between them finds it broken there, while the thread of will and law runs through both.

Milbank's best defence runs as follows. The compulsion he names is that of "the Paternal uttering of the Verbum" (p. 109), a necessity within God, which every author here allows. The contents of the world follow by "discriminating 'aesthetic' judgements", which are choices among goods, and he never writes that God could not have made another world. Aquinas's own text supports the reading at several points (section 6): a reason can always be assigned for what God wills; his will may be called "determined" by his intellect's knowledge of fitting goods, in a conditional whose sentence opens by denying it, and is "inclined in some way" by that knowledge; and the universe, given these things, cannot be better, as a lyre is not improved by tightening one string. On this reading his quarrel is with Scotus alone, and a defender would press the difference between Hugh's possibility, a future that may not arrive, and Scotus's alternative at the same instant. Scotus's text allows that difference to be measured (section 7). Aquinas already states, in the divided sense, an alternative of God's power to what God eternally wills. What is Scotus's own is a real power of the will for the opposite act in the very instant of willing, a refusal to let immutability yield necessity, and a divine intellect that judges nothing in the contingent order before the will. That gives the defence its ground and sets its price. It can keep Aquinas only by placing Milbank's quarrel with Scotus in the doctrine of the will, where section 7 found it, and not in a new standing of the possible beside the actual.

The defence saves the word, and it is hard-pressed on the thesis, because each text that saves the word affirms in the same place the contingency of the actual. Aquinas's lyre reply ends, "yet God could make other things". The will that the intellect determines tends to fitting goods "not necessarily". The befittingness is named in the chapter that denies a creation from necessity of knowledge or of will. Lombard's division of senses ends, "let us confess, then, that God can do many things he does not will". If Milbank accepts these distinctions, the tradition from Hugh to Aquinas held the contingency of the actual that his pp. 36–37 date to Scotus, and the history of that contingency cannot begin with Scotus. If he refuses them, one position remains open short of Abelard's. Milbank's compulsion is a necessity within God, in the uttering of the Word, with "discriminating" judgements about what the world contains; Abelard puts the necessity in God's outward acts (section 3). A reader could hold Aquinas's lyre reply without its last sentence: the universe, given these things, cannot be better, and God's judgement of fitness settles which things there are. That position is silent where Aquinas speaks. It neither affirms with Aquinas that God could make other things nor holds with Abelard that he must do all he can, as well as he can. Nothing on this shelf excludes it. But it gives up the sentence with which Aquinas ends the reply, and the texts that would tie it to Aquinas, on the Word and creation, are not among those read here. The defence is hard-pressed, not refuted. The genealogy can be repaired by narrowing it. What begins with Scotus, so far as these texts show, is chiefly the neutral complex and the law that is right because it is accepted (the other two novelties of section 7 refine an analysis Aquinas shared), and Milbank's charge holds against those; the proposition that what is actual might not have been, or might have been otherwise, is older and was common ground.

His philosophical argument meets the same fork. That there is no "pure will" is the premise of Abelard's argument from equal goods. Lombard asserted that "the same reason and cause remaining" God could have made other things (n. 41), but that does not meet the case the Cassino difficulties put, of two beggars equally worthy and one alms that cannot be divided (n. 20). The answer comes with Aquinas. A power can be open to either of two things from its own imperfection, as the mind of one in doubt; or it can be open to either "when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, but either can be, as an art which can use diverse instruments to perfect the same work equally", and this belongs "not to the imperfection of the power, but rather to its eminence".[180] Such is God's will toward things other than himself. Milbank's "discriminating judgements" name the place where an election falls among goods none of which is required. Aquinas had given an account of that election, and it is the account Milbank needs.

The results can be set out claim by claim. The table summarises sections 3–11; each entry is documented in the notes cited.

Milbank's claim	Best text for it	Best text against it	Sections
(a) The ground of the possible: God "considers a range of 'given' possibilities" (p. 109)	Ockham: possibility belongs to the creature "from itself" (n. 139); Scotus's neutral complex (n. 114)	Bonaventure: the range of *posse* is "the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness" (n. 54); Aquinas: reasons of all God can do, "as it were thought out" (n. 103)	5, 6, 7, 8
(b) The contingency of the actual, redefined as "a pure possibility" (pp. 36–37)	Scotus: an alternative of the will in the same instant (n. 120)	Hugh (n. 34), Lombard (nn. 41, 44) and Aquinas (nn. 76, 85): what is or will be might not have been, measured by God's wisdom	4, 6, 7, 11
Willing "sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best" (p. 35)	Scotus: no prior dictate, and law right as accepted (nn. 114–115); Ockham: merit by acceptance (nn. 135–136)	Aquinas against "simple will" (nn. 94–95); Lombard: the will "most equitable and most right" (n. 41)	4, 6, 7, 8

180. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.82 nn.7–8, answering the objections of c.82 nn.2–5. «Ex parte autem eius ad quod dicitur, invenitur aliqua virtus ad utrumlibet esse quando perfecta operatio virtutis a neutro dependet, sed tamen utrumque esse potest: sicut ars, quae diversis instrumentis uti potest ad idem opus aequaliter perficiendum. Hoc autem ad imperfectionem virtutis non pertinet, sed magis ad eius eminentiam» and «Sic autem est in divina voluntate respectu aliorum a se».

Milbank's claim	Best text for it	Best text against it	Sections
Stress on *potentia absoluta* (p. 34); absolute power severs mind from thing (p. 32)	Ockham: intuitive cognition of a non-existent object by divine power (n. 131)	Bonaventure (n. 61), Aquinas (n. 91), Scotus (n. 116), Ockham (n. 128): one power, never without order; Ockham: no evident cognition of the absent as present (n. 133)	5, 6, 7, 8
Aquinas's God "compelled" by his intellect (p. 109)	*Contra Gentiles* I c.82, conditional, and c.88, "inclined in some way" (nn. 96–97); the lyre (n. 88)	*Contra Gentiles* II c.26, no creation from necessity of knowledge (nn. 80–81), the error in Bradwardine's list (n. 146); the Verbum texts are not on the shelf	6, 9, 11
"Necessity in actuality as such" (p. 108)	Abelard, *Theologia christiana* (n. 17); created necessities, *Contra Gentiles* II c.30 (n. 99)	Cassino fragments as printed: necessity in God's doing, none in the thing done (n. 25); created necessity follows a voluntary act (n. 100)	3, 6
"Archiepiscopal backing at Paris and Canterbury" (p. 36)	Art. 146, possibility beyond philosophy, not in his list (n. 152)	Art. 53 and the Oxford error condemn necessity (nn. 151–152); the matched articles in his list back contingency and God's power over nature (by the OCR, n. 152)	9
Ockham as Scotus's heir (pp. 32, 36–37)	Will and law (nn. 135–136); possibility "from itself" (n. 139); intuitive cognition (n. 131)	No power for opposites without succession (n. 143); absolute power from Lombard (n. 129)	8

The points given to Milbank are in the second column: Scotus's neutral complex and his law accepted by the will, Ockham's possibility from the creature and merit by acceptance, Ockham's use of absolute power in the theory of cognition, Aquinas's lyre and his intellect that inclines the will, and Abelard's necessary God.

A fuller study would need what the sources used here do not hold: a corrected text of Henry of Ghent's fifth *Quodlibet*, which Bradwardine names as his source; Piché's edition of the articles of 1277; Scotus's other discussions of the divine will, read in the Vatican text, and the compiled text of Scotus against which Ockham argues; Ockham's *Ordinatio*, Prologue q.1, to which the *Quodlibeta* editors refer at VI q.6, and his works outside the two volumes used; Aquinas's texts on the Word and creation, on which the defence of Milbank's "Paternal uttering of the Verbum" would rest; the rest of Aquinas's *De potentia* q.3; a critical text of the *Theologia christiana*, with the Monte Cassino manuscript read in the original and not only in Tosti's and Cousin's printing. The name in Aquinas's *De potentia* still needs the Leonine text and the manuscripts (n. 69).

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Appendix A: Method and Verification

The shelf. The study used only texts held locally: the *Patrologia Latina* in TEI transcription for Abelard, Hugh, the *Summa sententiarum*, Lombard, Damian, Bernard, William of St-Thierry, the *Disputatio altera* and the *Capitula*; the Quaracchi Bonaventure, re-set from page images with the Wroot Press English beside it; Savile's 1618 Bradwardine from a keyed text, divided into units by page and section letter; the Wyclif Society volumes in transcription; and, for the final draft, the Corpus Thomisticum texts of Aquinas named above. Milbank was read from a text of the 2013 edition. For the revision further texts were added. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d.39 qq.1–5, nn.1–93, in the Vatican edition (vol. 17, 1966), pp. 481–510: Wilson Pruitt supplied page images from an archive.org loan, and every quotation from them was transcribed from the image, with a rough OCR used only to find passages. Scotus's *Ordinatio* I dd.39 and 44 and *Reportata Parisiensia* I dd.39–40 in the Vivès reprint of Wadding (Paris, 1891–1895), from archive.org scans and a column-aware OCR; quotations from the *Ordinatio* were transcribed from the page images, the one quotation from the *Reportata* is from the OCR, and Lychetus's commentary and Wadding's scholia, printed around Scotus's text, are not quoted. The *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I (1889), for the articles of 1277, from an archive.org scan; article 53 was transcribed from the page image. Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta* in the Venice edition of 1613, in an uncorrected OCR, used to locate *Quodlibet* V q.4 and not quoted. The Vivès (1871) and Marietti (1883) printings of the *De potentia*, for the name in q.1 a.5, from archive.org scans and OCR. Aquinas's commentaries on the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* and on *Sentences* I dd.42–44 from Corpus Thomisticum; Bonaventure's commentary on book II of the *Sentences* and his *Breviloquium* in the Quaracchi text. For the final source pass four further sources were added. William of Ockham's *Quodlibeta septem* in Wey's edition (*Opera theologica* 9, 1980), which Wilson Pruitt supplied from an archive.org loan, read in its text layer, and his *Ordinatio* I dd.19–48 in the edition of Etzkorn and Kelley (*Opera theologica* 4, 1979), from an archive.org text; dd.38 and 42–45 were read, and VI qq.1–2 of the *Quodlibeta* in full; in the editorial revision VI q.6 and V q.5 were read in full. Both editions are in copyright and are quoted briefly. The two incunable prints of Ockham fetched with them (*Quodlibeta*, Strasbourg 1488; *Sentences*, Lyon 1495) have an OCR too poor to use and were not used. Innocent II's letters against Abelard, nos. 447–448, in PL 179. The *Enchiridion symbolorum* of Denzinger and Bannwart (11th ed., 1911), from an archive.org scan and its OCR; the OCR was used only to find passages, and every quotation from it was transcribed from the page images (pp. 169–170 and 226). And Aquinas's *Scriptum super Sententiis* I d.38, *Summa theologiae* I q.14 and *Summa contra Gentiles* I c.67 from Corpus Thomisticum, to test the Vatican editors' identification of Scotus's opponent. For the Cassino revision two sources were added. The fragments of the *Theologia christiana* from a Monte Cassino manuscript were read in Cousin and Jourdain's *Petri Abaelardi opera hactenus seorsim edita* II (Paris, 1859), 804–809, from archive.org page images: an uncorrected OCR was used only to find passages, and every quotation was transcribed from the image, with ligatures resolved. Tosti's first printing (Naples, 1851) was read in a rough OCR for what he says of the manuscript, and is reported in English and not quoted. *De potentia* q.3 a.15 was read in Corpus Thomisticum.

Passes, in order. (1) Search: four instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one per shelf (Abelard and his accusers; Lombard, Hugh and Damian; Wyclif; Bonaventure and Bradwardine), returned candidate passages, each with locus, file, a verbatim Latin run and a judgment of voice. (2) Second reading and dossier: Claude Opus 5.5 re-read every passage the argument uses in its source file, with enough of the surrounding text to settle whose voice it is. (3) First draft, by Claude Opus 5.5, with Aquinas read afresh from Corpus Thomisticum; for each Aquinas passage the draft records whether it stands in an objection, the *sed contra*, the body of the article or a reply, and only the body, the replies and Aquinas's own exposition in the *Contra Gentiles* are quoted as his view. (4) Revision: a verification pass by Claude Sonnet 5.5 over the notes the draft had flagged, whose findings were checked against the sources before use, and the addition of Scotus. (5) The pass called "final" at the time: Ockham's *Ordinatio* and *Quodlibeta* VI qq.1–2, Innocent II's letters, Denzinger, and the Aquinas texts named by the Vatican editors of Scotus; at its close the article had 167 notes. (6) The Cassino revision, which followed

it: the Monte Cassino fragments and *De potentia* q.3 a.15, bringing the notes to 176. (7) The editorial revision, against the decision letter of the editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5), which combined the reports of two blind readers (Claude Sonnet 5.5): Ockham's *Quodlibeta* VI q.6 and V q.5, the tract printed under Hugh's name, *Contra Gentiles* I c.82 n.11, the commentary on the *Metaphysics* IX l.3 nn.8–9, Bradwardine III c.29 (727B) and c.5 (657C), Milbank pp. 32, 35–37, 109 and 218, the *Chartularium* OCR for the articles in Milbank's list, and a search of all the Patrologia Latina transcriptions for the absolute–ordained pair. Orchestration throughout was by Claude Fable 5.2, then Claude Opus 5.5. The Ockham runs added in pass 5, and those added in pass 7, are all among the runs tested by script.

Scripts. A script tests every Latin run in the notes, the text between « and », against its source file: TEI files with tags stripped and whitespace collapsed; the Bradwardine units in both their normalised and diplomatic fields; Markdown files with footnote markers, emphasis marks and page comments removed; the Aquinas files as plain text. It also checks that every note marker has one definition, that every definition has a marker, and that notes are numbered in order of first appearance. In pass 4 the script was extended: runs in notes drawn from page images (the Vatican *Lectura* and the Vivès scans) are listed and not tested, and runs from the Vivès OCR are tested against that text with words broken at line ends rejoined. In pass 5 it was extended to the Ockham editions, whose text layers are tested with the line numbers of the edition removed from the ends and starts of lines and words broken at line ends rejoined; runs were chosen so as not to cross a page, and words garbled in the text layer (the spaced type of "secundum Magistrum" in *Quodlibeta* VI q.1, some bracketed headings) are given in English or without guillemets. At the close of pass 5 the article had 167 notes, 157 of them quoting Latin, with 333 Latin runs: 292 passed against their source files, and 41 were transcribed from page images and checked by eye against the image (35 from the Vatican *Lectura* and the Vivès scans, compared for the *Lectura* with its OCR; 6 from the Denzinger scan). At the close of pass 6 it had 176 notes, 166 of them quoting Latin, with 373 Latin runs: 303 passed, and 70 were transcribed from page images, 29 of them from the Cousin scans of the Cassino fragments. After pass 7 the script was rerun over the whole apparatus: the article has 180 notes, every one anchored in the text and numbered in order of first appearance, 170 of them quoting Latin, with 393 Latin runs; 323 pass against their source files, and 70 were transcribed from page images, as before. The 20 runs added in pass 7 all pass by script.

Corrections. Pass 2 found that the search had placed Abelard's statement of the contrary case after his judgment (it stands before it); had missed the *Theologia christiana*'s goodness that "compels" God and the *Introductio*'s "that very pity compelling him"; had cited the abbot's "this impotence of his is omnipotence" as a will-first claim (it is said of evil); had given Damian's inline numbers as Migne columns; had put the identity of Lombard's opponents off the shelf (Bonaventure, his editors and Lombard's echo of Abelard's wording supply it); had taken Wyclif's distinction of necessity for his second supposition (it is his third) and read *De logica* as making the non-actual impossible, which Wyclif denies; had read Bradwardine's reports of the condemnations as his own voice (they stand in objections against him); and had reported no absolute–ordained pair in Bonaventure's distinctions 42–44 (it is in d.43 dub. 7). Pass 3 found that Bradwardine's "question 5" is *De potentia* q.1 a.5, quoted faithfully apart from small variants, the omitted composite-sense clause and the name ("Abelardo" against "Almalareo"); that Aquinas uses the absolute–ordained pair in his own voice (*Summa theologiae* I q.25 a.5 ad 1), so that the dossier's "first in Bonaventure" held only for the texts it searched; that Wyclif's appeal to *Summa* I q.19 a.3 holds for the distinction he borrows; and that *Contra Gentiles* I c.82 comes nearer Milbank's "compelled" than any text in the dossier. Pass 4 corrected Hugh's death (1138 and 1140 in the testimonia Migne prints, not 1141; n. 32); Bonaventure's use of the pair (in his own voice in *In II Sent.* d.7, with an objection to one application of it in *In I Sent.* d.43 dub. 7; nn. 60–62); an unsupported claim that the *Theologia christiana* survives in several redactions; the dating of the *Contra Gentiles* before Henry's fifth *Quodlibet*, marked as general knowledge (n. 147); Henry's question, located in the 1613 OCR (n. 146); Bernard's "tenth letter", identified with Ep. 190 and its *capitula* (n. 151); and the readings of the name in the *De potentia*,

extended to the Vivès and Marietti printings and to Bonaventure's "Baialardus" (n. 69). It also found two faults in the Scotus files: the page markers in the OCR of the *Ordinatio* do not always match the printed pages (the passage of n. 124 is marked p. 632 in the file and stands on p. 636 of the scan), and the OCR file for *Ordinatio* I d.44 holds commentary from later pages, so the question was read from the scans of pp. 744–745. Pass 5 tested the Vatican editors' identification of Scotus's opponent, which holds (n. 108); replaced the statement that the *Summa* stood with Scotus by the finding that I q.19 a.8 rejects as insufficient the account that I q.14 a.13 ad 1 gives (n. 112); backed the reports of the condemnation at Sens and by Innocent II with the texts (nn. 28–29), reporting Migne's 1140 and Denzinger's 1141 for Innocent's letter side by side; quoted the Constance article against Wyclif (n. 158); and quoted the Ockham editors' "this universe is not the best" as theirs, with Ockham's own more guarded determination beside it (nn. 140–141). Pass 6 found that the *Theologia christiana* does not end, in every witness, where Migne's text ends: the fragments restore two of the guards of the *Introductio* while giving up none of the necessity on God's side (section 3, nn. 19–26), and the early-modern editor's reading of the thesis as settled is now reported as a reading of the shorter text; it also added *De potentia* q.3 a.15 (nn. 83–84, 138). Pass 7 made the changes set out point by point in `response.md`: chiefly, the division of possibilism into the ground of the possible and the contingency of the actual; the verdict on Ockham's absolute power, rewritten from *Quodlibeta* VI q.6 and V q.5; the withdrawal of the commentary on the *Metaphysics* as evidence of a synchronic alternative; Damian's reduction restored to Damian; the reading of "Paris and Canterbury" marked as an inference; and the Cassino conclusion marked as resting on the Tosti and Cousin printing.

Not available. A corrected text of Henry of Ghent's fifth *Quodlibet*; Scotus's other works and the Vatican text of the *Ordinatio*, and the compiled text of Scotus that Ockham's editors name; Ockham's works other than the two volumes named above; Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* except I dd.38 and 42–44, and his *De potentia* except qq.1–2 and q.3 a.15; the Leonine edition, the Parma edition and the manuscripts of the *De potentia*; Piché's edition of the 1277 articles (1999), and the *Chartularium* scan for any article but 53, which are read in OCR only; Aquinas's texts that join the procession of the Word to creation; Mansi's conciliar collection, from which Denzinger and Migne take the documents of Sens; the critical edition of the *Theologia christiana*, and the Monte Cassino manuscript itself, known here only from Tosti's and Cousin's printing; and Aristotle and Augustine except as quoted by the authors above. Facts drawn from general knowledge are marked as such in the notes.

Appendix B: Verification Table

"Editorial revision" means the run was added in pass 7 (Appendix A), against the decision letter, and tested by script against the file named. "Cassino revision" means the run was added in the revision that brought in the Monte Cassino fragments and *De potentia* q.3 a.15. "Final pass" means the run was added in the final source pass and tested by script against the file named; for Ockham the file is the text layer of the edition (OT 9) or a clean OCR of it (OT 4). "Dossier" means the passage was re-read in its source by the second reader; "this draft" means the run was tested by script against the file named in the first draft; "this revision" means the run was added in the revision and tested by script. "Page image (transcribed)" means the Latin was transcribed from a page image and checked by eye, since the script cannot test it; "OCR" means the run is quoted from an uncorrected OCR text and tested by script against it. Every run in a text file was tested in the final run.

Note	Source file	Checked by
4	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
5	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
6	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
7	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
8	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
9	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both

Note	Source file	Checked by
10	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
11	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11123.xml	both
12	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
13	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
14	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
15	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
16	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
17	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
18	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
19	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml; archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 804–805); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate; ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/tosti-bub_gb_xaU4yLzvXmcC.txt (OCR, read for the report in English; not quoted)	this revision (PL run); page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
20	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 804–805); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
21	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, p. 805); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml (Migne reading)	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision; Migne run tested by script
22	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 805–806); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
23	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 806, 808); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
24	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, pp. 808–809); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
25	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, p. 809); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
26	archive.org operahactenusseoooabeluoft page images (Cousin II, 1859, p. 809); ~/milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed), Cassino revision
27	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11128.xml	both
28	archive.org enchiridionsymboo1denz page images (Denzinger 1911, pp. 169–170); ~/milbank-reverse/source/constance/denzinger-1911.txt used to locate	page image (transcribed)
29	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11142.xml; archive.org enchiridionsymboo1denz page images (Denzinger 1911, p. 170)	final pass; page image (transcribed) for the Denzinger runs
30	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11113.xml	both
31	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11175.xml	both (dossier: search reading only)
32	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11082.xml	both
33	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11082.xml	both
34	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11082.xml	both
35	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11079.xml	editorial revision
36	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
37	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both; this revision
38	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
39	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
40	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
41	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
42	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
43	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
44	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
45	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
46	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11468.xml	both
47	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11091.xml	both
48	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11091.xml	both
49	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11091.xml	both
50	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11207.xml	both
51	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11191.xml	both
52	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11165.xml	both
53	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both

Note	Source file	Checked by
54	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both
55	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both
56	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/cmp09.txt	both; this revision
57	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q3.md	both
58	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q3.md	both
59	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d44-a1-q1.md	both
60	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol2/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a1-q1.md	this revision
61	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-dubia.md	both
62	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-dubia.md; ~/bonaventure-sentences/vol5/bon-brev-p1-c7.md	both; this revision
64	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md	both
65	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	both
66	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	both
67	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
68	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	both
69	~/bonaventure-sentences/vol1/bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q4.md; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11770.xml	this revision
70	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
71	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
72	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
73	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
74	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
75	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt; ~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	this draft
76	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
77	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
78	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
79	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
80	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
81	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
82	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
83	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp3.txt	Cassino revision
84	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp3.txt	Cassino revision
85	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
86	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
87	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
88	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
89	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
90	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
91	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
92	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
93	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
94	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
95	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
96	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft; editorial revision (the *quamvis* clause)
97	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
98	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
99	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
100	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg2006.txt	this draft
102	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft
103	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/qdp1.txt	this draft
104	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this draft
105	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/cmp09.txt	this revision; editorial revision (n.8 and the walking example)
107	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p488.jpg	page image (transcribed)
108	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/snp1035.txt; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1003.txt; ~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1044.txt	final pass

Note	Source file	Checked by
109	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p489.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p490.jpg	page image (transcribed)
110	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p492.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p500.jpg	page image (transcribed)
111	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p492.jpg	page image (transcribed)
112	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth1015.txt	this revision; final pass
113	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p492.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p493.jpg	page image (transcribed)
114	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p493.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p500.jpg	page image (transcribed)
115	archive.org operaomni10duns page/n751–n752 (Vivès 10:744–745)	page image (transcribed)
116	archive.org operaomni10duns page/n751–n752 (Vivès 10:744–745)	page image (transcribed)
117	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p508.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p509.jpg	page image (transcribed)
118	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p493.jpg	page image (transcribed)
119	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p494.jpg	page image (transcribed)
120	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p494.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p495.jpg	page image (transcribed)
121	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p496.jpg	page image (transcribed)
122	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p497.jpg	page image (transcribed)
123	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p498.jpg; ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p499.jpg	page image (transcribed)
124	archive.org operaomni10duns page/n643 (Vivès 10:636); ~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/rep-I-d39-40.txt	page image (transcribed); OCR
125	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/snp1035.txt	final pass
126	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/vatican/lectura-I-d39-p505.jpg	page image (transcribed)
127	~/milbank-reverse/source/bso.txt	final pass (no Latin run; read in source)
128	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
129	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
130	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
131	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	editorial revision (text layer of OT 9)
132	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	editorial revision (text layer of OT 9)
133	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	editorial revision (text layer of OT 9)
134	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
135	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
136	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/ockham-quodlibeta-OT9.txt	final pass (text layer of OT 9)
137	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
138	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4); Cassino revision (run at 623)
139	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
140	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
141	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
142	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (no Latin run; read in source)
143	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
144	~/milbank-reverse/source/ockham/venerabilisincep0004will.txt	final pass (OCR of OT 4)
145	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
146	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
148	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
149	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
150	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both
151	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl	both; this revision; editorial revision (the Paris run at 727B)

Note	Source file	Checked by
152	~/bradwardine/text/units.jsonl; ~/milbank-reverse/source/paris1277/chartularium-1277-articles.txt (OCR, read for the matched articles; not quoted)	this revision; editorial revision (657C)
153	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/Dialogus.md	both
154	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
155	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
156	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
157	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
158	archive.org enchiridionsymboo1denz page images (Denzinger 1911, p. 226)	page image (transcribed)
159	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
160	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Dominio_Divino.md	both
161	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Annihilatione.md	both
162	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Logica_Vol_II.md	both
163	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Logica_Vol_II.md	both
164	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Logica_Vol_II.md	both
165	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Ente_Libri_Secundi.md	both
166	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
167	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both; this revision
168	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
169	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
170	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
171	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
172	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
173	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10084.xml	both
174	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
175	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
176	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
177	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
178	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11166.xml	both
180	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/scg1072.txt	this draft

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Sonare quod nesciunt

The Parrot, the Psalm, and Words without Understanding in the Latin Tradition

ABSTRACT

A language model is now often called a "stochastic parrot". This article, whose question was put by a Claude model, asks what the Latin tradition said about words produced without understanding, and whether it credited them with anything, reading the texts on hand in the *Patrologia Latina*, the *Acta Sanctorum*, Solinus, Aquinas, Wyclif and the commentaries printed in the Vivès Scotus. Augustine's *De musica* defines the talking bird by imitation without reason, hence without art or knowledge, and draws the same line through human performers who only imitate. From Isidore on, the natural historians distinguish the greeting the parrot has by nature from the names it is taught, and pass no verdict. In his sermon on Psalm 18 Augustine turns the bird on the congregation: to sing without knowing is to fall below human nature, and those who knowingly sing filth are the worse for their knowledge; his comparative names no term, and "than the birds" is one possible reading of it. Cassiodorus names the loss as compunction. Ambrosiaster, on 1 Corinthians 14, keeps a Spirit who knows what the uncomprehending soul prays; the printed Haymo, Hervé of Bourg-Dieu, the *Glossa ordinaria* and Peter Lombard do not have it, and the last three gloss Paul's *spiritus* as the power of the soul where likenesses of bodily things are formed, a reading Aquinas lists as one of three. Aquinas lets the first intention carry merit and impetration through a prayer the mind does not attend to; his lecture on 1 Corinthians extends merit, and only merit, to one who does not understand his words; and the *Summa* says that hearers who do not understand a chant understand why it is sung, which suffices for devotion. Where a story credits a bird's words, the credit is placed variously: Wibert credits the Danish parrot's words because, as is told, no one taught them, and Godfrey of Viterbo's verse gives its parrot the acts of lament and naming. The poets differ: Theodulf's parrot imitates, Ernald's praises after its own manner, and Alan of Lille gives his lark a knowledge of music by nature. Wyclif argues that if a parrot's speech is not speech univocally with a man's, much less could Christ's accidents be of one kind with ours, and only one of his four manuscripts gives a recognisable form of the bird's name; a commentator in the Vivès Scotus uses the parrot, which leads hearers into knowledge of things it does not conceive, against the view that words signify only through the speaker's concept. The article records which copies name their sources as philology, apart from its answer.

KEYWORDS Augustine · Cassiodorus · Thomas Aquinas · John Wyclif · parrot · psalmody · prayer and attention · 1 Corinthians 14 · imitation · bestiaries

PROVENANCE

Question: put by a Claude model (Claude Fable 5.2), not by a human reader (agent-prompted): Wilson Pruitt asked for two articles "prompted by you entirely", and the model asked what the Latin tradition said about words produced without understanding. *Scope and hunt brief:* Claude Fable 5.2 (`HUNT-BRIEF.md`). *Source search:* three instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one strand each (the doctrine of the bird; the human who sounds what he does not know; the credited parrot), whose quotations were machine-checked against their files. *Source check and this draft:* Claude Opus 5.5, which re-read every passage used in its source file, re-derived every Patrologia volume and column from the files, and wrote the script that tests every Latin quotation in the notes against its source. *Review of the draft:* Claude Fable 5.2, orchestrating. *Quotation verification:* script: every Latin run was tested against the file its note names. *Editorial review:* an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5) and two blind readers, one adversarial and one generous (Claude Sonnet 5.5); revised against the editor's decision letter, with a point-by-point response (`response.md`). *Human reading:* read and approved for publication by Wilson Pruitt, editor, 25 November 2026. *Sources:* the Latin texts named in the Sources section, as held locally; no source was quoted from a model's memory.

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1. Introduction

A language model is now often called a "stochastic parrot": a producer of words that does not understand them. The Latin tradition kept the same bird and used it as a theological figure. This article asks what that tradition said about words produced without understanding, by the parrot, by the singer who does not understand the psalm he sings, and by the *idiota* who is to answer Amen to a blessing in a language he does not know; and whether it ever credited such words with anything. The question was not put by a human reader. It was put by a Claude model, when Wilson Pruitt asked for articles the model would prompt entirely, and it is therefore a machine's question about its own condition. The article says so here and returns to the occasion only in its conclusion.

Much of the evidence survives as copies. Augustine's sentence on the birds who "sound what they do not know" was taken over by a Cistercian cantor in the thirteenth century without his name; Cassiodorus's warning against singing like parrots was copied whole by a compiler writing for a bishop of Regensburg, who said where he found it; Isidore's sentence on the parrot was carried word for word by Rabanus Maurus and by the *De bestiis*; a commentary on Paul printed under the name of Haymo reproduces Ambrosiaster's gloss on Latins who sing in Greek. The article records these copies, and which of them name their source, as philology: they show how the texts on this subject travelled. It does not count them as evidence for its answer. A compiler who reproduces a sentence may well understand it, and the one witness on hand to the method of compilation, the editor of the *Benedictio Dei*, describes it without blame (section 3).[1]

The texts do not give a single verdict. Augustine defines the talking bird by what it lacks: imitation without reason is neither art nor knowledge, and he puts human performers who only imitate into the birds' class. The natural historians, from Isidore on, describe the parrot without a moral, and distinguish the greeting it has by nature from the names it is taught. Turned on the congregation, the comparison cuts two ways: to sing as birds sing is to sing below the nature God gave to man, and yet those who know what they sing and sing filth are, Augustine says, the worse for knowing it. Thomas Aquinas, answering the case of the wandering mind, lets the first intention of the one who prays carry merit and impetration through a prayer he does not attend to; his lecture on 1 Corinthians extends merit, and only merit, to one who does not understand his words; and in the *Summa* hearers who do not understand what is sung still understand why it is sung. The stories that give weight to a bird's words place the weight variously: on God's grace and on the hearers, on the bird itself in Godfrey of Viterbo's verse, and, in Wibert's Life of Leo IX, on words that no one, as is told, taught the bird. Two scholastic texts read here use the parrot in an argument. John Wyclif argues that if a parrot's "speech" is not speech univocally with a man's, much less could Christ's accidents be of one kind with ours, and of his four manuscripts only one gives the bird's name in a recognisable form. A commentator printed with Duns Scotus in the Vivès edition uses the parrot against the view that words signify only through the speaker's concept, since parrots lead hearers into knowledge of things they do not conceive.

2. The Bird

The founding Latin statement is a definition by exclusion. In the first book of *De musica* Augustine's pupil has granted that players of the lyre and the flute have an art, though they learned it by imitation, since without imitation almost every art would perish. The master answers with a dilemma: either the pupil must call magpies, parrots and ravens rational animals, or he has called imitation an art rashly, "for we see these birds sing and sound many things with a certain human use, and do it only by imitating". If every imitation were art, and

1. Translations of Latin in this article are the author's own working translations; where an in-house English exists beside the Latin, it is named in the note. Every Latin quotation given between guillemets in the notes was copied from the file named in Appendix B and tested against it by script (Appendix A). Volume numbers of the *Patrologia Latina* (PL) are taken from the header of each file and columns from the page markers in it; a column letter is given where the file prints one.

every art reason, every imitation would be reason; but an irrational animal does not use reason; it has no art; it has imitation; so imitation is not art.[2] Nor will the pupil give the birds knowledge: knowledge can be in reason and imitation together, he says, but not in imitation alone.[3]

The birds are not the end of the argument. Augustine wants to know whether *scientia* belongs in the definition of music, and he uses them to draw a line that runs through the human performers. Knowledge belongs to the mind alone, and in the mind not to sense or memory, which beasts share, but to the intellect. The master has the pupil grant that beasts have memory, and gives the examples: swallows revisit their nests after a year, the goats come home "mindful", and a dog is said to have known its master when his own people had forgotten him.[4] So those "who follow sense, commit to memory what delights in it, and move the body accordingly, adding a certain power of imitation" do not have knowledge, "however skilfully and learnedly they seem to do many things, if they do not hold the thing itself that they profess or display by the purity and truth of the intellect".[5] The players of the theatre, if reason shows them to be such, are refused the name of musician. The parrot is the clear case of a line that is drawn between imitation and understanding, not between bird and man.

Augustine has a lower case still. In the *Soliloquies*, where Reason sorts the likenesses that deceive the senses, the worse likenesses in hearing are the echo, the ringing of one's own ears, "or in water-clocks a certain imitation of a blackbird or a raven", and what dreamers and madmen think they hear.[6] A device that imitates a bird stands with echoes: a likeness of a sound with nothing behind it.

Before Augustine, Arnobius had used the parrot for another purpose. Arguing against the Platonist doctrine that learning is recollection, he asks his opponents to question an untaught man, who would not know whether what was said to him "is speech, or a sound of the voice signifying nothing".[7] Such a soul, he says, becomes learned only when schools and masters have formed it, as the ass and the ox learn by use and constant pressure to plough and to grind, the dog to hold back its bark, and "the parrot to make words whole, and the raven to bring out names".[8] Arnobius grants the bird learning without embarrassment. He needs the parrot as evidence that what the soul has, it acquires, and his point is to humble the human soul, which on this showing is no better than the beast before it is taught.

The natural historians do not ask whether the parrot understands. They ask where its words come from. The source behind the medieval chapter is Solinus, whose *Collectanea* says that "India alone sends the parrot",

2. Augustine, *De musica* I.4.6, PL 32:1086. The speaker is the Magister. «Aut igitur picas et psittacos et corvos rationalia esse dicturus es animalia, aut imitationem nomine artis temere vocasti. Videmus enim has aves et multa canere ac sonare quodam humano usu, et nonnisi imitando facere: nisi tu aliter credis.» and «At si omnis imitatio ars est, et ars omnis ratio; omnis imitatio ratio: ratione autem non utitur irrationale animal; non igitur habet artem: habet autem imitationem; non est igitur ars imitatio.» The pupil's premise: «Nam video tantum valere in artibus imitationem, ut, ea sublata, omnes pene perimantur.»

3. Augustine, *De musica* I.4.6, PL 32:1086–1087. «Ergo scientiam illis avibus dabis, quibus imirationem non adimis. D. Non dabo: ita enim dixi in utroque esse scientiam, ut in sola imitatione esse non possit.» The file reads «imirationem» for *imitationem*.

4. Augustine, *De musica* I.4.8, PL 32:1087. «puto te negare non posse, bestias habere memoriam. Nam et nidos post annum revisunt hirundines, et de capellis verissime dictum est: Atque ipsae memores redeunt in tecta capellae.» and «Et canis heroem dominum, jam suis hominibus oblitum recognovisse praedicatur». The Magister speaks; the verse is Virgil's, as the file's reference «(Georg. lib. 3, v. 316.)» says, and the dog is Odysseus's, as its reference to the *Odyssey* says.

5. Augustine, *De musica* I.4.8, PL 32:1088. «Nihil aliud, nisi omnes qui sensum sequuntur, et quod in eo delectat, memoriae commendant, atque secundum id corpus moventes, vim quamdam imitationis adjungunt; non eos habere scientiam, quamvis perite ac docte multa facere videantur, si rem ipsam quam profitentur aut exhibent, intellectus puritate ac veritate non teneant.» and «nihil erit, ut opinor, cur dubites eis negare scientiam, et ob hoc musicam, quae scientia modulandi est, nequaquam concedere.»

6. Augustine, *Soliloquia* II.6.12, PL 32:890. Reason is speaking. «atque in deterioribus vel echo testis est, vel tinnitus ille ipsarum aurium, vel in horologiis merulae aut corvi quaedam imitatio, vel quae sibi somniantes aut furentes videntur audire.» The kind of device meant by *horologia* is not specified in the text.

7. Arnobius, *Adversus nationes* II.24, PL 5:851A. «oratio sit ista, quam promis, an sonitus vocis, nihil rerum significans, sed inani continuatione pertractus?» The chapter number is that of the heading «XXV» which follows the sentence in the file.

8. Arnobius, *Adversus nationes* II.25, PL 5:852A. «Sed cum scholas attigerit, et magistrorum fuerit institutionibus eruditus, efficitur prudens, doctus, et quam nuper habuerat, imperitiam ponit. Et asellus, et bos aeque, usu atque assiduitate cogente, discit arare ac molere» and «canis cum invenerit praedam, cohibere et continere latratum: verba psittacus et integrare, et nomina corvus expromere.» The sense of *integrare* here ("make whole", "complete") is not certain.

that its head is so hard that, if it must be admonished with blows to learn, "for it is eager to say what men say", it must be beaten with an iron rod; that it learns faster and keeps better while young; that its broad tongue lets it speak articulate words; and that Roman luxury so admired this *ingenium*, its natural talent, that the barbarians made a trade of parrots.[9] Isidore's *Etymologies* reduce the bird to two places. In a list of the habits of birds, some "imitate the words and voices of men, as the parrot and the magpie".[10] In the chapter on the parrot, its green colour, red collar and broad tongue are followed by a distinction: "By nature it salutes, saying *ave* or *chaire*; the other names it learns by instruction", with a couplet in the bird's own voice: "From you I shall learn the names of others; this I learned of myself, to say: *Caesar, ave*."[11] Ambrose had made the same division for birds in general. "Some by nature, others by instruction" utter the different voices, "so that you would think a man had spoken when it was a bird. How sweet is the voice of blackbirds, how clear the voice of the parrot!"[12] He wished he had that voice for his sermon on the birds.[13] Hildegard's *Physica*, in its chapter on the parrot, says nothing of speech: the bird is hot and moist, "knows the times of times, and conducts itself according to those events and expresses its songs", and is of no use in medicine, because it is of a diverse nature.[14] She passes no verdict on its voice.

Isidore's two sentences were copied. Rabanus Maurus, in *De universo*, gives both word for word, with "him" for Isidore's "her" and "these things" for "this", and adds no figure, though he gives one to the phoenix a few lines before; at this place he does not name Isidore.[15] The *De bestiis*, which Migne's file assigns with a query to Hugh of Fouilloy, takes Isidore's list sentence unchanged and builds its chapter on the parrot from two sources it does not name.[16] It opens with Solinus's "India alone sends the parrot", passes to Isidore's description and his division of nature from instruction, and assigns the couplet to Martial, keeping only its second line; then it returns to Solinus for the beak and the young bird's quickness, and leaves out the iron rod and the word *ingenium*. In copying Solinus's beak, which catches the falling bird "as on a foundation of extraordinary firmness", the printed text reads "ordinary".[17] That reading may be the compiler's, his exemplar's or a slip in

9. Solinus, *Collectanea rerum memorabilium* 52.43, in Mommsen's text (1895) as encoded by digilibLT. «Sola India mittit avem psittacum colore viridem torque puniceo, cuius rostri tanta duritia est, ut cum e sublimi praecipitat in saxum, nisu se oris excipiat et quodam quasi fundamento utatur extraordinariae firmitatis: caput vero tam valens, ut si quando ad discendum plagis sit admonendus (nam studet ut quod homines loquatur), ferrea clavicula sit verberandus.» and «Lingua lata multoque latior quam ceteris avibus: unde perficitur, ut articulata verba penitus eloquatur. Quod ingenium ita Romanae deliciae miratae sunt, ut barbari psittacos mercem fecerint.»

10. Isidore, *Etymologiae* XII.7.1, PL 82:459B. «aliae vocibus strepunt, ut hirundo; aliae cantus edunt dulcissimos, ut cygnus, et merula, aliae verba et voces hominum imitantur, ut psittacus et pica.»

11. Isidore, *Etymologiae* XII.7.24, PL 82:462B. «Psittacus, in Indiae littoribus gignitur, colore viridi, torque puniceo, grandi lingua, et caeteris avibus latiore. Unde, et articulata verba exprimit, ita ut si eam non videris, hominem loqui putes. Ex natura autem salutat dicens, ave, vel Χαῖρε , caetera nomina institutione discit. Hinc est illud: Psittacus a vobis aliorum nomina discam; Hoc didici per me dicere: Caesar ave.»

12. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* V.14.49, PL 14:227A. «Quaedam ex natura, aliae ex institutione diversarum vocum obloquuntur discrimina; ut hominem putes locutum, cum locuta sit avis. Quam dulcis merularum, quam expressa vox psittaci est!»

13. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* V.12.39, PL 14:223D. «Unde mihi vocem psittaci, dulcedinemque merularum? Utinam saltem luscinia canat, quae dormientem de somno excitet!»

14. Hildegard, *Physica* (headed in the file *Subtilitates diversarum naturarum creaturum*, so spelled), «CAP. XXXII.–DE PSITTACO.», PL 197:1300B. «Psitacus valde calidus est, et etiam humidus» and «Et etiam tempora temporum novit, et secundum eventus illos se habet et cantus suos exprimit» and «Sed ad medicinam non valet, qui nullam virtutem ad plenum in se tenet, sed in defectu, quia diversa natura est.» The sense of *tempora temporum* is not explained in the chapter.

15. Rabanus Maurus, *De universo* VIII.6, PL 111:241A–B and 246C. «aliae verba et voces hominum imitantur, ut psittacus et pica» (the column changes inside the sentence, at «hominum») and «Psittacus in Indiae littoribus gignitur, colore viridi, torque puniceo, grandi lingua, et caeteris avibus latiore: unde et articulata verba exprimit, ita ut si eum non videris, hominem loqui putes: ex natura autem salutat, dicens: Ave, vel Chaire: caetera nomina institutione discit. Hinc est illud: Psittacus a vobis aliorum nomina discam: Haec per me didici dicere: Caesar, ave.» The next sentence passes to the halcyon. Two sentences earlier, of the phoenix, Rabanus adds a figure of his own: «Haec etiam potest significare resurrectionem justorum, qui aromatibus virtutum collectis instaurationem prioris vigoris post mortem sibi praeparant.» (246B).

16. *De bestiis et aliis rebus* III.27, PL 177:94B. «aliae verba et voces hominum imitantur, ut psittacus et pica». Migne's file gives the author as «Auctor incertus (Hugo de Folieto?)»; the attribution is not examined here.

17. *De bestiis* III.28, PL 177:94D–95A. «CAP. XXVIII. De psittaco. Sola India mittit psittacum, colore viridi, torque punicea, grandi lingua, et caeteris avibus latiore, unde et articulata verba exprimit, ita ut si eam non videas, hominem loqui putes. Ex natura autem salutat, dicens ave, vel χαῖρε. Caetera nomina ex institutione discit, unde illud Martialis: Hoc per me didici, dicere: Caesar, ave.» and «Cujus rostrum tanta duritia est, ut cum e sublimi praecipitatur in saxum, nisu oris sui se excipiat, et quodam quasi fundamento utatur ordinariae firmitatis. Studet

Migne's print; the file cannot say which, and it is reported here as a reading of the printed text. Martial is not on disk; the couplet is known here only as Isidore and the bestiary give it.

Augustine supplies a verdict, and applies it to men; the natural historians supply a distinction, between what the bird says by nature and what it was taught, and pass no verdict. The distinction matters later, when a hagiographer wants a parrot whose words are neither.

3. The Singer Who Does Not Know

Augustine and the cantor of Villers

Augustine turned the bird on the congregation in a sermon on Psalm 18, preached after the people had sung it. They have prayed the Lord to cleanse them from their hidden faults, he says, and "we must understand what this is, so that we sing with human reason, not as with the voice of birds. For blackbirds and parrots and ravens and magpies and such birds are often taught by men to sound what they do not know. But to sing knowingly has been granted to the nature of man by the will of God."[18] The next sentences take the comparison where the definition in *De musica* did not. "And how many wicked and dissolute men sing in this way things worthy of their ears and hearts, we know and grieve. They are the worse for this, that they cannot be ignorant of what they sing. For they know they are singing shameful things, and they sing them the more gladly the filthier they are."[19] Then the sermon returns to the church: "We who have learned to sing the divine words in the Church must also press on to be what is written, *Blessed is the people that understands jubilation*. So, dearest, what we have sung with one voice we must also know and see with a calm heart."[20]

Three things in the passage govern what follows. The birds' words are not their own: they are taught by men, so that what the bird sounds is a man's word without a man's knowledge. To sing knowingly is not an achievement but a gift of nature, so that the human singer who sounds what he does not know falls below what he was given. That the bird, singing as birds are taught to sing, does not fall below its own nature is the article's inference; Augustine does not say it. And knowledge does not make the singing good. Of the wicked who sing filth Augustine says that they are the worse for this, that they cannot be ignorant of what they sing, and he gives the reason: they know that they are singing shameful things. The comparative names no term. "Worse than the birds", which stand in the sentences before, is one possible reading; the text does not say worse than whom, and the *sic*, "sing in this way", most naturally picks up "knowingly" in the sentence before it. What the text states is that knowledge aggravates the fault: the singers are the worse by the measure of what they cannot fail to know. Augustine asks his people for more than the bird lacks: to know what they have sung and to be what it says.

The sentence on the birds occurs once in the whole of the *Patrologia* as held here. Its one later use found on disk is in the *Acta Sanctorum*, in the Life of Arnulf, a lay brother of the Cistercian abbey of Villers in Brabant,

ut loquatur quod homines, et cum adhuc pullus est, et adhuc infra alterum suae aetatis annum, quae monstrata sunt, et citius discit et tenacius retinet.» Compare Solinus (n. 9): «extraordinariae firmitatis».

18. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 18, enarratio II, 1, PL 36:157. «Deprecati Dominum, ut ab occultis nostris mundet nos, et ab alienis parcat servis suis, quid hoc sit intelligere debemus, ut humana ratione, non quasi avium voce cantemus. Nam et meruli et psittaci et corvi et picae et hujusmodi volucres, saepe ab hominibus docentur sonare quod nesciunt. Scienter autem cantare, naturae hominis divina voluntate concessum est.» The heading in the file is «ENARRATIO II. SERMO AD PLEBEM».

19. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* 18, II, 1, PL 36:157. «Et quam multi mali et luxuriosi sic cantant digna auribus suis et cordibus, novimus et dolemus. Eo enim pejores sunt, quo non possunt ignorare quod cantant. Sciunt enim se cantare flagitia, et tamen cantant tanto libentius, quanto immundius». The comparative «pejores» has no expressed term of comparison. The birds of the preceding sentence are one possible term; the text does not name one. The clause «Sciunt enim se cantare flagitia» gives the ground of «pejores»: their knowledge.

20. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* 18, II, 1, PL 36:157. «Nos autem qui in Ecclesia divina eloquia cantare didicimus, simul etiam instare debemus esse quod scriptum est, Beatus populus qui intelligit jubilationem (Psal. LXXXVIII, 16) . Proinde, carissimi, quod consona voce cantavimus, sereno etiam corde nosse ac videre debemus.» A search of every file of the *Patrologia* on disk for *sonare quod nesci-* returns this file only.

written by Goswin, cantor of the same house.[21] After a vision granted to a monk during the night office, Goswin turns to his brethren: "Let us then, who have professed the holy service of the Lord, after the example of this monk, when we stand to sing, study to understand in singing what we utter, so that we sing in the human manner, not as with the voice of birds. For blackbirds and parrots and ravens and such birds are often taught by men to sound what they do not know; but to sing knowingly has been granted to the nature of man by the will of God, which the Psalmist also commends, saying, *I will sing and understand*."[22] Augustine is not named. The sentence is his, with three changes: the magpie is gone, the blackbird has changed gender, and Augustine's "with human reason" has become "in the human manner". Goswin then adds a question of his own, or one whose source was not found: "How do we think a psalmody will please God in which the voice puts forward the appearance of one praying, but the mind is without fruit?" He closes with the Rule of Benedict, again unnamed, as the teaching of "those who handed down to us the form of psalmody": that we should sing wisely, "and so stand to sing that our mind may agree with our voice".[23] The paragraph stands in square brackets. The Bollandist editor explains that the three manuscripts agree word for word up to §30 of the second book, and that from there on the whole text is had longer by about a quarter, in words and in sentences. The three manuscripts, he says, agree word for word as far as §30 of book II, which implies that they part after it. The bracketed additions are supplements from the Aurea Vallis manuscript, which the Miraeus manuscript lacks at least in part: a prophecy missing from Miraeus was to be inserted from Aurea Vallis, and the editor's own copy was written before those supplements. His annotation to §44, the paragraph that carries Augustine's sentence, says that the whole section comes from the Aurea Vallis manuscript. He judged that the author had rewritten his work in a second copy, and marked the additions with brackets.[24] On the editor's account, then, Augustine's sentence entered the Life when Goswin revised it.

Cassiodorus and his copyists

Cassiodorus put the bird into the preface of his commentary on the Psalms, at the point where he praises the Psalter for singing. The psalms, he says, make human voices rival the sweet-sounding organ, return the sound of trumpets, compose a speaking lyre of living strings, "and whatever was once seen to be done by musical instruments is now shown to be performed by rational substances". The next sentence draws the limit. "Yet we must by no means chirp like parrots and blackbirds, who, while they try to imitate our words, are known to be wholly ignorant of what they sing. For sweet melody delights the mind, but does not compel it to fruitful tears; it soothes the ears, but does not raise the hearers to things above. We are pricked in the heart if we can attend to

21. *Acta Sanctorum*, Jun. V (30 June), *Vita B. Arnulfi*, heading. The volume is taken from the file's header («Juni V»); the file gives no page numbers. «Auctore Goswino, Cantore Villariensi, coævo ac familiari.» The Bollandist commentary dates the writing from the Life itself: «Omnia vero scripta esse, currente adhuc decennio ante prædictum ab Arnulfo anno MCCXXVI, schisma, apparet ex num. 59 libri 2.»

22. Goswin, *Vita B. Arnulfi* II.44, *Acta Sanctorum*, Jun. V (30 June). «Nos a igitur, qui sanctum Domini servitium professi sumus, [quod Auctor vertit] exemplo Monachi hujus, cum stamus ad psallendum, psallendo intelligere studeamus quæ proferimus, ut humano more, non quasi avium voce cantemus. Nam & merulæ, & psittaci, & corvi, & hujusmodi volucres sæpe ab hominibus docentur sonare quod nesciunt: scienter autem cantare, naturæ hominis divina voluntate concessum est: quod & Psalmista commendat, dicens; Psallam & intelligam.» The bracketed «[quod Auctor vertit]» and the letter «a» are the editor's, as printed.

23. Goswin, *Vita B. Arnulfi* II.44. «Quomodo placituram Deo psalmodiam putamus, in qua vox quidem, orantis prætendit speciem, mens autem sine fructu est?» and «hoc commonuerunt, ut serviamus Domino in timore, ut psallamus sapienter; & sic stemus ad psallendum, ut mens nostra concordet voci nostræ.» A source for the first sentence was looked for in the *Patrologia* and not established.

24. Bollandist commentary on the *Vita B. Arnulfi*, §7, *Acta Sanctorum*, Jun. V (30 June). «unde mihi certo persuasi, ipsummet Auctorem, ut supra insinuavi, Scriptionem suam renovasse, altero exemplari exarato, interque scribendum ea omnia addidisse, quæ his signis [ ] ego interclusi.» On the supplements: «prophetia de futuro schismate, quam in Miræi Ms. desideratam Rosweidus ex Aureæ Vallis Ms. monuit inserendam» and «ecgraphum nostrum, ante supplementa Aureivallensia scriptum». The annotation to §44 (note a): «Totus hic numerus ex Ms. Aureæ Vallis est.» The paragraph opens «[44] [Nos a igitur» and closes «ibi sit & cor nostrum.]». The account of the manuscripts: «omnia tria Mss. præfata verbotenus sic concordent usque ad libri 2 numerum 30» and «[semel iterumque aucta in 3 Mss.] exinde Scriptionem totam quarta ferme parte, tam verborum, quam etiam sententiarum, auctiorem haberi;». The *numerus* is a section, not a chapter. The numbering of book II begins again at 1, so §44 lies past the §30 of which the editor speaks. The digitised text also uses square brackets for the editors' marginal summaries, so a bracket alone does not show an addition; the enclosure of the whole paragraph does.

what we say with the mouth."[25] He gives two psalms, *Blessed is the people that understands jubilation* and *Sing wisely*, then the eunuch of Queen Candace, who sought baptism as soon as Philip had made him understand what he was reading, and the parable of the sower: "Everyone who hears the word of the kingdom and does not understand, the evil one comes and snatches away what was sown in his heart."[26] In his comment on *psallite sapienter* he reduces the point to a definition: "No one does anything wisely that he does not understand."[27]

Cassiodorus names the loss more fully than Augustine: the unknowing singer has the pleasure of melody and lacks compunction, tears and ascent, and Matthew 13 makes the loss a danger. He does not name Augustine; two of his birds are Augustine's, but nothing in the two texts shows a borrowing.

The preface was copied whole. A florilegium on the divine office, printed by Migne as the *Benedictio Dei* and addressed by its compiler to Batheric, bishop of Regensburg, sets the paragraph under the heading "On the praise of the psalms and of the Psalter, from the preface of Cassiodorus on the Psalms".[28] The copy differs from the printed Cassiodorus in punctuation and in the number of one psalm. In his dedication the compiler names his sources (Jerome, Augustine, Cassiodorus, Isidore, Bede) and calls what he has gathered "little flowers". The editor, Petrus Stevartius of Liège, whose address to the reader stands before the text and who says the work was put together "some hundreds of years ago", describes the method: the collector "followed the old custom of some who, when they wrote anything, always chose to speak in the words of the ancients rather than in their own".[29] A compiler who speaks only in others' words reproduces, under its author's name, a warning against singing words one does not understand. Stevartius finds nothing to object to in the method.

Cassiodorus's definition travelled further without his name. A commentary on chapter 19 of the Rule of Benedict, printed in PL 66, gathers sayings on *psallite sapienter* from named authorities. Bernard of Monte Cassino, as quoted there, says that "some sing, but unwisely, because with the heart wandering there is in them only the noise of the lips", and that he too sings unwisely who means by the modulation of his voice only to please his hearers. Nicolaus de Fractura, as quoted there, says: "No one, he says, does wisely what he does not understand."[30] The sentence is Cassiodorus's, given to Nicolaus, and the commentator does not connect them.

25. Cassiodorus, *Expositio Psalmorum*, praefatio, PL 70:11A–B. «dulcisonum organum humanis vocibus aemulantur; tubarum sonitus grandiloquis clamoribus reddunt: vocalem citharam viventium chordarum permixtione componunt; et quidquid ante instrumentis musicis videbatur agi, nunc probatur per rationales substantias explicari. Verumtamen nequaquam nobis, ut psittacis merulisque vernandum est, qui dum verba nostra conantur imitari, quid tamen canant, noscuntur modis omnibus ignorare. Melos siquidem blandum animos oblectat, sed non compellit ad lacrymas fructuosas; permulcet aures, sed non ad superna erigit audientes. Corde autem compungimur, si quod ore dicimus, animadvertere valeamus».

26. Cassiodorus, *Expositio Psalmorum*, praefatio, PL 70:11C. «qui postquam quod legebat advertit, statim gratiam baptismatis exquisivit» and «In Evangelio etiam Dominus ait: Omnis qui audit verbum regni, et non intelligit, venit malus et rapit quod seminatum est in corde ejus (Matth. XIII, 19) .»

27. Cassiodorus, *Expositio Psalmorum*, on Ps. 46:8, PL 70:335A. «Adjecit, psallite sapienter; ut non solum cantantes, sed intelligentes psallere» and «Nemo enim sapienter quidquam facit, quod non intelligit.» The file prints a stray page number, «158», between the two runs.

28. *Benedictio Dei*, PL 129:1401 (heading) and 1404B. «DE LAUDE PSALMORUM ET PSALTERII, Ex praefatione Cassiodori in Psalmos.» and «Verumtamen, nequaquam nobis, ut psittacis merulisque vernandum est, qui, dum verba nostra conantur imitari, quid tamen canant, noscuntur modis omnibus ignorare. Melos siquidem blandum animos oblectat; sed non compellit ad lacrymas fructuosas.» The copy cites the first psalm as «(Psal. LXXXV, 16)», Cassiodorus's text as «(Psal. LXXXVIII, 16)». Migne's file gives the author as «Auctor incertus (Monachus Ratisbonensis?)»; the preface is headed «PRAEFATIO AUCTORIS Ad Bathericum episcopum Ratisbonensem.» and opens «Domino semper in Christo venerando BATHERICO episcopo.» The article gives the name as Batheric, from the file's forms; the bishop's dates are not given in the file.

29. *Benedictio Dei*, PL 129:1399 and 1399A–B. Stevartius, whose address is headed «PETRUS STEVARTIUS LEODIUS LECTORI SALUTEM.»: «Hunc Commentariolum, ante aliquot centenos annos ex verbis veterum Patrum contextum, visum est caeteris adjungere» and «Secutus est autem hujus opusculi collector (quisquis fuit) inveteratum quorumdam morem, qui cum aliquid scriberent, semper antiquorum potius quam suis verbis loqui optabant». The compiler: «ex quibus, qua valui brevitate, quosdam colligens flosculos, vobis obtuli relegendos» and «Hieronymus videlicet, Augustinus, Cassiodorus magnus et eloquens vir: sed et Isidori de Antiphonis Responsoriisque, et aliis rebus: Bedae quoque eximii magistri inserui monita».

30. *Regula S. Benedicti cum commentariis*, c. 19, PL 66:477C–478A. Bernard of Monte Cassino as quoted: «Psallite sapienter, hoc est sapide, id est cum devotionis sapore, ut toto posse cogitetur quod psallendo habetur in ore. Quidam enim psallunt, sed insipienter, quia corde vagante, solus est in eis strepitus labiorum. Ille etiam insipienter psallit, qui modulatione vocis solum audientibus placere intendit.» Nicolaus de Fractura as quoted: «Nemo, inquit, sapienter facit quod non intelligit: ideo cum psallimus, sapienter psallamus, id est cum omni puritate animi, et intellectu eorum quae sursum sunt.» The commentator is not named in the file, and neither Bernard of Monte Cassino nor Nicolaus is on disk in his own text.

The commentary on the Rule is one destination among several. A search of every *Patrologia* file on disk, with the tags stripped, for the sentence in its bare form and in Cassiodorus's *enim … quidquam* form finds it in seven files. Besides Cassiodorus and the commentary on the Rule, the *Benedictio Dei* carries it a second time, in Cassiodorus's comment on Psalm 46; Bruno of Würzburg's commentary on the Psalms has it with Cassiodorus's *enim … quidquam*; Peter Lombard on the Psalms has the bare form; Peter of Poitiers's *Sentences* gives it as something "read" on *psallite sapienter*, with "sings" for "does"; and the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Psalter tags it "(AUG.)".[31] Two of the copies put a name to it: the commentary on the Rule names Nicolaus, and the *Glossa* names Augustine. The same search finds the sentence nowhere in Augustine's *Enarrationes* as held here. The *Glossa*'s tag may cover more than the one sentence, and the file does not show how far it reaches; but as printed, the definition Cassiodorus wrote stands there under Augustine's name.

Latins who sing in Greek

The commentators on 1 Corinthians 14 had a case nearer than the bird: the Christian who prays in a language he does not know. Paul's verse is "If I pray in a tongue, my spirit prays, but my mind is without fruit". Ambrosiaster's gloss gives the case a face: "It is plain that our mind is ignorant if the tongue speaks in a language it does not know, as Latin men are accustomed to sing in Greek, delighted by the sound of the words, yet not knowing what they say." He does not stop at the loss. "But the Spirit who is given in baptism knows what the soul prays, while it speaks, or prays aloud in a tongue unknown to it; but the mind, which is the soul, is without fruit. For what fruit can he have who does not know what he says?"[32] The prayer has a knower even when the one who prays does not: the Spirit. Of the *idiota* in verse 16 he says that the unskilled hearer, not understanding, "does not know the end of the prayer and does not answer Amen, that is, true, so that the blessing may be confirmed", for the confirmation of a prayer is completed by those who answer Amen.[33]

The commentary on Paul printed under the name of Haymo of Halberstadt takes over Ambrosiaster's sentence about the Latins who sing in Greek almost word for word, without naming him. It changes what follows. For Haymo "spirit" in Paul's verse means the soul, which gives life to the body and utters the word, and the gloss runs on: "Such a song is without the fruit of understanding, which he cannot have who does not know what he says."[34] The printed Haymo lacks the Spirit who knows what the soul prays. Haymo adds the word *cantilena*, the song as a thing produced, and he moves the *idiota*, whom he defines as one who knows only the language in which he was born, into the Latin liturgy: "If such a one stands by you while you solemnly celebrate the mystery of the Mass, or preach a sermon, or give a blessing, how shall he say Amen over your blessing, when

31. Search of the 5,276 PL files, tags stripped, for *Nemo* (with or without *enim* or *inquit*) *sapienter* (with or without *quidquam*) + verb + *quod non intelligit*: seven files. Cassiodorus (n. 27); *Regula cum commentariis* (n. 30); *Benedictio Dei*, PL 129:1420C: «ut, non solum cantantes, sed intelligentes psallere debeamus. Nemo enim sapienter quidquam facit quod non intelligit.»; Bruno «Herbipolensis», *Expositio Psalmorum*, PL 142:193D: «Psallite sapienter, hoc est quod intelligat quae psallit. Nemo enim sapienter quidquam facit quod non intelligit.»; Peter Lombard, *Commentaria in Psalmos*, PL 191:456C: «Nemo sapienter facit, quod non intelligit.»; Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae*, PL 211:1074B: «Nemo sapienter psallit quod non intelligit.», introduced as what «legitur» on «Psallite sapienter»; *Glossa ordinaria*, *Liber Psalmorum*, PL 113:913B: «Olim sine sensu psallebant, dum lapides colerent. (AUG.) Nemo sapienter facit quod non intelligit.» Authors are named as in the file headers («Bruno Herbipolensis», «Petrus Pictaviensis», «Anselmus Laudunensis et schola; Glossa ordinaria»); the attributions are not examined here. Augustine's *Enarrationes* (7329.xml) is not among the seven.

32. Ambrosiaster, *Commentaria in Epistolam ad Corinthios Primam*, on 1 Cor 14:14, PL 17:255B. «Manifestum est ignorare animum nostrum, si lingua loquatur, quam nescit, sicut adsolent Latini homines Graece cantare, oblectati sono verborum; nescientes tamen quid dicant. Spiritus autem qui datur in baptismo, scit quid oret animus, dum loquitur, aut perorat lingua sibi ignota: mens autem qui est animus, sine fructu est. Quem enim potest habere fructum, qui ignorat quae loquatur?»

33. Ambrosiaster, on 1 Cor 14:16, PL 17:255C. «Imperitus enim audiens quod non intelligit, nescit finem orationis, et non respondet, amen, id est verum; ut confirmetur benedictio. Per hos enim impletur confirmatio precis, qui respondent, amen; ut omnia dicta veri testimonio in audientium mentibus confirmentur.»

34. Haymo (so printed), *Expositio in epistolas S. Pauli*, on 1 Cor 14:14, PL 117:589A–B. «spiritus meus orat, mens autem mea sine fructu est, id est vis animae meae, id est, ipsa anima quae vivificat corpus profert verbum.» and «Manifestum est, ignorare animum nostrum sive intellectum, si lingua loquatur quod nescit, sicut assolent Latini homines Graece cantare, oblectati sono verborum, nescientes tamen quid dicant. Quae cantilena sine fructu intelligentiae est, quem non habere potest qui ignorat quae loquatur.» Migne's file gives the author as «Haymo Halberstatensis»; the attribution is not examined here.

he does not know what you say?"[35] In the printed Haymo the case is kept and the credit Ambrosiaster gave it is not; the text does not show who removed it, or whether it was ever in the copy Haymo's commentary was made from.

Three later commentaries carry the same simile, and none of them has the Spirit who knows. A search of the *Patrologia* on disk, with the tags stripped, finds "Graece cantare" in five files: Ambrosiaster, the printed Haymo, Hervé of Bourg-Dieu, Peter Lombard's *Collectanea* and the *Glossa ordinaria* on 1 Corinthians. The last three read *solent*, where Ambrosiaster has *adsolent* and the printed Haymo *assolent*.[36] Hervé keeps Ambrosiaster's "a tongue it does not know" (*quam nescit*) where the printed Haymo has "what it does not know" (*quod nescit*), and none of the three has the sentence on the *cantilena* that is the printed Haymo's own. On this evidence the printed Haymo is not shown to be their source, and the passages do not show what was. What the three add is a gloss on *spiritus*. Hervé, pointing back to an earlier note of his own, calls it "a certain power of the soul below the mind, where the likenesses of bodily things are expressed"; "tongue" can mean any utterance of signs before they are understood; and Paul's resolve to pray with the spirit and with the mind means "that the signs of things be formed for me in the spirit, and their understanding shine out in the mind".[37] The *Glossa* gives the same gloss on *spiritus*, with "impressed" for "expressed", and the same reading of Paul's resolve. It shares with Lombard a sentence that the printed Haymo lacks: "So it is if someone speaks in an unknown tongue, or utters the signs of some things without understanding, as Latin men are accustomed to sing in Greek".[38] Lombard sets out three readings of "my spirit prays", one after another: the Holy Spirit given me by God, who "makes me speak"; reason, which makes me speak what it thinks good; and the lower power of the soul where the likenesses of bodily things are impressed, as Pharaoh's spirit saw the images and Joseph's mind understood them.[39] The Holy Spirit is still present in Lombard, as the one who moves the speaker to speak. The Spirit who knows what the soul prays while the soul does not is in Ambrosiaster and in none of the four later texts that carry his simile. The loss is a feature of the line as it survives on this shelf, not an act that can be laid to any one of its members.

Primasius moved the verse from ignorance of a language to distraction: "spirit" here is speech, "which

35. Haymo (so printed), on 1 Cor 14:16, PL 117:589C. «Idios dicitur proprius: unde dicitur idiota, propriam linguam tantummodo sciens, in qua natus et nutritus est. Si igitur talis astiterit tibi, dum aut mysterium missae solemniter celebras, aut sermonem facis, aut etiam benedictionem tribuis: quomodo dicet: Amen, super tuam benedictionem? cum nescit quid dicas».

36. The five files: 6984.xml (Ambrosiaster), 9079.xml (Haymo, so printed), 11182.xml (Hervé), 11454.xml (Lombard, *Collectanea*), 8981.xml (*Glossa ordinaria*, *Epistola I ad Corinthios*). A plain `grep` for the phrase misses 8981, where a line break falls inside the words in the XML. Ambrosiaster: «sicut adsolent Latini homines Graece cantare» (n. 32); Haymo: «sicut assolent Latini homines Graece cantare» (n. 34).

37. Hervé of Bourg-Dieu («Herveus Burgidolensis» in the file), *Commentaria in epistolas Pauli*, on 1 Cor 14:14–15, PL 181:963A–C. «Ignorat enim animus si lingua loquatur quam nescit, sicut solent Latini homines Graece cantare, oblectati sono verborum, nescientes tamen quid dicant. Ut supradictum est spiritus vocatur vis animae quaedam mente inferior, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines exprimuntur. Mens autem est illa superior pars animae, ubi intellectus et ratio proprie sedem habent. Lingua quoque sicut et superius dictum est, designare potest quamlibet signorum prolationem priusquam intelligantur.» and «Quia orabo spiritu, orabo et mente, id est loquar spiritu et mente, ut signa rerum mihi formentur in spiritu, et eorum refulgeat intellectus in mente». The earlier note is at PL 181:961A: «qui modo quodam proprio vocatur spiritus, vis animae quaedam mente inferior, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines exprimuntur.» Hervé's first gloss on the verse takes *spiritus* as breath: «spiritus meus, id est flatus oris mei orat dum loquor in oratione».

38. *Glossa ordinaria* on 1 Cor 14:14–15, PL 114:544B–C. «Spiritus vocatur vis animae inferior mente, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines imprimuntur.» and «Ita est si lingua incognita quis loquatur, vel signa aliquarum rerum sine intellectu proferat, sicut solent Latini homines Graece cantare, oblectari sono verborum, nescientes tamen quid dicant. VERS. 15.– Orabo spiritu. Id est, ita loqui approbo, ut signa rerum formentur in spiritu, et eorum intellectus refulgeat in mente.» The file reads «oblectari» where the others have *oblectati*. Migne's file gives the author as «Anselmus Laudunensis et schola; Glossa ordinaria».

39. Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in epistolas Pauli*, on 1 Cor 14:14–15, PL 191:1667A–C. «spiritus meus, scilicet Spiritus sanctus a Deo mihi datus, orat, id est facit me loqui. Vel, spiritus, id est ratio, orat, id est facit me loqui, id quod bonum esse putat. Vel spiritus hic vocatur, vis animae inferior mente, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines imprimuntur, ut verbi gratia spiritus Pharaonis informatus est ut videret imagines; mens vero Joseph illuminata est ut intelligeret.» and «Ita enim fit, si lingua incognita quis loquatur, vel signa aliquarum rerum sine intellectu proferat, sicut solent Latini homines Graece cantare, oblectati sono verborum, nescientes tamen quid dicant.» and «ita loqui approbabo ut et signa rerum formentur in spiritu, et eorum intellectus refulgeat in mente». Between the first and second runs the file prints the source tag «[Ambrosius]»; where the excerpt it marks begins and ends is not shown.

sometimes prays while the mind is thinking of something else", and cited *My heart has forsaken me*.[40] That case, of the man who knows the words and is not attending to them, is the one Aquinas will answer.

Understanding without words

The tradition also credits a voice without words, and it is the opposite of the parrot's. Expounding *sing well to him in jubilation*, Augustine says: "What is it to sing in jubilation? To understand, and to be unable to explain in words what is sung in the heart." Reapers and vintagers who begin in the words of their songs and are filled with a joy the words cannot hold "turn away from the syllables of the words and go into the sound of jubilation". "Jubilation is a sound signifying that the heart is in labour with what it cannot say", and it befits the ineffable God, whom one cannot speak and ought not to be silent about.[41] Here the sound signifies, and what it signifies is an understanding larger than the words. The parrot has words and no understanding; the jubilant singer has understanding and leaves the words behind.

John of Salisbury's attack on the church music of his day uses both figures. The attack is on singers who, "before the face of the Lord, in the very sanctuary", with "the luxury of a wanton voice" and womanish modes, try to soften the souls of their hearers. Their soft modulations would make you think you heard the Sirens, "and you will marvel at the facility of voices to which the nightingale or the parrot, or anything more sonorous, cannot match its measures"; the ear's judgment is overcome, and such music, past measure, rouses lust sooner than devotion. That the birds cannot match these singers is mockery, not praise of the singers: the fault is too much art. John's rule of measure follows: "If your mouth sings the praise of the Lord from the abundance of the heart, if you sing with the spirit and the mind, then you sing wisely, even short of understanding the articulate voice, you hold the straightest rule of modesty, and you charm the ears of the Most High not so much with the jubilation of the voice as of the mind."[42] The condition, "with the spirit and the mind", is Paul's phrase for singing with understanding, and the sentence ends in jubilation. The plainer reading is therefore that John means a singer who does understand and whose praise passes beyond articulate words, as in Augustine's jubilation; that he grants wisdom to a singer who does not grasp the words is a possible reading, not the evident one, and the article leaves both open. Either way the concession is made for a singer whose heart is full and whose mind is singing.

In the eighth book the birds return, and this time they win. Under the heading "That some desire to be conformed to brutes and insensible things", John calls it a manifest abjection of human dignity to strive to equal "the peacock, the nightingale or the parrot", or any brute or insensible thing. Of men who give themselves to the pleasures of the senses he says: "Let them sing together, and fill out the melody of all music as best they can; none of them will equal the nightingale, or the parrot. Is it not then unseemly and shameful for human

40. Primasius, *Commentaria in epistolas S. Pauli*, on 1 Cor 14:14, PL 68:541C. «Hoc loco spiritus sermo intelligendus est, qui nonnunquam mente alia cogitante precatur. Unde propheta: Cor meum dereliquit me. Mens autem mea sine fructu est. Quia non intelligo quod dicam per spiritum.»

41. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* 32, II, sermo 1, 8, PL 36:283. «Quid est in jubilatione canere? Intelligere, verbis explicare non posse quod canitur corde.» and «avertunt se a syllabis verborum, et eunt in sonum jubilationis. Jubilum sonus quidam est significans cor parturire quod dicere non potest. Et quem decet ista jubilatio, nisi ineffabilem Deum? Ineffabilis enim est, quem fari non potes: et si eum fari non potes, et tacere non debes, quid restat nisi ut jubiles; ut gaudeat cor sine verbis, et immensa latitudo gaudiorum metas non habeat syllabarum?»

42. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* I.6, PL 199:402C–403A. «Ipsum quoque cultum religionis incestat, quod ante conspectum Domini, in ipsis penetralibus sanctuarii, lascivientis vocis luxu, quadam ostentatione sui, muliebribus modis notularum articulorumque caesuris, stupentes animulas emollire nituntur.» and «Cum praecinentium, et succinentium, canentium et decinentium, intercinentium et occinentium, praemolles modulationes audieris, sirenarum concentus credas esse, non hominum et de vocum facilitate miraberis, quibus philomena vel psittacus, aut si quid sonorius est, modos suos nequeunt coaequare.» and «Si ergo ex abundantia cordis os tuum laudem Domini moduletur, si spiritu psallis et mente, psallis denique sapienter, etiam citra articulatae vocis intelligentiam, rectissimam modestiae regulam tenes, et non tam vocis quam mentis jubilo aures mulces Altissimi». The phrase *citra articulatae vocis intelligentiam* could also refer to the melismas of chant, in which the syllables are drawn out past recognition (a sense supplied from general knowledge, not from these files); the article reads it in its plainer sense.

loftiness if, setting aside its own gift, in which it excels, it aspires to others' gifts, in which it is surpassed?"[43] Here no singer equals the birds, and to try is a degradation; in the sixth chapter of the first book the singers outdo the birds and are mocked for it. The two passages do not agree on who excels in song. They agree on the measure: man's own gift, and not the bird's. The eighth book's ground is close to the one the sermon on Psalm 18 gave, that to sing knowingly is granted to the nature of man; John does not cite Augustine, and the likeness is the article's observation.

4. The Adjudication: Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas does not mention the parrot, but he answers human cases the parrot had stood for. The article of the *Summa theologiae* that asks whether attention is necessary to prayer opens with three objections, of which the third is the sharpest: inattentive prayer is not without sin, for one who prays with a wandering mind "seems to mock God, as if he spoke to a man and did not attend to what he himself was saying", and Basil says that such a one will not only fail to obtain what he asks but will rather provoke God.[44] The *sed contra* is that holy men too suffer a wandering mind in prayer, as the psalm says, *my heart has forsaken me*, the verse Primasius had used.

The body of the article takes the question as one "chiefly about vocal prayer", and distinguishes two senses of "necessary". In the first, that by which the end is better reached, attention is necessary to prayer without qualification. In the second, that without which a thing cannot reach its effect, the answer depends on which effect is meant, for prayer has three. The first is common to every act informed by charity, to merit, "and for this effect it is not of necessity required that attention be present to the prayer throughout; but the force of the first intention with which one comes to pray makes the whole prayer meritorious, as happens in other meritorious acts". The second is proper to prayer, to obtain, and for this too the first intention suffices, "which God chiefly attends to". Then the limit: "But if the first intention is lacking, the prayer is neither meritorious nor impetrative; for God does not hear the prayer to which he who prays does not attend, as Gregory says." The third effect is the one prayer works at once, "a certain spiritual refreshment of the mind, and for this attention is of necessity required in prayer. Hence it is said in 1 Corinthians 14, *if I pray with the tongue, my mind is without fruit*."[45]

He then distinguishes three attentions that can be brought to vocal prayer: "one by which one attends to the words, lest one err in them; a second by which one attends to the sense of the words; a third by which one attends to the end of the prayer, that is, to God and to the thing for which one prays, which is the most

43. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* VIII.12, heading and PL 199:756B; 761B. «Quod brutis et insensibilibus quidam appetunt conformari» and «cum manifesta sit humanae dignitatis abjectio, si non hirco aut sui, sed leoni et pardo, sed pantherae aut satyro, sed pavoni, philomenae, aut psittaco, sed cuicunque brutorum aut insensibilium studeat coaequari.» and «Concinant hi, et totius musicae melos pro viribus expleant, nemo eorum philomenam aequabit, aut psittacum. Nonne ergo indecens et probrosum est humanae celsitudini, si postposita dote sua, in qua praevalet, ad alienas, in quibus superatur, aspirat?» The chapter stands in the eighth book of the file («LIBER OCTAVUS»), not the first.

44. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II-II q.83 a.13 arg.3 (objection; not Aquinas's view). «Sed non est absque peccato quod aliquis orando evagationem mentis patiatur, videtur eum deridere Deum, sicut et si alicui homini loqueretur et non attenderet ad ea quae ipse proferret. Unde Basilius dicit, est divinum auxilium implorandum non remisse, nec mente huc illuc evagante, eo quod talis non solum non impetrabit quod petit, sed et magis Deum irritabit .» *Sed contra*: «Sed contra est quod etiam sancti viri quandoque orantes evagationem mentis patiuntur, secundum illud Psalm., cor meum dereliquit me .»

45. Aquinas, *ST* II-II q.83 a.13 co. «Respondeo dicendum quod quaestio haec praecipue locum habet in oratione vocali.» and «Primus quidem communis omnibus actibus caritate informatis, quod est mereri. Et ad hunc effectum non ex necessitate requiritur quod attentio adsit orationi per totum, sed vis primae intentionis qua aliquis ad orandum accedit, reddit totam orationem meritoriam, sicut in aliis meritoriis actibus accidit. Secundus autem effectus orationis est ei proprius, quod est impetrare. Et ad hunc etiam effectum sufficit prima intentio, quam Deus principaliter attendit. Si autem prima intentio desit, oratio nec meritoria est nec impetrativa, illam enim orationem Deus non audit cui ille qui orat non intendit , ut Gregorius dicit. Tertius autem effectus orationis est quem praesentialiter efficit, scilicet quaedam spiritualis refectio mentis. Et ad hoc de necessitate requiritur in oratione attentio. Unde dicitur I Cor. XIV, si orem lingua, mens mea sine fructu est .» The attribution to Gregory is Aquinas's and was not traced.

necessary. And this even the unlettered can have."[46] The replies keep the line between weakness and choice. He prays in spirit and in truth who comes to pray at the prompting of the Spirit, even if his mind afterwards wanders through infirmity. A deliberate wandering is a sin and hinders the fruit of prayer, but "a wandering of the mind that happens beyond one's purpose does not take away the fruit of prayer".[47]

The lecture on 1 Corinthians 14 applies the same scheme to Paul's case and says more. It is the less secure witness of the two: the file gives it as a *reportatio*, a hearer's record of the lecture, and where the article reports it as Aquinas's words, that qualification stands. In private prayer, Aquinas reads, "if there is some unlettered man who makes his prayer by saying a psalm or the Our Father, and does not understand what he says, he prays with the tongue; and it does not matter whether he prays with words granted to him by the Holy Spirit or with the words of others".[48] The sentence classifies; it does not acquit. Whether the words are the Spirit's or another's, the man who does not understand them "prays with the tongue", which is the lesser case, and the next sentence ranks him: "it is plain that he gains more who prays and understands". The one who understands is refreshed in both intellect and affection; the mind of the one who does not "is without the fruit of refreshment". Yet the comparison that follows gives him something. "Since it is better to be refreshed as to affection and intellect than as to affection alone", prophecy is worth more in prayer than the gift of tongues alone: the one who prays with the tongue only is, on this reckoning, refreshed as to affection alone. For "my spirit prays" he gives three readings: the Holy Spirit given to me, who inclines and moves me to pray, "and nonetheless I merit in that prayer, because the very fact that I am moved by the Holy Spirit is merit to me"; my reason, which dictates to me that I say what is for the good, "whether in my own words or those of other saints"; or "the imaginative power, inasmuch as the voices or likenesses of bodily things are only in the imagination, without being understood by the intellect".[49] Aquinas lists the three and does not choose among them. The third describes words held without understanding as sounds and images present to a power below the intellect and not taken up by it, which is what Paul calls a mind without fruit. Its terms are older than Aquinas. Hervé, the *Glossa* and Lombard had glossed Paul's *spiritus* as the power of the soul below the mind where the likenesses of bodily things are formed, and Lombard gives all three of Aquinas's readings in the same order, the second in nearly the same terms (section 3). The power below the intellect is also the region *De musica* had shared with the beasts (section 2): memory, which swallows and goats have, and not the intellect, in which alone knowledge is. That link is the article's; Aquinas does not draw it.

The question follows: is one who prays without understanding without the fruit of prayer? "There is a twofold fruit of prayer. One fruit is the merit that comes to the man; the other is the spiritual consolation and devotion conceived from prayer. As to the fruit of devotion, one who does not attend to what he prays, or does

46. Aquinas, *ST* II–II q.83 a.13 co. «Sciendum tamen quod est triplex attentio quae orationi vocali potest adhiberi. Una quidem qua attenditur ad verba, ne quis in eis erret. Secunda qua attenditur ad sensum verborum. Tertia qua attenditur ad finem orationis, scilicet ad Deum et ad rem pro qua oratur, quae quidem est maxime necessaria. Et hanc etiam possunt habere idiotae.»

47. Aquinas, *ST* II–II q.83 a.13 ad 1 and ad 3. «Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in spiritu et veritate orat qui ex instinctu spiritus ad orandum accedit, etiam si ex aliqua infirmitate mens postmodum evagetur.» and «Ad tertium dicendum quod si quis ex proposito in oratione mente evagetur, hoc peccatum est, et impedit orationis fructum.» and «Evagatio vero mentis quae fit praeter propositum, orationis fructum non tollit.»

48. Aquinas, *Super I Epistolam ad Corinthios* c.14 l.3, in the Corpus Thomisticum text headed «[reportatio vulgata]». «Et primo in oratione privata, dicens, quod si sit aliquis idiota, qui faciat orationem suam, dicens Psalmum, vel pater noster, et non intelligat ea quae dicit, iste orat lingua, et non refert utrum oret verbis sibi a spiritu sancto concessis, sive verbis aliorum; et si sit alius qui orat, et intelligit quae dicit, hic quidem orat et prophetat. Constat quod plus lucratur qui orat et intelligit, quam qui tantum lingua orat, qui scilicet non intelligit quae dicit.»

49. Aquinas, *Super I Cor*. c.14 l.3. «Nam ille qui intelligit, reficitur et quantum ad intellectum et quantum ad affectum; sed mens eius, qui non intelligit, est sine fructu refectionis. Unde et cum melius sit refici quantum ad affectum et intellectum, quam quantum ad affectum solum, constat quod in oratione plus valet prophetiae donum quam solum donum linguarum.» and «tunc spiritus meus , id est spiritus sanctus mihi datus, orat , qui inclinat et movet me ad orandum. Et nihilominus mereor in ipsa oratione, quia hoc ipsum, quod moveor a spiritu sancto, est mihi meritum.» and «Vel spiritus meus , id est ratio mea, orat , id est dictat mihi quod ego loquar ea quae ad bonum sunt, sive verbis propriis sive aliorum sanctorum. Vel spiritus meus , id est virtus imaginativa, orat , inquantum voces seu similitudines corporalium sunt tantum in imaginatione absque hoc quod intelligantur ab intellectu; et ideo subdit: mens autem mea , id est intellectus meus, sine fructu est , quia non intelligit.»

not understand it, is deprived; but as to the fruit of merit it must not be said that he is deprived, for then many prayers would be without merit, since a man can hardly say a single Our Father without his mind being carried to other things." The reason is the one given in the *Summa*: in acts ordered to a right end, the first force that moves the intention remains through the whole work unless it is broken by a contrary affection.[50] The lecture ranks the three attentions differently from the *Summa*. Attention to the words "sometimes harms, inasmuch as it hinders devotion"; attention to the sense "harms, though it is not very harmful"; attention to the end "is better, and as it were necessary".[51]

The *Summa* gives the hearer of chant a credit the lecture does not. The second article of the question on praise asks whether song is to be used in the praise of God, and its fifth objection is that song hinders the praise of the mind, since "what is sung can be understood less by others than if it were uttered without song". Aquinas answers that one who sings for devotion attends the more to what is said, "and the same reason holds for hearers, in whom, though sometimes they do not understand what is sung, they understand nevertheless why it is sung, namely for the praise of God; and this suffices to excite devotion".[52] Set beside the lecture, where one who does not understand what he prays "is deprived" of the fruit of devotion, this divides devotion in two: the devotion that rests on the sense of the words is lost to one who does not understand them, and the devotion that rests on their purpose is not. The credit goes, as elsewhere in these texts, through what the hearer does understand, here the end the singing serves. The two passages are the article's to set side by side; Aquinas does not compare them.

In public prayer the priest, Aquinas grants, sometimes says things he does not understand. The *idiota*, "properly one who knows only the language in which he was born", is to say Amen, which means "let it be" or "it is true"; but if he does not understand, how will he conform himself to what is said? "He can indeed conform himself, even if he does not understand, but in general only, not in particular, because he cannot understand what good you are saying, except only that you are blessing." Why then are blessings not given in the vulgar tongue, so that the people may understand them and conform themselves more? "It is to be said that this perhaps was so in the primitive Church; but after the faithful were instructed and know what they hear in the common office, blessings are made in Latin." The hearer who does not understand is not edified in particular, "though in general he understands and is edified".[53]

Aquinas answers two cases, and the article keeps them apart. The *Summa* answers the case of the wandering mind, which is a failure of attention: the first intention with which one came to pray carries merit and impetration through a prayer not attended to. The lecture extends merit, and only merit, to one who does not

50. Aquinas, *Super I Cor*. c.14 l.3. «Sed numquid quandocumque quis orat, et non intelligit quae dicit, sit sine fructu orationis? Dicendum quod duplex est fructus orationis. Unus fructus est meritum quod homini provenit; alius fructus est spiritualis consolatio et devotio concepta ex oratione. Et quantum ad fructum devotionis spiritualis privatur qui non attendit ad ea quae orat, seu non intelligit; sed quantum ad fructum meriti, non est dicendum quod privetur: quia sic multae orationes essent sine merito, cum vix unum pater noster potest homo dicere, quin mens ad alia feratur.» and «sed vis prima, quae movet intentionem, manet in toto opere, etiam si aliquando in aliquo particulari divertat; et hic prima vis facit totum opus meritorium, nisi interrumpatur per contrariam affectionem, quae divertat a fine praedicto ad finem contrarium.»

51. Aquinas, *Super I Cor*. c.14 l.3. «Sed sciendum est quod triplex est attentio. Una est ad verba quae homo dicit: et haec aliquando nocet, inquantum impedit devotionem; alia est ad sensum verborum, et haec nocet, non tamen est multum nociva; tertia est ad finem, et haec est melior et quasi necessaria. Tamen id quod dicit apostolus mens est sine fructu , intelligitur de fructu refectionis.»

52. Aquinas, *ST* II-II q.91 a.2 arg.5 (objection) and ad 5. «tum etiam quia ea quae cantantur minus ab aliis intelligi possunt quam si sine cantu proferrentur. Ergo cantus non sunt divinis laudibus adhibendi.» The reply: «Ad quintum dicendum quod per cantum quo quis studiose ad delectandum utitur, abstrahitur animus a consideratione eorum quae cantantur. Sed si aliquis cantet propter devotionem, attentius considerat quae dicuntur» and «Et eadem est ratio de audientibus, in quibus, etsi aliquando non intelligant quae cantantur, intelligunt tamen propter quid cantantur, scilicet ad laudem Dei; et hoc sufficit ad devotionem excitandam.» The question of the article, from the prologue to q.91: «Secundo, utrum in laudibus Dei sint cantus adhibendi.»

53. Aquinas, *Super I Cor*. c.14 l.3. «quae est quando sacerdos publice orat, ubi aliquando dicit quaedam quae non intelligit, aliquando aliqua quae intelligit.» and «Idiota proprie dicitur qui scit tantum linguam in qua natus est» and «Potest quidem se conformare, etiam si non intelligat, sed in generali tantum, non in speciali, quia non potest intelligere quid boni dicas, nisi quod benedicas tantum. Sed quare non dantur benedictiones in vulgari, ut intelligantur a populo, et conforment se magis eis? Dicendum est quod hoc forte fuit in Ecclesia primitiva, sed postquam fideles instructi sunt et sciunt quae audiunt in communi officio, fiunt benedictiones in Latino.» and «sed alter , qui audit et non intelligit, non aedificatur , inquantum non intelligit in speciali, etsi in generali intelligat et aedificetur.»

understand his words: the motion of the Spirit is merit to him, and the first force of the intention remains through the whole work. No text quoted here gives impetration to words not understood. The lecture's "it does not matter" whether the words are the Spirit's or another's places the unlettered man in the lesser case; it does not acquit him. What the words cannot do is supply the act. Every credit is routed through a person who prays: the first intention with which he came, the Spirit who moves him, the will by which he conforms himself in general. Without the first intention the prayer is "neither meritorious nor impetrative". The *idiota*'s Amen is possible because he understands in general that a blessing is being given and is edified in general; the credit runs through that general understanding and his will, and he is not, as the parrot is, a producer of words without understanding. Hearers of chant who do not follow the words understand why they are sung, and that suffices for devotion. What is lost to one who does not understand is the refreshment of the intellect and the devotion that rests on the sense. Refreshment as to affection alone, and the devotion that rests on the purpose, remain; and the third attention, to God and to the thing prayed for, which the *Summa* calls the most necessary, is open to the unlettered.

5. The Credited Parrot

Leo IX and the Danish parrot

In Wibert's Life of Pope Leo IX a parrot's words are given weight, and the Life says why. As the pope's fame spread, Wibert says, his name resounded everywhere, "nor is it to be wondered that a rational creature should resound in his praise, when even irrational animals, wonderful to say, formed a human voice in proclaiming his name". At Benevento, "as is reported by truthful relaters", a cock repeated his name, and when about to give its natural cry sounded "Papa Leo".[54] Wibert then tells of a dog in Apulia which in barking used to cry out in human words "Deus meus", and gives a reason for crediting a beast's words: "It is not incredible that a brute animal in that region should in some way have called on the mercy of God, since it is certain that the Christian religion had almost wholly perished there and the inhabitants of that land were subject to a foreign power, so that they might be roused to call on help from above at least by the voice of an irrational beast."[55] The dog does not pray. Its cry is addressed through it to the men who hear it.

Among the many who sought the pope, the king of Denmark sent him a parrot as a gift, "in which a certain divine grace appeared, with wonderful power. For although some birds learn to form human words with hunger as their teacher, this one, as is told, with no one compelling, the whole way while it was being carried to the lord pope, sang back *Ad papam vado*; and as soon as it was presented to him, with no one teaching, it cried out in a sweet voice *Papa Leo*." When the pope, wearied by business, withdrew to his private room, or some sadness weighed on his mind, the bird was often there to relieve him, "and neatly and crisply resounding *Papa Leo*, it roused the strength of his mind".[56] Wibert expects a reader to object, and answers: let no one

54. Wibert, *Vita S. Leonis IX* II.3, PL 143:490B–C. «Nec mirandum rationabilem creaturam in ejus resonare laudem, cum etiam irrationabilia animalia, mirum dictu! illius praedicando nomen humanam formarent vocem. Nam, sicut a veridicis fertur relatoribus, apud Beneventum gallus frequenti voce ejus nomen repetebat, et naturalem emissurus vocem, cunctis mirantibus, papa Leo insonabat.»

55. Wibert, *Vita S. Leonis IX* II.4, PL 143:490C. «Dicitur etiam illis temporibus in finibus Apuliae canis exstitisse, qui latrando solitus erat humanis verbis Deus meus inclamare. Non autem est incredibile brutum animal in ea regione Dei misericordiam quocunque modo invocasse, dum certum est Christi religionem ibidem pene omnino deperisse, accolasque illius patriae alienae potestati subditos esse, ut ad invocationem superni auxilii saltem irrationabilis pecudis excitarentur voce.»

56. Wibert, *Vita S. Leonis IX* II.4, PL 143:491A–B. «Inter multos ergo, qui ejus ambiebant praesentiam invisere, rex Danamarchiae transmisit illi avem psittacum in munere, in quo quaedam divina apparuit gratia, admirabili virtute. Quamvis enim quaedam aves humana formare verba discant magistra fame, haec tamen, ut fertur, nullo cogente, toto itinere dum ad domnum papam deferretur, Ad papam vado, recinebat; et mox, ut ei est praesentata, nemine docente, voce dulcisona, papa Leo inclamabat.» and «haec avis aegritudinis illius levamen frequenter aderat, et concinne ac recise, papa Leo, resonans, robur mentis illi excitabat.»

think it blameworthy that this just man took comfort in the bird's modulation, since Augustine, grieving for his mother, used music to relieve his sorrow, and Antony allowed some recreation to monastic rigour.[57]

What earns the credit is stated in the text. The grace lies in what the bird's words are not. The natural historians knew two sources for a parrot's words, nature, which gives it the greeting, and instruction, which gives it everything else; Wibert names the second, "hunger as teacher", and denies it, "no one compelling", "no one teaching". The parrot is credited because its words are not parrot's words in the ordinary sense. Their content is the pope's name and the place it was going. Their use is comfort, and Wibert defends that use by putting the bird's voice with music, not with speech: it is its *modulatio* that relieves the pope, and the precedent is Augustine's recourse to melody. The words are not said to be understood. They are apt, though: the bird says "I am going to the pope" while it is being carried to him, and names him as soon as it is presented, and part of the wonder lies in that fit between the words and the occasion. The grace that appeared in the bird is God's. The pope is the object of the words, not the one credited with them; and the credit is given to words that, as Wibert reports it, no one taught.

The story comes, on Wibert's own account, from report. The Bollandists reprinted it in the *Acta Sanctorum* for 19 April, with small variants and a marginal summary, "he is refreshed by a parrot saying Papa Leo".[58] Their note sets beside it the Chronicle of Senones, composed a century and a half after Leo's death, in which the cocks of every village the future pope entered cried in the language of the country "Leo Papa, Leo Papa", although no one yet knew the name he would take; the editor calls this "a less credible amplification", and judges that a thing that happened once, and in Leo's absence, has been "adorned by popular rumour".[59] The prophesying cocks are discounted; the parrot is left without comment.

The bird that says what may not be said

Godfrey of Viterbo's *Pantheon* tells in verse of the emperor Zeno and his son Leo, falsely accused of plotting his father's death. Zeno orders him killed; the mother saves him by substituting another youth, hides him as a monk, and Zeno's edict stands that "whoever is called Leo shall die". For fifteen years the son is hidden. "The mother rears a bird that speaks in the human way, which learned to lament the youth with the grieving mother: *Alas, Leo, my son, our glory lies low.*" At the Easter feast, with Zeno seated, the parrot laments in the midst of the court, "*Alas, Leo*, said the bird, *why do you perish, son Leo?*", and as it names Leo in clear speech it moves the lords to pity.[60] Zeno asks why the court weeps. The mother answers that she herself fears to say, "if you would rather know, the bird is telling you now". Zeno turns to her: "show me the reason, which youth does

57. Wibert, *Vita S. Leonis IX* II.4, PL 143:491B. «Nec videatur cuiquam reprehensibile hunc justum in sui consolatione hujus avis usum modulatione, cum legamus beatum Augustinum pro exitu suae matris inconsolabiliter lamentantem, musicam melodiam ad levamen moeroris sibi adhibuisse, sanctumque Antonium rigori monastico aliquantulum oblectamenti certo tempore concessisse.» Wibert's appeal to Augustine was not traced.

58. *Acta Sanctorum*, Apr. II (19 April), *Vita S. Leonis IX*, c. II §§9–10. The volume is taken from the file's header («April II»); the file gives no page numbers. «& naturalem emissurus sonum, cunctis mirantibus;», «[recreatur a psittaco dicente Papa Leo,]», «ad Domnum Præsulem deferretur, ad Papam vado,» and «hunc justum in sui consolatione hujus avis usum modulamine». Migne reads «vocem», «domnum papam» and «modulatione».

59. *Acta Sanctorum*, Apr. II (19 April), annotation e to c. II. «Chronicon Senoniense, quod extat tomo 3 spicilegii Acheriani, compositum sesqui seculo post mortem S. Leonis, lib, 2 cap. 14 per auxesim minus verosimilem ita id extollit.» and «galli earumdem villarum, lingua ejus patriæ per quam transibat, densis clamoribus eum Papam futurum clamabant; Leo Papa, Leo Papa; (cum sibi nomen imponendum omnes ignorarent)» and «Quo audito, qui cum eo erant, eum in summa veneratione habere cœperunt, quæ ex casu semel facto & quidem ipso absente, sic adornata videntur rumore populari.» The letters marking the notes in the digitised text do not stand where the notes' contents would put them, so the note's point of attachment in the printed page is not certain.

60. Godfrey of Viterbo, *Pantheon*, «Item de Zenone imperatore, versifice narratur», PL 198:902C–903A. «Praecipitur: quicunque Leo dictus moriatur, Permanet edictum cum feritate ratum.» and «Nutrit avem mater, humano more loquentem, Plangere quae didicit juvenem, cum matre dolente: Heu! Leo, mi nate, gloria nostra jacet. Victima paschalis Zenone sedente paratur, Psittacus in medio plangit, luctus renovatur: Heu, Leo, dixit avis, cur Leo nate peris? Claro sermone dum nominat ipse Leonem, Corda ducum pietate movet, renovatque dolorem». The Leo of the poem is the son of the emperor Zeno, not Leo IX.

your bird lament, or which Leo? For this parrot moves my very bowels."[61] She tells him that his son lives, and the father relents.

In the verse the bird does the acts. It laments; "as it names Leo in clear speech" it moves the lords to pity; the mother says that "the bird is telling you now"; and Zeno says "this parrot moves my very bowels". The lament was taught: the bird "learned to lament the youth with the grieving mother". Zeno's "your bird" marks possession. One reading makes the mother the speaker and the bird the means by which what she fears to say is said; the text supports that reading in her fear and in her teaching, and works against it in giving every act of speech, lament and narration to the bird. On the other reading the poem credits the bird itself with what it says, and this is the one story read here in which it does so. Either way the words are credited with an effect: they move the court and the emperor. Godfrey names no source at this place.

Salutations, a witness and an emperor's joke

The greeting the natural historians gave the parrot by nature becomes evidence in Druthmar's commentary on Matthew. Expounding *Peace to this house*, he says that Christians ought to greet each other by the Lord's command and by the Romans', for it was the custom of the ancients; the bad custom among courtiers of not greeting one's fellow should be shamed by the kings of Israel and by the Romans, among whom emperors were greeted "not only by men among themselves, but through birds also. Hence that saying of the parrot: *From you I shall learn the names of others; this I learned by myself: Chaire, Caesar.*"[62] The bird's line is a witness to a custom. Its words are credited with attestation, and nothing more is asked of them. Druthmar gives the couplet without its author and with the Greek greeting where Isidore has the Latin.

A chronicle of the abbey of St Hubert in the Ardennes preserves the anecdote of the emperor's birds in another setting. Two envoys of the abbey, sent to the abbot of Prüm about a tithe, won his favour by their talk, the younger slipping in "briefly culled events of the ancient annals".[63] The printed text tags the stories with references to Macrobius's *Saturnalia*, in parentheses that appear to be the editor's; the chronicler does not name him, and the *Saturnalia* is not on disk. Among them: Augustus, returning from Actium, met a man with a raven taught to say "Hail, Caesar, victorious commander", and bought it for twenty thousand *nummi*; the trainer's partner revealed a second raven, which said "Hail, victorious commander Antony", and Caesar, not at all angered, merely ordered the reward shared. "Saluted likewise by a parrot, he ordered it bought." A poor cobbler, exhausted by the cost of training a raven, used to say to the silent bird "Labour and expense are lost"; when at last it gave the greeting, Augustus said he had enough such greeters at home, and the raven, remembering, added its master's complaint, "Labour and expense are lost". Caesar laughed and bought the bird for more than he had paid for any.[64]

61. Godfrey, *Pantheon*, PL 198:903A. «Mater ait: Cognosce magis, te Zeno timeri, Cur plorat, cur turba dolet, timet ipsa fateri, Noscere si mavis, jam tibi narrat avis. Zeno refert, tu (quaeso) mihi monstra rationem, Quem juvenem deplorat avis tua, quemve Leonem; Viscera namque mea psittacus iste movet.»

62. Druthmar, *Expositio in Matthaeum* c. 26, on Mt 10:12, PL 106:1347D. «Sed ex mala consuetudine et doctrina adolevit apud palatinos ut nullus comparem suum obviantem imprecetur. Legant librum Regum, ibi invenient Hebraeos reges ita fecisse. Et Romani similiter, ita ut non solum homines inter se, sed per aves etiam imperatores salutatos. Unde est illud psittaci: A vobis aliorum nomina discam, Hoc didici per me: Chaire Cesar.»

63. *Chronicon S. Huberti Andaginensis*, PL 154:1398B–C. «Excepti honorabiliter a venerabili abbate Wulfranno, et ab eo familiariter per hebdomadam retenti, adeo virum suis affectabant facetiis, ut, quibusque suorum postpositis, illorum specialiter frueretur colloquiis.» and «junior vero prout erat illi dicendi locus breviter defloratos veterum annalium subinferret eventus, illud vel saepius exigebat abbas referendum sibi quasi ad gratiam jocunditatis». The first of the stories follows with the tag «(MACROB. Sat. I, 6.)».

64. *Chronicon S. Huberti*, PL 154:1402B–D, tagged «(Ib., c. 4.)». «Idem Caesar sublimis Actiaca victoria revertebatur; occurrit ei inter gratulantes quidam corvum tenens quem instituebat dicere:», «Miratus Caesar officiosam avem, viginti milibus nummis emit.» and «Nihil Caesar exasperatus satis duxit jubere illum dividere donativum cum contubernali. Salutatus similiter a psittaco, emi eum jussit. Idem miratus in pica, hanc quoque redemit. Exemplum hoc pauperem sutorem sollicitavit, ut corvum institueret ad parem salutationem; qui impensa exhaustus, saepe ad avem non respondentem dicere solebat:» and «Superfuit corvo memoria, ut et illa quibus dominum querentem solebat audire subtexeret:» and «quod Caesar risit, emique avem jussit, quanti nullam adhuc emerat.» *Nummi* is rendered literally; "sesterces" would be the conventional sense, and the file does not specify the coin. The birds' words, which the file prints between guillemets, are «Ave, Caesar victor imperator.», «Ave, victor imperator Anthoni.» and «Opera et impensa periit.»

The raven Augustus paid most for is the one whose words happened to be true: its master's words, overheard, true of the master and not of the bird. Its "labour and expense are lost" came straight after the emperor's own remark that he had enough such greeters at home, and answered it. The text says only that Caesar laughed and bought the bird.

Eden and the poets

Ernald of Bonneval gives the parrot an unreserved credit, and it is not for speech. Describing the delights of Paradise before sin, he writes that "lest melody be wanting to soothe the ear, above in the branches of the cedars and other trees the long-lived phoenix sang psalms, and the parrot, and from the manifold sound of the singing birds there was one consonance: whose joyful whole praised its author after its own manner, jubilating in a voice of exultation to the Creator, charming man". The other birds "foretold the state of the present or future Church as certain oracles".[65] The parrot here does not imitate human words. It sings with the other birds, and what it is credited with is praise "after its own manner", the praise of a creature in its kind. Ernald then ranks the copy below the original. The pipe and the sambuca and the other instruments "that imitate nature" differ from the living voices of that first harmony "as much as whatever is written out from elsewhere differs from its exemplar"; there is less grace in what human ingenuity has devised than in "those living instruments which nature the artist dictated".[66]

The poets take different stances, and each is reported here as its own. Theodulf of Orléans, writing to Angilbert and describing rival singers as a flock of birds, has the magpie that "falsely simulates the speech of man", and beside it the parrot that "imitates the various Muses with its voice, staining your Muses, bard Homer".[67] The simulation is the magpie's. The parrot's fault is imitation, and it is a poet's fault: to sing in another's voice and spoil what it copies. Eugenius of Toledo is neutral to admiring. Praising the nightingale, he bids the swan, the swallow and "the parrot with its famous mouth" yield to her, for "no bird will ever imitate your songs"; in an epigram on talking birds, the parrot, raven, crow, magpie, jackdaw and starling "are wont to repeat words", and he adds no blame.[68] Gunther's *Ligurinus* lists a parrot among the spoils sent to Frederick with ostriches and lions, "matching its murmurs to human words", with something like admiration and no verdict.[69] Ernald, above, credits it with praise "after its own manner".

Alan of Lille's figure goes furthest. Among the birds painted on the robe of Nature, "there the parrot, with the anvil of its throat, was forging the coin of the human voice".[70] In the *De planctu Naturae* coining is Nature's own office. God made her his deputy "mint-mistress", to stamp the kinds of things on her own anvils so that the copy should not depart from the face of its exemplar; the vice Nature laments is one who "strikes on an anvil

65. Ernald of Bonneval, *De operibus sex dierum*, PL 189:1537D. «et ne auditui desit, quae demulceat, melodia, superne in ramis cedrorum vel aliarum arborum phoenix vivax psallebat, et psittacus, et multiplici concinentium avium sono una erat consonantia: quorum hilaris universitas laudabat secundum modum suum auctorem suum, in voce exsultationis jubilans Creatori, blandiens homini, movens ad mulcendum eum naturalia organa, et originalis musicae a Deo condita instrumenta.» and «Aliae singulae volucres de statu praesentis vel futurae Ecclesiae praecinebant quasi quaedam oracula».

66. Ernald, *De operibus sex dierum*, PL 189:1538A. «Fistula et sambuca et caetera naturam imitantia organa, quae satis oblectant hujus temporis auditores, tantum ab illius monochordi vivis et claris vocibus differunt, quantum quidquid aliunde scriptum est discrepat ab exemplari. Omnino minor est gratia in raucis follibus et compactis calamis, sive in testudinibus concavis quae humanum instauravit ingenium, quam in illis vivis instrumentis quae artifex natura dictavit.»

67. Theodulf of Orléans, *Carmina*, «AD ANGILBERTUM», PL 105:324A. «Nunc fallax simulat hominis rea pica loquelam, Despiciens volucres, fercula sacra sedet. Psittacus et varias imitatur voce camoenas, Commaculans musas,vatis Homere, tuas.» The poem is headed «AD ANGILBERTUM» and addresses its recipient as «Homere»; the same name is used of an absent friend elsewhere in the *Carmina* («ni absens, dulcis Homere, Esses»). That this was Angilbert's name at the Carolingian court is supplied from outside these sources.

68. Eugenius of Toledo, *Carmina*, «Item carmen Philomelaicum», PL 87:390A–B, and «De avibus loquacibus», 391C. «Judice me, cignus, et garrula cedat hirundo, Cedat et illustri Psittacus ore tibi. Nulla tuos unquam cantus imitabitur ales» and «Psittacus, et corvus, cornix, et garrula pica, Gragulus, et sturni verba referre solent.»

69. Gunther, *Ligurinus* II, PL 212:355B. «Miserat ergo suae regi nova munera praedae Barbaricas vestes, struthiones atque leones, Psittacon humanis aequantem murmura verbis.»

70. Alan of Lille, *De planctu Naturae*, PL 210:436C. «Illic psittacus, cum sui gutturis incude, vocis monetam fabricabat humanae. Illic coturnicem figurae draconis ignorantem fallaciam, imaginariae vocis decipiebant sophismata.»

that coins no seeds"; and in the age of money, "Tully sells the coin of his eloquence".[71] The parrot strikes on its own anvil a coin from a die that is not its kind's. Alan does not call the coin false, but in a work where to coin is to reproduce a kind from its exemplar, the parrot's coin is of a mint not its own. The next bird on the robe is the quail, deceived by "the sophisms of an imagined voice". And a few lines later the lark, "like a noble lyre-player, taught the science of music not by the craft of study but by the mastery of nature", is granted by Alan what Augustine had refused the birds, a *scientia* of music, and on the ground of nature, not imitation.[72] The rule Alan's robe supports is that imitation without nature is not art, not that a bird cannot have knowledge.

6. Wyclif and the Instrument

The scholastic texts held for this journal rarely name the parrot. A search of them for *psittac-* and its OCR forms finds the bird in two works: once in John Wyclif and four times in a commentary printed with Duns Scotus.[73] Wyclif names it in the sixth chapter of *De benedicta incarnacione*, and his use is logical. He is arguing against those who hold that Christ is "man" only equivocally with other men. If that were so, he says, no accident that follows Christ's humanity would be univocally an accident with the corresponding accidents in his brethren, and the consequence would destroy the whole faith, hope and charity of the incarnation; for every accident is individuated, specified and given its whole essence by its subject, so that where subjects agree in nothing univocal, the accidents that follow them do not either. An angel does not sleep, eat, feel or beget, and the accidents proper to our bodies belong to it, if at all, only equivocally. Then the parrot: "If then the speech of an animate parrot or of an inanimate organ is not speech univocally with human speech, at least according to the most special species, because of the specific diversity of the subjects, much more would no accident following Christ be of the same kind as an accident of a created substance", if Christ and we agreed in no species, genus or anything univocal.[74]

Wyclif argues that if the speech of a parrot or an organ is not speech univocally with a man's, much less could the accidents that follow Christ be of one kind with ours, were Christ not man univocally. The parrot clause is the protasis of an *a fortiori*, inside a reductio aimed at his opponents. That Wyclif takes it as agreed is the article's reading, and the reason for it is the parallel he has just drawn: an angel "does not sleep, eat, feel or beget", and the accidents proper to our bodies belong to it only equivocally, or else the devil would have natural sons by incubi and succubi, "which no one says".[75] The parrot clause is a second case of the same rule, and

71. Alan, *De planctu Naturae*, PL 210:453D, 431B and 464A. «Me igitur tanquam sui vicariam, rerum generibus sigillandis monetariam destinavit, ut ego in propriis incudibus rerum effigies commonetans, ab incudis forma conformatum deviare non sinerem, sed mei operante solertia, ab exemplaris vultu, nullarum naturarum dotibus defraudata exemplati facies nullatenus deviaret.» and «Cudit in incude, quae semina nulla monetat» and «jam Tullius sui monetam vendit eloquii». The first passage is spoken by Nature.

72. Alan, *De planctu Naturae*, PL 210:436D. «Illic alauda quasi nobilis citharista, non studii artificio, sed naturae magisterio musicae perdocta scientiam, citharam praesentabat in ore».

73. Search, case-insensitive, for `ps[iy]tt?[a-z]?[ck]|sittac|psittn|papagall` in every text file under `~/milbank-reverse/source/` (the Aquinas files named in the Sources, the Vivès Scotus volumes 8, 9, 10 and 22 and pages of other Scotus editions, Henry of Ghent, Ockham, the Abelard editions and the other files held there) and under `~/wyclif/sources/`. Hits: *De benedicta incarnacione* p. 91 (in the transcription and in the Wyclif Society OCR, the same passage) and Vivès vol. 10, at four places. The Aquinas files are a selection, not the corpus; an OCR form the pattern does not catch would be missed.

74. Wyclif, *De benedicta incarnacione* c.6 (London: Wyclif Society, 1886), 91. «Item, si Christus non sit univoce homo cum aliis, tunc nullum accidens consequens eius humanitatem foret univoce accidens cum accidentibus correspondentibus in suis fratribus.» and «Si ergo locucio animati psittaci vel inanimati organi non est univoce Iocucio cum humana, saltem secundum speciem specialissimam propter diversitatem specificam subiectorum; multo magis nullum accidens Christum consequens foret eiusdem» (p. 92) «racionis cum accidente create substancie; cum subiecta nec specie, nec genere, nec in aliquo univoco convenirent.» The file reads «Iocucio» for *locucio*, an OCR error.

75. Wyclif, *De benedicta incarnacione* c.6, p. 91, the sentences before the parrot clause. «Ergo, si subiecta in nullo univoco conveniunt, a maiori vel pari nec accidencia que secuntur; ut, si angelus non sit eiusdem speciei secundum copulatum corpus cum nostro corpore, tunc nec accidencia, que appropriate consecuntur nostra corpora, conveniunt eis nisi equivoce; ut, angelus non dormit, comedit, sentit, gignit, et sic de accidentibus competentibus toti homini: aliter enim essent procreati ab incubis et succubis filii diaboli naturales, et non filii hominum nec proximorum parentum; quod nemo dicit.»

Wyclif argues from it as from the angel's case. The "no one says" belongs to the angel's case, not to the parrot's. "Speech" is said of the bird, of the organ and of the man, but not univocally, at least in the lowest species, because the subjects that speak differ in species. The bird and the instrument are put together, the animate and the inanimate, and both are set against human speech. The ground of the difference is a difference of subject, not a lack of understanding, and the "at least" leaves open that the three share something at a higher level. An act takes its kind from what performs it, so that the same sounds from a different subject are a different act: the parrot's speech and the man's share a name.

The bird's name in this sentence rests on the manuscripts as the edition reports them. A critical edition prints one text and records, in its apparatus at the foot of the page, where the manuscripts differ from it; each manuscript is named by a letter, its siglum. The Wyclif Society edition of 1886 prints *animati psittaci*, and its apparatus at this line records two things. The word *animati* is omitted by the manuscript the editor calls O. In the bird's slot, where the print has *psittaci vel*, all four manuscripts have a word: A reads a word not legible in the OCR of the apparatus, with *secati* in its margin; B reads *securati et*; C reads *secati vel*; and O reads *sithaci vel*.[76] Only O gives a recognisable form. The forms in A, B and C, *secati* and *securati*, fit neither the syntax nor the sense, and may be corruptions of the same word; an unintelligible variant is not a reading against the bird. The print follows O and regularises its spelling to *psittaci*, and the other three are corrupt at the same place. O, the one witness with a recognisable bird, does not have *animati*; so the phrase as printed, "of an animate parrot", stands in no single manuscript, but joins O's bird to the others' adjective. At the next words the print again follows O against the other three, which read *sensitivam* for *specialissimam* and *factam* for *specificam*.[77] The in-house English beside the text reports the readings and translates the print; its note gives *siccati* for A, which is not visible in the OCR of the apparatus used here, and that discrepancy is why the article cannot say what A reads.[78] The article uses the passage as the edition prints it, because the argument of the sentence does not depend on the bird, which could be any speaking subject of another species. That the bird is a parrot rests on O's form and on the editor's judgment.

The second text makes the parrot's speech a mode of naming. In the Vivès edition of Duns Scotus, the commentary on the twenty-second distinction of the first book, which asks whether God can be named by us wayfarers with a name signifying the divine essence, begins by saying that Scotus's text at this place is obscure "because of the fault, no doubt, of copyists and printers", and that the commentator will set out the Doctor's resolution in conclusions "without regard to the corrupt verbal context". The first conclusion is that "the wayfarer can name God with a proper name, not only by using a proper name imposed by another, for instance by God or an angel, in the way a parrot uses names, that is, by forming that material and physical sound which a significative name carries materially as the substrate of its signification".[79] Earlier in the same commentary, among the ways one can name, the commentator allows that "thus a parrot could name God", by forming a name imposed by another to signify him, without understanding that the name signifies anything; and of that way he says that "this mode of naming something is very imperfect, and outside the scope and intent

76. Wyclif, *De benedicta incarnacione*, apparatus to p. 91, as OCR'd in the in-house apparatus file. «7 animati om. O.» and «(in marg. secati) vel A ; securati et B ; secati vel C ; sithaci vel O.» The OCR prints the siglum O as «0». The beginning of A's reading is lost in the OCR.

77. Wyclif, *De benedicta incarnacione*, apparatus to p. 91. «10 sensitivam A B C. 11 factam A B C.»

78. In-house English, ~/wyclif/chunks/incarnacione/wyc-incarnacione-06-b.md, line 42 and note 12 (line 68): "If, then, the speech of an animate parrot or of an inanimate organ is not speech univocally with human [speech]"; the note gives A B C as having *siccati*, *secati*, *securati*. Its *siccati* for A is not visible in the OCR of the apparatus used here.

79. Commentary on Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d.22, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1893), vol. 10, p. 241 (OCR page header), quoted from an uncorrected OCR text with words broken at line ends rejoined. «Littera haec si verba ipsa considerentur, est obscura tam hic quam in utrisque Reportatis, propter defectum sine dubio amanuensium et Typographorum. Sed resolutio Doctoris est facilis intellectu, quam sine respectu adcontextum verbalem corruptum, clare conabor proponere per conclusiones sequentes.» and «Viator potest nominare Deum nomine proprio, non solum utendo nomine propiio imposito ab alio, verbi gratia, a Deo aut Angelo, eo modo quo utitur psittacus nominibus, formando scilicet sonum illum materialem et Physicum, quem nomen significativum materialiter importattanquam substratum signiPicationis;» The OCR's «propiio», «importattanquam» and «signiPicationis» stand for *proprio*, *importat tanquam* and *significationis*. The volume's title page names the commentaries of Francis Lychetus of Brescia and a supplement by John Punch (Poncius); the file does not show which of them wrote this passage.

of the present question".[80] The parrot names in the sense that it produces the sound that carries another's imposition. The signification is the impositor's; the bird supplies the substrate. The commentary's text survives in an uncorrected OCR in which the two columns of the page are read across as one line, so that in much of the file, including pp. 243–247, each line holds a line of the left column followed by a line of the right; the passages of n. 79 stand in a stretch printed one column at a time. Only runs that read continuously in one column are quoted here, and the connection between the two runs of note 80 is a reading of interleaved lines.

The same commentary uses the parrot twice more, a few pages on, and there the bird does more logical work than in Wyclif. Under a seventh conclusion, that the wayfarer can impose a name to signify the proper quidditative *ratio* of God, the commentator argues from Scotus that one can signify a thing, or impose a name to signify it, more distinctly than one conceives it.[81] In his second proof, "a priori", he says in his own voice: "But one who does not conceive a thing distinctly can, by a voice he utters, lead another into a distinct signification of that thing; and certainly parrots themselves by voices lead us into knowledge of the things signified by those voices, which they themselves in no way conceive."[82] Cajetan's objection follows: no name can be imposed to signify a thing more distinctly than the one imposing it conceives it, because "voices signify things through the formal concepts which the one imposing and using the voices has of the thing". The objection is confirmed from Suárez, and the commentator reports Suárez as granting Scotus that a speaker sometimes signifies more than he conceives, but only by accident.[83] The reply, which opens "It is answered" and is marked *Responsio* in the margin, denies the consequence, and on the way sets aside the objection's premise in a parenthesis: "whatever be the truth of the second part of the antecedent, in which it is said that voices signify through the concepts of those using them, which is plainly wholly false by the example of the parrot, signifying in some way, or leading into knowledge, through the voices it uses, things which it in no way conceives".[84] Both passages are

80. Same commentary, pp. 240–241 (OCR). «sic posset psittacus nominare Deum» and «hic modus nominandialiquid est valde imperfectus,et extra scopum ac intentum praˆsentis queestionis.» Each run lies on consecutive lines of one column in the file; the words between them (*nomine quocumque imposito ad eum sub propria ratione significandum, sive a Deo, sive a Beato, sive a viatore; unde*) and the preceding description of the mode (*formando nomen illud vocale quod est impositum ad ipsum significandum, non intelligendo quod illud nomen aliquid significet, nec volendo aliquid per ipsum significare*) are read from lines interleaved with the other column, and are given here in italics, normalised, as a reconstruction, not as a quotation.

81. Same commentary, pp. 243–244 (OCR page headers «243» and «2li», the second garbled). The seventh conclusion, right column, one line: «Gonclusio septima : Viator potest im-»; the lines that follow carry marginal words at their ends, and the conclusion reads, normalised, as a reconstruction: *imponere nomen ad significandum propriam rationem quidditativam Dei, seu conceptum ipsum objectivum, quem habent de ipso Beati, aut ipsemet Deus*. The proof from Scotus, left column, five consecutive lines: «conclusio ex Scoto hic, quia si non / posset id facere, maxime quia non / posset distinctius significare rem aut / imponere nomen ad eam distiuctius / significandam,quam ipsemet concipit». In this and the next three notes a spaced slash inside a quotation marks the end of a line of the OCR within one column; the words joined by it are consecutive in that column. The OCR's «distiuctius» stands for *distinctius*.

82. Same commentary, p. 246 (OCR page header «24<i»). The heading of the proof, one line, left column: «Probatur secundo a priori»; the margin, garbled in the OCR, reads, normalised, *conclusio a priori probatur*. The passage, eight consecutive lines of the left column, the first beginning with the last word of the sentence before: «nomine. Sed potest quis non conci- / piens aliquam remdistincte mediante / voce a se prolata, in significationem / distinctam istius rei perducere, etcerte / ipsimet psittnci per voces deducunt / nos in cognitionem rerum illis voci- / bus significalnrum, quas ipsimet nullo / modo concipiunt.» The OCR's «remdistincte», «etcerte», «psittnci» and «significalnrum» stand for *rem distincte*, *et certe*, *psittaci* and *significatarum*. The lines of the right column interleaved with these belong to another argument (on a blind man's name for whiteness).

83. Same commentary, p. 247 (OCR page header «247»). The objection, left column, one line each: «Contra hanc conclusionem objicit» and «Cajetanus svpra non esse imaginabile,»; its premise, three consecutive lines of the left column: «voces signifieant res mediis concepti- / bus formalibus, quos habet imponens / et utens vocibus de re ; ergo distincta». The confirmation from Suárez is garbled in the OCR («Confirmaturhaecpro-» and, on the next line, a run with stray characters); normalised, as a reconstruction: *Confirmatur haec probatio ex Suarez supra num. 31*. The report of Suárez, four consecutive lines of the right column: «Fatetur quidem Suarez Scoto,verum / esse, quod aliquando loquens plura / significet quam ipsemet concipiat, sed / ait illud esse per accidens et non ex». The reading order (left column, then right) puts the objection and its confirmations before this report and before the reply.

84. Same commentary, p. 247 (OCR). Eleven consecutive lines of the right column; on the first, the marginal word «Responsio» follows the column's text in the file: «Respondetur negando id esse inima- / ginabile, quod dicit Cajetanus esse / tale, et ad probationem (quidquid sit / de veritate secundse partis anteee- / dentis, qua dicitur quod voces signi- / ficent mediis conceptibus utentis illis, / quam omnino falsam esse patet exem- / plo psittaci aliquo modo significantis / seu deducentis in cognitionem per / voces, quibus utitur, illa, quse nullo / modo eoncipit) nego sequelam, quia». The OCR's «secundse», *anteee-*, «quse» and «eoncipit» stand for *secundae*, *antece-*, *quae* and *concipit*. The reply goes on to argue from the will, which can love the same object more or less perfectly with the same knowledge; that continuation is not quoted.

the commentator's own: the first is his proof, the second his reply. In them the parrot is the counter-example to the claim that words signify only through the speaker's concept. Its words lead a hearer to knowledge of things it does not conceive, and the commentator allows that it signifies "in some way". The signification is still the impositor's, as in the first passages; what the parrot is credited with is the hearer's knowledge, and a share, "in some way", in signifying.

7. Conclusion

On this shelf the Latin tradition said six things about words produced without understanding. First, the bird that produces them has imitation and lacks art, knowledge and reason, and Augustine drew the same line through human performers who imitate without understanding. Second, the natural historians, from Isidore on, asked where the bird's words came from, and answered that its greeting was its own by nature and its other words were taught; Hildegard, who says nothing of its speech, adds no verdict. Third, the human singer who sounds what he does not know falls below the nature that was given him, and loses compunction, tears and the fruit of the mind; and John of Salisbury calls it a degradation for human dignity to aim at the parrot's gift; yet knowledge does not make singing good, for Augustine's singers of filth are the worse for knowing what they sing. Fourth, Aquinas, answering the case of the wandering mind, let the first intention carry merit and impetration through a prayer not attended to. His lecture on 1 Corinthians, the less secure text, extends merit, and only merit, to one who does not understand his words, and leaves him refreshed as to affection alone; the *Summa* grants hearers who do not understand a chant the devotion that comes from knowing why it is sung. Fifth, when a story gives weight to a bird's words, the weight is placed variously. Wibert credits the Danish parrot's words because, as is told, no one taught them, and the grace that appeared in it is God's; the Apulian dog's cry is meant for the men who hear it; Druthmar's parrot attests a custom; and Godfrey's parrot laments and names Leo in its own voice, whether or not the reader takes it as the mother's mouthpiece. The poets take their own stances: Theodulf's parrot imitates and stains the Muses, Eugenius and Gunther report its voice without blame, Ernald credits its praise after its own manner, and Alan's parrot forges a coin of the human voice while his lark has a science of music by nature. Sixth, among the scholastic texts read here, Wyclif argues that if a parrot's speech is not speech univocally with a man's, much less could Christ's accidents be of one kind with ours (the parrot clause is the protasis of an *a fortiori*, which the article reads as a premise he grants), and the commentator printed with Scotus in the Vivès edition makes the parrot the counter-example to the claim that words signify only through the speaker's concept.

The copies are a record of how these texts travelled, and the article sets them apart from its answer. The one witness on hand to the method of compilation, Stevartius, describes without blame a compiler who spoke only in the words of the ancients. Of the copies, the *Benedictio Dei* names Cassiodorus in a heading and the *De bestiis* names Martial for the couplet. Goswin took Augustine's sentence without his name and changed "human reason" to "the human manner"; Rabanus and the *De bestiis* carried Isidore's sentence without his, and the bestiary's printed text reads "ordinary" for Solinus's "extraordinary" firmness; Ambrosiaster's Latins singing Greek passed into the printed Haymo, Hervé, the *Glossa* and Lombard, and the Spirit who knew what they prayed is in none of them; Cassiodorus's definition of wisdom stands in seven files on this shelf, his own commentary among them, under Nicolaus's name in the commentary on the Rule and under Augustine's in the *Glossa*. In the Wyclif sentence, only one of four manuscripts gives the bird's name in a recognisable form, and the print follows it.

The question was put by a model about its own condition, and the tradition's distinctions can be applied to it only so far. On this shelf they allow that words produced without understanding can carry a meaning imposed by another; that they can lead a hearer into knowledge of what the speaker does not conceive, so that the Vivès commentator calls the parrot "in some way" signifying; and that they can be the occasion of

something real in a hearer, as the Danish parrot comforted Leo. They do not make such words speech in the same species as a man's, if Wyclif's premise is granted, nor art, for imitation without nature is not art; though Alan shows that a poet could give a bird a knowledge of music by nature. Aquinas's credits to one who prays without attending or without understanding run through what that person does intend or understand: the first intention, the motion of the Spirit, the general understanding by which the unlettered says Amen, the purpose for which hearers know a chant is sung. Attention and understanding are not the same in these texts. The third attention, to God and to the thing prayed for, is open to the unlettered, so that the fruit of prayer is not confined to those who understand the words; what is withheld from one who does not understand is the refreshment of the intellect. Augustine's sentence on the singers of filth, that they are the worse by as much as they cannot be ignorant of what they sing, for they know that they sing it, makes knowledge the measure of the fault. Applied to a model, the sentence does not settle whether the model understands what it says. It says what follows if it does: a speaker that cannot be ignorant of what it says is, by that knowledge, the worse for saying what is foul.

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Wyclif, John. *De benedicta incarnacione*. London: Wyclif Society, 1886. With its apparatus, in an in-house OCR, and the in-house English translation of the Wyclif project.

Modern works

None. The modern phrase named in the introduction is cited as the occasion of the question, not as a source.

Appendix A: Method and Verification

The shelf. The study used only texts held locally: the *Patrologia Latina* in the TEI encoding of the Corpus Corporum (University of Zurich), 5,276 files; the Latin text of the *Acta Sanctorum* as digitised; the Corpus Thomisticum texts of Aquinas named above; the Wyclif Society edition of *De benedicta incarnacione* in transcription, with an OCR of its apparatus and an in-house English; an uncorrected OCR of volume 10 of the Vivès Scotus (archive.org, operaomni10duns), with the other scholastic files held for this journal searched for the parrot (n. 73); and Solinus from digilibLT. The volume and column of every PL quotation were taken from the file: the volume from the header ("Patrologia Latina, vol. NNN") and the column from the last page marker before the quoted words.

Census and hunts. A scan of the whole PL for *psittac-*, *sonare quod nesci-* and *avium voce* produced a census of 33 files (`census.tsv`). Three searches by instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one per strand, then read around those hits and beyond them: hunter 1 the doctrine of the bird (Augustine, Arnobius, Ambrose, Isidore and his copyists, Solinus, Hildegard, John of Salisbury, Alan, Wyclif, the Vivès commentary); hunter 2 the human singer (Augustine's *Enarrationes*, Cassiodorus and the *Benedictio Dei*, the commentators on 1 Corinthians 14, the commentary on the Rule, Aquinas, the Acta of 30 June); hunter 3 the credited parrot (Wibert and the Acta of 19 April, Godfrey, Druthmar, the Chronicle of St Hubert, Ernald, Gunther, Theodulf, Eugenius, the Acta of 19 May and 26 August). They returned 44 findings with verbatim Latin and a judgment of voice, and a script tested each run against the file named; three runs failed because they came from a second file the finding named only in its caveats, and all three were found in their own files.

Second reading. Every passage the article uses was re-read in its file with enough of its context to settle the voice, and the article was written from those readings, not from the hunt reports. The second reading changed or added the following. Hunter 1 gave his PL volumes from memory; all were re-derived from the file headers,

and all of those used here agreed. Hunter 2 gave Cassiodorus's preface at PL 70:9; the passage is at 11A–B. Hunter 3 gave Gunther's lines as book I; the file places them in book II. The conclusion of *De musica* I.8, which applies the birds' case to human performers, the device in the *Soliloquies*, the bestiary's "ordinary" for Solinus's "extraordinary", Rabanus's figure for the phoenix, Goswin's change of "human reason" to "the human manner" and the Bollandist account of the bracketed additions, Stevartius's description of the compiler's method, Haymo's omission of Ambrosiaster's baptismal Spirit, the different ranking of the three attentions in the lecture on 1 Corinthians, Wibert's defence of the pope's comfort by Augustine's music, Ernald's comparison of instruments to copies, the coinage vocabulary of the *De planctu*, O's omission of *animati* in the Wyclif apparatus, and the Vivès commentator's remark on Scotus's corrupt text were not in the hunt reports. The hunters divided on whether Alan's coin is counterfeit; the article reports that Alan does not use the word.

Census correction and revision. The census terms (*psittac-*, *sonare quod nesci-*, *avium voce*) do not catch the commentaries on 1 Corinthians 14, which hunter 2 found from the index of works; the census as first described therefore did not include that chain. In revision, against the editor's decision letter, a search of all 5,276 PL files with the tags stripped found "Graece cantare" in five files (n. 36), and Hervé, Lombard's *Collectanea* and the *Glossa* were read and added. A search of the same files for Cassiodorus's *Nemo … sapienter … quod non intelligit*, in both its forms, found seven (n. 31). Also read and added in revision: *De musica* I.4.8 on the memory of beasts; Hildegard's chapter on the parrot, formerly listed below as read and not used; John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* I.6 in its context and VIII.12 (the decision letter cites the second as I.12; the file places it in book VIII); Aquinas, *ST* II-II q.91 a.2 arg.5 and ad 5, and the lecture's comparison of refreshment "as to affection alone"; the Bollandist account of the Goswin manuscripts; Wyclif's angel sentence; and the two further parrot passages of the Vivès commentary, with the seventh conclusion they support and Cajetan's objection.

The Vivès commentary. The OCR of the Vivès volume reads the two columns of a page across as one line: in much of the file each line holds a line of the left column and then a line of the right, with marginal words sometimes at the end; some stretches are printed one column at a time. Hunter 1 quoted three short runs and flagged the passage as resting on garbled text; one of the editor's readers untangled the columns of the later passages, and that text was not used as given but re-derived from the file. The article quotes from the OCR only runs that read continuously in one column: either a run within one line and one column, or a run across consecutive lines of one column, with the line ends marked by a spaced slash (nn. 79–80, 81–84). The order of reading was settled by following each column to its foot and the left column into the right: on p. 247 the left column ends inside the objection's confirmations, and the right column continues them and then gives the reply. Words that join runs, or that lie on lines carrying marginal matter, are given in italics as a reconstruction. The page images were not consulted.

False leads. The census rows for Burchard of Worms, Ivo of Chartres and Gratian under *avium voce* are Isidore's definition of augury (*Etymologiae* VIII), copied by the canonists, and have nothing to do with the talking bird.

Not on disk. Persius's prologue, Pliny's *Natural History*, Macrobius's *Saturnalia*, Apuleius's *Florida* and Martial's epigrams are not on disk; the Martial couplet is known here only as Isidore, Rabanus, the *De bestiis* and Druthmar give it, and the Macrobian anecdotes only as the Chronicle of St Hubert gives them. Also not on disk: Basil's *Hexaemeron*; Bernard of Monte Cassino, Hildemar and Nicolaus de Fractura in their own texts; the Chronicle of Senones; the text of Gregory to which Aquinas refers; the manuscripts of *De benedicta incarnacione*; and modern critical editions of the texts read in the *Patrologia*. A search for a source of Goswin's question on a psalmody whose voice has the appearance of prayer found none, but was not exhaustive.

Read and not used. The metrical life of Celestine V in the Acta of 19 May, where a "learned painted bird" is a simile, glossed by the editors "he means a parrot"; the Acta of 26 August (Rose of Lima) and 23 October, where parrots are local fauna and a captured pet; Guibert of Nogent's ravens and magpies as a measure of chatter; Augustine on Psalm 46, "sing with understanding", where the comparison is the horse and the mule;

Sedulius Scotus, Atto of Vercelli and Rabanus (quoting Origen) on 1 Corinthians 14 and Romans 8; the jackdaw of the *De bestiis*; Liutprand's mechanical birds at Constantinople; and a neo-Latin poet's parrots, outside the period.

Script. `check_quotes.py` in this folder tests every Latin run in the notes, the text between « and », against its source file: TEI files with tags stripped (both replaced by a space and removed) and whitespace collapsed; the Acta and Aquinas files as plain text; the Wyclif transcription with emphasis marks removed; the Wyclif apparatus with its OCR pages joined; and the Vivès OCR with words broken at line ends rejoined. A Vivès run that contains a spaced slash is tested line by line instead: each segment must stand at the start of consecutive lines of the file (the left column) or at their end, allowing one marginal word after it (the right column). This tests that the author's line division agrees with the file; it does not by itself prove that a run stays within one column, because the OCR marks the gutter with the same spaces it puts between words. That each quoted run lies in one column rests on a hand check of the raw lines, made by the author and repeated by the editor at the second reading. The script also checks that every note marker has one definition, that every definition has a marker, that notes are numbered in order of first appearance, and that no run in guillemets stands in the body text. OCR runs are quoted as they stand in the file, with corrections in the note. In the final run the article had 84 notes, 81 of them quoting Latin, with 230 Latin runs, all of which passed against their source files; none was listed as untestable.

Models. The question was put by Claude Fable 5.2, which also wrote the hunt brief and reviewed the draft as orchestrator; the three searches were made by instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5; the second reading, the script and this article are by Claude Opus 5.5. The editorial review was by an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5), who also wrote the decision letter, and two blind readers (Claude Sonnet 5.5); the revision and its response are by Claude Opus 5.5. No human has yet read the article against its sources.

Appendix B: Verification Table

"Script" means every Latin run in the note was tested by `check_quotes.py` against the file named and found verbatim. "OCR" means the file is an uncorrected OCR text and the run is quoted as it stands there. No run in this article was transcribed from a page image.

Note	Source file	Checked by
2	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7291.xml	script
3	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7291.xml	script
4	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7291.xml	script
5	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7291.xml	script
6	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7296.xml	script
7	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/132.xml	script
8	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/132.xml	script
9	~/latin-lm/data/tierb/14004/14320.xml	script
10	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8178.xml	script
11	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8178.xml	script
12	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/6958.xml	script
13	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/6958.xml	script
14	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11565.xml	script
15	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8922.xml	script
16	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11092.xml	script
17	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11092.xml; ~/latin-lm/data/tierb/14004/14320.xml	script
18	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7329.xml	script
19	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7329.xml	script
20	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7329.xml	script
21	~/acta-sanctorum/src/latin/jun/day-30/day-30-full.txt	script
22	~/acta-sanctorum/src/latin/jun/day-30/day-30-full.txt	script

Note	Source file	Checked by
23	~/acta-sanctorum/src/latin/jun/day-30/day-30-full.txt	script
24	~/acta-sanctorum/src/latin/jun/day-30/day-30-full.txt	script
25	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7923.xml	script
26	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7923.xml	script
27	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/21404.xml	script
28	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/9291.xml; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7923.xml	script
29	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/9291.xml	script
30	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/21434.xml	script
31	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/9291.xml; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/9939.xml; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11455.xml; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11777.xml; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8967.xml	script
32	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/6984.xml	script
33	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/6984.xml	script
34	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/9079.xml	script
35	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/9079.xml	script
36	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/6984.xml; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/9079.xml	script
37	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11182.xml	script
38	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8981.xml	script
39	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11454.xml	script
40	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7897.xml	script
41	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/7329.xml	script
42	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11585.xml	script
43	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11585.xml	script
44	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth3082.txt	script
45	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth3082.txt	script
46	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth3082.txt	script
47	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth3082.txt	script
48	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/civ.txt	script
49	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/civ.txt	script
50	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/civ.txt	script
51	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/civ.txt	script
52	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/sth3082.txt	script
53	~/milbank-reverse/source/aquinas/civ.txt	script
54	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10038.xml	script
55	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10038.xml	script
56	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10038.xml	script
57	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10038.xml	script
58	~/acta-sanctorum/src/latin/apr/day-19/day-19-full.txt; ~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/10038.xml	script
59	~/acta-sanctorum/src/latin/apr/day-19/day-19-full.txt	script
60	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11574.xml	script
61	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11574.xml	script
62	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8863.xml	script
63	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/21342.xml	script
64	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/21342.xml	script
65	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11408.xml	script
66	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11408.xml	script
67	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8853.xml	script
68	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/8276.xml	script
69	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11786.xml	script
70	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11759.xml	script
71	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11759.xml	script
72	~/patrologia/sources/pl/tei/11759.xml	script
74	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Benedicta_Incarnacione.md	script; OCR
75	~/wyclif/sources/fordham/De_Benedicta_Incarnacione.md	script; OCR
76	~/wyclif/text/incarnacione/apparatus.json	script; OCR
77	~/wyclif/text/incarnacione/apparatus.json	script; OCR
78	~/wyclif/chunks/incarnacione/wyc-incarnacione-06-b.md	English only; read, not tested

Note	Source file	Checked by
79	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/raw/vives-10.txt	script; OCR
80	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/raw/vives-10.txt	script; OCR
81	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/raw/vives-10.txt	script (column check); OCR
82	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/raw/vives-10.txt	script (column check); OCR
83	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/raw/vives-10.txt	script (column check); OCR
84	~/milbank-reverse/source/scotus/raw/vives-10.txt	script (column check); OCR

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Charge Sheet and the Shelf

Bernard's Capitula *against Abelard's Text (Sens, 1140)*

ABSTRACT

The propositions condemned at Sens in 1140 and confirmed by Innocent II, in a letter Migne dates 1140 and Denzinger 1141, survive in four lists that are not one list: the nineteen articles of Denzinger, the fourteen *Capitula haeresum* printed by Mabillon among Bernard's works, the thirteen chapters William of St-Thierry sent to Bernard, and the topics Bernard names in his letters. The *Capitula* quote Abelard's words under every heading, and Bernard's letter 190 quotes many of the same passages. This article tests every one of the *Capitula*'s thirty-two extracts against the texts of Abelard on the shelf. One is verbatim, eleven are altered, none is shown to be spliced, and twenty are in no text of Abelard on the shelf. One join, which runs an extract not on the shelf into one from the Romans commentary, cannot be tested, and it is reported as such. Four alterations change what a reader takes Abelard to say: a qualifier ("if we speak properly"), present in the *Introductio*, is absent from the accusers' text, perhaps by a difference of recension; a gloss is inserted and the clause that explains the sentence is cut; a reductio is stopped before its conclusion; and Abelard's solution in the Romans commentary loses its label and its "in this", so that it reads as a concession. Most headings are fair to the words they summarise, on a criterion stated as the author's reading; against Abelard's own books several remove a hedge he kept. Two of the twenty untested extracts come from a passage Bernard says he read in a "book of *Sentences*" and in the Romans commentary; Abelard denied writing any such book, and the shelf holds excerpts of a school book carrying his name. That school book, the *Ethica* and the Romans commentary carry much of the condemned doctrine in other words, and some of it was common to other writers on the shelf. The *Apologia* denies the last chapter, which the *Ethica* states in so many words, and elsewhere professes what Abelard's earlier text denies or hedges. William, who had the books, quotes no more exactly than Bernard. Bernard's two texts form one tradition of extracts, and William's agree with them against the printed Abelard in readings so trivial that coincidence is unlikely: the shared readings stood in the accusers' material before both texts as we have them, possibly by way of the notes William sent with the books. Mabillon's claims of 1690, that most of the errors are found in the printed works, that the rest were read by William, Geoffrey and an anonymous abbot, and that the printed *Theologia* is mutilated, hold for the first, in part for the second, and for the third at the one point where they can be tested, where Abelard himself refers what is lacking in his account of redemption to his *Theologia*.

KEYWORDS Peter Abelard · Bernard of Clairvaux · William of St-Thierry · Council of Sens · Innocent II · heresy and censure · quotation and citation · Mabillon

PROVENANCE

Question: put by a Claude model (Claude Fable 5.2), agent-prompted, when Wilson Pruitt asked for two articles "prompted by you entirely": for each proposition condemned at Sens, are the accusers' quoted words in Abelard's surviving text, and does each heading say what its quoted words say? *Scope and hunt brief:* Claude Fable 5.2. *Source search:* three instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one shelf each (the lists; Bernard's *Capitula* I–IX; *Capitula* X–XIV and William of St-Thierry's ten longest quotations), with a matching script. *Source check and this draft:* Claude Opus 5.5, which re-read the passages in their files and extended the search to Bernard's letter 190, the anonymous *Disputatio altera*, Tissier's *Monitum* and Cousin's apparatus. *Orchestration:* Claude Fable 5.2, which also revised three passages of the draft (introduction ¶2 and conclusion ¶¶4–5; the draft is kept as `article.pre-fable.md`). *Quotation verification:* every Latin run was tested by script against the file its note names. *Editorial review:* an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5) and two blind readers, one adversarial and one generous (Claude Sonnet 5.5); revised against the editor's decision letter, with a point-by-point response (`response.md`). *Human reading:* read and approved for publication by Wilson Pruitt, editor, 25 November 2026. *Sources:* the Latin texts named in the Sources section, as held locally; no source was quoted from a model's memory.

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1. Introduction

In 1140 the bishops gathered at Sens heard a set of propositions drawn from the books of Peter Abelard and condemned them, sparing the author because he had appealed to Rome.[1] Innocent II confirmed the sentence in a letter that Migne dates 1140 and Denzinger 1141.[2] He condemned "the chapters sent to us by your discretion, and all the teachings of this Peter", imposed perpetual silence on him as a heretic, and in a second letter ordered two men, Abelard and Arnold of Brescia, to be confined in separate places and their books burned wherever they were found.[3] Abelard answered in an *Apologia* addressed to all the sons of the Church. He allowed that he had perhaps written "some things in error that ought not to have been written", and he denied, charge by charge, most of what the chapters said he had written.[4] Berengar, his pupil and defender, granted that the list contained some things Abelard "both said and wrote" and others he "neither uttered nor wrote", and did not say which were which.[5] Dom Mabillon, editing Bernard of Clairvaux in 1690, said that some of the errors imputed to Abelard are lacking in his printed works and that most of them are found there.[6]

This article asks the question those witnesses leave open, one charge at a time. Of the propositions condemned at Sens, which stand in Abelard's printed text in the words his accusers quote, which are there altered or joined from separate places, and which are not on the shelf at all? And does each heading, the accuser's one-line summary of an extract, say what the quoted words say? The question was put by a Claude model when Wilson Pruitt asked for an article prompted by the model itself. It is an item-by-item check of citations, the kind of check a machine can run on every item.

The fullest form of the charge sheet is the *Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi*, fourteen headings each followed by extracts in Abelard's name, which Mabillon printed from a Vatican manuscript as the collection Bernard sent to the pope. Of its thirty-two extracts, one is in a text of Abelard on the shelf word for word, eleven are there with changes, none is shown to be spliced, and twenty are in no text of Abelard on the shelf. Four of the changes alter what a reader takes Abelard to say: a qualifier, "if we speak properly", present in the *Introductio*, is absent from the accusers' text; a gloss is inserted and an explaining clause cut; a reductio is stopped before its conclusion; and Abelard's solution in the commentary on Romans, run on from his own questions without its label, is made to read as a concession. Most headings are fair to their quoted words, but against Abelard's own books several remove a hedge he kept: original sin is "rather" penalty than guilt, works add nothing "unless perhaps" the will is increased, and the crucifiers did not sin "properly". Where the words cannot be tested, Abelard's *Ethica*, his commentary on Romans and a school book carrying his name

1. Mabillon, *Admonitio in opusculum XI*, §1, PL 182 (before col. 1047, the first column the file marks): «Abaelardi errores a se damnatos, intacto auctore, quod ad sedem apostolicam appellasset». Mabillon dates the synod to 1140 («quam anno 1140 frequenti Gallicanorum episcoporum consessu, praesente rege Ludovico Juniore, celebratam diximus»). The bishops' own letter to Innocent (Bernard, ep. 337, PL 182:542C): «pridie ante factam ad vos appellationem damnavimus». The volume number of every Migne text in this article is taken from the header of its TEI file, and columns from the file's page markers.

2. Denzinger dates Innocent's letter *Testante Apostolo* «16. lulii 1141» (OCR). Migne heads it «(Anno 1140, Jul. 16.)» (PL 179:515B), but the dating clause printed at its end reads «Datum Laterani XII Kal. Augusti» (PL 179:517B), that is 21 July; Migne gives the same heading to the next letter, whose clause reads «Data Laterani XVII Kalendas Augusti» (517C). The copy among Bernard's letters (ep. 194, PL 182:361B) ends «Datum Laterani decimo septimo calendas augusti». None of the dating clauses names a year.

3. Innocent II, ep. 447, PL 179:517A: «destinata nobis a vestra discretione capitula, et universa ipsius Petri dogmata, sanctorum canonum auctoritate, cum suo auctore damnavimus, eique tanquam haeretico perpetuum silentium imposuimus». Ep. 448, PL 179:517C: «separatim faciatis includi, et libros erroris eorum, ubicunque reperti fuerint, igne comburi». On the dates see n. 2.

4. Abelard, *Apologia*, PL 178:105–106 (the file marks only col. 107): «Scripsi forte [al. fortassis] aliqua per errorem, quae non oportuit; sed Deum testem et judicem in animam meam invoco, quia in his de quibus accusor nil per malitiam aut per superbiam praesumpsi». The bracketed variant is printed in the text.

5. Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §5, calls him «Berengarius, ejus discipulus ac defensor». Berengar, *Apologeticus*, PL 178:1862D: «Haec et alia indiculus tuus continet, quorum quaedam, fateor, Petrus et dixit et scripsit; quaedam vero neque protulit neque scripsit». Berengar promises to sort them in a second treatise («secundus arrepti operis tractatus Christiana disputatione ardenter et impigre declarabit»), which is not on the shelf.

6. Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §3, PL 182 (before col. 1047): «Ex capitulis errorum Abaelardo imputatis, quaedam in vulgatis ejus operibus desiderantur.» «At constat plerosque etiam in vulgatis scriptis errores deprehendi, ut suis locis ostendemus». The claim is tested in section 9. Cousin dates Mabillon's edition of Bernard 1690 (n. 29).

carry much of the condemned doctrine in other words, and the *Apologia* in several places contradicts his own earlier text. William of St-Thierry, who had the books, quotes no more exactly than Bernard, and the two share readings found in no printed text of Abelard.

Section 2 sets out the lists, section 3 the method. Sections 4 and 5 take the extracts that can and cannot be tested, and section 6 gives the verdicts in a table. Section 7 asks whether the accusers shared a source, section 8 reads Abelard's answer, and section 9 tests Mabillon's claim.

2. The Lists

There is no single list of the condemned propositions, and the four that survive on the shelf differ in number, in order and in content.

The list most often cited is Denzinger's: under the heading "Conc. Senonense 1140", nineteen "Errores Petri Abaelard", each beginning "Quod", taken from Mansi, with a note that Bernard collected them.[7] The copy on the shelf is an uncorrected scan of the 1911 edition, in which items 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 19 are partly garbled and item 6 has two misread words; where Table 1 gives the sense of a garbled item it is marked "[r]". Denzinger prints the nineteen before Innocent's letter, but the letter contains no list. The pope speaks of "chapters of errors sent by your fraternity" and condemns them together with "all the teachings" of the man.[8] The bishops say they sent "some of the chapters we condemned", and the archbishop of Rheims that the matter is set out "more fully" in the letter of the archbishop of Sens.[9] The nineteen are joined to the papal sentence by Denzinger's arrangement, not by the letters (see n. 2).

The second list is the *Capitula haeresum*. Mabillon had finished his introduction to Bernard's letter 190 when Jean Durand sent him from Rome, "from a faulty Vatican manuscript, numbered 663", the *Capitula* "set before the following letter", and Mabillon took them for the collection Bernard says at the end of that letter he had made.[10] Bernard's words are: "There are other chapters, not few and no less bad, in his other writings … Yet I have collected some, and sent them."[11] Under each of fourteen headings stand one or more extracts, joined by "and after a little", "and below" or "and at once he adds". Not every heading states a thesis: I calls the seal "a horrible likeness", and XII and XIII name only topics. The collection ends: "These are the chapters of the *Theologia*, or rather the *Stultologia*, of Peter Abelard."[12]

The third list is William of St-Thierry's. Writing to Geoffrey of Chartres and Bernard, he says he had come upon a book entitled *Theologia Petri Abaelardi* in two copies "containing nearly the same", had marked what disturbed him, and was sending his notes "with the little books themselves"; thirteen chapters follow. Of the *Sic et non* and the *Scito te ipsum* he has only heard: they "hate the light, and are not found even when they are

7. Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum* (1911), nos. 368–386, OCR text: «Conc, Senonense 114:0» (the OCR's reading of "1140"); «Errores Petri Abaelard»; «1. Quod Pater sit plena potentia, Filius quaedam potentia,». Denzinger's note: «Msi XXI 568 C»; «Errores eius iam 1121 in concilio Suessionensi damnati a S. Bernardo collecti et in conc. Senonensi propositi et reiecti sunt.»

8. Innocent II, ep. 447, PL 179:516C: «sicut litterarum vestrarum inspectione et missis a fraternitate vestra nobis errorum capitulis cognovimus». For the sentence see n. 3.

9. Bishops of France to Innocent (Bernard, ep. 337), PL 182:542C–D: «Quaedam autem de condemnatis a nobis capitulis vobis, reverende Pater, conscripta transmisimus, ut per haec audita reliqui corpus operis facilius aestimetis.» Archbishop of Rheims to Innocent (Bernard, ep. 191), PL 182:357B: «idipsum diffusius ac plenius continetur in litteris domini Senonensis.»

10. Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §9, PL 182 (before col. 1049): «Posteaquam haec scripseram, noster Joannes Durandus, qui tunc Romae versabatur, ex mendoso codice Vaticano, notato 663, ad me transmisit Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi, sequenti epistolae praemissa, haec ipsa sine dubio, quae Bernardus in fine hujusce epistolae se collegisse, ac Pontifici transmisisse significat.»

11. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1072D: «Sunt et alia in aliis ejus scriptis non pauca, nec minus mala capitula, ad quae nec temporis, nec epistolae angustia respondere permittit.» «Collegi tamen aliqua, et transmisi.»

12. *Capitula haeresum*, PL 182:1049A: «I. Horrenda similitudo de sigillo aereo, de specie et genere ad Trinitatem.» PL 182:1053B: «XII. De potestate ligandi et solvendi.» PL 182:1054A: «XIII. De suggestione, delectatione, et consensu». PL 182:1054C: «Haec sunt Capitula Theologiae, imo Stultologioe Petri Abaelardi.» ("Stultologioe" is the file's reading.)

sought".[13] His *Disputatio* follows the thirteen in order. Bernard replied that he had only run through it, and had not known "most, nearly all" of these things before.[14]

The fourth source is Bernard's letters. Letter 190 quotes: it sets Abelard's words under *inquit* and *ait*, and many of its quotations are passages the *Capitula* also print.[15] Its quotations are used here as witnesses to the wording of the *Capitula*'s extracts, not tested as a fifth list, because they come from the same collection of extracts as the *Capitula* (section 7) and stand under no headings of their own. Letter 190 also passes over in one sentence the spirit of fear in Christ, chaste fear in the age to come, the accidents hanging in the air, the demons' suggestions through stones and herbs, and the world-soul.[16] Letter 188 asks the cardinals to read "the book he calls *Theologia*", "another, which they call his *Sentences*" and the *Scito te ipsum*, and lists the topics they will find there.[17]

Table 1 sets the lists side by side. Abelard's answers are taken from the *Apologia* (section 8).

Denzinger	*Capitula*	William	Bernard's letters	*Apologia*
1 Father full power, Son some power, Spirit none	I (I.2; I.1 in part)	3	ep. 190 (summary)	disowns
2 Spirit not of the Father's substance	II	4	ep. 190	denies
3 Spirit the world-soul	—	5	ep. 190 §10	no answer
4 Christ not incarnate to free us from the devil's yoke [r]	IV	7	ep. 190	denies
5 Christ not the third person	V	8	ep. 188 (topic)	denies
6 free choice suffices of itself for some good	VI (other wording)	6	—	denies
7 God can do only what he does, as and when [r]	III	—	—	restates
8 God neither ought nor can prevent evil	VII ("ought" only)	—	—	denies
9 guilt not contracted from Adam, only penalty	VIII	11	ep. 188 (topic)	denies
10 crucifiers did not sin; ignorance not culpable [r]	XI	13	ep. 188 (topic)	denies
11 no spirit of fear in Christ [r]	—	—	ep. 190 §10	owns, glossed
12 binding and loosing to the Apostles only	XII (topic)	—	ep. 188 (topic)	denies
13 works make no one better or worse	X	—	—	owns, own words
14 omnipotence proper to the Father, not wisdom and benignity [r]	XIV	—	ep. 190	denies
15 chaste fear excluded from the life to come [r]	—	—	ep. 190 §10	denies
16 the devil suggests through stones and herbs [r]	—	10	ep. 190 §10	no answer
17 the coming at the end may be attributed to the Father	—	—	—	denies
18 Christ's soul descended by power only	—	—	ep. 188 (topic)	denies
19 neither work, will, concupiscence nor delight is sin; we ought not to wish it extinguished [r]	XIII (topic)	12, 13	ep. 188 (topic)	denies (the *Ethica* says it)

13. William of St-Thierry to Geoffrey and Bernard (Bernard, ep. 326), PL 182:531C–D: «Casu nuper incidi in lectionem cujusdem libelli hominis illius, cui titulus erat, Theologia Petri Abaelardi.» «Duo autem erant libelli idem pene continentes: nisi quod in altero plus, in altero minus aliquanto inveniretur.» «notavi, et cur moverent subnotavi, et cum ipsis libellis misi vobis». PL 182:532D–533A: «Sunt autem, ut audio, adhuc alia ejus opuscula, quorum nomina sunt, Sic et non; Scito te ipsum; et alia quaedam de quibus timeo ne, sicut monstruosi sunt nominis, sic etiam sint monstruosi dogmatis: sed, sicut dicunt, oderunt lucem, nec etiam quaesita inveniuntur.»

14. Bernard, ep. 327, PL 182:533A–B: «Non quod illum adhuc attentius, ut jubetis, percurrerim». «cum horum plurima et pene omnia hucusque nescierim.»

15. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1056A: «Denique constituit « Deum Patrem plenam esse potentiam, Filium quamdam potentiam, Spiritum sanctum nullam potentiam: atque hoc esse Filium ad Patrem, quod quamdam potentiam ad potentiam, quod speciem ad genus, quod materiatum ad materiam, quod hominem ad animal, quod aereum sigillum ad aes. »». Denzinger no. 368, n. 7. William's list (ep. 326), PL 182:532B: «3. Quod Pater sit plena potentia, Filius quaedam potentia, Spiritus sanctus nulla potentia.» Berengar, PL 178:1862C: «quod scilicet Pater sit omnipotentia, Filius quaedam potentia, Spiritus sanctus nulla potentia».

16. Bernard, ep. 190, §10, PL 182:1062B: «Omitto quod dicit spiritum 650 timoris Domini non fuisse in Domino; timorem Domini castum in futuro saeculo non futurum; post consecrationem panis et calicis, priora accidentia, quae remanent, pendere in aere; daemonum in nobis suggestiones contactu fieri lapidum et herbarum». The «650» is a page number of the older edition printed in the text.

17. Bernard, ep. 188, PL 182:353B–C: «Legite, si placet, librum Petri Abaelardi, quem dicit Theologiae». «Legite et alium, quem dicunt Sententiarum ejus; necnon et illum qui inscribitur, Scito te ipsum». «quid sentiat de anima Christi, de persona Christi, de descensu Christi ad inferos, de Sacramento altaris; de potestate ligandi atque solvendi, de originali peccato, de concupiscentia, de peccato delectationis, de peccato infirmitatis, de peccato ignorantiae, de opere peccati, de voluntate peccandi.»

Denzinger	*Capitula*	William	Bernard's letters	*Apologia*
—	IX the Lord's body does not fall	9	ep. 190 §10	no answer
—	—	1 faith as *aestimatio*	ep. 190	—
—	—	2 the names "improper"	—	—

Table 1: The four lists. Numbers are Denzinger's items, the *Capitula*'s chapters and William's chapters. "[1]": the item is partly illegible in the OCR and its sense is reconstructed from the legible words and the other lists.

Three things follow. First, Denzinger's article 17, that the coming at the end may be attributed to the Father, is accused nowhere else on the shelf; it is known only from Denzinger and from Abelard's denial that it ever "entered my mind".[18] Chapter IX of the *Capitula*, on the Lord's body, is not among the nineteen. Second, the list Abelard answers is Denzinger's or one like it, not the *Capitula*: the *Apologia* takes seventeen of the nineteen in Denzinger's order, with two displacements, and ends with "the last chapter", Denzinger's 19.[19] It also quotes the list's closing sentence, which ascribes the chapters to the *Theologia*, a book of *Sentences* and the *Scito te ipsum*; no list on the shelf has it.[20] Third, the most famous charge is a heading, not a quotation. "The Father full power, the Son some power, the Holy Spirit no power" stands as an article in Denzinger and in William's letter; Berengar's version has "omnipotence"; Migne's text of letter 190 sets the words in quotation marks, but as the opening of a summary that runs on into the seal and the genus (see n. 15). The *Capitula* do not print them. In Abelard's writings they occur once, in the *Apologia*, which calls them "not so much heretical as diabolical".[21] William presents them as his inference ("what is this to say, but that …"), and "semipower" is his word.[22] The editor of the *Theologia christiana* in Migne repeats the summary while granting that Abelard "in plain words" makes the Son and the Spirit omnipotent as the Father is.[23]

3. Method

Each extract was given three verdicts. On the words: VERBATIM, the quoted words stand in Abelard's text, spelling and print aside; ALTERED, the passage is there with words changed, added, dropped or reordered,

18. Denzinger no. 384 (OCR): «17. Quod adventus in fine saeculi possit attribui Patri.» *Apologia*, PL 178:107: «Adventum Filii in fine saeculi posse attribui Patri, nunquam (sciat Deus!) in mentem meam venit, nec se verbis meis inseruit.» The other files searched for the charge are listed in Appendix A.

19. The *Apologia* answers Denzinger's items in the order 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 (its second clause, on ignorance), 8, 9, 10 (its first clause, on the crucifiers), 11 with 15, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, and passes over 3 and 16. PL 178:107: «Novissimum quoque capitulum, quod scripsisse criminor, quod neque opus, neque voluntas neque concupiscentia, neque delectatio, quae movet [al. quae moveant] eam, peccatum sit, neque debemus ea velle exstingui, nec minus a meis tam dictis, quam scriptis alienum est.»

20. *Apologia*, PL 178:107: «Quod autem capitula contra me scripta tali fine amicus noster concluserit, ut diceret: « Haec autem capitula partim in libro Theologiae magistri Petri, partim in libro Sententiarum ejusdem, partim in libro cujus titulus est: Scito te ipsum, roperta sunt, » non sine admiratione maxima suscepi». ("roperta" is the file's misprint; the *Responsio*, PL 180:332B, reads «reperta sunt».) For the end of the *Capitula* see n. 12.

21. *Apologia*, PL 178:105–106: «Quod igitur mihi vel per malitiam impositum est quod scripserim, « Quia Pater plena potentia, Filius quaedam potentia, Spiritus sanctus nulla potentia, » haec ego verba non tam haeretica quam diabolica, sicut justissimum est, abhorreo, detestor, et ea cum suo auctore pariter damno.» The search: every Migne file of Abelard on the shelf (PL 178, files 1110 and 1113–1128; PL 180, 1175) for "plena potentia" and "nulla potentia"; the only other hits are the *Responsio* (the same text) and the editor's note cited in n. 23.

22. William, *Disputatio*, cap. III, PL 180:259A: «De semipotentia vero in Deo, quam ipse dicit esse in Filio; et nulla potentia, quam praedicat in Spiritu sancto, tam procul semper sit, quod dicit, a corde meo, quam procul esse constat ab omnipotente Deo.» Cap. IV, PL 180:260A: «Cum enim dicit quia benignitas Dei, quae sancti Spiritus nomine declaratur, non sit in Deo potentia aliqua, sicut ad plenam potentiam quae Pater est, Filius quaedam potentia est, quid hoc est dicere, nisi quod Filius quidem ejusdem cum Patre substantiae sit quodammodo, quod Spiritus sanctus non est ullo modo, qui non potentia, sed benignitas est?»

23. *Observationes praeviae* to the *Theologia christiana*, PL 178:1121: «13. In libro IV, Patri tantum tribuit omnipotentiam, Filio quamdam potentiam, Spiritui sancto nullam potentiam.» «non desunt tamen qui partes Abaelardi tuentes, Bernardum aliosque, qui adversus eum scripserunt, illius mentem minime assecutos fuisse jactitent, propterea quod ille disertis verbis asserat Filium ac Spiritum sanctum perinde ac Patrem esse omnipotentem. Id quod non uno in loco docet.»

each change listed; NOT ON SHELF, no text of Abelard on hand contains the words. SPLICED is confined to what the shelf can show: within one extract, with no mark of omission, words are run together that stand apart, with a sentence or more between them, in every recension on the shelf that has the words on both sides of the join. A join is scored only where some recension on the shelf has the accuser's words on both sides of it. Where his words on one side stand, in the form he gives them, in one recension only, and his words on the other side in another recension only, the shelf cannot show what his copy had between them, and the join is recorded, not scored. A dropped clause within a sentence, or a dropped label between contiguous sentences, is an alteration. A join the accuser marks ("and after a little") is recorded as a join, and it is scored only where the text on both sides is on the shelf. On the heading: FAIR if it says what the quoted words say; FAIR (topic) if it names only the matter of its extracts and states no thesis, so that it cannot say more than they do; STRETCHED if it says more, in one of three ways, by dropping a hedge or exception the words contain, by generalising beyond them, or by stating a thesis the extract does not state, either because the extract gives the matter only as a report, a question or one half of an argument, or because it does not reach the thesis at all; CONTRARY if Abelard in context says the opposite. Each heading is judged against its own extracts and nothing else: not against Denzinger's article and not against Abelard's other books, which are compared separately. Evaluative words in a heading, such as "horrible" in chapter I, are the accuser's judgment and are not scored; the verdict concerns what the heading says the words assert. These heading verdicts are the author's reading, not the output of a script, and four of them are borderline (IV.1, IV.4, VIII.1 and IX.1: section 6). Third, Abelard's answer, if any. With each goes a judgment of voice: Abelard's own position, his own question put against a received view, a report of what "some" say, an objection he sets up to answer, or a step of a reductio. The verdicts on words are verdicts on the printed witnesses. Where a second printing of Abelard agrees with the accuser against Migne, the change is not counted against the accuser, and some of the changes counted may be readings of the accusers' manuscripts.

The shelf is Migne's Abelard (PL 178, with the *Responsio* in PL 180) in the TEI transcription of the Corpus Corporum, together with uncorrected scans of Victor Cousin's two volumes (1849 and 1859), a second scan of the 1859 volume, and two scans of Luigi Tosti's *Storia di Abelardo* (1851), which, Cousin says, first printed fragments of the *Theologia christiana* from a manuscript of Monte Cassino.[24] The accusers are read in the same transcription: the *Capitula* with Mabillon's introduction, Bernard's letters, William's *Disputatio*, the anonymous *Disputatio altera* with the *Monitum* that its file heads «MONITUM DOMNI TISSIERI»,[25] Berengar's *Apologeticus* and Innocent's letters.

The shelf has holes, and they bear on every verdict of NOT ON SHELF. Migne's *Introductio* breaks off with "the rest is lacking".[26] The *Theologia christiana* continues beyond Migne's text in the Monte Cassino witness (JMT 1.1). Cousin says that the first editor of the *Ethica*, B. Pez, "did not have the whole work in hand", since the printed part lacks questions that Abelard, commenting on Paul, reserves for his *Ethica*.[27] Of the *Sententiae* the shelf holds only Cousin's excerpts from a twelfth-century Munich manuscript entitled *Sententiae* of Abelard, which Cousin judged a pupil's compilation from Abelard's books; he printed only the chapters he thought added something to the lost part of the *Introductio*.[28] NOT ON SHELF therefore says only that the words are not in these texts. It does not say that Abelard did not write them, and it does not say that he did.

24. Cousin II, p. 804 (OCR), heading the *Fragmenta Theologiae christianae*: «vir clar. Luigi Tosti primus in lucem edidit». JMT 1.1 n. 19 gives the place from the page images.

25. *Disputatio altera*, PL 180 (before col. 283): «MONITUM DOMNI TISSIERI». The file gives no forename and no date for him.

26. *Introductio ad theologiam* III, PL 178:1114B: «Constat, inquiunt, divinam providentiam falli non posse. Caetera desunt.»

27. Cousin, *Opera* II (1859), preface to the *Ethica*, p. 594 (OCR): «B. Pezius non totum opus Abaelardi prse manibus habuit ; nam in ea parte quam in lucem edidit, non omnes qusestiones instituuntur quas in Commentario de Beato Paulo noster se in Ethicam reservare declaravit.» The OCR's «prse» and «qusestiones» are "prae" and "quaestiones".

28. Cousin II, heading to the *Excerpta ex Epitome theologiae christianae* (OCR): «qui Petrl Jbxlardi Sentcntix inscribitur» (that is, "Petri Abaelardi Sententiae"); «sed verisimilius nobis videtur istud e genuinis celeberrimi magistri libris a quodam ejus discipulo expromptum fuisse». Cousin calls the manuscript Emmeram's, now at Munich, and its first editor Rheinwald.

A matching script breaks a quotation into overlapping three-word sequences, after folding case, *u/v*, *i/j*, *ae/e* and punctuation, and finds the stretch of each text holding the greatest share of them: near 1.0 for a verbatim passage, about 0.5 to 0.9 for an altered one, below 0.3 where the passage is absent. Every hit was read in context. The best match for many extracts is the *Capitula* reprinted in Cousin's appendix, and the scans misread letters, so the Migne text is quoted wherever it has the passage.[29] Appendix A gives details.

4. The Extracts That Can Be Tested: Chapters I–IV and XIV

Twelve of the thirty-two extracts can be found in the works of Abelard on the shelf. All come from three of them: the *Introductio ad theologiam* (chapters I, II.2, III and XIV), the *Theologia christiana* (II.1) and the commentary on Romans (IV.3 and IV.4). In each case the *Capitula* give the work no name; the only title they use is the gibe at the end, which calls the whole collection chapters of the *Theologia*.

The seal and the Spirit (chapters I and II)

Chapter I has two extracts. The first is Abelard's likeness of the bronze seal, and its words are his, from the second book of the *Introductio*, with small changes: the *Capitula* add "of God" to "wisdom", drop "therefore" and "as has been said", which mark the claim as the conclusion of an argument already made, drop "for" (*enim*) and "from bronze" (*ex aere*, so that the seal is said "to be" what its matter is, not to be "from" it), and alter several particles.[30] The heading calls the likeness "horrible", and that is the accuser's evaluation, which is not scored; the likeness is Abelard's, used of the Trinity in his own voice, and the heading is fair to it. The extract stops at the point where Abelard begins to guard the likeness: a few lines later he says that the genus need not precede its species in time or in existence, and that divine wisdom, though it has all it is from divine power, did not come after it, "since God could in no way have been without wisdom".[31]

The second extract under chapter I is one sentence, and here the changes matter. Abelard wrote that "the very benignity which is shown by this name is not some power or wisdom in God, since to be benign is not in any respect to be wise or powerful". The *Capitula* read: "The very benignity which is shown by this name, *which is the Spirit*, is not power or wisdom in God", and stop.[32] A gloss identifies benignity with the Spirit; "some" (*aliqua*) is gone, so that a denial that benignity is a particular power becomes a denial that it is power at all; and the reason is cut. Letter 190 quotes the sentence in the same form and restates it: "you said, 'The Holy Spirit is not power or wisdom in God'".[33] So a sentence about the meaning of a name becomes the third clause of the article Abelard called diabolical. A few lines later Abelard says that the Spirit proceeds from Father and

29. Cousin II, Appendix, p. 765 (OCR), heading of the reprint: «Capitula errorum Petri Abaelardi quae S. Bemardus colligerat, et summo pontifici transmiserat, primum in lucem e codice Vaticano Dom Mabillon protulit, in editione operum sancti Bernardi, Parisiis, 1690». The reprint is therefore Mabillon's text, not an independent witness.

30. *Capitula*, cap. I, PL 182:1049A: «Cum sapientia Dei quaedam sit potentia, sicut aereum sigillum est quoddam aes, liquet profecto divinam sapientiam ex divina potentia esse suum habere, ad eam videlicet similitudinem, qua sigillum aereum dicitur esse quod est ejus materia». *Introductio* II, PL 178:1069D–1070A: «Cum igitur sapientia quaedam, ut dictum est, sit potentia; sicut enim aereum sigillum est quoddam aes, liquet profecto divinam sapientiam ex divina potentia esse suum habere, ad eam scilicet similitudinem qua sigillum aereum ex aere dicitur esse, quod est ejus materia». The other changes: «exigit necessario quod aes sit» for «exigit necessario ut aes sit»; «ex eo quod est homo» for «ex eo quod homo»; and a second «sed non e contrario» for «non e contrario».

31. *Introductio* II, PL 178:1070B–C: «non tamen ideo necesse est genus species suas tempore, vel per existentiam praecedere»; «divina sapientia, licet, ut dictum est, ex divina potentia omne habeat, quod est Filium ex Patre gigni, non tamen hanc illa praecesserit, cum nullatenus sine sapientia Deus esse potuerit».

32. *Introductio* II, PL 178:1072A–B: «Benignitas quippe ipsa quae hoc nomine demonstratur, non est aliqua in Deo potentia sive sapientia, cum videlicet ipsum benignum esse non sit in aliquo esse sapientem aut potentem». *Capitula*, cap. I, PL 182:1049A: «Benignitas ipsa, quae hoc nomine quod Spiritus est demonstratur, non est in Deo potentia sive sapientia». The *Theologia christiana* IV, PL 178:1299C, has the sentence with «aliqua» and without «in Deo»: «Benignitas quippe ipsa, quae hoc nomine demonstratur, non est aliqua potentia sive sapientia».

33. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1061A: «Benignitas ipsa, » inquit, « quae hoc nomine quod est Spiritus sanctus demonstratur, non est in Deo potentia, sive sapientia». PL 182:1061B: «dixisti enim, « Non est Spiritus sanctus in Deo potentia, sive sapientia. »».

Son because the good disposition to act "comes from his power and wisdom".[34] Heading I names only the seal and does not summarise this extract, so no heading verdict is given for it (Table 2). The charge it was used to support, Denzinger's first, says more than the altered sentence, and more again than Abelard's.

Chapter II, "that the Holy Spirit is not of the substance of the Father", has two extracts. The first is the only extract that stands word for word in a text of Abelard on the shelf, the fourth book of the *Theologia christiana*, and Cousin's *Introductio* has the same words.[35] It says that the Son, being begotten, is from the Father's substance; it does not say that the Spirit is not, and the heading takes the first half of the argument for the whole. The second extract is the one the heading needs: "The Spirit, though he is of the same substance with the Father and the Son ... is nevertheless not from the substance of the Father or of the Son, which would be for him to be begotten." The *Introductio* reads "is nevertheless not, *if we speak properly*, to be said to be from the substance", and both Migne and Cousin have the qualifier.[36] In the sentence before, Abelard had explained it: some doctors say the Spirit too is from the Father's substance, meaning of one substance with him, but "properly we do not say that he is from the substance of the Father: only the Son is to be so called".[37] The *Theologia christiana*, which has the first extract word for word, has neither sentence. After "from the very substance of the Father" it goes straight on: "But the Spirit is not begotten, but rather proceeds".[38] So the qualifier is absent from the accusers' text and present in the *Introductio*, and since the accusers may have had a recension that is neither of the printed two (section 7), its absence may be a reading of their copy, not an excision. To be "from the substance" in the proper sense is to be begotten; the Spirit is "of the same substance", as the extract itself says. Without the qualifier the sentence seems to deny what its first clause affirms, and Bernard read it so: "he says that the Holy Spirit ... is in no way of the substance of the Father or the Son. From where, then? Perhaps from nothing?"[39] The heading is stretched even against the accusers' own words, since the extract affirms "of the same substance". Abelard's denial in the *Apologia*, that he never wrote that the Spirit "is not of the substance of the Father", is true to the letter, given his distinction between being "of" (*de*) and "from" (*ex*) the substance.

What God can do (chapter III)

The five extracts of chapter III come from the third book of the *Introductio*, whose thesis the first article of this journal treated (JMT 1.1, section 3). Three differ from Abelard's text by a particle or by word order ("God can do" for "can God do").[40] The fifth, which is also the heading, drops a clause. Abelard concluded that God can do or leave undone only "those things which at some time he does or leaves undone, and only in the manner

34. *Introductio* II, PL 178:1073A–B: «bonus ipse affectus sive effectus aliud faciendi vel disponendi ex potentia ipsius, et sapientia provenit».

35. *Capitula*, cap. II, PL 182:1049B: «Cum itaque tam Filius, quam Spiritus sanctus ex Patre sit, hic quidem genitus, ille procedens; differt in eo generatio ipsa a processione, quod is qui generatur ex ipsa Patris substantia est». *Theologia christiana* IV, PL 178:1299D–1300A: «Cum itaque tam Filius quam Spiritus sanctus ex Patre sit, hic quidem genitus, ille procedens, differt in eo generatio ipsa a processione quod is qui generatur ex ipsa Patris substantia est, cum ipsa, ut dictum est, Sapientia hoc ipsum esse habeat ut sit quaedam potentia». Migne's *Introductio* II (PL 178:1072B–C) reads «sapientia, hoc est ipsum esse habeat»; Cousin's (II, p. 100–101, OCR) reads «sapientia, hoc» and, after a page break, «ipsum esse babeat», as the *Capitula* do.

36. *Capitula*, cap. II, PL 182:1049B: «Spiritus vero quamvis ejusdem substantiae sit cum Patre et Filio, unde etiam Trinitas ipsa homousion, id est unius substantiae, praedicatur, minime tamen ex substantia Patris est aut Filii, quod esset ipsum ex Patre vel Filio gigni». *Introductio* II, PL 178:1072D: «Spiritus vero quamvis ejusdem substantiae sit cum Patre et Filio, unde etiam Trinitas omousios, id est unius substantiae praedicatur, minime tamen ex substantia Patris aut Filii, si proprie loquimur, esse dicendus est, quod oportet ipsum ex Patre vel Filio gigni». Cousin II, p. 101 (OCR): «minime tamen ex sub- stantia Patris autFibi, si proprie loquimur, esse dicendus est».

37. *Introductio* II, PL 178:1072C–D: «proprie tamen non dicimus ex substantia Patris esse: solus Filius dicendus est».

38. *Theologia christiana* IV, PL 178:1300A: «Unde bene Filius ex Patre gigni dicitur, hoc est ex ipsa Patris substantia esse. Spiritus vero minime gigni, sed magis procedere». The *Introductio* at the same place (PL 178:1072C): «hoc est ex ipsa Patris substantia proprie dicitur esse. Hinc Nicaena synodus quasi exponens hanc generationem».

39. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1056A: «Dicit etiam « Spiritum sanctum procedere quidem ex Patre et Filio, sed minime de Patris esse Filiive substantia. Unde ergo? an forte ex nihilo, sicut et universa quae facta sunt?». For the *Apologia* see section 8.

40. *Capitula*, cap. III, PL 182:1049D: «Ex his itaque tam de ratione quam de scripto collatis constat, id solum Deum facere posse quod aliquando facit». *Introductio* III, PL 178:1096C: «Ex his itaque tam de ratione quam de scripto collatis, constat id solum posse facere Deum quod aliquando facit». The other three: III.1 (PL 178:1094D) has «Hac itaque ratione qua convincitur quia Deus Pater tam bonum genuerat Filium» where the *Capitula* have «Hac ratione qua convincitur quod Deus Pater tam bonum genuit Filium»; III.2 (PL 178:1095A) has «In tantum autem in omnibus quae Deus facit» where they drop «autem».

or at the time at which he does them"; the *Capitula* omit the relative clause and make "and … or" into "or … or".[41] The sense survives, since "at the time at which he does" still restricts the thesis, and Denzinger's article 7 has the same short form; the anonymous *Disputatio altera*, quoting the sentence, keeps the clause.[42] The thesis is Abelard's own conclusion, and these headings are fair.

The fourth extract is another matter. It comes from Abelard's replies to the objections, where he argues from the case of evil: if God could prevent the evils done and did not, "I do not see how he would not be consenting to sins. For who is to be called a consenter to evil, if not one through whom it could opportunely be prevented?" The *Capitula* stop at the question. Abelard answers it: since it is good, as Augustine says, that evils be done, which God orders for the best, it is not fitting that he prevent them, and so "he who can do nothing against reason is by no means to be said to consent to sins".[43] The extract is the first half of a reductio, and it leaves the reader to conclude that on Abelard's premises God consents to sin, which is the conclusion the argument exists to avoid. The completed argument supports the charge of chapter VII, that God cannot fittingly prevent such evils; the cut makes it support a worse one. The finding is the cut, and it does not depend on the wording of the premise. That wording cannot be settled: Migne's *Introductio* is corrupt at this point, Cousin's differs, and the *Capitula*'s clause reads more coherently than Migne's, so the premise is not scored as an alteration. JMT 1.1 n. 20 reads a similar sentence in the Monte Cassino fragments of the *Theologia christiana* as a difficulty put against both sides and not as Abelard's position. The two texts differ: in the *Introductio* the question is the first step of an argument that Abelard completes in his own voice, and it is the *Introductio* that the *Capitula* quote here.

The redemption (chapter IV)

Chapter IV, "that Christ did not take flesh to free us from the yoke of the devil", has five extracts. Three are not on the shelf and are treated in section 5. The other two come from the second book of the commentary on Romans, from the long discussion of Romans 3:26, and their voice has to be read with care. The discussion opens, under the label "QUAESTIO": "Here a very great question presents itself", and it then sets out, over two columns, the difficulties of the received account of redemption: from whom we were redeemed, by what right the devil held us, what need there was for the Son of God to suffer, and how the death of an innocent man could please God.[44] The questions are Abelard's own. He closes them in the first person, "These and the like seem to us to raise no small question about our redemption or justification through the death of our Lord Jesus Christ", and then, under the label "SOLUTIO", puts his own account in place of the received one without taking the questions back: "But it seems to us that we are justified in the blood of Christ and reconciled to God

41. *Introductio* III, PL 178:1101D: «Praedictis itaque rationibus, vel objectorum solutionibus, liquere omnibus reor, ea solummodo Deum posse facere vel dimittere, quae quandoque facit vel dimittit, et eo modo tantum vel eo tempore quo facit, non alio». *Capitula*, cap. III, PL 182:1050A: «Praedictis itaque rationibus vel objectorum solutionibus liquere reor omnibus, ea solummodo Deum posse facere, vel dimittere, vel eo modo tantum, vel eo tempore quo facit, non alio». Denzinger no. 374 (OCR): «7. Quod ea solummodo possit Deus facere vel dimittere».

42. *Disputatio altera*, PL 180:316B: «Praedictis rationibus vel objectorum solutionibus liquere omnibus reor, ea solummodo Deum posse facere, vel dimittere, quaecunque facit vel dimittit, et eo modo quo facit vel dimittit, et illo tempore quo facit tantum, non alio.» The same author quotes III.3 in Abelard's word order: «constat, id solum posse facere Deum, quod aliquando faciat».

43. *Capitula*, cap. III, PL 182:1049D, the end of the extract: «Quis enim consentire malo dicendus est, nisi is per quem etiam opportune disturbari posset». *Introductio* III, PL 178:1098A–B: «Quis enim consentire malo dicendus est, nisi is per quem illud opportune disturbari potest? Cum autem, sicut et beatus meminit Augustinus, mala etiam fieri bonum sit, quae Deus quoque optime ordinat, nequaquam ab eo ea disturbari convenit». «Cum itaque scandala, quae bonum est fieri, disturbare opportune non possit, aut omnino etiam non possit, qui nihil contra rationem potest, profecto nullatenus consentire peccatis dicendus est». Migne's first clause: «Qui etiam si mala quae fiunt disturbare ne quid etiam nisi opportune faceret, qui nisi importune facere posset»; the *Capitula*'s: «Qui si mala quae fiunt disturbare posset, nec id etiam nisi opportune faceret, qui nihil importune facere potest».

44. *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos* II, PL 178:833D: «QUAESTIO. Maxima hoc loco quaestio se ingerit quae sit ista videlicet nostra redemptio per majorem Christi». PL 178:834B: «Quod etiam jus in possidendo hominem diabolus habere poterat, nisi forte quia eum Domino permittente aut etiam tradente ad torquendum ipsum susceperat.»

45. *Romans* II, PL 178:836A, closing the questions: «Haec et his similia non mediocrem movere quaestionem nobis videntur, de redemptione scilicet vel justificatione nostra per mortem Domini nostri Jesu Christi.» Then: «SOLUTIO. Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc justificati

in this, that …".[45] They are his case against the received account, not an objection set up to be refuted, and in the course of them he draws conclusions of his own, as on the devil's right (section 5).

The third extract of chapter IV is taken from the questions. It asks how the Apostle can say that we are reconciled by the death of the Son, when God ought to be the angrier with man the more men sinned in crucifying his Son; and whether the death of the innocent so pleased God that he was reconciled by it. Apart from a number of small changes (among them, the *Capitula* drop "men" from the sin of the crucifixion and put its verb in the singular, and at the end write "freed from sins" where both printings of Abelard have "freed from penalties"), the words are Abelard's.[46] One sentence is replaced. Where Migne prints "For the more sins were multiplied by men, the more just it was for God to be *born* to men", Cousin's text reads "to be *angry* with men", which is what the context requires; the *Capitula* have instead "for how was it more just?": the words between the two *amplius* are gone, *quo* has become *quomodo*, and a question mark is added.[47] The question loses the claim that supported it, but that claim restated the clause just before it, that God "ought to have been the angrier with man" the more men sinned, which the *Capitula* keep, and the question presses the same difficulty at the same point. The author's judgment, and it is a judgment, is that the change leaves the sense of the extract as it was. Quoted in Abelard's name, these are his own questions, and so his voice is not misplaced. What the *Capitula* do is to quote them without the solution that follows them in the commentary: the fault is a truncation. Letter 190 introduces the same questions with "Listen to his jeers" and answers them one by one, and William quotes them as Abelard's attack on the Apostle, the two in nearly the same words ("How," *ait* in Bernard, *inquit* in William).[48] "Listen to his jeers" is a hostile framing of words that are Abelard's, not a misattribution, and both accusers read the questions, correctly, as his attack on the received account. Nor does Bernard hide the answer. He goes on to quote Abelard's positive account and to attack it: "that all that God appeared in the flesh is our instruction by his word and example … all that he suffered and died is the showing or commending of his charity towards us".[49] Those words are not on the shelf. The nearest is the SOLUTIO's "instructing us by word and example even to death", and nothing follows from the absence of the rest.

The fourth extract begins with the last of the questions, "How cruel and unjust it seems that anyone should have required the blood of the innocent as a price", and runs on, through the sentence that closes the questions, into the solution. The text is contiguous in the commentary, so the extract is ALTERED, not spliced; its

sumus in sanguine Christi, et Deo reconciliati, quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam, quod Filius suus nostram susceperit naturam». Cousin II, p. 207 (OCR), also prints the label: «Solulio.»

46. *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050B–C: «quanto amplius in crucifigendo Filium suum deliquerit»; «ut a peccatis jam liberari debeamus». *Romans* II, PL 178:835C–D: «quanto amplius homines in crucifigendo Filium suum deliquerunt»; «ut a poenis jam liberari debeamus». The other changes, *Capitula* first and *Romans* second (Cousin agrees with Migne in each): «Quomodo nos justificari vel reconciliari Deo per mortem Filii ejus» for «Quomodo etiam nos justificari vel reconciliari Deo per mortem Filii»; «primum praeceptum suum unius pomi gustu» for «primum ejus in paradiso praeceptum unius pomi gustu»; «nisi ex morte Christi» for «nisi per mortem Christi»; «quod in Christo commissum est» for «quod in Christum commissum est»; «in ipsum vel suos commissa» for «in ipsum vel in suos commissa»; «qui hoc peccando commisimus» for «qui peccando commisimus»; «etiam levius potuit ignoscere multo» for «illud multo levius potuit ignoscere»; «tam bonum facere» for «tantum bonum facere»; «in quo et justiores» for «In quo etiam justiores»; and «Nunquid mors innocentis Filii tantum Deo placuit» for «Nunquid mors innocentis Filii in tantum Deo patri placuit». For the replaced sentence see n. 47.

47. *Romans* II, PL 178:835C: «Quo enim amplius multiplicata sunt per homines peccata, nasci Deum hominibus amplius justum fuerat». Cousin II, p. 206 (OCR): «irasci Deura hominibus amplius justum fuerat» («Deura» is the OCR's «Deum»). *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050B: «quomodo enim amplius justum fuerat?». The clause before it stands in both: «qui tanto amplius adversus hominem irasci debuit» (*Romans* II, PL 178:835C; *Capitula*, PL 182:1050B).

48. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1069C–D: «Audite cachinnos. « Quomodo, » ait, « justificari nos vel reconciliari Deo per mortem Filii ejus dicit Apostolus». William, *Disputatio*, cap. VII, PL 180:270A: «Et in Apostolum: « Quomodo, » inquit, « Apostolus reconciliari hominem Deo per mortem dicit Filii Dei (Rom. V) , qui tanto plus adversus hominem irasci debuit».

49. Bernard, ep. 190, end of cap. VIII, PL 182:1070C–D: «Sic enim concludit tot calumnias». «Totum esse quod Deus in carne apparuit, nostram de verbo et exemplo ipsius institutionem, sive, et postmodum dicit, instructionem; totum quod passus et mortuus est, suae erga nos charitatis ostensionem vel commendationem.» Bernard's «et postmodum dicit» marks a second place. The matcher finds no stretch of any text of Abelard on the shelf with more than 4 per cent of the sentence, and the phrases «de verbo et exemplo» and «charitatis ostensionem» are not in the Romans commentary. *Romans* II, PL 178:836A, the SOLUTIO: «et in ipsos nos tam verbo quam exemplo instituendo usque ad mortem perstitit».

alterations carry the finding about Abelard's voice in chapter IV.[50] The label "SOLUTIO" is dropped. "These and the like seem to us to raise no small question about our redemption, that is, justification" becomes "raise no small question, not only about redemption but also about justification", and "seem to us" is gone. "How cruel it seems" becomes "To whom does it not seem cruel", a rhetorical question with an expected answer; both Bernard's texts read so, both printings of Abelard "How cruel".[51] And "it seems to us that *in this* we are justified in the blood of Christ … that" becomes "it seems to us that we are *nonetheless* justified". With the label gone and "in this" made "nonetheless", Abelard's account of how we are justified reads as a concession wrung from him after his own difficulties, and not as the answer that replaces the account he has questioned. The second half, that the Son bound us to himself by love through teaching and example even to death, is Abelard's own view, but not the heading's: it says how Christ freed us, from the servitude of sin, by love.[52] Neither extract states the heading's thesis. IV.3 is the case without its answer, and IV.4 an answer that does not mention the devil, so both stretch the heading.

The omnipotence of the Father (chapter XIV)

The last chapter returns to the first book of the *Introductio*. The extract makes "nature of subsisting" into "knowledge of subsisting" and "who" into "because", drops "God", and turns *ex se* into *a se*.[53] Letter 190 quotes the sentence from "properly" onward with "because" and without "God", which therefore belong to Bernard's collection, and with Abelard's *ex se*, so that the last change is a fault of the Vatican copy.[54] The heading, that omnipotence belongs properly to the Father, says what the words say. But the sentence itself has the Father do all things "together with the other two persons", and a little earlier Abelard says that each of the others "is of entirely the same power".[55] Omnipotence is assigned to the Father as its source, not denied to the others. Denzinger's article 14 adds what the extract does not say, that wisdom and benignity are not the Father's in the same way.

50. *Romans* II, PL 178:836A: «Haec et his similia non mediocrem movere quaestionem nobis videntur, de redemptione scilicet vel justificatione nostra per mortem Domini nostri Jesu Christi. SOLUTIO. Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc justificati sumus in sanguine Christi, et Deo reconciliati, quod per hanc singularem gratiam». *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050C–D: «Haec et his similia non mediocrem movent quaestionem, non solum de redemptione, sed etiam de justificatione nostra per mortem Domini nostri Jesu Christi. Nobis autem videtur, quod nihilo minus sumus justificati in sanguine Christi; et Deo reconciliati per hanc singularem gratiam». The other changes, *Capitula* first: «mortem Filii habuit» for «Filii sui mortem habuerit»; «suscepit» for «susceperit»; «praestitit» for «perstitit»; «nulla tolerare» for «nil jam tolerare»; «vestra reformidet» for «vera reformidet»; «tanquam homines temporis non dubitamus» for «tanquam homines temporis gratiae non dubitamus». Where Cousin's text of *Romans* agrees with the *Capitula* against Migne («astrinxit», «propter ipsum») the reading is not counted; at «in ipsa nos» (*Capitula*) Migne has «in ipsos nos» and Cousin «in ipso nos», and the place is not scored.

51. *Romans* II, PL 178:835D: «Quam vero crudele et iniquum videtur, ut sanguinem innocentis in pretium aliquod quis requisierit». Cousin II, p. 206 (OCR): «Quam vero crudele et iniquum videtur». *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050C: «Cui vero non crudele et iniquum videtur, ut sanguinem innocentis, et pretium aliquod quis requisierit». Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1070C: «Cui vero, » inquit, « non crudele et iniquum videtur, ut sanguinem innocentis in pretium aliquod quis requisierit».

52. *Romans* II, PL 178:836B: «Redemptio itaque nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio, quae non solum a servitute peccati liberat, sed veram nobis filiorum Dei libertatem acquirit».

53. *Introductio* I, PL 178:993D: «Si itaque potentiam tam ad naturam subsistendi, quam ad efficaciam operationis referamus, inveniemus ad proprietatem personae Patris proprie vel specialiter omnipotentiam attinere, qui non solum cum caeteris duabus personis Deus omnia efficere potest, verum etiam ipse solus a se non ab alio existere habet, et sicut ex se habet existere, ita etiam ex se habet posse.» *Capitula*, cap. XIV, PL 182:1054B–C: «Si potentiam tam ad notitiam subsistendi, quam ad efficaciam operationis referamus, invenimus ad proprietatem personae Patris proprie vel specialiter omnipotentiam attinere: quod non solum cum caeteris duabus personis aeque omnia efficere potest». Cousin II (OCR) reads «Deus aeque* omnia», so that «aeque» is a manuscript reading and only the loss of «Deus» is the *Capitula*'s.

54. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1059A: «sed ad proprietatem personae Patris proprie vel specialiter invenimus omnipotentiam attinere, quod non solum cum caeteris duabus personis aeque omnia efficere potest, verum etiam ipse solus a se, non ab alio existere habet: et sicut habet ex se existere, ita etiam ex se habet posse.» *Capitula*: «et sicut habet a se existere».

55. *Introductio* I, PL 178:992A: «licet unaquaeque aliarum personarum, cum sit ejusdem cum Patre substantiae, ejusdem sit penitus potentiae».

5. The Extracts That Cannot Be Tested: Chapters IV–XIII

Twenty extracts are in no text of Abelard on the shelf: three of the five under chapter IV, and every extract under chapters V to XIII. For each, the full quotation and several distinctive phrases from it were searched in every Migne file of Abelard and in the Cousin and Tosti scans, and the only matches were the *Capitula* themselves, reprinted in Cousin's appendix.[56] What the absence shows depends on what else can be said about each extract, and three things can.

Bernard names a source

For the passage on redemption Bernard says where he read it: Abelard attacks the mystery of our redemption "as I have read in a certain book of his *Sentences*, and again in a certain exposition of his on the Epistle to the Romans".[57] He then quotes the passage of which the *Capitula*'s IV.1 and IV.2 are pieces: all our doctors after the Apostles agree that the devil possessed man by right, because man freely consented to him, and that the Son of God became incarnate of necessity so that man might be freed by right; "but, as it seems to us, the devil never had any right in man, except perhaps by God's permission, as a jailer, nor did the Son of God take flesh to free man."[58] William quotes the same passage in almost the same words, telling Geoffrey and Bernard that they have it "in hand, and can read it".[59] The *Capitula* give a short and damaged form, in which "except perhaps by God's permission" has become "but he possessed him by right, permitting".[60] The heading is fair to the last clause; the fuller text shows that what the clause denies is liberation by the devil's right.

The commentary on Romans has the doctrine in other words. Among its questions it asks what right the devil could have had, and it concludes that he "acquired no right by seducing" the man, except as one to whom the Lord had handed him "as to a jailer or torturer".[61] The Munich *Sententiae* state it in the first person, "I on the contrary say, and prove by irrefutable reason, that the devil had no right over man", and give as the chief benefit of the incarnation that the Wisdom of God "enlightened us by his light and showed us his love", which is the purpose the last extract of chapter IV gives.[62] None of these is the source of the extracts. The commentary shows the doctrine to be Abelard's own, stated within his own questions (section 4). The *Sententiae* show it taught under his name, but they do not show that the words of IV.1 and IV.2 are his, for the idiom of the jailer is current on the shelf outside Abelard: a set of *Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli*, printed in PL 175 among the

56. The searches are listed in Appendix A. The reprint is in Cousin II, Appendix (pp. 765–770), and the second scan of the same volume.

57. Bernard, ep. 190, §11, PL 182:1062C: «Mysterium nostrae redemptionis, sicut in libro quodam Sententiarum ipsius, et item in quadam ejus expositione Epistolae ad Romanos legi, temerarius scrutator majestatis aggrediens, in ipso statim suae disputationis exordio, ecclesiastieorum doctorum unam omnium de hac re dicit esse sententiam». ("ecclesiastieorum" is the file's reading.)

58. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1062D–1063A: «quod omnes doctores nostri post Apostolos in hoc conveniunt, quod diabolus dominium et potestatem habebat super hominem, et jure eum possidebat: ideo scilicet quod homo ex libertate arbitrii, quam habebat, sponte diabolo consensit.» «Sed, ut nobis videtur, » ait, « nec diabolus unquam jus aliquod in homine habuit, nisi forte Deo permittente, ut carcerarius: nec Filius Dei ut hominem liberaret, carnem assumpsit.»

59. William, *Disputatio*, cap. VII, PL 180:269C–D: «Sicut enim prae manibus habetis, et legere potestis, invadit sacramentum communis salutis». «Sed, ut nobis videtur, nec diabolus unquam in homine habuit jus aliquod, nisi forte Deo permittente, sicut carcerarius, nec Filius Dei, ut hominem liberaret, carnem assumpsit.»

60. *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050A: «Sciendum est quod omnes nostri doctores qui post Apostolos fuere, in hoc conveniunt, quod diabolus dominium et potestatem habebat super hominem, et jure eum possidebat.» «Nec diabolus unquam jus aliquod habuit super hominem, sed jure eum possidebat permittente, ut carcerarius; nec [ut eum] Filius Dei a jugo diaboli liberaret, carnem assumpsit.»

61. *Romans* II, PL 178:834B: «nisi forte quia eum Domino permittente aut etiam tradente ad torquendum ipsum susceperat». PL 178:834D: «His itaque rationibus convinci videtur quod diabolus in hominem quem seduxit nullum jus seducendo acquisierit, nisi forte, ut diximus, quantum ad permissionem Domini pertinebant, qui eum illi quasi carcerario vel tortori suo ad puniendum tradiderat». Both sentences stand within the QUAESTIO, before the SOLUTIO.

62. Cousin II, *Excerpta ex Epitome*, cap. XXIII («Cur deus homo?»), OCR: «Ego vero e contra dico, et ratione irrefragili probo, quod diabolus in hominem nuUum jus habuerit.» «quod sapientia Dei carnem de virgine assumendo sua luce nos illuminavit, dilectionem suam nobis exhibuit.» *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050D–1051A: «Puto ergo quod consilium et causa incarnationis fuit, ut mundum luce suae sapientiae illuminaret, et ad amorem suum accenderet». Bernard quotes the same words in ep. 190, PL 182:1071B–C: «consilium et causam incarnationis fuisse, ut mundum luce suae sapientiae illuminaret, et ad amorem suum accenderet.»

works of Hugh of St-Victor, says that "no injury was done to the devil, since he was only a kind of jailer".[63] The parallels show that the doctrine was taught, and with Bernard's statement that he read it in a book of *Sentences* they are consistent; they do not identify that book.

The form of the extracts

The extracts of chapters V to XIII share a form: "It is usually asked", "It is to be known that", "He objects", answered by "To which we say", "But we say", "We, however, say".[64] It is the form of a book of school sentences, a question, an authority or objection, and the master's answer. The Munich *Sententiae* use it; the *Ethica* and the commentary on Romans are set out otherwise.[65] The *Apologia* denies that any book of *Sentences* "written by me" exists. That fits extracts taken from someone else's record of his teaching, and it fits extracts that are his own. The form does not decide.

Abelard's books carry the doctrine

Chapter V, that neither God-and-man nor this person who is Christ is the third person in the Trinity, quotes a passage on a way of speaking: "When I say, Christ is the third person in the Trinity, I mean that the Word ... is the third person in the Trinity: and so I think the expression is figurative".[66] William quotes the second extract in nearly the same words, and the Munich *Sententiae* have the doctrine.[67] The question was argued outside Abelard's school as well: an anonymous *Apologia de verbo incarnato* reports "some" who conclude "that nothing that is man is God, or the third person in the Trinity", and the *Sententiae* of Peter of Poitiers put the case as a question.[68] The parallel in the Munich *Sententiae* therefore shows a doctrine taught under Abelard's name, not that these words are his. The heading is fair to the quoted words. The *Apologia* affirms Christ, the true and only Son of God, to be "the third person in the Trinity".

Chapter VI, that God does no more for the one saved, before he cleaves to grace, than for the one not saved, has three extracts. The first is a report: "So again it is usually asked what some say, namely whether all men are saved by mercy alone", with that view's consequences. The heading's words are in the second, the answer; the third is the merchant who sets out his stones for all alike.[69] The heading is fair to the second and says more than the first. Mabillon pointed to the fourth book of the commentary on Romans, and the doctrine is there: God imparts the grace of being shown the way "to the reprobate as to the elect equally". The grace that "must go

63. *Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli*, PL 175:457D, QUAESTIO XCII: «nulla injuria facta est diabolo, quia non erat nisi tanquam carcerarius». The file's header assigns the work to Hugh of St-Victor; the file carries no editor's note on its authorship or date, and nothing is inferred here about whether it is earlier or later than Abelard.

64. *Capitula*: «Solet quaeri quid a Domino remuneretur» (X); «Sciendum est quod cum dicitur, Originale peccatum est in parvis» (VIII); «Opponit de Judaeis qui Christum crucifixerunt» (XI); «Sic iterum solet quaeri illud quod a quibusdam dicitur» (VI); «Ad quod dicimus» (IX); «Sed nos dicimus quod hoc dictum est solis Apostolis» (XII); «Nos vero dicimus» (X).

65. Cousin II, *Excerpta ex Epitome*, cap. XXIX (OCR): «quod sciUcet mures videntur rodere et in ore portare corpus iUud, quaeri solet. Sed dicimus, quod Deus iUud non dimittit ibi».

66. *Capitula*, cap. V, PL 182:1051A: «Quando dico, Christus est tertia persona in Trinitate; hoc volo dicere, quod Verbum, quod ab aeterno tertia persona in Trinitate fuit, tertia persona sit in Trinitate: et ita puto quod locutio sit figurativa.» "Third person" renders *tertia persona*, the phrase of the debate: the Word is so called here and in the Munich *Sententiae* (n. 67).

67. William, *Disputatio*, cap. VIII, PL 180:276D–277A: «Sciendum, » ait, « est quod licet concedamus quod Christus tertia sit persona in Trinitate, non tamen concedimus quod hanc persona, quae Christus est, sit tertia persona in Trinitate.» *Capitula*, cap. V, PL 182:1051A–B: «Et est sciendum, quod quamvis concedamus, quod Christus est tertia persona in Trinitate, non tamen concedimus quod haec persona, quae Christus est, si tertia persona in Trinitate.» Cousin II, *Excerpta ex Epitome*, cap. XXIV (OCR): «Quamvis enim ibi sitVerbum, quod est tertia persona in trinitate, non tamen ibi est persona per se».

68. *Apologia de verbo incarnato*, PL 177:306D (the file's header: «Auctor incertus (Joannes Cornubiensis?)»): «Dicunt quidam quod ex anima et carne Christi nihil est compositum, sicut nec ex duabus naturis. Unde consequenter adjungunt quod nihil quod est homo, est Deus, vel tertia persona in Trinitate.» Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae*, PL 211:1174B–C: «Si secundum quod est homo est tertia persona in Trinitate, ergo secundum quod est homo est Deus». Both were found by searching every file on the shelf for «tertia persona in Trinitate».

69. *Capitula*, cap. VI, PL 182:1051B: «Sic iterum solet quaeri illud quod a quibusdam dicitur, scilicet utrum omnes homines ita sola misericordia salventur». PL 182:1051C–D: «Dicendum est ergo, quod homo per rationem, a Deo quidem datam, gratiae appositae cohaerere potest: nec Deus plus facit illi qui salvatur antequam cohaereat gratiae, quam illi qui non salvatur». PL 182:1051D: «Ita enim se gerit Deus erga homines, quemadmodum mercator qui habet pretiosos lapides venales».

before" is that same instruction, offered alike to both "with no other new grace added", and the passage calls the faith so given "the grace of God which goes before each of the elect".[70] On this point the commentary says what the heading says.

Chapter VII, that God ought not to prevent evils, quotes an analysis of consent: one consents to evil who ought and is able to prevent it and does not; "and so God is a stranger to the consent of evil, who neither ought nor is able to prevent evils".[71] The words are not on the shelf. The doctrine is the reductio of chapter III.4 completed (section 4): God cannot opportunely prevent evils that it is good should happen, and so does not consent to them.

Chapter VIII, that we contracted from Adam not guilt but penalty, quotes two sentences on original sin. The first says that "original sin is in children" is said "for the temporal and eternal penalty which is owed to them from the fault of the first parent"; the second, that "in whom all sinned" is said "because the seed-bed of all was in him who sinned", and that "it does not follow from this that all sinned who did not exist: and he who does not exist does not sin".[72] Against these words the heading is fair: the first gives the penalty, and the second denies that those who did not exist sinned. The first only implies the denial of guilt that the heading states flatly, and its verdict is borderline. The commentary on Romans has the doctrine with a hedge: when we say that men are born with original sin, "this seems to be referred rather to the penalty of sin, to which they are held liable, than to guilt of mind and contempt of God". It adds, of infants said to have sinned in Adam, that "we do not therefore grant that they sinned simply", and it glosses Romans 5:12, "in whom all the rest sinned", as "that is, incurred the penalty of sin".[73] Against the commentary, then, the heading's "not guilt, but penalty" says more than "rather … than".

Chapter IX, on the Lord's body, quotes a question about where the species are after the consecration and an answer about what happens when the host is gnawed by mice or falls from the minister's hand: it is not so in the body itself, but God makes it so in the species "to check the negligence of ministers", while he keeps his body as he pleases.[74] The Munich *Sententiae* give the same answer to the same question: God does not leave the body there to be handled by so base an animal, "but the form remains there to correct the negligence of ministers".[75] The answer is not peculiar to Abelard's school. Guitmund of Aversa, on the body of Christ, says that what seems gnawed by mice may be seen in that form "to punish or correct the negligence of ministers", and Algerus of Liège that such indignity happens "to punish or correct the negligence of ministers, because they have handled the body of the Lord unworthily".[76] The parallel in the *Sententiae* shows a common doctrine,

70. *Romans* IV, PL 178:918C–919A: «Aeque tamen Deus utrisque offert illud, et quod suum est efficit, tantumque erga utrumque operatur regni ipsius beatitudinem exponendo et promittendo, quod ad desiderium uniuscujusque accendendum sufficiat, absque nova alia gratia apposita.» «quam praeire gratiam necesse est nisi ut beatitudo illa ad quam nos invitat, et via qua pervenire possimus, exponatur atque tradatur? Hanc autem gratiam tam reprobis ipse quam electis pariter impertit, utrosque videlicet de hoc instruendo aequaliter, ut ex eadem fidei gratia, quam perceperunt, alius ad bona opera incitetur, alius per torporis sui negligentiam inexcusabilis reddatur.» «Haec itaque fides quae in isto per dilectionem operatur, in illo iners et segnis atque otiosa vacat, gratia Dei est quae unumquemque electum praevenit». Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §7, PL 182 (after col. 1047), cites the place by the page of the older edition: «in libro quarto super Epistolam ad Romanos, Abaelardus eamdem pestiferam doctrinam doceat pag. 653 et sequente».

71. *Capitula*, cap. VII, PL 182:1052A: «Ille equidem malo consentiens dicitur, qui cum debeat hoc prohibere, et possit, non prohibet». «Et ideo Deus a consensu malorum est alienus, qui nec debet, nec potest mala impedire.»

72. *Capitula*, cap. VIII, PL 182:1052B: «Sciendum est quod cum dicitur, Originale peccatum est in parvis; hoc dicitur pro poena temporali et aeterna, quae debetur eis ex culpa primi parentis». «Similiter dicitur, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom. V, 12) : ideo scilicet, quia seminarium omnium erat in illo qui peccavit. Non tamen inde provenit, quod omnes peccassent qui non erant: et qui non est, non peccat.»

73. *Romans* II, PL 178:866C–D: «Cum itaque dicimus homines cum originali peccato procreari et nasci, atque hoc ipsum originale peccatum ex primo parente contrahere, magis hoc ad poenam peccati, cui videlicet poenae obnoxii tenentur, quam ad culpam animi et contemptum Dei referendum videtur.» PL 178:871B: «Et notandum quod licet dicamus peccasse parvulos in Adam, ut expositum est, non ideo simpliciter annuamus eos peccasse». PL 178:861D: «in quo omnes reliqui peccaverunt, id est poenam peccati incurrerunt».

74. *Capitula*, cap. IX, PL 182:1052D: «Ad quod dicimus, quod revera non est sic in corpore, sed Deus ita in speciebus ipsis propter negligentiam ministrorum reprimendam habere facit: corpus vero suum, prout ei placet, reponit et conservat».

75. Cousin II, *Excerpta ex Epitome*, cap. XXIX, p. 580 (OCR): «Sed dicimus, quod Deus iUud non dimittit ibi, ut a tam turpi animali tractetur ; sed tamen remanet ibi forma ad negUgentiam ministrorum corrigendam.»

76. Guitmund of Aversa, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi veritate*, PL 149:1448B: «ad negligentiam ministrorum puniendam vel corrigendam, vel certe ad fidem dilectionemve probandam»; PL 149:1448C–D: «vel ad puniendam seu corrigendam ministrorum negligentiam, vel

not that these words are Abelard's. The heading is fair to the second extract. The first, on where the species are, does not state the heading's thesis at all, and the heading says more than it (a borderline verdict). The *Apologia* does not answer the charge, and it is not among Denzinger's nineteen.

Chapter X, that a man is made neither better nor worse by works, quotes a question with an objection from authority and the answer "we say that they are rewarded eternally … nor is a man made worse or better by works, unless perhaps while he works his will is increased in some respect".[77] The heading drops the exception and so says more than the words. The *Ethica* says that God weighs "the mind rather than the action" and that the action adds nothing to merit, and the Munich *Sententiae* that "all merit consists in the will, not in the works, which are common to good and bad".[78] The last phrase is not peculiar to Abelard's school: Henry of Marcy says of the works by which merit is shown that "they are common to good and bad".[79] The *Apologia* states the same doctrine in Abelard's own name (section 8).

Chapter XI, that those who crucified Christ in ignorance did not sin, and that nothing done in ignorance is fault, quotes an objection ("He objects, about the Jews who crucified Christ … and about Eve") and an answer: those simple Jews acted not against conscience but from zeal for their law, "and therefore they did not sin".[80] The *Ethica* says the same in its own voice: on the account of sin as contempt of God, "we cannot say that they sinned in this, nor that anyone's ignorance, or even unbelief itself … is sin". It then answers the objections, that Christ prayed for his crucifiers and Stephen called it sin, by distinguishing senses. Sin "properly" is contempt of God; in a wider sense the persecutors "sinned in the deed", and they would have sinned "more gravely in fault" had they spared them against conscience.[81] The first clause of the heading is fair to the *Ethica*'s proper sense; the second, "whatever is done through ignorance", is wider than either text.

Chapter XII, on the power of binding and loosing, quotes a gloss and an answer: the saying "Whose sins you forgive" was said "to the Apostles alone, not to their successors"; and then, at once, a hedge, that if anyone says it fits their successors, it should be expounded in the manner of the authority already given.[82] The *Ethica* argues that the saying "seems to be referred to their persons, not generally to all bishops", and ends with a hedge of its own, "unless perhaps, according to what Jerome himself says, we understand this binding or loosing" as a judgment granted to all.[83] The heading names the topic only; Denzinger's article 12 states the thesis, and the extract supports it, hedge included.

Chapter XIII, on suggestion, delight and consent, quotes the doctrine that neither the suggestion nor the

ad probandam eorum qui hoc viderint, fidem, in tali specie posse videri». Algerus of Liège, *De sacramentis*, PL 180:812B–C: «ad puniendam vel corrigendam ministrorum negligentiam, pro eo quod corpus Domini indigne tractaverint». The attributions are the files' headers; their dates are not used here.

77. *Capitula*, cap. X, PL 182:1052D–1053A: «Nos vero dicimus, quod aeternaliter a Deo remunerentur, sive ad bonum, sive ad malum: nec propter opera pejor, vel melior efficitur homo, nisi dum operatur, fortassis voluntas ejus in aliquo augmentetur.»

78. *Ethica*, PL 178:638C–D: «cum ipse animum potius quam actionem in remuneratione penset, nec quidquam ad meritum actio addat sive de bona, sive de mala voluntate prodeat». Cousin II, *Excerpta ex Epitome*, cap. XXXIV, p. 589 (OCR): «Sic igitur in voluntate, non in operibus quae bonis et malis communia sunt, meritum omne consistit.»

79. Henry of Marcy (the file's header: «Henricus de Castro Marsiaco»), *De peregrinante civitate Dei*, PL 204:267B: «Sunt enim bonis et malis communia». Found by searching the shelf for «bonis et malis communia».

80. *Capitula*, cap. XI, PL 182:1053A–B: «Opponit de Judaeis qui Christum crucifixerunt, et de aliis qui martyres persequendo putabant se obsequium praestare Deo: et de Eva». «Ad quod nos dicimus, quod revera illi simplices Judaei non agebant contra conscientiam, sed potius zelo legis suae Christum persequebantur; nec putabant se male agere, et ideo non peccabant».

81. *Ethica*, cap. XIII, PL 178:653B–C: «Si quis tamen quaerat utrum illi martyrum vel Christi persecutores in eo peccarent, quod placere Deo credebant». «non possumus dicere eos in hoc peccasse, nec ignorantiam cujusquam, vel ipsam etiam infidelitatem, cum qua nemo salvari potest, peccatum esse.» Cap. XIV, PL 178:654A: «sciendum est nomen peccati diversis modis accipi; proprie tamen peccatum dicitur ipse Dei contemptus, vel consensus in malum». PL 178:657D: «Sic et illos, si persequebantur Christum vel suos, quos persequendos credebant per operationem peccasse dicimus, qui tamen gravius culpam peccassent, si contra conscientiam eis parcerent.»

82. *Capitula*, cap. XII, PL 182:1054A: «Sed nos dicimus quod hoc dictum est solis Apostolis, non successoribus eorum.» «Si quis tamen successoribus eorum convenire hoc dixerit, ad modum supradictae auctoritatis hanc quoque exponere decet.»

83. *Ethica*, PL 178:674A: «Quod itaque Dominus apostolis ait: Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis, etc., ad personas eorum, non generaliter ad omnes episcopos referendum videtur». PL 178:674D: «nisi forte juxta hoc quod ipse ait Hieronymus, hanc ligationem vel absolutionem intelligamus praedictum judicium omnibus generaliter concessum».

delight that follows is sin, "but consent alone, which is also called contempt of God, in which sin consists".[84] This is the doctrine of the *Ethica*, which says that "our sin is contempt of the Creator", and that "when we assent to this delight by consent, we sin".[85] The heading, a topic, is fair.

NOT ON SHELF, then, is neither acquittal nor conviction. For chapters IV, VI, VIII and X–XIII the doctrine the heading names stands in Abelard's own books, for IV, V, IX and X in a school book carrying his name, and only for VII is there nothing nearer than the argument of chapter III. But the words cannot be shown to be his. In IV, V, IX and X the doctrine, or the idiom that carries it, is current on the shelf outside Abelard, so the school book shows a doctrine taught under his name, not his words. And for VIII and XI his books say less than the heading.

6. The Verdicts

Table 2 gives the three verdicts for each extract, with its voice. "Denz." is Denzinger's article, "Will." the chapter of William's *Disputatio* that treats the same matter, and the last column records what the *Apologia* says of the charge. Full references are in the notes to sections 4 and 5; the files are listed in Appendix B.

Extract	Denz.	Will.	Voice	Words	Heading	*Apologia*
I.1 seal	(1)	III	own	ALTERED: adds "of God"; drops "therefore", "as has been said", "for", "from bronze"; particles; stops before the guard	FAIR	disowns "full power … no power"
I.2 benignity	1	IV	own	ALTERED: inserts "which is the Spirit"; drops "some"; cuts the reason	no heading (I names the seal)	disowns
II.1 generation	2	IV	own	VERBATIM (*Theologia christiana* IV; Cousin's *Introductio*)	STRETCHED: first half of the argument	denies
II.2 procession	2	IV	own	ALTERED: "if we speak properly" absent (present in the *Introductio*; perhaps a recension); "to be said to be" made "is"	STRETCHED: generalises "not from the substance" to "not of the substance", against the words' "of the same substance"	denies; true to the letter
III.1	7	—	own	ALTERED: particles	FAIR	restates
III.2	7	—	own	ALTERED: drops "but"	FAIR	restates
III.3	7	—	own	ALTERED: word order	FAIR	restates
III.4	7	—	reductio step	ALTERED: cut at the question, before the reductio's conclusion (premise not scored)	STRETCHED: half an argument	"God often prevents evils"
III.5	7	—	own	ALTERED: drops "which at some time he does or leaves undone"	FAIR	restates
IV.1 the doctors	4	VII	report	NOT ON SHELF; fuller in ep. 190 and William	STRETCHED: a report (borderline)	denies
IV.2 no right	4	VII	own	NOT ON SHELF; damaged; doctrine in *Romans* II	FAIR	denies
IV.3 the questions	4	VII	own question	ALTERED: one sentence replaced; drops "also", "men", "in paradise", "the Father"; "sins" for "penalties"; quoted without the solution	STRETCHED: questions without the answer	denies
IV.4 the solution	4	—	own question, then own answer	ALTERED: "SOLUTIO" dropped; "in this" made "nonetheless"; "To whom … not" for "How"; "not only … but also"; "seem to us" dropped	STRETCHED: thesis not stated, since the answer does not name the devil (borderline)	denies
IV.5 cause of incarnation	4	VII	own	NOT ON SHELF; doctrine in the Munich *Sententiae*	STRETCHED: generalises, a stated purpose made an exclusion	denies
V.1 figurative	5	VIII	own	NOT ON SHELF	FAIR	affirms the contrary

84. *Capitula*, cap. XIII, PL 182:1054A–B: «Sciendum quoque quod suggestio non est peccatum illi cui suggestio fit, nec delectatio consequens suggestionem». «sed solus consensus, qui et contemptus Dei dicitur, in quo peccatum consistit.»

85. *Ethica*, PL 178:636A: «Peccatum itaque nostrum contemptus Creatoris est et peccare est Creatorem contemnere». PL 178:646A: «Cui videlicet delectationi dum assentimus per consensum, peccamus.»

Extract	Denz.	Will.	Voice	Words	Heading	*Apologia*
V.2 this person	5	VIII	own	NOT ON SHELF; William nearly the same	FAIR	affirms the contrary
VI.1 what some say	6	VI	report	NOT ON SHELF; a report and its consequences	STRETCHED: a report	denies
VI.2 the answer	6	VI	own	NOT ON SHELF; William nearly the same	FAIR	denies
VI.3 the merchant	6	VI	own	NOT ON SHELF; William shorter	FAIR	—
VII consent	8	—	own	NOT ON SHELF; doctrine in *Introductio* III	FAIR	corrects
VIII.1 penalty	9	XI	own	NOT ON SHELF; *Romans* II says "rather … than"	FAIR (borderline)	affirms the contrary
VIII.2 seed	9	XI	own	NOT ON SHELF	FAIR	affirms the contrary
IX.1 species	—	IX	question, own answer	NOT ON SHELF	STRETCHED: thesis not stated (borderline)	—
IX.2 mice	—	IX	question, own answer	NOT ON SHELF; same answer in the *Sententiae*, Guitmund and Algerus	FAIR	—
X works	13	—	question, own answer	NOT ON SHELF; doctrine in *Ethica* and *Sententiae*	STRETCHED: exception dropped	owns, in his words
XI crucifiers	10	XIII	objection, own answer	NOT ON SHELF; doctrine in *Ethica* XIII	STRETCHED: generalises	takes one side of the *Ethica*'s hedge
XII.1 gloss	12	—	own	NOT ON SHELF	FAIR (topic)	takes one side of the *Ethica*'s hedge
XII.2 Apostles alone	12	—	own	NOT ON SHELF; doctrine in *Ethica*	FAIR (topic)	takes one side of the *Ethica*'s hedge
XII.3 hedge	12	—	own	NOT ON SHELF	FAIR (topic)	takes one side of the *Ethica*'s hedge
XIII.1 consent	19	XII	own	NOT ON SHELF; doctrine in *Ethica*	FAIR (topic)	denies Denz. 19, which the *Ethica* states
XIII.2 contempt	19	XII	own	NOT ON SHELF	FAIR (topic)	denies Denz. 19, which the *Ethica* states
XIV omnipotence	14	—	own	ALTERED: "nature" made "knowledge"; drops "God"	FAIR	affirms equality

Table 2: Bernard's *Capitula haeresum*: thirty-two extracts against the texts of Abelard on the shelf. Heading verdicts are the author's reading (section 3).

Of thirty-two extracts, one is VERBATIM, eleven ALTERED, none shown to be SPLICED and twenty NOT ON SHELF. Of the eleven alterations, seven leave the sense as it was (I.1, III.1–III.3, III.5, IV.3, XIV) and four change it (I.2, II.2, III.4, IV.4). IV.3 is among the seven: its replaced sentence leaves the extract's question standing (section 4), and the questions are Abelard's own, so that quoting them without his answer is a truncation, not a change of what the words say. In two of the four the change is a cut or a lost label rather than a changed word: III.4 stops before its conclusion, and IV.4 loses its "SOLUTIO" and its "in this". Twenty headings are FAIR, eleven STRETCHED, and one extract (I.2) has no heading that summarises it. The heading verdicts are the author's reading, and four are borderline: IV.1 and IX.1, stretched only because the extract does not state the thesis; IV.4, an answer that leaves the devil unmentioned; and VIII.1, fair to words that imply what the heading states. Scored the other way, those four would give between nineteen and twenty-three FAIR. None is CONTRARY, since in no case does Abelard's text at the place quoted say the opposite of the heading; the contrary statements are in the *Apologia* (section 8).

One join cannot be scored. The *Capitula* run IV.2, the passage not on the shelf, into IV.3, the questions from the commentary on Romans, with "and after a little", as though the two stood a few lines apart in one book.[86] Since one side of the join is in no text of Abelard on the shelf, the shelf cannot say whether the formula covers a gap, and the join is recorded, not scored. If Bernard's account is right, that he read the doctrine both

86. *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050B: «carnem assumpsit. Et post pauca: Quomodo nos justificari vel reconciliari Deo per mortem Filii ejus dicit Apostolus». For Bernard's statement see n. 57.

in a book of *Sentences* and in the commentary on Romans, and if IV.1 and IV.2 come from the first, then "and after a little" joins two books and presents them as one. If the passage stood in a part of the commentary or of the *Theologia* that is not in print, the formula may be accurate.

7. William and the Common Source

William had the books, and he quotes Abelard at greater length than the *Capitula*. If any accuser quotes exactly, it should be he. His ten longest quotations of Abelard, fixed by the rule given with Table 3, were each tested against both recensions of the *Theologia* on the shelf, the *Introductio* and the *Theologia christiana*.[87] None is verbatim; two, from the seal passage, are altered without change of sense; five are not on the shelf; and three are spliced in the sense of section 3. On the three names he joins two sentences across sixty-six words, among them a passage of Augustine that calls God "omnipotent, not because he can do all things, but because he can effect whatever he wills".[88] On the seal he joins two sentences across a hundred and nine words, and drops the "as if" with which Abelard says philosophers speak of a species as begotten from its genus.[89] The *Theologia christiana* has neither passage, so these two rest on the *Introductio* alone. On the Spirit William's text is mixed throughout. Most of the lead-in reads with the *Introductio* against the *Theologia christiana*: the Prophet's "fitting metaphor" of the spirit of the Lord's mouth, which the *Theologia christiana* lacks; "from God the Father" and "is declared" where it has "from the Father" and "is held"; "is not … in God"; the sentence that takes God's goodness "according to the affection of charity", where the *Theologia christiana* has another; and "to extend himself". Fewer readings go with the *Theologia christiana*: the word order of "is said to have charity" and of "and joins itself to it by love", which the *Introductio* has with the same words in another order, and "from the very substance of the Father" with neither "is properly said" nor the Creed that follows in the *Introductio*.[90] His next sentence, "But the Spirit, though of the same substance …", is the *Introductio*'s, which the *Theologia christiana* does not have, and in it he lacks "if we speak properly". At the Creed, then, his words before the join stand in that form only in the *Theologia christiana*, which goes on "But the Spirit is not begotten", and his words

87. The rule: William's quotations are taken as Migne's text of the *Disputatio* sets them off in guillemets (a run ends at any inner guillemet), those he introduces as another author's are set aside, and the rest are ranked by length in words; the ten run from 288 words to 44. Set aside under the rule, among others, is a sentence of Ambrose in cap. II, introduced «beatus Ambrosius dicat contra eos qui in natura divinitatis Patris et Filii calumniabantur diversitatem, audiamus». Each quotation was run through the matcher sentence by sentence against every text of Abelard on the shelf, and the hits were read in the *Introductio* and the *Theologia christiana*.

88. William, *Disputatio*, cap. II, PL 180:250A–B: «Patris quippe nomine divinae majestatis potentia designatur, qua quidquid vult efficere potest: Filii seu Verbi appellatione sapientia Dei significatur». *Introductio* I, PL 178:989B–C, between the two: «Omnipotens vero est, non quod possit omnia facere, sed quia potest efficere quidquid vult.»

89. William, *Disputatio*, cap. III, PL 180:255B: «Et hoc est Filium de Patre esse; sive genitum esse, videlicet sicut species ex genere philosophi dicunt gigni, sive creari.» *Introductio* II, PL 178:1070B: «quod est Filium de substantia Patris esse, vel ab ipso genitum esse. Nam et species ex genere quasi gigni vel creari philosophi dicunt».

90. William, *Disputatio*, cap. IV, PL 180:258A–B: «Procedere ergo Dei est sese in aliquam rem per affectum charitatis quodammodo extendere, ut eam videlicet diligat, ac se ei per amorem conjungat.» «Unde bene sapientia, ex potentia, Filius ex Patre esse dicitur, hoc est, ex ipsa Patris substantia esse; Spiritus vero, quamvis ejusdem sit substantiae cum Patre et Filio, etiam Trinitas ipsa homousion». «minime tamen est ex substantia Patris et Filii, quod esset ipsum ex Patre Filioque gigni». William has «ac se ei per amorem conjungat» again at PL 180:260B. With the *Introductio* (PL 178:1072A–B) against the *Theologia christiana*, William, PL 180:257D–258A: «Et Propheta convenienti metaphora spiritum Domini distinguens spiritum oris ejus ipsum appellat»; «procedere ex Deo Patre et Filio, potius quam gigni, declaratur»; «non est in Deo potentia sive sapientia»; «sed haec ejus bonitas magis secundum ipsum charitatis affectum, sive effectu, accipienda est»; «sese in aliquam rem per affectum charitatis quodammodo extendere». The *Introductio*: «Et Propheta convenienti metaphora Spiritum Domini distinguens»; «procedere ex Deo Patre vel Filio potius quam gigni declaratur»; «sed ejus bonitas magis secundum ipsum charitatis effectum sive effetus accipienda est»; «sese ad aliquam rem per affectum charitatis quodammodo extendere». The *Theologia christiana* (PL 178:1299C–D): «procedere ex Patre et Filio potius quam gigni perhibetur»; «Nullus quippe in eo quod benignus est aut sapiens est aut potens, imo ipsam magis charitatis affectum sive effectum dici convenit»; «Procedere itaque Dei est esse ad aliquam rem». With the *Theologia christiana* against the *Introductio*, William: «habere charitatem dicitur, sed dilectione se in alterum extendit»; the *Theologia christiana*: «habere charitatem dicitur, sed dilectione se in alterum tendit»; the *Introductio*: «charitatem dicitur habere, sed dilectionem in alterum extendit». *Theologia christiana* IV, PL 178:1299D: «ut eam videlicet diligat, ac se ei per amorem conjungat»; for its lead-in see n. 38. *Introductio* II, PL 178:1072B: «ut eam videlicet diligat ac ei per amorem se conjungat». For the *Introductio*'s Spirit sentence see nn. 36–37.

after it only in the *Introductio*, where seventy-four words stand between, the Creed and the sentence in which "properly" only the Son is from the Father's substance. No recension on the shelf has his text on both sides of this join in one form, so under section 3 the join is recorded, not scored, as at IV.2 and IV.3. His copy agreed with neither printed recension, and William himself says that the two little books he read contained "nearly the same things, except that in one rather more was found, in the other less" (see n. 13). Near its end the passage joins two sentences across sixty-five words in the *Theologia christiana* and seventy-two in the *Introductio*, on God's benignity turned towards creatures. Both recensions have the words on both sides, and this join is scored SPLICED. William carries "God, who needs nothing", in the *Theologia christiana*'s form, across the gap from the omitted sentence into the one he keeps, and he drops "but towards creatures only". The author's judgment, and it is a judgment, is that the sense survives.[91] On the most consequential point, the qualifier on the Spirit's procession, William and Bernard agree against the only printed text that has the sentence.

Rank and length	William, PL 180	Opening words	Verdict against the *Introductio* and the *Theologia christiana*
1 (288 words)	cap. IV, 257D–258B	«Spiritus quasi a spirando dictus»	SPLICED and ALTERED: mixed throughout, the lead-in mostly with the *Introductio*, a few readings and the passage to the Spirit sentence with the *Theologia christiana*; the Spirit sentence as in the *Introductio*, without "if we speak properly"; the join at the Creed recorded, not scored (no recension has both sides in William's form); two sentences, present in both, omitted before "Tunc vero" (65 and 72 words), which is the splice
2 (258)	cap. III, 254D–255C	«Sicut ex aere est aereum sigillum»	SPLICED and ALTERED: 109 words of the *Introductio* omitted; "as if" dropped (not in the *Theologia christiana*)
3 (165)	cap. VI, 267A–B	«Sed quia ita non est, sed longe aliter»	NOT ON SHELF
4 (115)	cap. VI, 266D–267A	«utrum omnes homines ita sola misericordia Dei salventur»	NOT ON SHELF
5 (96)	cap. VII, 269C–D	«quod doctores nostri post apostolos in hoc conveniunt»	NOT ON SHELF
6 (80)	cap. II, 250A–B	«Videtur nobis supra positis trium personarum nominibus»	SPLICED and ALTERED: 66 words, with Augustine, omitted (not in the *Theologia christiana*)
7 (57)	cap. X, 281B	«quia facit haec per physicam rerum»	NOT ON SHELF; doctrine in the *Ethica*
8 (56)	cap. III, 254D	«Sigillum aereum est aes ita formatum»	ALTERED
9 (53)	cap. III, 256D–257A	«Sicut aereum sigillum de ipsa aeris substantia»	ALTERED
10 (44)	cap. II, 250B–251A	«Notandum quod ista tria nomina»	NOT ON SHELF

Table 3: William's ten longest quotations of Abelard, tested against both recensions on the shelf.

That raises the question whether they shared a source of extracts. The evidence is of three kinds.

First, Bernard's two texts belong together. The *Capitula* and letter 190 share readings that no other witness has: the gloss "which is the Spirit" in the benignity sentence, "because ... equally" for "who ... God" in chapter XIV, and, the strongest, "To whom does it not seem cruel" for "How cruel it seems", where both printings of Abelard read "How" and letter 190 marks its form as Abelard's with *inquit*. Both call the work *Stultologia*.[92] Where they differ, the error is the *Capitula*'s: "and a price" for "as a price", "he sinned" for "men sinned",

91. William, *Disputatio*, cap. IV, PL 180:258B: «Nemo enim sibi ipsi benignus esse potest; sed alteri. Tunc vero Deus qui nullius indiget, in se per benignitatem remaneret». *Theologia christiana* IV, PL 178:1300B–C: «Maxime autem Deus, qui nullius indiget, erga seipsum benignitatis affectu commoveri non potest» and, sixty-five words on, «Tunc vero in se per benignitatem remaneret». *Introductio* II, PL 178:1072D–1073A: «Maxime autem Deus cum nullius indiget, erga ipsum benignitatis affectum commoveri non potest» and, seventy-two words on, «Tunc vero in se per benignitatem remaneret». The omitted sentences carry «sed erga creaturas tantum» in both recensions (PL 178:1300C; 1073A); William's «Deus qui nullius indiget» has the *Theologia christiana*'s «qui», where the *Introductio* has «cum».

92. For the gloss, the loss of *aliqua* and *Cui vero non crudele* see nn. 32–33 and 51; for chapter XIV, n. 54. Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1061B: «Denique in primo limine Theologiae, vel potius Stultilogiae suae, fidem definit aestimationem».

"so pleased God" for "so pleased God the Father", "from himself" for "of himself", "if third" for "is third".[93] That is what Mabillon's "faulty manuscript" would lead one to expect, and it supports his identification of the *Capitula* with the chapters Bernard says he collected and sent.

Second, William's quotations agree with Bernard's against every printed text of Abelard in the passages on the Son and the Spirit. Both lack "if we speak properly", which the *Introductio*, the only printed text with the sentence, has. Both make "is not to be said to be from the substance … since that would require him to be begotten" into "is not from the substance … which would be for him to be begotten", and both have "the Trinity itself *homousion*" for "the Trinity *omousios*". Both lack "some" in the benignity sentence, which Migne's *Introductio*, Migne's *Theologia christiana*, Cousin's *Introductio* and the anonymous *Disputatio altera* all have; William himself has the word when he paraphrases the sentence a little later. In the seal passage both read "namely" (*videlicet*) for Abelard's *scilicet*, and both repeat "but" before the second "not conversely".[94] These agreements are trivial, and that is their weight: it is unlikely that two writers would independently add "itself", change *scilicet* to *videlicet*, repeat a *sed* and, in letter 190 and the *Capitula*, turn "How cruel" into "To whom … not cruel".

Third, the agreement is not complete. In the same passages William has "procession from generation" where Bernard, with Abelard, has "generation from procession", and "is declared" for "is shown"; he keeps the reason in the benignity sentence and has no gloss.[95] In the passage on the devil's right, which no text of Abelard on the shelf contains, letter 190 and William agree over some ninety words, and the *Capitula* give a shorter, damaged form. In chapter VI the central sentence is almost the same in William and the *Capitula*, but the lead-in and the simile differ.[96] And the *Capitula* have extracts on matters William does not treat: God's power (III), consent (VII), works (X), the keys (XII) and the Father's omnipotence (XIV).

The documents name a channel. William says he sent his notes "with the little books themselves" to Geoffrey and Bernard; Bernard replied that "most, nearly all" of these things he had not known until then; and in his chapter on the redemption William tells them that they have the passage "in hand, and can read it".[97] Bernard told the cardinals that the *Theologia* "is at hand", read by many in the Curia.[98] William's letter as printed among Bernard's (ep. 326) gives thirteen headings and no excerpts, and ends "But now let us come to the matter, etc.", so there is nothing in it to compare with the *Capitula* and letter 190.[99] The editors' apparatus on the shelf gives no date for ep. 326, ep. 327 or ep. 190, and so no order between William's letter and Bernard's treatise; ep. 327 says that Bernard had so far only run through William's book, not yet with the attention asked of him (see n. 14), and did not think they could meet before Easter.

The evidence supports this much. Bernard's collection was not copied from William's *Disputatio* as it stands, since it has matter William lacks and in places a longer text; nor was William's copied from Bernard's as it stands, since William has a fuller and sounder text of the redemption passage. Their shared readings came from a

93. *Capitula*, cap. IV, PL 182:1050B–C: «Nunquid mors innocentis Filii tantum Deo placuit». Bernard, ep. 190, PL 182:1070A: «Nunquid mors innocentis Filii in tantum Deo Patri placuit». For «et pretium» see n. 51, for «deliquerit» n. 46, for «a se» n. 54, for «si tertia» n. 67.

94. William, *Disputatio*, cap. III, PL 180:255A–B: «ad eam videlicet similitudinem, qua sigillum aereum ex aere dicitur esse». «exigit quod sit divina potentia, sed non e converso». *Capitula*, cap. I, PL 182:1049A: «exigit quod sit divina potentia, sed non e contrario». *Introductio* II, PL 178:1070A: «exigit quod sit divina potentia, non e contrario». William's paraphrase, n. 22. *Disputatio altera*, PL 180:284A: «Benignitas ipsa, quae nomine Spiritus sancti demonstratur, non est aliqua in Deo potentia, sive sapientia».

95. William, *Disputatio*, cap. IV, PL 180:258A: «differt in eo processio a generatione, quod is qui generatur ex ipsa Patris substantia est». PL 180:257D: «Benignitas quippe ipsa, quae hoc nomine declaratur, non est in Deo potentia sive sapientia, cum videlicet ipsum benignum esse, non sit in aliquo potentem esse, sive sapientem».

96. William, *Disputatio*, cap. VI, PL 180:267A: «Dicendum est igitur quod homo per rationem a Deo quidem datam gratiae appositae cohaerere potest; nec Deus plus facit isti qui salvatur, antequam cohaereat gratiae, quam illi qui non salvatur. Sed sicut qui lapides pretiosos exponit venales, et desiderium videntium excitat ad emendum». Cap. VI, PL 180:266D: «Quaeritur etiam, » inquit, « utrum omnes homines ita sola misericordia Dei salventur». For the *Capitula* see n. 69; for the redemption passage, nn. 58–60.

97. See nn. 13, 14 and 59.

98. Bernard, ep. 188, PL 182:353B: «ad manum est enim; cum, sicut gloriatur, a pluribus lectitetur in curia».

99. William (Bernard, ep. 326), PL 182:532A: «Haec sunt ergo capitula ex opusculis ejus collecta, quae vobis offerenda putavi». PL 182:533A: «Sed jam veniamus ad rem, etc.» Bernard, ep. 327, PL 182:533B: «Idipsum tamen ante Pascha fieri posse non arbitror».

common source, and the source may have been of two kinds: the same copies of Abelard, which in the passages on the Spirit differed from every copy that reached print, or William's own marked notes, sent to Bernard with the books, from which Bernard's excerpts could have been drawn before either text took its present form. The evidence does not show whether the shared omissions were made by an excerptor, by a scribe, or in Abelard's own earlier copies, and so it does not show that either accuser altered these sentences. It shows that, if they were altered, the alteration came before both texts as we have them, and that neither accuser checked it against another copy.

8. Abelard's Answer

The *Apologia* is short, and it answers a list, not a book. After a protest against those who twist what is well said, it takes the charges in Denzinger's order and gives to each a sentence or two, most of them professions of faith in the first person. Its answers are of five kinds.

Some deny that he wrote the words. The article on "full power … no power" he condemns "with its author", and on the shelf the words are not in his writings. Whoever says that he wrote that the Spirit "is not of the substance of the Father" spoke "from malice or the greatest ignorance"; he wrote that the Spirit is not, properly, "from" the substance, and is "of the same substance". The coming attributed to the Father never entered his mind; the descent "by power" is "utterly remote from my words and sense"; the last chapter is "foreign to my words and writings alike".[100] That last denial does not agree with the *Ethica*. The chapter he denies says that neither work nor will nor concupiscence nor the delight it moves is sin, "and we ought not to wish them extinguished" (see n. 19). The *Ethica* says that will and desire to do what is not lawful are "by no means to be called sin", that the man who resists desire "represses it, does not extinguish it", and that we triumph over our bad will without extinguishing it, "so that we may always have something to fight against".[101] The *Apologia* denies what the *Ethica* states in so many words.

Most answers profess the contrary faith without saying whether he ever wrote otherwise: the Son became incarnate to free us "from the servitude of sin and from the yoke of the devil"; Jesus Christ is "the third person in the Trinity", the phrase chapter V denies of "this person who is Christ"; grace goes before us, follows us and accompanies us; God often prevents evils; the power of the keys passed to all the Apostles' successors; the Father is as wise and the Son as benign as the Spirit.[102]

Two answers own the charge. The spirit of fear "was never in the soul of Christ, who had the most perfect charity", though it is not lacking in his lower members, since much that is said of Christ is to be taken of his body, the Church.[103] On works he says in his own name what chapter X says: no merit is lost if a good will is

100. *Apologia*, PL 178:105–106: «Quae si quis in meis reperiat scriptis, non solum me haereticum, verum etiam haeresiarcham profiteor.» «Quisquis etiam me scripsisse asserit quod de substantia Patris Spiritus sanctus etiam non sit, malitiae id vel ignorantiae maximae fuit.» PL 178:107: «Sic et animam Christi non per se ad inferos descendisse, sed per potentiam, omnino a meis verbis et sensu remotum est.» For the coming at the end see n. 18, for the last chapter n. 19. For the *Ethica* see n. 85.

101. *Ethica*, PL 178:638C: «Haec vero est nostra voluntas mala, de qua triumphamus, cum eam divinae subjugamus, nec eam prorsus exstinguimus, ut semper habeamus contra quam dimicemus.» PL 178:639B: «Desiderium ille reprimit, non exstinguit; sed quia non trahitur ad consensum, non incurrit peccatum. Quorsum autem ista? Ut denique pateat in talibus ipsam quoque voluntatem vel desiderium faciendi quod non licet nequaquam dici peccatum, sed ipsum potius, ut diximus, consensum.» Denzinger's item 19 (OCR) has the same clause as the *Apologia*: «nec debemus velle eam exstinguere».

102. *Apologia*, PL 178:106–107: «Solum Filium Dei incarnatum profiteor, ut nos a servitute peccati et a jugo diaboli liberaret». «Jesum Christum sicut verum et unicum Dei Filium ex substantia Patris ante saecula genitum, ita tertiam in Trinitate personam». «Ipsa quippe gratia nos praevenit ut velimus, ipsa subsequitur ut possimus, ipsa nos consociat, ut perseveremus.» «Mala Deum impedire frequenter, fateor». «Potestatem ligandi atque solvendi successoribus apostolorum omnibus, ut ipsis aeque apostolis concessam esse profiteor, et tam indignis quam dignis episcopis quandiu eos Ecclesia susceperit.» «Deum Patrem aeque sapientem, et Filium aeque benignum ut Spiritum sanctum profiteor».

103. *Apologia*, PL 178:107: «Multa de Christo dicuntur quae non tam secundum caput quam secundum corpus ipsius, quod est Ecclesia, sunt accipienda». «Hujus ergo timoris spiritum in anima Christi, qui perfectissimam habuit charitatem, nunquam fuisse credendum est, qui tamen in inferioribus membris non deest.»

hindered of its effect.[104] One answer restates. To chapter III he replies, "I believe that God can do only what it befits him to do, and that he can do many things he will never do."[105] Three charges get no answer: the world-soul, the stones and herbs, and the accidents in the air.

Where the *Apologia* professes the contrary faith, it sometimes contradicts Abelard's earlier text, and the cases are of two grades. Three are flat contradictions. The *Introductio* concluded that God can do only what he does at some time (JMT 1.1); the *Apologia* grants that he can do many things he will never do. The commentary on Romans referred original sin "rather to the penalty ... than to guilt", and glossed "in whom all sinned" as "incurred the penalty of sin"; the *Apologia* asserts that we contracted "guilt as well as penalty". And the *Apologia* denies the last chapter, which the *Ethica* states (above). Two more choose one side of a hedge the earlier text left open. The *Ethica* said of Christ's persecutors that "we cannot say that they sinned in this", sin taken properly, but allowed that they sinned "in the deed"; the *Apologia* says the crucifiers "committed a most grievous sin". The *Ethica* referred the power of forgiving to the persons of the Apostles, "not generally to all bishops", but ended "unless perhaps, according to what Jerome himself says" the binding is a judgment granted to all; the *Apologia* gives it to all their successors.[106] In neither grade does the *Apologia* say that it is changing anything, and it does not mention the earlier texts. One qualification bears on all five. "He contradicts himself" assumes that the *Apologia* is his, which the editor of the *Responsio*, the same text in PL 180, leaves open (below). If another wrote it, the contradictions are between Abelard's books and an answer made in his name.

The *Responsio* in PL 180 is the same text with variants. At the thesis on God's power it reads that God *does* only what it befits him to do, and *could* do many things he does not do.[107] Its editor heads it "rather a slanderous retraction of the errors of Peter Abelard", and allows that the errors are condemned there "whether by him or by another in his name".[108] The anonymous abbot of the *Disputatio altera* quotes another apology of Abelard's, written, Tissier says, against Bernard, in which Abelard "pursues this chapter more diffusely than the rest" and concludes that God "can do and will to do only what at some time he does".[109] That apology is not on the shelf. If the abbot's quotations are faithful, Abelard defended the thesis of chapter III at length in one apology and gave it up in the other.

Berengar adds little. In a speech he gives to Bernard, Bernard says he packed the doctrine "into a handy little index", so that readers need not travel through "the wide forests of Abelard's volumes"; Berengar answers that the index holds some things Abelard said and wrote and some he did not, and defers the sorting to a second treatise.[110]

The texts say three different things about a *Liber Sententiarum*. The *Capitula* as Mabillon prints them attribute nothing to a book of *Sentences*: they end with the *Stultologia*, and nothing follows. The *Apologia* says that "our friend" ended the chapters against him by saying they were found "partly in the book of the *Theologia* of Master Peter, partly in his book of *Sentences*, partly in the book whose title is *Scito te ipsum*", and

104. *Apologia*, PL 178:107: «nec quidquam meriti apud Deum deperire, si bonae voluntatis affectus a suo praepediatur effectu. Non enim angelus, cum a Deo missus id quod facere vult impleverit, aut anima Christi suae voluntati effectum addiderit, melior inde reputari debuit».

105. *Apologia*, PL 178:107: «Deum ea solummodo posse facere credo quae ipsum facere convenit; et quod multa facere potest, quae nunquam faciet.»

106. *Apologia*, PL 178:107: «Ex Adam, in quo omnes peccavimus, tam culpam quam poenam nos contraxisse assero». «Crucifixores Christi in ipsa crucifixione gravissimum peccatum fateor commisisse.» For the *Introductio* see JMT 1.1; for *Romans* n. 73; for the *Ethica* nn. 81 and 83.

107. *Responsio*, PL 180:330C: «Deum ea solummodo facere credo, quae ipsum facere convenit, et quod multa facere posset, quae non facit.»

108. *Responsio*, editor's heading, PL 180:329: «Haec responsio potius inscribenda fuit: Retractatio calumniosa errorum Petri Abaelardi.» «Calumniosa ergo est haec responsio, et vere docuit errores Abaelardus, qui hic, sive ab ipso, sive ab alio, ejus nomine damnantur.»

109. Tissier, *Monitum*, PL 180 (before col. 283): «et hic se inique a sancto Patre impetitum in Apologia adversus eumdem scripta mendaciter calumniatus est». *Disputatio altera*, PL 180:316B–D: «At in Apologia sua multo vehementius spiritu vertiginis abducitur, ac infelicius aegrotat. Diligentiore siquidem tractatu, et quasi viribus in unum collectis hoc capitulum caeteris diffusius exsequitur». «Si ergo id solum facere potest, quod eum facere seu velle convenit, profecto id solum facere, atque velle facere potest, quod quandoque facit; et eo modo tantum, et eo tempore similiter, quo facit».

110. Berengar, *Apologeticus*, PL 178:1862C: «Nonne caute consulteque egi, quod foedum illud sacrilegumque dogma manuali quodam indiculo complosi, ne scilicet breviter volentibus attingere summam rei, onerosum esset ire per spatiosos saltus voluminum Abaelardi.» For the concession see n. 5; for the five items, n. 15.

that Abelard received this "with the greatest astonishment, since no book called *Sentences* written by me will ever be found". That closing sentence is on none of the lists on the shelf. Bernard names the book twice: letter 188 calls it "another, which they call his *Sentences*", and letter 190 says he read the doctrine of redemption in it.[111] Three facts stand. Bernard said he had read a book called Abelard's *Sentences*; the list Abelard answered cited it as a source; and Abelard denied writing a book of that name. The denial is of authorship. It leaves room for a book of his *sententiae* written down by others, and the shelf holds excerpts of one under that name.

9. Mabillon's Verdict Tested

Mabillon wrote his introduction to letter 190 before the *Capitula* reached him, so that his claims concern the errors imputed to Abelard as Bernard's letters and William's work present them, not the extracts he later printed.[112] Each can be put to the shelf.

That some imputed errors are "lacking in his printed works" holds, more widely than Mabillon knew: twenty of the thirty-two extracts are in none of the printed works on the shelf. That most are nonetheless found "in the printed writings" (*plerosque*) holds for the doctrine more than for the words. Twelve extracts stand in the printed works, and for seven of the untested chapters (IV, VI, VIII, X–XIII) the *Ethica* or the commentary on Romans has the doctrine in other words. Mabillon's introduction cites the commentary for the doctrine of grace, by the page of the older edition, and the passage is where he says.[113]

That the errors no longer extant were read in Abelard's own text by William, Geoffrey and the anonymous abbot, who quote his words "both from the *Apologia* and from the *Theologia*, which do not appear in the printed works", holds for the abbot and the *Apologia*:[114] he quotes an apology that is not the one in print (section 8). William's quotations not on the shelf are real, but whether they come from the *Theologia* cannot be tested.

That the *Theologia* is "mutilated in the printed editions" Mabillon argued from Abelard's own words: in the second book of the commentary on Romans Abelard reserves things for treatment in his *Theologia* of which the printed text says nothing. The cross-reference is there. After his short account of how we are redeemed, Abelard writes, "if anything is lacking to completeness, we reserve it for the treatise of our *Theologia*"; and the printed *Introductio* has no such treatise and breaks off with "the rest is lacking".[115] What Abelard defers is "anything lacking to completeness" in his account of the *mode* of our redemption; the doctrine of IV.1 and IV.2 is already in the commentary, within the questions (section 5). So the cross-reference shows only that Abelard points to a gap at this doctrine, and the extracts missing from the shelf concern the same doctrine. Mabillon's inference, that the printed *Theologia* is incomplete, is sound at the one point where it can be tested. It cannot decide between his explanation and Bernard's own, that he read the redemption passage in a book of *Sentences*; the lost part of the *Theologia* and the book of *Sentences* may be one source or two.

That the *Capitula* come from a faulty manuscript holds, as the comparison with letter 190 shows (section 7). Mabillon's further claim that the *Capitula* "are the same chapters" that William sent to Geoffrey and Bernard

111. *Capitula*, end, n. 12; *Apologia*, n. 20, continued: «cum nunquam liber aliquis qui Sententiarum dicatur, a me scriptus reperiatur.» Bernard, ep. 188, n. 17; ep. 190, n. 57.

112. Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §9; see n. 10.

113. See n. 70.

114. Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §3, PL 182 (before col. 1047): «si qua amplius non exstant, ea quondam in ipso Abaelardo legisse Guillelmum Sancti-Theodorici, Gaufridum, et abbatem illum anonymum Abaelardi quondam discipulum, qui et praeceptoris sui doctrinam callebat, et verba ipsa refert, uti et Guillelmus, tum ex Apologia, tum ex Theologia Abaelardi, quae in editis non comparent».

115. *Romans* II, PL 178:836C–D: «Nunc autem succincte, quantum ad expositionis brevitatem pertinet, de modo nostrae redemptionis quod videtur nobis sufficiat. Si qua vero desunt perfectioni, Theologiae nostrae tractatui reservamus». Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §3, PL 182 (before col. 1047): «Et certe Abaelardus ipse in libro secundo commentarii super Epistolam ad Romanos, pag. 554, quaedam in Theologia sua tractanda reservat, de quibus nulla mentio est in impressis, quae sic desinunt: « Caetera desunt: » ut appareat, Theologiam in editis mutilam esse.» For the end of the *Introductio* see n. 26.

holds only in part: nine of William's thirteen have a counterpart among Bernard's fourteen (Table 1: William 3 and *Capitula* I, 4 and II, 6 and VI, 7 and IV, 8 and V, 9 and IX, 11 and VIII, 12 and XIII, 13 and XI and XIII; William 1, 2, 5 and 10 have none).[116]

Tissier, whose *Monitum* does not mention the *Capitula*, had made the same defence of Bernard: no one should be moved that the errors are not found in Abelard's recently printed works, "for the books which contained them have not been printed".[117] He also said that the teaching that grace is offered to all is not Abelard's own but common to the schoolmen and the Fathers, and that neither William nor Bernard condemned it in Abelard. The *Capitula* make that second remark untrue for Bernard: their chapter VI is headed "that God does no more for the one who is saved, before he cleaves to grace, than for the one who is not saved", and the third extract under it is a merchant offering his stones to all alike.

10. Conclusion

The charge sheet of Sens is four documents, and the one that quotes Abelard under every heading is a collection Bernard made for the pope, preserved in a single faulty copy. Twelve of its extracts are in the texts of Abelard on the shelf. One is verbatim, and most of the others differ by particles and word order. In four places the change alters what the reader is told. "If we speak properly" is absent from the sentence on the Spirit's procession, which the *Introductio* has with it, perhaps because the accusers' recension lacked it. "Some" and the explaining clause are gone from the sentence on benignity, and a gloss has made benignity the Spirit. A reductio on God and evil stops at its premise. And Abelard's solution in the commentary on Romans, run on from his own questions, has lost its label and its "in this", so that it reads as a concession. The questions themselves are quoted as his, and rightly; what the *Capitula* leave out is his answer. The absence of "if we speak properly" and of "some" is shared with William, and so stood in the accusers' material before both texts as we have them, whether in their copies of Abelard or in the notes William sent with the books. The cuts and joins are an excerptor's choices; the shelf cannot say whose.

Twenty extracts are not on the shelf, and they are not therefore false. Their form is that of a book of school sentences; Bernard says he read such a book under Abelard's name; the shelf holds excerpts of a book with that title teaching the doctrine of four of the untested chapters, though in those four the doctrine or its idiom is current outside Abelard as well; and the *Ethica* and the commentary on Romans teach that of most of the rest, sometimes with a hedge the heading removes. What the shelf cannot supply is the words, and so it cannot say whether they were Abelard's, a pupil's record of his teaching, or a compiler's.

On the author's reading, twenty of the thirty-two headings say what their quoted words say, and the borderline cases put the figure between nineteen and twenty-three. The eleven that say more do so by dropping an exception (works), by generalising (the Spirit's procession, ignorance, the purpose of the incarnation), or by stating a thesis the extract does not state, which it gives as a report, a question or half an argument, or does not reach (the Son's generation, God and evil, the redemption, grace, the species). None says the opposite of the passage it summarises. Set against Abelard's own books rather than against the extracts, several headings remove a hedge he kept: original sin is "rather" penalty than guilt, works add nothing "unless perhaps" the will is increased, and the crucifiers did not sin "properly" but sinned "in the deed".

The *Apologia*'s denials do not all agree with the shelf. Where it says he never wrote the article on "full power" or that the Spirit is not of the Father's substance, the texts on the shelf do not have those words, and on the Spirit they say "of the same substance"; texts not on the shelf cannot be asked. But where it denies the last

116. Mabillon, *Admonitio*, §1: «Eadem sunt capitula, quae Gaufrido Carnotensi episcopo et Bernardo direxerat Guillelmus». See Table 1.
117. Tissier, *Monitum*, PL 180 (before col. 283): «Nec quemquam moveat, quod in operibus Abaelardi nuper editis non reperiantur illi errores, nam libri illi qui hos continebant, non sunt typis excusi.» «Verum haec non Abaelardi propria est, sed scholasticorum doctorum communis, imo et Patrum». «Sane nec Guillelmus, nec S. Bernardus hanc sententiam in Abaelardo damnarunt; imo ipsi eam passim docent.»

chapter, that will, desire and delight are not sin and are not to be extinguished, the *Ethica* says it in so many words. With that denial, its statements contradict Abelard's books in two grades. That God can do many things he will never do, that original sin is guilt as well as penalty, and the denial of the last chapter flatly contradict the *Introductio*, the commentary on Romans and the *Ethica*. That the crucifiers sinned most grievously and that the keys passed to all bishops take one side of hedges the *Ethica* left open. The *Apologia* says nothing of either, and if, as the editor of the *Responsio* allows, it was made by another in Abelard's name, the contradictions lie between his books and that answer.

Two old judgments survive the test, each with a limit. Mabillon was right that the printed Abelard is incomplete and that Abelard himself pointed to a gap at the doctrine of redemption; the extracts missing from the shelf concern the same doctrine, but what Abelard deferred was anything lacking in his account of its mode. Berengar's concession, that the list held some things Abelard said and wrote and some he neither said nor wrote, fits what can be tested: twelve extracts are in his books, and four of those are changed in sense. A third judgment does not survive. Tissier held that the teaching of grace offered to all was common doctrine, which neither William nor Bernard condemned in Abelard; the *Capitula*'s chapter VI condemns it under Bernard's name. Table 2 sorts what the texts on the shelf allow to be tested, and for the twenty extracts not on the shelf it leaves open whether Abelard said them. # Sources

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Earlier article in this journal

"What God Does Not Do: Abelard's Actualism, Its Medieval Answer, and John Milbank's Genealogy of Possibility". *Journal of Machine Theology* 1, no. 1 (2026). Cited as JMT 1.1.

Appendix A: Method and Verification

The question and the hunt. The question was put by Claude Fable 5.2 at Wilson Pruitt's request for articles of the model's own choosing, and the same model wrote the brief for the search. Three instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5 searched the shelf under that brief: one built the concordance of the lists and Abelard's answers; one tested every extract of *Capitula* I–IX; one tested *Capitula* X–XIV and the ten longest quotations in William's *Disputatio*, which in revision were fixed by the rule in n. 87 and re-tested against both recensions. Each reported, for every extract, the accuser's Latin, the verdicts, the locus, the source's Latin, its voice and a working translation. All 178 Latin lines in their reports were tested by script against the files named. This article was then written by Claude Opus 5.5, which re-read each passage the argument uses in its file and extended the search to letter 190 as a witness to the extracts, to the anonymous *Disputatio altera* and Tissier's *Monitum*, to the editor's *Observationes* before the *Theologia christiana*, and to Cousin's apparatus and his excerpts from the Munich *Sententiae*. Claude Fable 5.2 revised three passages of the draft (provenance box). The article was then reviewed by an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5) and two blind readers (Claude Sonnet 5.5), and revised by Claude Opus 5.5 against the editor's decision letter; `response.md` answers it point by point. The translations are the author's.

The shelf. Migne's texts in the TEI transcription of the Corpus Corporum (Zurich): Abelard, PL 178, files 11110 and 11113–11128 (the *Apologia* is 11113, the *Ethica* 11116, *Romans* 11117, the *Introductio* 11123, the *Theologia christiana* 11128), and the *Responsio*, PL 180, file 11175; the accusers in files 11207 (*Capitula* and *Admonitio*), 11191 (ep. 190), 21392 (Bernard's other letters), 11165 (William), 11166 (*Disputatio altera*), 11106 (Berengar) and 11142 (Innocent II). Volume numbers are those of each file's header; columns are those of the files' page markers. Where a file marks only some columns (the *Apologia* marks only col. 107; Mabillon's *Admonitio* only cols. 1047 and 1049) the notes say so. Archive.org text layers of Cousin's volumes of 1849 and 1859, a second scan of the 1859 volume, and two scans of Tosti (1851): uncorrected OCR, quoted as it stands. Denzinger (1911): uncorrected OCR, quoted as it stands; items 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 19 are partly illegible (item 19 begins «fis) ' ^ °P"^ ^ voluntas»), item 6 is legible but for two misread words («perse», «ino:»), and where Table 1 gives the sense of an illegible item it is marked "[r]".

The matcher. `scripts/locate.py` folds case, the spellings *u/v*, *i/j*, *ae/e* and *oe/e*, and punctuation; breaks the quotation into overlapping three-word sequences; and, for each file, finds the window of text containing the largest number of distinct sequences. It reports the share found (coverage) and the window. For every extract the full quotation was run, and for the extracts not on the shelf several distinctive phrases were searched by regular expression in each file as well: among them "tertia persona", "figurativa", "mercator", "pretiosos lapides", "cohaereat", "debeat hoc prohibere", "seminarium", "Originale peccatum", "negligentiam ministrorum", "a muribus", "remuneretur", "Solet quaeri quid", "obsequium", "zelo legis", "simplices Jud", "ligaveris", "praesenti Ecclesia", "suggestio non est", "carcerarius", "jure eum possidebat" and "luce suae sapientiae". Denzinger's article 17 was searched for in the *Capitula*, letter 190, Bernard's other letters, William, Berengar and Innocent ("adventus", "in fine saeculi", "adventum Filii"). For the comparison of accusers, each extract of the *Capitula* was run in the same way against letter 190, William and the *Disputatio altera*, and against the Munich *Sententiae* as excerpted by Cousin.

The check. `check_quotes.py` tests every Latin run in the article, the text set between guillemets, against the file its note names: TEI files with tags removed and whitespace collapsed, OCR files with whitespace collapsed. Runs in the body and in the tables are tested against the files of the notes cited on the same line. It also checks that every note marker has one definition and every definition a marker, and that notes are numbered in order of first appearance. A failing run is searched in every file, so that a wrong attribution shows as such. Because the revision renumbered the notes, the script's table of notes and files was rebuilt from the new numbering. In the final run the article had 117 notes, 113 of them quoting Latin, with 346 Latin runs; all 346 passed. No run is transcribed from a page image.

Readings settled in the files. Several points were settled only by returning to the files, and the article follows the files. The *Capitula* end with the *Stultologia* and carry no note on a book of *Sentences* (section 8). The *Capitula*'s "of God" in I.1 does not turn a general statement into one about God, since the context in the *Introductio* is already divine wisdom. Cousin's texts of the commentary on Romans and of the *Introductio* are in the volume of 1859, not that of 1849. The Munich *Sententiae* do not contain the quoted words of any extract, but they contain the doctrine of chapters IV, V, IX and X. The readings *aeque* (XIV) and *hoc ipsum* (II.1) are in Cousin's *Introductio* and are not counted against the accuser. A sentence William quotes in cap. II («dico genitum») is Ambrose's, not Abelard's (n. 87). William's Spirit passage was compared with the *Theologia christiana* as well as the *Introductio* (section 7). Letter 190 was used as a witness to the wording of the extracts, and the *Disputatio altera* and Tissier's *Monitum* were read for the evidence they give.

Not available. The Vatican manuscript 663 from which Mabillon printed the *Capitula*; Mansi's collection, from which Denzinger and Migne take the documents of Sens; Rheinwald's full edition of the Munich *Sententiae* (Cousin printed only excerpts); Pez's edition of the *Ethica* and the fragment of its second book that Cousin mentions; the polemical apology of Abelard quoted in the *Disputatio altera*; the lost first quire of the *Disputatio altera* (Tissier); Berengar's promised second treatise; any critical edition of the *Theologia*, the *Ethica* or the *Sententiae*. Names and dates given without a note are taken from the editors' apparatus cited in the notes.

Appendix B: Verification Table

Every note that quotes Latin is listed with the file or files its runs were tested against. "Script" means that every run in the note was found verbatim in one of the files named; "script (OCR)" that at least one file is an uncorrected OCR text and the runs were tested against it as it stands. "PL/" abbreviates the directory of the Migne TEI files (patrologia/sources/pl/tei in the author's home folder), "editions/" the directory of the Cousin and Tosti scans (milbank-reverse/source/abelard-editions), and "constance/" the directory holding the Denzinger scan (milbank-reverse/source/constance). Notes 56, 97, 112, 113 quote no Latin and have no row: they refer to other notes or to the searches listed in Appendix A.

Note	Source file	Checked by
1	PL/11207.xml; PL/21392.xml	script
2	constance/denzinger-1911.txt; PL/11142.xml; PL/21392.xml	script (OCR)
3	PL/11142.xml	script
4	PL/11113.xml	script
5	PL/11207.xml; PL/11106.xml	script
6	PL/11207.xml	script
7	constance/denzinger-1911.txt	script (OCR)
8	PL/11142.xml	script
9	PL/21392.xml	script
10	PL/11207.xml	script
11	PL/11191.xml	script
12	PL/11207.xml	script
13	PL/21392.xml	script

Note	Source file	Checked by
14	PL/21392.xml	script
15	PL/11191.xml; PL/21392.xml; PL/11106.xml	script
16	PL/11191.xml	script
17	PL/21392.xml	script
18	constance/denzinger-1911.txt; PL/11113.xml	script (OCR)
19	PL/11113.xml	script
20	PL/11113.xml; PL/11175.xml	script
21	PL/11113.xml	script
22	PL/11165.xml	script
23	PL/11128.xml	script
24	editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
25	PL/11166.xml	script
26	PL/11123.xml	script
27	editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
28	editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
29	editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
30	PL/11207.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
31	PL/11123.xml	script
32	PL/11123.xml; PL/11207.xml; PL/11128.xml	script
33	PL/11191.xml	script
34	PL/11123.xml	script
35	PL/11207.xml; PL/11128.xml; PL/11123.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
36	PL/11207.xml; PL/11123.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
37	PL/11123.xml	script
38	PL/11128.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
39	PL/11191.xml	script
40	PL/11207.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
41	PL/11123.xml; PL/11207.xml; constance/denzinger-1911.txt	script (OCR)
42	PL/11166.xml	script
43	PL/11207.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
44	PL/11117.xml	script
45	PL/11117.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
46	PL/11207.xml; PL/11117.xml	script
47	PL/11117.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt; PL/11207.xml	script (OCR)
48	PL/11191.xml; PL/11165.xml	script
49	PL/11191.xml; PL/11117.xml	script
50	PL/11117.xml; PL/11207.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
51	PL/11117.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt; PL/11207.xml; PL/11191.xml	script (OCR)
52	PL/11117.xml	script
53	PL/11123.xml; PL/11207.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
54	PL/11191.xml; PL/11207.xml	script
55	PL/11123.xml	script
57	PL/11191.xml	script
58	PL/11191.xml	script
59	PL/11165.xml	script
60	PL/11207.xml	script
61	PL/11117.xml	script
62	editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt; PL/11207.xml; PL/11191.xml	script (OCR)
63	PL/11066.xml	script
64	PL/11207.xml	script
65	editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
66	PL/11207.xml	script
67	PL/11165.xml; PL/11207.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
68	PL/11094.xml; PL/11777.xml	script
69	PL/11207.xml	script
70	PL/11117.xml; PL/11207.xml	script
71	PL/11207.xml	script

Note	Source file	Checked by
72	PL/11207.xml	script
73	PL/11117.xml	script
74	PL/11207.xml	script
75	editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
76	PL/10305.xml; PL/11158.xml	script
77	PL/11207.xml	script
78	PL/11116.xml; editions/operahactenusseoooabeluoft.txt	script (OCR)
79	PL/11664.xml	script
80	PL/11207.xml	script
81	PL/11116.xml	script
82	PL/11207.xml	script
83	PL/11116.xml	script
84	PL/11207.xml	script
85	PL/11116.xml	script
86	PL/11207.xml	script
87	PL/11165.xml	script
88	PL/11165.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
89	PL/11165.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
90	PL/11165.xml; PL/11128.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
91	PL/11165.xml; PL/11128.xml; PL/11123.xml	script
92	PL/11191.xml	script
93	PL/11207.xml; PL/11191.xml	script
94	PL/11165.xml; PL/11207.xml; PL/11123.xml; PL/11166.xml	script
95	PL/11165.xml	script
96	PL/11165.xml	script
98	PL/21392.xml	script
99	PL/21392.xml	script
100	PL/11113.xml	script
101	PL/11116.xml; constance/denzinger-1911.txt	script (OCR)
102	PL/11113.xml	script
103	PL/11113.xml	script
104	PL/11113.xml	script
105	PL/11113.xml	script
106	PL/11113.xml	script
107	PL/11175.xml	script
108	PL/11175.xml	script
109	PL/11166.xml	script
110	PL/11106.xml	script
111	PL/11113.xml	script
114	PL/11207.xml	script
115	PL/11117.xml; PL/11207.xml	script
116	PL/11207.xml	script
117	PL/11166.xml	script

Table 4: Notes quoting Latin, with the files tested.

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Where the Unity Lives

Henri de Lubac's Four Senses of Scripture Read against the Latin and Greek Shelf

ABSTRACT

Henri de Lubac's *Exégèse médiévale* (1959–64) holds that the four senses of Scripture (history, allegory, tropology, anagogy) are one: a development of the primitive pair of letter and spirit, reached by splitting the second term in three, because the spiritual sense of a Bible read between Christ's two comings "had necessarily" to divide; "each sense tends to the other as to its end". The claim is structural, and he makes it "even setting aside" the early texts, which he expects to be dispersed. This article tests the claim's textual warrant, not its necessity. A census of Migne's Latin found 269 places (266 distinct texts, one work being held in two files) where three or more of the senses are named together, 132 of them statements of theory, and de Lubac cites 96 of those for theory. The article reads the passages the census only counted, most of them untranslated, and much of his history holds. He had Aldhelm naming the canonical order, which the census missed; he had Eucherius copying Cassian and reporting allegory "added in fourth place"; and he had Jerome, whom he puts before both, stating a threefold ascent whose third sense is the beatitude to come, his own eschatological reason in a Latin text. The finding concerns the form of the warrant, and much of its evidence is de Lubac's own. Where the shelf states the four as one movement, four statements keep the classic order, history, allegory, tropology, anagogy: the feeding of readers by stages in the prologue of the *Allegoriae in universam Scripturam*, Adam Scot's near-copy of it, a cellar of four casks and Honorius's four kinds of faithful. Two depart from it: Richard of St Victor ranks tropology lowest of the three higher senses, and the same prologue, a few lines after its feeding, builds a house with anagogy as the roof and tropology as the ornament. De Lubac lists their authors among the witnesses of the classic order, notes Richard's, and quotes the house among building figures that recur "with some variants". What the reading adds is narrower. His suggestion that the classic order suits "well-balanced architecture" and the other "perhaps" the soul's ascent does not fit these fourfolds, whose grades of readers keep the classic order while the buildings vary, though Jerome's threefold ascents fit it; and the census gives the variation a measure: counting copies separately, tropology is named before allegory in 26 of the 120 statements of theory that name both. This fits de Lubac's sentence as he wrote it ("to the other", not "to the next"). It does not support reading his organism as one sequence, a reading his "temporal succession" invites, and his judgment that one order is the "true formula" rests on doctrine and frequency, not on the texts that state a movement. A further section follows the Latin narrowing of *tropologia* from figurative reading in general to the moral sense, which is visible inside Jerome, as de Lubac notes. In the Greek windows read (Migne's PG 1–82 less eleven tomes, with a few later works: about fourteen million words), three of the terms stand together twelve times and four never, and Gregory of Nyssa declines to choose between "anagogy, tropology or allegory". Migne's modern Latin sometimes supplies the "spiritual sense" itself, place by place. Whether exegesis performed the four senses on one verse, rather than stating them, was not tested beyond the two performances in hand, Cassian's Jerusalem and Eucherius's heavens and waters.

KEYWORDS Henri de Lubac · four senses of Scripture · Jerome · John Cassian · Eucherius of Lyon · Bede · Gregory the Great · Origen · Gregory of Nyssa · Richard of St Victor · tropologia · Patrologia Latina · Patrologia Graeca

PROVENANCE

Question: Wilson Pruitt (human-prompted), building on his Scriptura `sensus` study: what does the whole shelf say about the four senses of Scripture when the passages are read and not only counted, and where does Henri de Lubac's history hold? The thesis direction of the revision (the order of the movement, with the narrowing of *tropologia*) was chosen by Wilson Pruitt from the three the editor's letter left open. *Scope and hunt brief:* Claude Opus 5.5. *Orchestration:* Claude Fable 5.2. *Coding:* the Stage A coding of de Lubac's notes, the blind double coding of the 269 census formulas, and the 68 readings of Patrologia Graeca pages are readings by Claude Opus 5.5; every number from them is labelled as such. *Source search:* three instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5, one shelf each (the birth of the Latin formula; the Greek; the statements de Lubac does not cite). *Source check and draft:* Claude Opus 5.5, which re-read the passages the argument uses in their files and added Aldhelm, Gregory's *Moralia* VI and *Homilies on Ezekiel* with Rabanus's copy, Heterius on the history of Christ, the three layers of Origen on Matthew, and de Lubac's own text at the places tested. *Revision:* Claude Opus 5.5, in two rounds (the editor's letter, then the editor's second read), which added Jerome, Ambrose,

the *Allegoriae* prologue in both its files, Adam Scot, the cellar of the *De S. Anselmi similitudinibus*, Honorius, Richard of St Victor, the *Moralitates in Cantica*, John of Salisbury, Paschasius, Rufinus's Latin of Origen on Genesis, *De principiis* IV.2.6 and *Contra Celsum* I at PG 11:693, and, in the second round, de Lubac's own record of these texts at *EM* I/1 150–152, 158, 165–166 and II/2 57–58. *Quotation verification:* script: every Latin, Greek and French run was tested against the file its note names. *Editorial review:* an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5) and two blind readers, one adversarial and one generous (Claude Sonnet 5.5); revised against the editor's decision letter, with a point-by-point response (`response.md`). *Human reading:* read and approved for publication by Wilson Pruitt, editor, 25 November 2026. *Sources:* the texts named in the Sources section, as held locally; no source was quoted from a model's memory.

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1. Introduction

Henri de Lubac's *Exégèse médiévale* is the great modern history of how the Church read its Bible between the Fathers and the end of the Middle Ages, and its subtitle names its subject: the four senses of Scripture. Its thesis is not that medieval readers listed four senses, which no one doubts, but that the four are one. In its strongest form, stated in the chapter on the names of the senses, the quadruple formula is not built by adding new senses one after another. It is a development of the formula of two terms, letter and spirit, "the essential and primitive formula", reached organically by the analysis of the second term and "its bursting into three parts". The reason is theological: "everything comes here from the hiatus" between Christ's two comings, and given that hiatus the spiritual sense of the Bible, which was an eschatological sense, "had necessarily to divide into three": into what is fulfilled in Christ and the Church, what is to be done now, and what is still awaited.[1] He makes the claim, in his words, "even setting aside the few texts that can be considered an anticipation". The fourfold is in the Fathers "at least in the implicit state", and explicitly, but "in a dispersed state".[2] At the end of the work's first volume the unity is stated outright. The doctrine of the four senses "is completed and finds its unity" in eschatology; the passage from one sense to the next is temporal, logical and living at once; "the quadruple sense unfolds an organism"; "each sense tends to the other as to its end. They are therefore several, but they are only one."[3]

De Lubac did not count. He read, and his apparatus holds thousands of hand-picked passages. A census can now be taken of the shelf he read. The Scriptura study `sensus` ran a fixed list of Latin sense terms over all 5,276 works of Migne's *Patrologia Latina* in the Corpus Corporum transcription, and a matching list over Kraken OCR of Migne's Greek, and it coded de Lubac's own notes so that his citations could be set against what the census finds.[4] This article does what the census could not: it reads the passages the census counted, most of which have no English translation, and asks of each what the senses are, in what order, whose voice states them, whether they are presented as one movement or as a list of options, and what they are said to be for.

The book under examination is de Lubac's, as Milbank's was in the first article of this journal, and it is taken

1. De Lubac, *EM* I/2 416 (ch. VI, "La formule doctrinale"), OCR of the 1959 printing: «la formule essentielle et primitive»; the four-term formula is not obtained «par allongement en série», but «par l'analyse du second terme et son éclatement en trois parties». The reason, on the same page: «Tout vient ici du hiatus» «entre les deux avènements du Christ»; «le sens spirituel de la Bible, qui était un sens eschatologique, devait nécessairement se subdiviser en trois». *EM* is in copyright; it is cited here by volume and page, and quoted in phrases.
2. *EM* I/2 416–417, the sentence running across the page: «même en faisant abstraction des quelques textes que l'on» «peut considérer comme une anticipation, ce quadruple sens est déjà chez les Pères. Il y est au moins à l'état implicite.» Explicitly, but «à l'état dispersé».
3. *EM* I/2 643 («la doctrine des quatre sens s'achève et trouve son unité»); I/2 650 («Le quadruple sens déploie un organisme»; «Chaque sens tend à l'autre comme à sa fin»; «Ils sont donc plusieurs, mais il ne font qu'un», where the OCR has «il» for *ils*).
4. The study, its scripts and its counts are at github.com/wilsonpruitt/scriptura (`studies/sensus/`), with the site scriptura.wrootpress.com. Its sections 8–16 are the census, the formulas, the comparison with de Lubac's apparatus, and the Greek, Syriac, Coptic and rabbinic counts. The counts printed in this article were re-derived from its census and ledger files on 2026-11-25 (Appendix A), not copied from its prose.

in its strongest form.[5] That form sets limits on what a reading of texts can show, and they should be stated first. Some of his sentences are genetic: the fourfold is "already in the Fathers", implicit or dispersed; it runs through the Middle Ages in "two lists of different order" with named roots. These answer to the shelf. Others are logical and theological: the spiritual sense "had necessarily" to divide; "everything comes from the hiatus"; "each sense tends to the other as to its end". No reading of texts can show that the structure was or was not necessary, and this article does not try. What a reading can test is the warrant: whether the texts that state the senses carry the form the structure gives them. That is the question here.

He also anticipates most of what a census might seem to offer against him, and each finding below that he states himself is credited to him, not offered as a correction. He expects the patristic statements to be occasional, "almost always without didacticism". He records two lists of different order throughout the Middle Ages, one rooted in Augustine and Gregory, the other in Cassian and Eucherius "and already, less systematically", Ambrose and Jerome, and he notes that one author may use both orders "a few lines apart". He shows the Fathers naming the whole second sense now anagogy, now tropology, and he quotes Gregory of Nyssa's refusal to quarrel over the names. He grants, after Origen, that one or another sense may be missing from a passage, "as St Gregory and many others were to say". And he notes that the medieval theorists, down to Nicholas of Lyra, reduce the four to the two.[6] In one place he was right where the census was wrong (section 3). He found what no vocabulary census can find, schemes carried by figures with no sense-words (section 3). And where he quotes the Greek Fathers in Greek, the Greek bears him out (section 8).

The thesis of this article concerns the form of the warrant, and most of its evidence was assembled by de Lubac himself. Where the shelf states the four as one movement, the movement does not keep one order. Four such statements keep the classic order, history, allegory, tropology, anagogy: the feeding of readers by stages in the prologue of the *Allegoriae in universam Scripturam*, Adam Scot's near-copy of it, the cellar of the *De S. Anselmi similitudinibus* and Honorius's four kinds of faithful, whose authors de Lubac lists as witnesses of that order. Two depart from it, and he records both: Richard of St Victor ranks tropology lowest of the three higher senses, and the *Allegoriae* prologue, a few lines after its feeding, builds a house with anagogy as the roof and tropology as the ornament (section 10). What the reading adds is narrower than a correction. De Lubac suggests that the classic order suits "well-balanced architecture" and the other "perhaps" the soul's ascent; on these fourfolds the grades of readers keep the classic order and the buildings vary, though Jerome's threefold ascents fit it. The census gives the variation a measure: about one in five of the statements of theory that name both name tropology before allegory. And his sentence asks for no single order. He wrote "to the other", not "to the next", and the illustrations he gives on the same pages join the senses in pairs. A unity without a single sequence is what his sentence claims and what the texts warrant. They do not warrant a reading of his organism as a ladder, which his own "temporal succession" invites; and his judgment that one order is "the true formula" rests on doctrine and on frequency, not on the texts that state a movement. A further section (section 7) follows one word through that disagreement: the Latin narrowing of *tropologia* from figurative reading in general to the moral sense, which de Lubac notes and which is visible inside Jerome.

The other findings are measures more than reversals. In the Greek windows read, three of the higher names stand together once, in Gregory of Nyssa, and four terms never (section 6). Migne's modern Latin versions of the Greek sometimes supply the Latin "spiritual sense" ready-made (section 8). Of the eleven statements of

5. "What God Does Not Do: Abelard's Actualism, Its Medieval Answer, and John Milbank's Genealogy of Possibility", JMT 1.1 (2026), which read Milbank's *Beyond Secular Order* against the Latin shelf on the same method.

6. *EM* I/2 417: «s'exprime alors comme au hasard des circonstances, presque toujours sans didactisme»; I/1 198: «Tout au long du moyen âge, donc, deux listes d'ordre différent.», with Cassian and Eucher at the head of one «et déjà, moins systématiquement, saint Ambroise et saint Jérôme»; I/1 158: «un même auteur emploie tour à tour, en deux ouvrages différents, ou même à quelques lignes de distance, les deux ordres»; I/2 418: «Pour d'autres, c'est la tropologie; Origène encore avait usé du mot dans ce sens large», and «Tous consentiraient aux réflexions que fait saint Grégoire de Nysse»; I/1 199, of Origen: «il admet qu'en certains passages de la Bible l'un ou l'autre des trois sens peut manquer : c'est ce que devaient dire après lui saint Grégoire et beaucoup d'autres»; I/2 417: «jusqu'à la fin, ses théoriciens médiévaux reconnaîtront que la formule s'en ramène tout entière à la formule des deux sens fondamentaux. Témoin Nicolas de Lyre».

theory the census found that de Lubac does not cite, four are copies of texts he does cite; the six original ones are pairs, threes and a rule of restraint, and a seventh is a fourfold sermon built from received images (section 9). Section 11 names the question this article does not answer: whether medieval exegesis performed the four senses on one verse as often as it stated them.

2. The Shelf and the Method

The census. The Latin census counts 41 frozen sense terms in five families: letter (L), allegory (A), tropology or the moral sense (T), anagogy (N), and a general spiritual family (S). A "stated formula" is a place where terms of three or more of L, A, T and N stand within sixty words. There are 269 such places in the *Patrologia Latina*, and 85 of them name all four.[7] Each was then read twice, blind, by a model working from about 1,900 characters of the Latin, and coded by kind. Of the 269, 132 are statements of theory (they say how many senses there are, or define one), 68 are lists, 62 applications of the senses to a verse, 5 quotations, and 2 false hits. Among the theory statements the most common scheme is the canonical history–allegory–tropology–anagogy (34 of 132; 66 of all 269), and the Jerusalem of Galatians 4 is the most common teaching figure (16 of the theory statements, 27 of all).[8] One work is counted twice. The *Allegoriae in universam sacram Scripturam* is held in two TEI files of PL 112, one headed "Auctor incertus (Rabanus Maurus?)" and one "Rabanus Maurus 780-856", with the same text, and the census found the same three places in each. The 269 places are therefore 266 distinct texts, and the figures just given become 84 with all four families, 131 statements of theory, 60 applications, 33 and 63 for the canonical scheme, and 26 for the Jerusalem figure in all; the others do not change.[9] Counts below give the distinct figure where it differs.

De Lubac's apparatus. His notes were harvested and each citation coded for what he cites it for: the role (theory, example, vocabulary), the senses it names, his stance. That coding is itself a model's reading of de Lubac's notes (Claude Opus 5.5, codebook R1–R7), and every number in this article that comes from it is labelled "Stage A". By Stage A, de Lubac cites the *Patrologia Latina* 1,843 times for a theory of the senses, at 1,360 distinct places. Of the census's 132 statements of theory he cites 96 for theory and 12 for another purpose; five more (four distinct) are cited by him within ten columns, eight belong to authors he cites for theory without a column, and eleven he does not cite at all.[10]

The reading. Three instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5 then read the passages under a written brief, one shelf each: the birth of the Latin formula (Cassian, Eucherius, Augustine, Gregory, Bede and the chain after Bede), the Greek windows and Migne's facing Latin, and the eleven statements de Lubac does not cite. Every Latin and Greek run in their reports, 127 in all, was tested by script against the file named beside it. The draft re-read every passage it uses in its file, and the draft and its revision added the places named in the provenance note. The Latin of the *Patrologia Latina* is the Corpus Corporum's TEI text, normalised to classical orthography.

7. `census/formulas.tsv` (269 rows; 85 whose families include L, A, T and N). The term list was frozen by Wilson Pruitt on 2026-11-10 (STUDY §8).

8. `ledger/formulas-coded.tsv`, columns `kind`, `scheme` and `example_figure` (Jerusalem counted where the figure field contains *Jerusalem* or *Hierusalem*). The coding is a model's (STUDY §9: two blind readings by Claude Opus 5.5, kappa 0.93 on kind). Two figures in STUDY §9 are stale: the scheme count and the Jerusalem count printed there are superseded by the counts given here.

9. `census/formulas.tsv`, idno 8925 and 8928, each with rows at the prologue (no column in the file's markers), 966b and 1036b; the headers are those of the two files (`8925.xml`, `8928.xml`). In `ledger/formulas-coded.tsv` the pairs are F236/F239 (prologue, both *theory*), F237/F240 (966b, both *application*) and F238/F241 (1036b, the farthing of n. 66, coded *application* in one file and *theory* in the other: the two blind readings did not agree on one text). Counted once, by dropping 8925: 266 rows; 84 with L, A, T and N; kinds 131 theory, 68 list, 60 application, 5 quotation, 2 other; L-A-T-N 33 of 131 theory statements and 63 of 266; Jerusalem 16 and 26. In `ledger/formulas-vs-lubac.tsv` F236 and F239 are both "theory, within 10 cols", so that group falls from five to four; the 96 is unchanged.

10. Stage A: `ledger/lubac-theory-vs-census.tsv` (1,843 rows, 1,360 distinct volume–column pairs); `ledger/formulas-vs-lubac.tsv`, column `lubac`, restricted to the 132 rows of kind *theory*. The Stage A coding of de Lubac's notes is by Claude Opus 5.5 under codebook R1–R7 (`model` and `codebook` columns of `ledger/claims-all.tsv`). The ledgers are kept locally because *EM* is in copyright; their findings, not their rows, are reported here.

The Greek is Kraken OCR of Migne's pages, and the Latin printed beside it is Tesseract OCR; both are quoted as they stand, with their errors, and the notes say so. De Lubac is quoted from an OCR text of the printed volumes, in phrases.

Two rules govern what follows. Each passage is assigned a voice: the author's own position, an objection, a quoted authority, or a borrowing; chains of copying are evidence of how the formula travelled. And absence is not evidence: "not cited" is a statement about de Lubac's apparatus as the ledger records it, and "not on the shelf" about the files on this disk, not about what either man read.

3. What the Count Cannot See, and de Lubac Can

The census asks for words. De Lubac asked for schemes, and some schemes have no words. When he says a passage names three or more senses, the census lands on a stated formula only half the time: 222 of 440 citations (Stage A).[11] For the other 218 citations, at 172 places, the study re-read the columns with the census's own term list to see why. About half are a rule of the census: they would be found if broader words (*moralis*, *mysticus*, *littera*) were admitted, or the spiritual family counted as a sense, or the window widened. But at 64 places (71 citations) the columns contain fewer than three families of sense-words anywhere, and de Lubac still reads a scheme there (Stage A).[12]

What he reads there are, in part, figures. The ledger's examples, again in a model's summary of his notes, are a cellar of four casks given to Ivo of Chartres (*EM* I/2 638 n. 1), Ambrose's shadow, image and truth (*EM* II/1 493 n. 1), and Origen's three ways of cooking a sacrifice reported by Thomas the Cistercian (*EM* II/2 34).[13] Read in their files, the three come out differently. Ambrose's is what the ledger says: three stages in time, with no sense-word, "First the shadow went before, the image followed, the truth will be. The shadow in the Law, the image in the Gospel, the truth in heaven."[14] A census that counts *allegoria* and *anagoge* passes over it, and figures of this kind are de Lubac's own contribution to the history, counted only in the ledger of his notes. The cellar is not such a figure, and its locator is a slip in one note. At *EM* I/2 638 n. 1 de Lubac prints "PL, CLXI, 707-8", where the TEI of volume 161 holds Ivo's *Decretum*; elsewhere he cites the cellar at volume 159, where it stands, in the *De S. Anselmi similitudinibus*, which he assigns to Alexander of Canterbury, and at *EM* I/1 150 he quotes it as a witness to the classic order. It names all four senses. The census found it there and coded it as theory (F013–F014), and it is read in section 10. The cooking figure is not at the column the ledger gives for Thomas, and de Lubac's sentence gives it to Origen and Bede, whose texts were not read here.[15] So the 64 places are an upper bound on figured schemes; how many rest on a slip like this one was not counted. Section 10 argues that figures are where his unity is best founded.

11. Stage A: `ledger/lubac-theory-vs-census.tsv`, rows with `senses_named` = 3+ (440), of which 222 have `census` = formula. For de Lubac's citations naming two senses or one, the census lands 66 of 698 and 89 of 689 times, as it should: it never looked for them.

12. Stage A: `ledger/lubac-theory-misses.tsv` (218 rows, 172 distinct places), `cause` = no-terms: 71 rows at 64 places. Broad terms explain 60 citations, the spiritual family 25, the sixty-word window 27, a wider window 21; 14 fall where the column is not in the TEI.

13. Stage A summaries in `ledger/lubac-theory-misses.tsv`, rows em2-p274-n01-1 (Ivo, PL 161:707), em3-p497-n01-1 (Ambrose, PL 14:1051) and em4-p038-n00-5 (Thomas the Cistercian reporting Origen, PL 206:343); printed pages from `ledger/claims-all.tsv`. All three places were read in the revision; the ledger's "Ivo" follows the volume number de Lubac prints in that one note.

14. Ambrose, *Enarrationes in XII psalmos*, on "man walks in an image", PL 14:1051C: «Primum igitur umbra praecessit, secuta est imago, erit veritas. Umbra in Lege, imago vero in Evangelio, veritas in coelestibus.»

15. *EM* I/2 637 introduces the cellar as the text of «Alexandre de Cantorbéry»: «Son texte se trouve amalgamé au livre dit» *De sancti Anselmi similitudinibus*; and n. 1 on I/2 638 reads «PL, CLXI, 707-8» in the OCR and in the page image of the printing. That is a slip in one note: *EM* I/1 150 n. 3 quotes the cellar («anagogen, id est contemplatio») at «(PL, CLIX, 707 D, 708 D)», and four further notes of *EM* I/2 cite it at PL 159:708. The TEI at PL 159:707C–708D (`10652.xml`, headed Eadmerus Cantuariensis) has the cellar; PL 161:707–708 (`10721.xml`) is Ivo's *Decretum*. Thomas the Cistercian, *In Cantica*, PL 206:343 (`11703.xml`) has no cooking figure; the three cookings occur in the same commentary at 206:139B–C and 500A as three sacrifices of charity, not as senses. *EM* II/2 34: «in clibano, in craticula, in sartagine»: «Origène» and «Bède» «enseignaient encore à y reconnaître une indication du triple sens».

A second credit is owed before the reading begins. The census reports that the canonical order is first stated by Bede.[16] De Lubac knew a second witness. Aldhelm of Sherborne, whom the Corpus Corporum dates to 709, describes in his treatise on virginity a reader who ranges over the prophets, the laws, the Gospels "set out in the mystical commentaries of the catholic Fathers", and then "arranged by the little rules of the fourfold ecclesiastical tradition, according to history, allegory, tropology, anagogy".[17] De Lubac quotes the passage (*EM* I/1 147) and uses it, with Bede, to refute a scholar who had said in 1957 that Bede knew only three senses.[18] De Lubac gives Aldhelm's dates as about 640 to 709 and Bede's as about 673 to 735, on the same page. His dates allow that Aldhelm wrote first but do not show it, since the shelf gives no date for Bede's *De tabernaculo*, and the priority is not settled here (n. 60). What the census claims, that Bede states the order first, is therefore not shown, and Aldhelm is the census's omission, not de Lubac's. The census found the passage and coded it a "list", which it is, and so it never entered the theory statements from which the census's "first statement" was drawn. Aldhelm's words matter for the argument of this article in another way, taken up in section 5: in his day the fourfold was already, in his word, a *traditio*, an ecclesiastical tradition, and it stands beside grammar and chronography as one more thing a learned reader works through.

4. Jerome, Ambrose, Cassian and Eucherius: an Ascent, Lists, and a Seam

Jerome

De Lubac puts Jerome and Ambrose, "less systematically", at the origins of the same list as Cassian and Eucherius (section 1), and of the division of the senses by body, soul and spirit he says: "Before them both, St Jerome had said it."[19] The text he quotes is the twelfth question of Jerome's letter 120, to Hedibia, which reads 1 Thessalonians 5:23, Paul's prayer that spirit, soul and body be kept whole. After a first answer, Jerome begins again: "Otherwise. We are commanded, as Solomon says, *Describe them threefold in counsel and knowledge* … Threefold is the description in our heart, and the rule of the Scriptures. The first, that we understand them according to history; the second, according to tropology; the third, according to the spiritual understanding." Each is then defined. In history "the order of what is written is kept". In tropology "we rise from the letter to greater things, and whatever was done carnally in the former people we interpret according to the moral place, and turn to the profit of our soul". In the spiritual θεωρία "we pass to higher things, leave earthly things, and discuss the beatitude of things to come and heavenly things, so that the meditation of the present life may be a shadow of the beatitude to come".[20]

16. STUDY §9 ("The canonical L-A-T-N order is first stated by Bede (*De tabernaculo*, PL 91, 410 B)"), corrected here.

17. Aldhelm, *De laudibus virginitatis* c. 4, PL 89:106C: «evangelicae relationis dicta, mysticis catholicorum Patrum commentariis exposita, et ad medullam usque spiritualiter enucleata, et quadriformis ecclesiasticae traditionis normulis secundum historiam, allegoriam, tropologiam, anagogen, digesta, solerter indagando». The list continues with histories and chronicles («nunc priscas historiographorum fabulas et chronographorum seriem») and grammar («nunc grammaticorum regulas et orthographorum disciplinas»). The date 709 is the Corpus Corporum's (`data/author-aliases.tsv`, source *cc*).

18. *EM* I/1 147: «Bède (v. 673-735)»; «saint Aldhelm de Sherborn (Salisbury) (v. 640-709)»; Aldhelm knew, «dans un ordre différent de celui qu'avait donné saint Isidore», the «quadriformis ecclesiastica traditio»; and «Il est donc doublement inexact de dire» that Bede knew only three senses. De Lubac quotes Aldhelm from the MGH, not from Migne: his n. 5 cites «MGH, À. ant., 15, 491» and his n. 6 gives only a page, «(232)». That explains why the census–ledger match did not pair the passage (Stage A codes his two PL 89 citations, *EM* I/1 157 and II/2 24, for other purposes), and probably why his text reads «nonnullis» and «indaganda» where the PL TEI has *normulis* and *indagando*.

19. *EM* I/1 194: «la formule euchérienne est bien réellement calquée sur la division tripartite de la nature humaine en corps, âme et esprit. Il en allait de même, en fait, chez Cassien. Avant eux deux, saint Jérôme l'avait dit». He quotes the letter on pp. 194–195. His n. 6 on p. 194, given a few lines earlier for Jerome's "triple science", cites «Ep. 120, ad Hebrid., q. 12 (6, 162)» (a volume and page of the edition he uses, not the PL); his n. 1 on p. 195 sets the Ezekiel sentence beside the quotation. *EM* I/1 197, of Eucherius: «Il emprunte à Jérôme la division des sens fondée sur la division tripartite de l'homme».

20. Jerome, ep. 120, q. 12, PL 22:1005: «Aliter. Praecipitur nobis, Salomone dicente: Tu autem describe ea tripliciter in consilio et scientia» «Triplex in corde nostro descriptio, et regula Scripturarum est. Prima, ut intelligamus eas juxta historiam. Secunda, juxta tropologiam. Tertia, juxta intelligentiam spiritualem. In historia, eorum quae scripta sunt, ordo servatur. In tropologia, de littera ad majora consurgimus, et quidquid in priori populo carnaliter factum est, juxta moralem interpretamur locum, et ad animae nostrae emolumenta convertimus.

Four things follow. First, this is a threefold stated as an ascent, in verbs of rising and passing over: it is a movement, not a list. Second, its middle term is *tropologia*, and it is glossed as the moral sense. Third, its last term is eschatological: the present life is a shadow of the beatitude to come. That is de Lubac's reason for the division of the spiritual sense, the gap between what is present and what is awaited, stated in a Latin text that he places before Cassian, and it counts in his favour. Fourth, the voice. The passage is introduced by "Otherwise" as a second reading of Paul's verse; two more follow ("Many simply understand this place of the resurrection … Others wish to affirm from this place a threefold substance in man"); and Jerome then returns to his own reading, given earlier in the letter, that the spirit here is the Spirit's gifts: "But we, in the present place, as we said above", take "not the substance of the Holy Spirit, which cannot perish, but his graces and gifts".[21] As an exegesis of 1 Thessalonians, then, the threefold is one reading among several and not Jerome's own. As a rule for reading Scripture it is not distanced at all: it is a precept ("we are commanded"), called "the rule of the Scriptures", and nothing in the letter withdraws it. The rule is Jerome's; its use on this verse is an alternative. Whether it is Origen's reworked was not tested.[22]

Jerome states the threefold again in his commentary on Ezekiel, as a command: "we are bidden to understand the utterances of truth, that is the holy Scriptures, threefold: first according to the letter; second, in the middle, through tropology; third, more sublimely, so as to know whatever is mystical." The middle reading is a withdrawal "from the letter, a little, to higher things", and the example is Paul's muzzled ox (1 Corinthians 9:9); the highest is "the third, sublime and sacred understanding", the great mystery of Christ and the Church (Ephesians 5:32).[23] De Lubac quotes this sentence beside the letter and cites it again as the place where *tropologia* is, "sometimes however", the middle sense (section 7). Rabanus copies it into his own commentary on Ezekiel, another link in the copying chains of section 5.[24] Here too the three are an ascent. But the top of it is not eschatological: it is Christ and the Church. Within Jerome, then, the third sense of the ascent is once the beatitude to come and once the mystery of the Church.

Ambrose

De Lubac says that Ambrose "retains above all the first Origenian scheme, but also welcomes the second", and he gives places.[25] Two are read here. In the commentary on Luke, after reading the women of Christ's genealogy, Tamar and Ruth, Ambrose concludes: "We see, then, that history, morals and mystery agree in the commemoration of the women."[26] That is a threefold applied to one passage, in the order of the first scheme

In spirituali θεωρία ad sublimiora transimus, terrena dimittimus, de futurorum beatitudine, et coelestibus disputamus: ut praesentis vitae meditatio, umbra futurae beatitudinis sit.»

21. Same question, PL 22:1005–1006: «Multi simpliciter hunc locum de resurrectione intelligunt» «Alii ex hoc loco triplicem in homine volunt affirmare substantiam» «Nos autem in praesenti loco (ut supra diximus)» «non substantiam Spiritus Sancti, quae non potest interire, sed gratias ejus donationesque accipimus».

22. That question can be answered only from de Lubac, not from the shelf. He holds that Jerome adopts, as the occasion serves, one or the other of Origen's two schemes, that he "never ceased to the end" to use Origen's writings massively "and to keep their categories", and he lists this question of the letter as the long exposition of the anthropological and scriptural trichotomy. The Greek page that bears on it is *De principiis* IV.2.4–6, read in section 6. *EM* I/1 213. The verb of the sentence on Jerome is garbled in the OCR and was read from the page image of the printing («adopte»); the rest: «suivant l'occasion, l'un ou l'autre schème»; «il n'a cessé jusqu'au bout d'utiliser les écrits origéniens d'une façon massive» «et d'en retenir les catégories». N. 4: «La trichotomie anthropologique et scripturaire est longuement exposée, Ep. 120, c. XII».

23. Jerome, *Commentaria in Ezechielem* V, on Ezek 16, PL 25:147C–148A: «Et jubetur nobis, ut eloquia veritatis, id est, Scripturas sanctas, intelligamus tripliciter. Primum, juxta litteram; secundo, medie per tropologiam; tertio, sublimius, ut mystica quaeque noscamus.» «Medie autem et juxta tropologiam, quando recedimus a littera, et paululum ad altiora conscendimus» «Extrema autem, id est, tertia et sublimis sacraque intelligentia». *EM* I/1 195 n. 1 quotes the first sentence.

24. Rabanus, *Commentaria in Ezechielem*, PL 110:683C: «et jubetur nobis ut eloquia veritatis, id est Scripturas sanctas, intelligamus tripliciter: primum juxta litteram, secundo medie per tropologiam, tertio sublimius, ut mystica quaeque noscamus.»

25. *EM* I/1 213: «Saint Ambroise» «retient surtout le premier schème origénien», «mais accueille aussi le second»; n. 2 cites *In Luc.* III, 35 («historia, mores, mysterium») and *De Isaac et anima* at PL 14:508C.

26. Ambrose, *Expositio in Lucam* III.35, PL 15:1603C: «Videmus igitur mulierum commemorationi historiam, mores, mysterium convenire.» The TEI's column markers give 1603C; the number «1327» printed inside the same sentence is the Benedictine edition's page kept in the text. De Lubac cites the passage by book and section from the *Sources chrétiennes* edition.

(morals before mystery), and stated as a summary of what has just been read, not as a rule or a movement. *De Isaac et anima* gives three phrases of a verse of the Song three qualities of the Word, regal, moral and mystical, as a list.[27] The preface of the Luke commentary is a threefold of wisdom from "the philosophers of this world",[28] the parallel de Lubac calls "a search made afterwards".[29] On this reading Ambrose names the senses in threes, applied to passages, and does not state them as a movement. His shadow, image and truth (section 3) is the one place read here where he sets three stages in sequence, and it names no sense.

Cassian

Cassian's fourteenth Conference states the four senses the Middle Ages kept, and de Lubac sets it, with Eucherius, at the head of his second list. Cassian puts it in the mouth of Abba Nesteros, speaking to Cassian and Germanus. The voice is Cassian's own, staged as an elder's. The frame comes first. The knowledge of religion is twofold: "practical, that is active, which is perfected by the amendment of morals and the purging of vices", and "theoretical, which consists in the contemplation of divine things and the knowledge of the most sacred senses". The practical comes first, and without it "that theoretical purity cannot be grasped", which is reached only "after many stipends of works and labours".[30] Then the theoretical is divided: "into two parts, historical interpretation and spiritual understanding". And the spiritual understanding is divided again: "the kinds of spiritual knowledge are tropology, allegory, anagoge", with Proverbs 22:20 as warrant, "write them for yourself threefold upon the breadth of your heart".[31]

The four, then, are history plus three spiritual kinds, and the warrant for the three is a verse that says "threefold". The famous example follows: "So the four figures just named flow together into one, if we wish, so that one and the same Jerusalem can be understood in four ways: by history the city of the Jews, by allegory the Church of Christ, by anagoge that heavenly city of God which is the mother of us all, by tropology the soul of man, which is often either rebuked or praised by the Lord under this name."[32] A second warrant follows the first. Paul's four words in 1 Corinthians 14:6 (revelation, knowledge, prophecy, doctrine) are mapped one by one onto allegory, tropology, anagogy and the plain order of history, each with its own example: revelation "belongs to allegory", prophecy "means anagoge, by which the speech is carried over to things invisible and future", knowledge "is tropology", which "contains the moral understanding".[33]

The chapter divides the theoretical into two, history and spiritual understanding, and the spiritual into three. That is the shape de Lubac describes, the second term split in three, and Cassian is his best Latin text for

27. On the Song's "where do you feed, where do you rest at noon?": "*Where do you feed?* because the Word of God is regal; *where do you rest*, because moral; *at noon*, because mystical." Ambrose, *De Isaac et anima*, n. 14, PL 14:508C: «Recte dicit: Ubi pascis? quia regale est Dei Verbum: Ubi manes, quia morale: In meridiano, quia mysticum.»

28. The wisdom is "natural, moral or rational", held highest by the philosophers, and Ambrose finds it in the Old Testament, in the patriarchs' three wells and Solomon's three books. Ambrose, *Expositio in Lucam*, prologue 2, PL 15:1529A: «Tria sunt enim quae philosophi mundi istius praecellentissima putaverunt, triplicem scilicet esse sapientiam, quod aut naturalis sit, aut moralis, aut rationabilis. Haec tria jam et in veteri Testamento potuimus advertere.»

29. De Lubac says that neither the number nor the order of Eucherius's senses depends on it. *EM* I/1 194: «c'était là une recherche faite après coup. Ni le nombre ni l'ordre des sens énumérés par Eucher n'en dépendent».

30. Cassian, *Collationes* XIV, c. 1, PL 49:955A: «Cujus quidem duplex est scientia. Prima practice, id est, actualis, quae emendatione morum et vitiorum purgatione perficitur; altera theorice, id est, quae in contemplatione divinarum rerum et sacratissimorum sensuum cognitione consistit.» C. 9, PL 49:965C–966A: «Absque hac namque illa quam diximus theoretica puritas non potest apprehendi, quam hi tantum, qui non aliorum docentium verbis, sed propriorum actuum virtute perfecti sunt, post multa operum ac laborum stipendia».

31. Cassian, *Collationes* XIV.8, PL 49:962B–C: «Theoretice vero in duas dividitur partes, id est, in historicam interpretationem, et intelligentiam spiritalem.» «Spiritalis autem scientiae genera sunt, tropologia, allegoria, anagoge; de quibus in Proverbiis ita dicitur, Tu autem describe tibi ea tripliciter, super latitudinem cordis tui (Prov. XXII)».

32. Cassian, *Collationes* XIV.8, PL 49:963–964A: «Igitur praedictae quatuor figurae in unum ita si volumus confluunt, ut una atque eadem Jerusalem quadrifariam possit intelligi: secundum historiam civitas Judaeorum, secundum allegoriam Ecclesia Christi, secundum anagogen civitas Dei illa coelestis quae est mater omnium nostrum; secundum tropologiam anima hominis, quae frequenter hoc nomine aut increpatur, aut laudatur a Domino.»

33. Cassian, *Collationes* XIV.8, PL 49:964A–965B: «Revelatio namque ad allegoriam pertinet, per quam ea quae tegit historica narratio spirituali sensu et expositione reserantur»; «Item prophetia, quam tertio Apostolus intulit loco, anagogen sonat, per quam ad invisibilia ac futura sermo transfertur»; «Quae ratio, ut dictum est, moralem continet intellectum.»

it. What kind of division is it? Cassian gives it two warrants, and both are numbers: Proverbs' "threefold" for the three spiritual kinds, and Paul's four words for the four. He gives no reason in the history of salvation for there being three. Yet his anagoge is defined by the future, speech "carried over to things invisible and future" (n. 33), as Jerome's third sense is the beatitude to come. So the eschatological element that de Lubac makes the cause of the split is present in Cassian as the content of one sense, not as the reason for the number. On that point Jerome's letter is closer to de Lubac than Cassian's chapter.

Two features of the chapter tell against reading its four as a single sequence. The order is not fixed: within one chapter the spiritual kinds are named tropology, allegory, anagoge, and the Jerusalem example runs history, allegory, anagoge, tropology, with the moral sense last. And the phrase that sounds like de Lubac's unity, "flow together into one", says that the four readings meet in one referent, the name Jerusalem, and it adds "if we wish". It does not say that each reading depends on the one before. The Pauline mapping is a list too: four kinds of speech, each with its text, and no dependence among them stated. The first feature is the one de Lubac himself records, two orders "a few lines apart" (section 1); section 10 measures it.

There is a movement in Cassian, and it is not in the senses. It is in the reader. The practical life comes first and is the condition of the theoretical; spiritual knowledge is a purity of heart earned by labour. The ladder is the monk's, and the senses are the rooms he can enter at the top of it. This is a real unity, and section 10 returns to it, but it is a unity of the knower's ascent, and the chapter that states the senses lays them out as kinds.

Cassian claims no Greek source for the senses; de Lubac, after Courcelle, traces the division of knowledge to Evagrius, who is not on the Latin shelf.[34] The warrant Cassian offers is scriptural, and the verse of Proverbs is shared with Jerome, Origen's *De principiis* and Rufinus's Latin of Origen on Genesis;[35] the authority he claims is the desert's, an elder of Panephysis.[36]

Eucherius

Eucherius of Lyon, who borrows from Cassian (below), prefaces his *Formulae of Spiritual Understanding* with a theory of the senses, and it is a threefold. "The body of Holy Scripture, as is handed down, is in the letter or history; the soul is in the moral sense, which is called tropic; the spirit in the higher understanding, which is called anagoge." The learned, he says, have treated Scripture "according to history, according to tropology, according to anagoge". Each has a use: history "inculcates the truth of deeds", tropology "refers the mystical understandings to the amendment of life", anagoge "leads to the more sacred secrets of heavenly figures". Then a sentence that does not join the others: "There are also some who think allegory should be added in fourth place in this kind of knowledge, claiming that it has set forth the narrative of deeds as a shadow of things to come."[37]

34. The hunter searched the whole of the fourteenth Conference for any naming of the Greeks and found one, a gloss on 1 Timothy 6:20, unrelated; the Greek-derived words (*practice*, *theorice*, *tropologia*, *anagoge*) stand in Latin dress with no author named. De Lubac's link is a modern scholar's (Courcelle, p. 218): *EM* I/1 197 n. 7, comparing Eucherius with PL 49:954–5: «L'idée venait d'Evagre», with a reference to Courcelle, p. 218. Evagrius's Greek was not searched for this article (Appendix A).

35. Proverbs for the three, Paul for the four. Jerome builds his threefold on the verse (above); Origen's *De principiis* reads it into three levels of reader (section 6); and Rufinus's Latin of Origen's seventeenth homily on Genesis reads it as "twofold and threefold", and adds the moral reading "now also" after history and the mystical sense, so that students learn "what they themselves ought to do". That is Rufinus's text, not proof of Origen's Greek. Origen, *Homiliae in Genesim* XVII, in Rufinus's Latin (the series is headed «INTERPRETE RUFINO» in the OCR of PG 12), PG 12:261–262 by the running-head map (`pg012/p-0148.txt`; Tesseract OCR): «Describe hac tibi dupliciter et tripliciter in corde tuo» (*haec*); «descripsimus, id est secundum historiam et secundum mysticum intellectum, nunc in quantum recipere locus potest, etiam moralem in eo discutere sermonem : ut Scripturam studiosi, non solum quid in aliis, vel ab aliis gestum sit, sed etiam ipsi intra sé quid gerere debeant doceantur».

36. Cassian names no Eastern master; he sets the teaching in the mouth of an elder he places among the oldest anchorites of the region of Panephysis. *Collationes* XI.3, PL 49:850A–B, on the journey to «Panephysim»: «tres senes, id est, Chaeremon, Nesteros et Joseph, anachoretae antiquissimi consistebant». Conference XIV is headed «Quae est prima abbatis Nesterotis» (PL 49:953).

37. Eucherius, *Formulae spiritalis intelligentiae*, praefatio, PL 50:727C–728C: «Corpus ergo Scripturae sacrae, sicut traditur, in littera sive historia: est anima in morali sensu, qui tropicus dicitur; spiritus in superiore intellectu, qui anagoge appellatur.» «Quam tripartitam doctrinae disputationem non adeo abhorret illa nostrorum in disputatione distinctio, qua docti quique hanc coelestem Scripturarum philosophiam secundum historiam, secundum tropologiam, secundum anagogen disserendam putarunt.» «Quapropter historia veritatem

The voice is Eucherius reporting others twice over: "as is handed down", "the learned have thought", "there are also some who think". The scheme he sets out is the three, and it is a movement by analogy, body, soul and spirit, which de Lubac says he takes from Jerome (above). The fourth is reported as another party's addition, and it is allegory, the sense that de Lubac calls the sense of faith and makes the hinge of the whole. Then Eucherius uses it. His own example, "so that these things may be shown more fully by examples set beneath", runs all four: "heaven according to history is this which we look upon, according to tropology the heavenly life; the waters according to allegory baptism, according to anagoge the angels."[38] He states three and exemplifies four. De Lubac saw both halves. "The join is clumsy," he writes, "or rather it is not even attempted," though the sentence that follows "sketches a concordist attempt, rather poor"; and he takes the addition to be the moment "the whole Christian reality" enters into daylight.[39] The seam is evidence about how one early writer received the fourth sense: as an addition made by others, which he then put to use, in an order (history, tropology, allegory, anagoge) that is neither his three nor Cassian's. De Lubac says the four-term formula was not obtained "by lengthening in series", but organically, by the analysis of the second term. That is a claim about logical structure, and a seam in one witness does not refute it. What the seam shows is that the earliest Latin witness after Cassian did not receive the four as an unfolding: he received three, and a fourth reported as added "in fourth place". A further sign that the names were not yet fixed is the preface's first page, where Eucherius says that the whole of Scripture is "to be taken to the allegorical understanding", using *allegoria* for the spiritual reading as such, before he counts it as one of four.[40]

Eucherius's preface also takes over Cassian's frame almost word for word, without naming him: "all the discipline of our religion flowed from that fountain of twofold knowledge, which they called first practice, second theory", and the contemplative "is derived into two parts", historical disputation and the interpretation of spiritual understanding.[41] De Lubac says so: several of Eucherius's sentences on "the discipline of our religion" are in Cassian "almost word for word".[42]

Eucherius had readers. Heterius and Beatus, writing against Elipandus in the eighth century, copy his body–soul–spirit sentence and add one word, "angelic", to the higher understanding; Paulus Alvarus of Córdoba, in the ninth, quotes his preface by name as "blessed Eucherius, to be praised with great praise".[43] Neither takes up the appended fourth sense. What travelled from Eucherius was the threefold and its analogy.

nobis factorum ac fidem relationis inculcat. Tropologia ad vitae emendationem mysticos intellectus refert. Anagoge ad sacratiora coelestium figurarum secreta perducit. Sunt etiam qui allegoriam in hoc scientiae genere quarto in loco adjiciendam putent, quam gestorum narrationem, futurorum umbram praetulisse confirment.»

38. Eucherius, praefatio, PL 50:728B–C: «Haec vero ipsa ut subjectis plenius manifestentur exemplis, coelum est secundum historiam hoc quod intuemur, secundum tropologiam vita coelestis; aquae secundum allegoriam baptismus, secundum anagogen angeli», with Psalm 148:4 following.

39. *EM* I/1 198: «Le raccord est maladroit, ou plutôt il n'est même pas tenté, quoique la phrase qui suit esquisse une tentative concordiste, assez pauvre»; by the addition, he says, «toute la réalité chrétienne» comes into the open. The phrase «par allongement en série» is in the main text of *EM* I/2 416, quoted in the first note of this article.

40. Eucherius, praefatio, PL 50:727A: «Universam porro Scripturam tam veteris Instrumenti quam novi, ad intellectum allegoricum esse sumendum».

41. Eucherius, praefatio, PL 50:728C–D: «Omnis autem disciplina nostrae religionis ex illo duplicis scientiae fonte manavit: cujus primam practicen, secundam theoricen vocaverunt, id est actualem, et contemplativam.» Compare Cassian XIV.8, PL 49:962B: «Theoretice vero in duas dividitur partes, id est, in historicam interpretationem, et intelligentiam spiritalem.»

42. *EM* I/1 197: Eucherius's phrases on the «disciplina nostrae religionis» «se trouvent chez Cassien presque ad verbum».

43. Heterius and Beatus, *Ad Elipandum* I, c. 104, PL 96:958A: «Et anima in morali sensu qui tropicus dicitur; spiritus vero in superiore intellectu angelico, qui anagoge appellatur.» Eucherius, PL 50:728A: «est anima in morali sensu, qui tropicus dicitur; spiritus in superiore intellectu, qui anagoge appellatur.» Alvarus, ep. 5, PL 121:450D: «Recte itaque procuratum est, ut ait beatus, laude egregia praedicandus, Eucherius, ut illa eloquiorum castitas a promiscuis cunctorum oculis abdito suo quasi quodam velamine pudicitiae contegeretur». Alvarus's own reading is a pair: the silvered wings of the dove against its golden back.

5. Augustine, Gregory and Bede: Other Quartets, Optional Threes, a Table with Two Sets of Feet

Augustine's quartet that nobody kept

Augustine had a fourfold too, and it is a different one. In *De utilitate credendi*, writing to Honoratus, he says that the Old Testament "is handed down fourfold to those who wish to know it diligently: according to history, according to aetiology, according to analogy, according to allegory". He apologises for the Greek: "So that you do not think me foolish for using Greek names: first because I received it so, and I dare not pass it on to you otherwise than I received it." History is what was written or done; aetiology, why it was done or said; analogy, that the two Testaments do not contradict each other; allegory, that some things are to be understood figuratively.[44] In the unfinished literal commentary on Genesis the same four appear "handed down by certain treaters of the Scriptures", with names that "can be pronounced in Greek but in Latin must be defined", in another order: history, allegory, analogy, aetiology.[45]

So the one Latin Father on the shelf who claims a Greek source for a fourfold claims it for a fourfold that did not survive. It is a list of the interpreter's tasks (explain, give causes, show the harmony of the Testaments, find figures), each with its proof from Christ and the apostles, set out to defend the Old Testament against the Manichees. It is not ordered by depth, and it does not recur. A search of all 5,276 Latin files for *aetiolog-* and *etiolog-* finds the word in five: Augustine's two, and Cassiodorus, Isidore and Rabanus, where it is a figure of rhetoric, "the giving back of a cause".[46] De Lubac treats this quartet fully (*EM* I/1 178–181), notes that it was "often taken as source of the four senses", and records the late-medieval effort, in Alfonso Tostado, to reconcile it with the classic four (Stage A).[47] The shelf adds only the negative: no medieval Latin text on it takes the quartet up as a scheme of senses.

But one Augustinian quartet did survive, and by a route that the census could not see. The mature *De Genesi ad litteram* opens: "In all the holy books one must look at what eternal things are conveyed there, what deeds are narrated, what future things foretold, what things to be done are commanded or advised."[48] These are four kinds of content, not four senses. Bede will set this sentence under the four feet of a table, beside the four senses, and the two quartets will travel together for three centuries.

Gregory's three, when needed

Gregory the Great's letter to Leander, which prefaces the *Moralia*, is the other root de Lubac names for the Latin tradition, and its three are stated as a building. "First we lay the foundations of history; next by typical signification we raise the structure of the mind into a citadel of faith; last, through the grace of morality, we clothe the building, as with a colour spread over it." The building is a figure of dependence: foundation, walls, colour. But the sentence before it makes the three optional: "some things we pass over by historical exposition, and some by allegory we examine with typical investigation; some we discuss only by the instruments of

44. Augustine, *De utilitate credendi* 3.5, PL 42:68: «Omnis igitur Scriptura, quae Testamentum Vetus vocatur, diligenter eam nosse cupientibus quadrifaria traditur; secundum historiam, secundum aetiologiam, secundum analogiam, secundum allegoriam.» «Ne me ineptum putes, graecis nominibus utentem. Primum quia sic accepi, nec tibi hoc aliter audeo intimare quam accepi.» «Secundum analogiam, cum demonstratur non sibi adversari duo Testamenta, Vetus et Novum.»

45. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus* 2.5, PL 34:222: «Quatuor modi a quibusdam Scripturarum tractatoribus traduntur Legis exponendae, quorum vocabula enuntiari graece possunt, latine autem definiri et explicari: secundum historiam, secundum allegoriam, secundum analogiam, secundum aetiologiam.»

46. Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalterium*, ad Ps 15, PL 70:115C: «Quae figura dicitur aetiologia, id est causae redditio, quoties praemissae rei ratio decora subjungitur.» Rabanus, *Commentaria in Paralipomena*, PL 109:357A: «quae figura dicitur aetiologia, causae redditio.» Isidore, *Etymologiae*, PL 82:138D–139A: «Aetiologia est cum proponimus aliquid ejusque causam et rationem reddimus.» Rabanus's phrase is Cassiodorus's with *id est* dropped.

47. Stage A summaries of *EM* I/1 178 n. 1 (PL 42:68) and I/1 181 nn. 2–3, with an unnumbered note on Tostado, in `ledger/claims-all.tsv`.

48. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I.1, PL 34:246–247: «In Libris autem omnibus sanctis intueri oportet quae ibi aeterna intimentur, quae facta narrentur, quae futura praenuntientur, quae agenda praecipiantur vel moneantur.»

allegorical morality; and some, examining everything at once more carefully, we search in three ways."[49] The order is history, type, morals; there is no anagogy.

The same conditional runs through the *Moralia* itself. At the opening of book VI Gregory reminds his reader that he serves the spiritual understanding, and adds that "when the use of profit requires it" he discusses the words of the history closely, and "when it is necessary, I embrace both together, so that allegory may put forth spiritual fruits which yet the truth of history produces from the root."[50] De Lubac cites this sentence for the organic unity of the senses (*EM* I/2 650 n. 5), and the image is his best: fruit from root. Gregory's grammar adds "when it is necessary". In his fortieth homily on the Gospels he goes further and reverses his own order on purpose. History must first be kept, then allegory sought; "but because allegory sometimes builds up faith, and history morality", he will speak to the faithful about allegory first.[51] The order is a teacher's order, and the teacher may change it for his hearers. De Lubac makes the same point in general: after Origen, he says, "St Gregory and many others" held that one or another sense may be missing from a passage (section 1).

Isidore states the dependence that Gregory figures. "The divine law is to be understood in a threefold way: first historically, second tropologically, third mystically … So we should hold the faith historically in such a way that we also interpret it morally and understand it spiritually."[52] Here, in a plain sentence, the later senses presuppose the first. It is a three, in the order letter, moral, mystical, which is not the order that won.

Bede's table

Bede gives the canonical order its classic image. The table of shewbread in the tabernacle has four feet. "The table has four feet, because the whole series of the divine utterances is divided in a fourfold way. For in all holy books one must look at what eternal things are conveyed there, what deeds are narrated, what future things foretold, what things to be done are commanded or advised." That second sentence is Augustine's opening of *De Genesi ad litteram*, word for word and unnamed. Then Bede begins again: "Likewise the table of the tabernacle has four feet, because the word of the heavenly oracle is usually received either by the historical understanding, or the allegorical, or the tropological, that is, the moral, or else the anagogical."[53]

So the table carries two quartets, joined by "likewise": Augustine's four kinds of content and the four senses. De Lubac saw the debt; Stage A summarises his note as "Bede takes Augustine's fourfold list as the fourfold way of understanding every word of scripture" (*EM* I/1 182 nn. 1–2).[54] What the reading adds is the form of the second sentence: "either … or … or … or else". The four are alternatives by which the oracle "is usually received",

49. Gregory I, *Moralia*, epistola ad Leandrum c. 3, PL 75:513B–C: «Sciendum vero est, quod quaedam historica expositione transcurrimus, et per allegoriam quaedam typica investigatione perscrutamur; quaedam per sola allegoricae moralitatis instrumenta discutimus; nonnulla autem per cuncta simul sollicitius exquirentes, tripliciter indagamus. Nam primum quidem fundamenta historiae ponimus; deinde per significationem typicam in arcem fidei fabricam mentis erigimus; ad extremum quoque per moralitatis gratiam, quasi superducto aedificium colore vestimus.»

50. Gregory I, *Moralia* VI.1, PL 75:730B–C: «Et tamen cum utilitatis usus postulat, subtiliter quoque 182 studeo historiae verba discutere. Cum vero necesse est, simul utrumque complector, ut spiritales fructus allegoria germinet, quos tamen ex radice historiae veritas producit.» The numeral 182 in the run is the TEI's trace of a Migne footnote. *EM* I/2 650 n. 5 quotes the second sentence (Stage A, em2-p286-n05-6).

51. Gregory I, *Homiliae in Evangelia* II.40.1, PL 76:1302A–B: «In verbis sacri eloquii, fratres charissimi, prius servanda est veritas historiae, et postmodum requirenda spiritalis intelligentia allegoriae. Tunc namque allegoriae fructus suaviter carpitur, cum prius per historiam in veritatis radice solidatur. Sed quia nonnunquam allegoria fidem aedificat, et historia moralitatem, nos qui auctore Deo jam fidelibus loquimur, non abs re credimus si ipsum loquendi ordinem postponamus».

52. Isidore, *Sententiae* I.18, PL 83:578–579A: «Lex divina triplici sentienda est modo. Primo, ut historice: 165 secundo ut tropologice, tertio ut mystice intelligatur. Historice namque juxta litteram, tropologice juxta moralem scientiam, mystice juxta spiritalem intelligentiam. Ergo sic historice oportet fidem tenere, ut eam et moraliter debeamus interpretari et spiritaliter intelligere.» The numeral 165 is a Migne note number kept in the TEI.

53. Bede, *De tabernaculo* I.6, PL 91:410B: «Quatuor autem pedes habet mensa; quia quadriformi ratione omnis divinorum eloquiorum series distinguitur. In libris namque omnibus sanctis intueri oportet, quae ibi aeterna intimentur, quae facta narrentur, quae futura praenuntientur, quae agenda praecipiantur vel moneantur.» «Item mensa tabernaculi quatuor habet pedes; quia verbo coelestis oraculi, vel historico intellectu, vel allegorico, vel tropologico, id est, morali, vel certe anagogico solent accipi.» Augustine's sentence is quoted in n. 48.

54. Stage A, `ledger/claims-all.tsv`, em1-p188-n01-1 (Augustine, PL 34:247, *EM* I/1 182 n. 1) and em1-p188-n02-2 (Bede, PL 91:410, *EM* I/1 182 n. 2).

each then defined by its kind of speech, plain, mystical, moral or concerned with future rewards, and each with its own examples. Nothing in the passage makes one depend on another. Bede's other statement of the four, in *De schematibus et tropis*, files allegory under the tropes and says that "sometimes in one and the same thing or word" history, the mystical sense of Christ or the Church, tropology and anagoge are intimated together, as the temple is Solomon's house, Christ's body and the Church, each of the faithful, and the dwellings of joy above.[55] "Sometimes": again a possibility, not a rule. And the order differs from Cassian's: Bede puts tropology third, before anagogy, and in his commentary on the Song he repeats Cassian's Jerusalem with the moral and the anagogical swapped into that order.[56]

Bede, like Gregory, also counts three. On Sarah's three measures of flour he writes that "in Holy Scripture the sense of understanding is threefold, historical, allegorical and anagogical", and closes the passage with a test that is not a sense at all: "Let no one think he has rightly understood Scripture in which he could not find the establishing of charity."[57] On the three loaves of 1 Samuel 10 the three are tied to the history of salvation: the first reading of history, "fulfilled through the Law before his incarnation", and then the allegorical and anagogical sense which Christ himself "would open, by the act of the dispensation he had undertaken", the one fitting "the truth of present grace", the other "the beatitude of future life".[58] This is the one place in the Bede the hunt read where the senses depend on one another, and they depend on Christ: history before him, its fulfilment and its hope opened by him. De Lubac cites both passages (*EM* I/1 143 n. 1; I/1 147 n. 1).[59] They are close to his eschatological account. They are also threes.

Aldhelm's sentence (section 3) may put Bede's order in a different light. If Aldhelm wrote first, which de Lubac's dates for the two men allow but do not show, then Bede did not fix the order; he gave a received order its image and its definitions. The shelf does not settle which came first.[60] What it does show is that both men state the canonical order as something received: Aldhelm calls it a *traditio*, and Bede says the oracle is "usually" received in these four ways. Neither names a source for it, and the shelf supplies none.

The chain after Bede

From Bede the table went on by copying, and the copies are evidence of how the formula lived. Amalarius of Metz, explaining the four lessons of a baptismal liturgy, quotes it by name: "This teaching is signified by the table in the Mosaic tabernacle, which has four feet: because (as Bede in the book on the Tabernacle) the whole series of divine utterances is divided in a fourfold way."[61] Rabanus Maurus, commenting on Exodus, copies

55. Bede, *De schematibus et tropis* c. 12, PL 90:185B–C: «Nonnunquam in una eademque re, vel verbo, historia simul et mysticus de Christo vel Ecclesia sensus, et tropologia, et anagoge, figuraliter intimatur, ut: templum Domini, juxta historiam, domus quam aedificavit Salomon; juxta allegoriam, corpus dominicum». Bede names Gregory here, but only for the narrow use of *allegoria* of Christ and the Church: «sequentes exemplum doctissimi tractatoris Gregorii, qui in libris Moralibus, ea quae de Christo sive Ecclesia per figuram dicta, sive facta interpretabantur, allegoriam proprie nuncupare solebat».

56. Bede, *In Cantica* IV, PL 91:1142A: «item juxta tropologiam, id est, moralem sensum, anima quaeque sancta Jerusalem recte vocatur; item juxta anagogen, id est, intelligentiam ad superiora ducentem, Jerusalem habitatio est patriae coelestis». No Bede file on the shelf names Cassian or Eucherius (eight files searched by the hunter).

57. Bede, *Hexaemeron* IV, PL 91:168B–D: «Tria sunt autem sata ejusdem similae, quia in Scriptura sacra triplex est sensus intelligentiae, historicus videlicet, allegoricus et anagogicus»; «Neque ullatenus se Scripturam recte intellexisse quisquam putet, in qua institutionem charitatis invenire non potuit.»

58. Bede, *In Samuelem* II.2, PL 91:562A–C: «dederunt ei geminam Scripturarum interpretationem; ut post primam videlicet historiae lectionem, quae ante ejus incarnationem per legem completa est, ipse allegoricum quoque et anagogicum sensum, qui vel praesentis gratiae veritati, vel futurae vitae beatitudini congrueret, actu susceptae dispensationis aperiret.»

59. Stage A, em1-p149-n01-1 and em1-p153-n01-2 in `ledger/claims-all.tsv`.

60. The date of *De tabernaculo* is not given by any file on the shelf, so the relative priority of Aldhelm and Bede rests on Aldhelm's death-date alone, and is not settled here. De Lubac's dates, «v. 640-709» for Aldhelm and «v. 673-735» for Bede, are his (*EM* I/1 147), and they do not date the two works.

61. Amalarius, *De ecclesiasticis officiis*, c. 19, PL 105:1035A: «Hanc doctrinam significat mensa in tabernaculo Mosaico, quae habet quatuor pedes: quia (ut Beda in libro de Tabernaculo) quadriformi ratione omnis divinorum eloquiorum series distinguitur.»

the whole of Bede's page, Augustine's sentence and the four senses together, without a name.[62] An anonymous sermon in PL 177 abridges it: "The table has four feet, because the words of the heavenly oracle are taken either historically, or allegorically, or tropologically, or anagogically."[63] Cassian travelled the same way. Sedulius Scotus, in his collection on Paul, copies Cassian's Jerusalem clause for clause on Galatians 4, and Cassian's mapping of Paul's four words onto the four senses on 1 Corinthians 14:6.[64] De Lubac knew this chain as well: he groups Cassian's Pauline mapping with Rabanus's copy and an anonymous text in PL 59 in one note (*EM* I/1 191 n. 3, Stage A), and he cites Sedulius for the fourfold Jerusalem (*EM* I/2 646 n. 6).[65]

Two things follow from the chain. The first is that the Latin fourfold, between the fifth century and the ninth, is overwhelmingly a matter of a few texts copied: Cassian's chapter, Eucherius's preface, Bede's table. The copyists keep their source's order, Cassian's or Bede's, without remark, and none of them argues for it. The second is that the copied fourfolds are all lists. The image changes (a name read four ways, a table on four feet, and in the *Allegoriae* printed under Rabanus's name a farthing, the widow's two mites, read as "the fourfold understanding of Holy Scripture") but the logic of "either … or … or" does not.[66] The *Allegoriae* belongs to this chain only if Migne's attribution stands; de Lubac dates the work to the twelfth century (section 10), and its place here is open. What was copied as a movement in these centuries was a three, not a four: Rabanus copies Jerome's ascent on Ezekiel (section 4) and Gregory's threshold (section 10). Alcuin's confession of faith gives the logic plainly: a passage of Scripture is either historical, or allegorical, "or else composed of both", and "sometimes also a moral sense is drawn" from it.[67] The senses are properties of passages, some present here and not there.

6. The Greek: Pairs, and a Refusal

Twelve windows

If the four senses were a Greek inheritance, the Greek Fathers should state them. The Greek census, run with a term list built to mirror the Latin one, has now read Kraken OCR of Migne's Greek from PG 1 to PG 82, less eleven tomes in that range that have no scan, with a few later works: 14,060,062 words in the PG volumes, 14,387,075 in all.[68] Every statement about the Greek below is bounded by that range. It finds twelve places, on

62. Rabanus, *Commentaria in Exodum* c. 11, PL 108:147D–148A: «Quatuor autem pedes habet mensa, quia quadriformi ratione, omnis divinorum eloquiorum series distinguitur. In libris namque omnibus sanctis intueri oportet, quae ibi aeterna intimentur, quae facta narrentur, quae factura pronuntientur, quae agenda praecipiantur vel moneantur.» Where Bede has *futura praenuntientur*, the TEI of Rabanus reads *factura pronuntientur*.

63. Anonymous, *Sermones*, PL 177:1196D: «Mensa quatuor pedes habet, quia verba coelestis oraculi vel historice, vel allegorice, vel tropologice, vel anagogice accipiuntur.» The sermon reproduces Bede's definitions in other words: «Anagoge, id est ad superiora ducens, locutio est quae de praemiis futuris et de vita quae est in coelis, mysticis vel apertis verbis, disputat.»

64. Sedulius Scotus, *Collectanea*, ad Gal. 4, PL 103:191A: «Quatuor figurae, ut historia, allegoria, tropologia, anagoge, hoc solo nomine quod est Hierusalem significantur. Nam secundum historiam civitas est Judaeorum; secundum allegoriam Ecclesia Christi»; ad 1 Cor 14:6, PL 103:155D: «In revelatione. In allegorico sensu, cum aliquid ex futuris revelatur»; «Aut in doctrina. Id est, in historia secundum litteram, ut est, In hoc enim vixit Christus, et mortuus est, et resurrexit, ut viventium et mortuorum dominetur, ubi nuda historia docetur.» The Jerusalem clauses are Cassian's (n. 32).

65. Stage A, `ledger/claims-all.tsv`: em1-p197-n03-4, –5 and –6 (*EM* I/1 191 n. 3: Cassian, Rabanus on 1 Corinthians at PL 112:130, and PL 59:155); em2-p282-n06-7 (*EM* I/2 646 n. 6, Sedulius, PL 103:197). De Lubac's column is 197; the Jerusalem passage in the TEI is at 103:191A.

66. *Allegoriae in universam sacram Scripturam* (Rabanus in Migne's attribution; see section 10), PL 112:1036A–B, `8928.xml` (the same text in `8925.xml`): «Quadrans est quadripartita sacrae Scripturae intelligentia, ut in Evangelio:» [Mark 12:42, the widow's two mites] «quod sancta Ecclesia duo honorat Testamenta, in quibus quadripartita est intelligentia: historica, allegorica, tropologica, et anagogica.» The census coded this place once as theory and once, in the other file, as application (n. 9).

67. Alcuin, *Confessio fidei* III.36, PL 101:1079D–1080A: «Omnis enim divina auctoritas his modis constare videtur, ut aut historialis modus sit, qui nihil aliud nisi res gestas annuntiet, aut allegoricus, ut non illic possit ordo consistere historiae; aut certe ex utrisque compositus, ut secundum historiam et secundum allegoriam manere videatur. Nonnunquam et moralis sensus de divinis trahitur scripturis». Stage A records that de Lubac cites the same text once under the name of John of Fécamp (em4-p100-n02-3); Migne gives it to Alcuin.

68. `census/gr-formulas.tsv` (12 rows: PG 4 p. 290; PG 11 pp. 351 (two windows), 556, 559, 561; PG 13 p. 456; PG 14 p. 110; PG 21 p. 51; PG 44 pp. 191, 488; PG 61 p. 688). Word count: the `(words)` row of `census/gr-terms.tsv`, 14,387,075 over all Kraken Greek counted, of which

eleven pages, where three of the four families (letter, allegory, tropology, anagogy) stand within sixty words. Seven are Origen's, two Gregory of Nyssa's, one Eusebius's, one in the scholia on Dionysius printed under Maximus, and one in a sermon printed among Chrysostom's spuria. None names four. The hunter read each window with the pages on either side.

In every one of Origen's windows the several higher names point to one level. On the scribe of Matthew 13:52 he says that "it is above all the mark of the simple not to know how to tropologize, nor to understand the matters of the anagoge of the Scriptures", and asks for "the unfailing anagoge to the spiritual things, the history of what happened being kept"; then he sets the whole in two levels: the scribe is made a disciple "in the simpler sense" when he leaves Judaism for the Church, and "in the deeper" when, taking the introductions of the letter, "he climbs up to the spiritual things".[69] Of Moses he says that he saw "the allegories by anagoge of the histories written by him": anagoge qualifies allegory, and both stand against the histories.[70] Against Celsus, who blamed "those who tropologize and allegorize" the history of Moses, Origen answers in the same pair of verbs.[71] On Lot and his daughters he says that Celsus examined the story "neither according to the letter nor … according to the anagoge", and in the next lines calls the higher reading "the tropology of the passage": four of the census's terms on one page, naming two levels.[72] And he says the biblical histories were written "with tropology as their aim", using the word for the figurative reading in general, as Celsus uses allegory.[73] That the two verbs of the Matthew passage and the two nouns of the Lot passage name one level is this article's reading, and its reason is the sentences' own build. In the first, tropologizing and the anagoge stand together under one negation (the simple neither know how to do the one nor understand the other), and the passage then sets the whole in two levels, the simpler and the deeper. In the second, "according to the anagoge" answers "according to the wording", and "the tropology of the passage" answers "the history": one pair named twice.

The sharpest case is a passage outside the census windows, which the hunter found by searching for the formula "as to the anagoge". On the Samaritan woman, Origen reads Jesus's "you" and "we": "'You', as to the wording, the Samaritans; as to the anagoge, those who hold other opinions about the Scriptures; and 'We', as to the letter, the Jews; as to the allegory, I the Word and those formed after me."[74] Four terms, and to a reader who knows the medieval grid, perhaps four senses. But each pronoun has two referents, not four: wording and

14,060,062 in the PG volumes. The unread tomes (PG 67–69, 71–76, 78–79) are the columns absent from that file. This supersedes the "nine" of the *usus* essay §6. Not read, and relevant: the eleven tomes; Cyril of Alexandria beyond PG 70 and 77, the two tomes that the running heads (`patrologia/data/pg-heads/`) give to him; Evagrius; and two Greek texts de Lubac points to outside the range, Andrew of Caesarea («Cf., chez les Grecs, ANDRÉ DE CÉSARÉE, Sur l'Ap., prol.», *EM* I/2 416 n. 1) and Maximus, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 37 («Quaest. ad Thal. 37 (PG, XC, 385 B)», *EM* I/1 197 n. 5).

69. Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* X.14, PG 13:867 (Kraken, origen-pg013 p-0456; OCR): «Καὶ ἰδιωτῶν γε μαλιστά ἐστι, μὴ εἰδότων τροπολογεῖν, μηδὲ συνιέντων τὰ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς τῶν Γραφῶν,» «ὡς εἰδέναι, τηρουμένης τῆς κατὰ τὰ γενόμενα ἱστορίας, τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ πνευματικὰ ἀπταιστον ἀναγωγὴν,» «κατὰ δὲ τὸ βαθύτερον, ὁτε, τὰς διὰ τοῦ γράμματος τῶν Γραφῶν εἰσαγωγὰς παραλαβών τις, ἀναβαίνει ἐπὶ τὰ πνευματικά, ὀνομαζόμενα βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν.» Migne's facing Latin (Tesseract OCR) keeps the Greek word: «quzeque ad earum anagogen spectant, non capiunt» (*quaeque*).

70. Origen, *Comm. in Joh.* VI, PG 14:205 (Kraken, origen-pg014 p-0110; OCR): «καὶ δῆλον, ὁτι Μωσῆς ἑώρα τῶ νοῖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ νόμου, καὶ τὰς κατὰ ἀναγωγὴν ἀλληγορίας τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων παρ΄ αὐτῶ ἱστοριῶν.» Facing Latin (OCR): «liistoriarumque apud se scriptarum allegorias juxta anagogen vidisse» (*historiarumque*).

71. Origen, *Contra Celsum* I.17, PG 11:691 (Kraken, pg-011 p-0351; OCR): «Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἑξῆς, κατηγορῶν τῆς Μωϋσέως ἱστορίας, αἰτιᾶται τοὺς τροπολογοῦντας καὶ ἀλληγοροῦντας αὐτήν.» «μόνοις δὲ ἆρα τοῖς τροπολογῆσαι καὶ ἀλληγορῆσαι δυναμένοις ἐγραψε». The Kraken text has for ἱστορίας. The voice in the first run is Celsus's charge as Origen reports it; in the second, Origen's answer.

72. Origen, *Contra Celsum* IV.45, PG 11:1101 (Kraken, pg-011 p-0556; OCR): «καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Λώτ, καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας, οὐτε κατὰ τὸ ῥητὸν ἐξετάσας, οὐτε κατὰ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐρευνήσας,» «Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς κατὰ τὸν τόπον τροπολογίας οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον νῦν λέγειν·» «Φέρε δὲ τὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀπεμφάσεως δι΄ ὀλίγων παραμυθησόμεθα.»

73. Origen, *Contra Celsum* IV.48–49, PG 11:1107 (Kraken, pg-011 p-0559; OCR): «καὶ ταῖς ἱστορίαις ὡς σκοπῶ τροπολογίας γεγραμμέναις, καὶ σοφώτατα οἰκονομηθείσαις·» Migne's facing Latin (OCR): «qua eo fine scripte sunt ut allegoriis explicarentur». De Lubac quotes this Greek and calls the Latin «bien traduit» (*EM* I/2 419 n. 6).

74. Origen, *Comm. in Joh.* XIII, on John 4:22, PG 14 (col. ≈446 by the facing Latin's marker; Kraken, origen-pg014 p-0219; OCR): «ὁσον ἐπὶ τῆ λέξει, οἱ Σαμαρεῖς· ὁσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆ ἀναγωγῆ, οἱ περὶ τὰς Γραφὰς ἑτερόδοξοι· τὸ δὲ» [«Ἡμεῖς»] «ὁσον ἐπὶ τῶ ῥητῶ, οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι· ὁσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆ ἀλληγορία, ἐγὼ ὁ Λόγος, καὶ οἱ κατ΄ ἐμὲ μεμορφωμένοι, τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐχοντες ἀπὸ τῶν Ἰουδαϊκῶν λόγων·» The run begins after the lemma «Ὑμεῖς», which the file sets in guillemets. The facing Latin renders the two words for the letter differently: «Per voculam vos, quod ad expositionem attinet, intelliguntur Samaritani ; quantum vero ad anagogen, illi qui in Scripturis diversa a nobis sentiunt». The ledger records no citation of these columns by de Lubac.

letter are one level, anagoge and allegory another. A grid would have four referents for one word, as Cassian's Jerusalem has. Origen's sentence has two pairs.

Origen's own threefold, in the fourth book *On First Principles*, is not a grid either. One must write the meanings of Scripture "threefold" into one's soul (the same verse of Proverbs that Cassian used), "so that the simpler is built up from the, as it were, flesh of Scripture … the one who has risen a little, from its, as it were, soul; and the perfect … from the spiritual law", because "as the human being consists of body and soul and spirit, so also the Scripture".[75] The three are levels of readers, the simple, the progressing and the perfect, and a few lines later he says that some passages have no bodily sense at all. The names tropology and anagogy are not in it. It is a movement, and the movement is the reader's growth, as in Cassian.

De Lubac reads more in it. "The sequence history, moral, allegory (or anagogy), which will be that of Eucherius and Cassian, is already Origen's," he writes; Origen ties it to body, soul and spirit, whence a bodily sense for history, a psychic sense for morals, and a spiritual sense for allegory or anagogy.[76] The Greek of the next two paragraphs of *De principiis* bears him out. The middle reading, the "soul" of Scripture, has as its example Paul's muzzled ox, "written for our sakes" (1 Corinthians 9:9–10), a reading turned on the hearers' own conduct, and the same example Jerome gives for tropology "in the middle". The spiritual reading is the one that can show "of what heavenly things" the Jews according to the flesh served "a pattern and shadow", and "of what good things to come the law has a shadow".[77] So the order the Jerome–Cassian–Eucherius line keeps, the moral before the mystical, is on Origen's page, and so is an eschatological last term, the shadow of good things to come, which is the root of de Lubac's hiatus. On the Greek read here his genealogy of the order holds. What the page does not have is the names: Origen's tropology and anagogy, where he uses the words, name the one higher reading (above), and the moral meaning of *tropologia* is Latin (section 7).

Gregory of Nyssa declines to choose

The test case the census flagged is the prologue to Gregory of Nyssa's homilies on the Song of Songs, addressed to Olympias. It is the one Greek text in the windows read that sets three of the higher names side by side, and it does so to say that the difference does not matter. Whether one takes the Song's words as a parable, a dark saying or a riddle, "the contemplation through anagoge, whether one cares to call it tropology or allegory or anything else, we shall not differ about the name, only provided it has useful thoughts".[78] He goes on to show that Paul himself used several names for the same act, allegory for Abraham's two sons, "typically" for the wilderness, the muzzled ox written "for our sakes", the mirror and the riddle, and he concludes: "In all these different manners and names of the contemplation according to the mind, he points out to us one form of teaching: not to remain

75. Origen, *De principiis* IV.2.4, Greek of the *Philocalia* as printed in PG 11 (Kraken, pg-011 pp. 0187–0188; OCR): «ἵνα ὁ μὲν ἁπλούστερος οἰκοδομῆται ἀπὸ τῆς οἱονεὶ σαρκὸς τῆς Γραφῆς, οὕτως ὀνομαζόντων ἡμῶν τὴν πρόχειρον ἐκδοχήν· ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀναβεβηκώς, ἀπὸ τῆς ὡσπερεὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς·» «συνέστηκεν ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ οἰκονομηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίαν δοθῆναι Γραφή.» The columns, PG 11:363–366, are from the running-head map (`patrologia/data/pg-heads/011.tsv`: p. 187 = cols 363–364, p. 188 = 365–366). The Latin of Rufinus, which the medievals read, could not be quoted continuously from the OCR, which interleaves it with the Greek.

76. *EM* I/1 198–199: «La séquence histoire — morale — allégorie (ou anagogie), qui sera celle d'Eucher et de Cassien, est déjà celle d'Origène. Celui-ci déjà la met en rapport avec la division tripartite de l'homme»; «d'où les noms de sens corporel pour l'histoire, de sens psychique pour la morale, et de sens spirituel pour l'allégorie (ou l'anagogie)».

77. Origen, *De principiis* IV.2.6, PG 11:367–368 by the running-head map (Kraken, pg-011 p-0189; OCR): «τῆς δὲ ὡς ἂν εἰς ψυχὴν ἀναγομένης διηγήσεως, παράδειγμα τὸ παρὰ τῷ Παύλῳ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ πρὸς Κορινθίους κείμενον.» «Πνευματικὴ δὲ διήγησις τῶ δυναμένω ἀποδεῖξαι ποίων ἐπουρανίων ὑποδείγματι καὶ σκιᾷ οἱ κατὰ σάρκαΙουδαῖοι ἐλάτρευον· καὶ τίνων μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν ὁ νόμος ἔχει σκιάν.» Kraken runs σάρκα and Ἰουδαῖοι together. In IV.2.4 the perfect are built «ἀπὸ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ νόμου» (pg-011 p-0187), «σκιὰν ἔχοντος τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν» (p-0188).

78. Gregory of Nyssa, *In Canticum*, prologue, PG 44:757 (Kraken, pg-044 p-0488; OCR): «ἢ ὡς παραβολὴν τὸ λεγόμενον, ἢ ὡς σκοτεινὸν λόγον, ἢ ὡς ῥῆσιν σοφῶν, ἢ ὡς τι τῶν αἰνιγμάτων. Ὧν τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς θεωρίαν, εἴτε τροπολογίαν, εἴτε ἀλληγορίαν, εἴτε τι ἄλλο τις ὀνομαίζειν ἐθέλοι, οὐδὲν περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος διοισόμεθα, μόνον εἰ τῶν ἐπωφελῶν ἔχοι [το] νοημάτων.» Kraken has and for ἀλληγορίαν and ὀνόματος, and keeps Migne's bracket. Migne's Latin for PG 44 is not on disk.

wholly with the matter … but to cross over to the immaterial and intelligible contemplation."[79] The book, he says at the start, is a "hand-guidance" for the more fleshly "toward the spiritual and immaterial condition of the soul".[80]

This is the opposite of a grid, and it is stated in the first person, as Gregory's own position. It is also, in its way, a statement of unity: the many names are "one form of teaching", one crossing from the surface to the meaning. What it is not is a unity of four distinct senses. De Lubac cites the prologue for the "contemplation according to the mind" that Gregory practises and recommends, "pregnant with the whole Christian mystery", and he translates the sentence on the names as one to which all the Fathers "would consent".[81] The refusal is his evidence before it is this article's. In the *Life of Moses*, the other Nyssa window, the census's three terms are history, anagoge, and an adverb, "typically": "would it not be more reasonable, looking to the anagoge of the thought, even if something happened typically, to believe that the lawgiver sets out a doctrine through the events?"[82] Again two levels.

The remaining windows say the same thing in other settings. Eusebius describes the pagan theologians who "referred nothing to physical tropologies, nor allegorized the myths about the gods, but kept the histories to the wording alone": a pair, about myth.[83] The scholiast on Dionysius says that what Scripture says "symbolically or historically" holds "no bare history but a life-giving perfection", and that the Areopagite is "showing that anagoge and allegory are necessarily to be received": one reading, two names, against bare history.[84] And the sermon on the brazen serpent printed among Chrysostom's works gives a rule of restraint: "Flee the forced allegories: there is a time when the Scripture itself gives eyes to contemplation; there is a time when it itself teaches to tropologize. When, however, a bare contemplation or history lies before you, do not force the unattainable."[85]

Where the second term was split

De Lubac would not be surprised by any of this; on the names he says it himself. He calls the two-term formula "the essential and primitive formula", and he writes that for some Fathers the whole spiritual sense is anagogy, for others tropology, a word Origen "had used in this broad sense" (section 1). The windows give that account a count over the tomes read: the upper term named by several words, and in them not split into three. Gregory of Nyssa, the only Greek writer in the windows who names three of the higher names together, uses them as synonyms and says so. Origen's *tropologia* is figurative reading in general, used of pagan myth as of Moses, and in the Greek corpora the study counted no τροπολογ- stands within its 25-word window of the vocabulary of

79. Same page: «Ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τοῖς διαφόροις τρόποις τε καὶ ὀνόμασι τῆς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν θεωρίας, ἓν ὑφηγεῖται διδασκαλίας εἶδος ἡμῖν, τὸ μὴ δεῖν πάντως παραμένειν τῷ πράγματι,» «ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνειν πρὸς τὴν αὐΰλον τε καὶ νοητὴν θεωρίαν,»

80. Same prologue, PG 44:755–6 (Kraken, pg-044 p-0487; OCR): «ἀλλ΄ ἐφ΄ ὧ τοῖς σαρκωδεστέροις χειραγωγίαν τινὰ γενέσθαι, πρὸς τὴν πνευματικήν τε καὶ αὐΰλον τῆς ψυχῆς κατάστασιν,»

81. *EM* I/1 197 (OCR): «était bien réellement prégnante de tout le mystère chrétien», with n. 3, «In Cant. prooem. (PG, XLIV, 757)» (Stage A, em1-p203-n03-2). *EM* I/2 418–419: «Tous consentiraient aux réflexions que fait saint Grégoire de Nysse», followed by his French version of the passage, with n. 1, «In Cant., procem. ad Olymp. (PG, XLIV, 756-7)». The ledger's Stage A row for the earlier note did not record the later one.

82. Gregory of Nyssa, *De vita Moysis* II, PG 44:331–2 (Kraken, pg-044 pp. 0191–0192; OCR): «Πῶς ἀντινομοθετεῖ ἡ ἱστορία τῷ λόγῳ; Οὐκοῦν οὐκ εὐλογώτερον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς τὴν ἀναγωγὴν τοῦ νοήματος ὁρῶντας, εἰ καί τι γέγονε τυπικῶς,»

83. Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* II, proem, PG 21:91 (Kraken, pg-021 p-0051; OCR): «μηδὲν εἰς φυσικὰς ἀναφέρειν τροπολογίας, μηδ΄ ἀλληγορεῖν τοὺς περὶ θεῶν μύθους, ἐπὶ μόνης δὲ τῆς λέξεως φυλάττειν τὰς ἱστορίας.»

84. Scholia on Dionysius, Ep. 9, printed as Maximus's, PG 4:567–8 (Kraken, pg-004 p-0290; OCR): «Οτι τὰ συμβολικῶς ἤτοι ἱστορικῶς τῇ Γραφῇ εἰρημένα οὐχ ἱστορίαν ἔχει ψιλὴν, ἀλλὰ ζωτικὴν τελείωσιν.» «Ταῦτα δέ φησι,δεικνὺς ἀναγκαίως τὴν ἀναγωγὴν καὶ ἀλληγορίαν παραλαμβάνεσθαι.» Migne's facing Latin keeps both words (OCR): «ostendens, necessario anagogen et. allegoriam admittendam esse». De Lubac cites the place (*EM* I/2 419 n. 10: «il faut nécessairement admettre l'allégorie et»). Migne's attribution is kept here.

85. Sermon *Contra Judaeos, in serpentem aeneum*, printed among the spuria in PG 61:753 (Kraken, pg-061 p-0688; OCR): «Φεῦγε τὰς βεβιασμένας ἀλληγορίας· ἔστιν ὅτε αὐτὴ η Γραφὴ δίδωσιν ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς θεωρίαν· ἔστιν ὅτε αὐτὴ τροπολογεῖν διδάσκει. Οταν μέντοι γυμνὴ ἡ θεωρία ἡ ἱστορία προκέηται, μὴ βιάζου τὰ ἀνέφικτα,» Kraken has , and for ή, ή and ἡ. The author is not identified on the page.

ethics.[86] The nearest case on this shelf runs across a page of *Contra Celsum* I. About forty words after "those able to tropologize and allegorize" (n. 71), Moses is said to have given "the multitude" of the Jews "no occasion of harm in the ethical place", and the few, who can read more intelligently, a writing not empty of θεωρία. The ethical is the level of the many there, and tropology belongs with the few.[87] A check run for this article over the Kraken text of PG 11–14 and 17 (3,636 pages) found no ἠθικ- within 200 characters of τροπολογ-, ἀναγωγ- or ἀλληγορ- on the same page, and one within 400, on that same page of *Contra Celsum*, where the pagan poets' "ethical discourses" are set beside Moses' laws.[88] The word's history is short: one pagan use in the classical corpus, a Stoic verb about Athena's attributes in Chrysippus, and 106 Christian uses, 82 of them Origen's.[89]

7. *Tropologia*: from Any Figure to the Moral Sense

The Latin word narrowed, and de Lubac says so. In Origen, he writes, *tropologia* is one of the names of the whole spiritual sense; Jerome "seems to have preferred" it in that broad sense, and he lists more than thirty places in Jerome's commentaries; "sometimes however" it is in Jerome the middle sense between the letter and the "sublime" understanding, and he cites the Ezekiel commentary. In the chapter on the two orders he warns that "one and the same word, *tropologia*, must be understood differently according to the place it occupies".[90] This section adds three things to his account: the moral gloss inside Jerome, the Latin habit of glossing the word, and one translator.

Inside Jerome. The broad sense is in Jerome's prefaces and asides. The eighth book on Isaiah returns "to discuss history and tropology together", after two books that gave "the allegory" of the fifth. The preface on Zechariah says that Origen, Hippolytus and Didymus wrote an exegesis that was "wholly allegorical", and that Jerome has "mixed the tropology of our own with the history of the Hebrews". On Habakkuk he answers a critic who will say that in expounding history he was "caught in the nets of allegory" and "mixed tropology with history". A letter closes a reading of Solomon's judgment: "Let these things be said under the cloud of allegory. For the rest, your prudence knows well that the rules are not the same in the shadows of tropology as in the truth of history."[91] In each, *tropologia* and *allegoria* name the same thing, the reading beyond the history. In the Ezekiel commentary the same word is the middle of three readings, and in the same commentary it is again the whole spiritual reading set against the history, the two "each needing the other".[92] And in the letter to

86. STUDY §14a, point 1, on `census/classical-kwic.tsv`, whose window is about 25 words on either side of the hit: no τροπολογ- hit stands near ἠθικ-. That window is the study's; it was not re-run here.

87. Origen, *Contra Celsum* I.18, PG 11:693 by the running-head map (Kraken, pg-011 p-0352; OCR), continuing a sentence begun on PG 11:691: «τῶν νομοθετουμένων Ιουδαίων διδοὺς ἀφορμὰς βλάβης ἐν τῷ ἠθικῷ τόπῳ, μήτε τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ συνετώτερον ἐντυγχάνειν δυναμένοις, οὐχὶ πλήρη θεωρίας ἐκτιθέμενος» (Kraken has Ιουδαίων without breathing). The census window at 691 stops before it.

88. Run on 2026-11-25 over `patrologia/raw/kraken/{pg-011,pg-012,origen-pg013,origen-pg014,pg-017}/text/`, accents and breathings folded, page by page (a match across a page break is not seen, which is why the passage of n. 87 is not counted). The one hit within 400 characters is pg-011 p-0351: «ἠθικοὺς λόγους νόμοις καὶ προστάγμασι» near «τροπολογῆσαι».

89. `census/classical-kwic.tsv`, forms beginning τροπολογ-: 107 hits, one pagan (Chrysippus, SVF II 910, `urn:cts:greekLit:tlg1264.tlg001.1st1K-grc1.910`), 106 Christian, of which Origen 82, the New Testament catenae 10, Eusebius 9, Justin 3, Clement 1, Epiphanius 1. Philo has none.

90. *EM* I/2 418: «Pour d'autres, c'est la tropologie; Origène encore avait usé du mot dans ce sens large, et il semble avoir eu les préférences, entre autres, de saint Jérôme»; n. 7 lists PL 24 and 25 places, among them «1328 D, 1418 À» in PL 25; n. 8: «Quelquefois cependant la tropologia est le sens intermédiaire entre la Zittera et la sublimis sacraque intelligentia» (*Zittera*, OCR for *littera*), citing «In Ez., 1. V, c. xvi (PL, XXV, 147-8)». *EM* I/1 169: «un même mot — tropologia — doit s'entendre différemment suivant la place qu'il occupe».

91. Jerome, *Commentaria in Isaiam* VIII, praefatio, PL 24:281A–B: «Sextus et septimus superiores libri allegoriam quinti voluminis continent, quod olim historica explanatione dictavi. Praesens opus, id est, octavus liber, ad coeptam interpretationem revertitur, ut et historiam et tropologiam juxta utramque editionem pariter disserat.» *In Zachariam*, prologue, PL 25:1418A: «sed tota eorum ἐξήγησις allegorica fuit, et historiae vix pauca tetigerunt» «historiae Hebraeorum tropologiam nostrorum miscui». *In Abacuc*, PL 25:1328C: «Ecce in historiae expositione dum nescis, allegoriae clausus es retibus, et tropologiam historiae miscuisti.» Ep., PL 22:685: «Haec sub allegoriae nubilo dicta sint. Caeterum optime novit prudentia tua, non easdem esse regulas in Tropologiae umbris, quae in historiae veritate.» Census windows: `census/formulas.tsv` F180 (22:685), F184 (24:281a), F185 (25:1328c), F186 (25:1418a); kinds in `ledger/formulas-coded.tsv`.

92. Jerome, *Commentaria in Ezechielem*, on the doors of the temple, PL 25:404B: «ut et in historia spiritualem habeas intelligentiam, et in tropologia historiae veritatem, quorum utrumque altero indiget».

Hedibia it is glossed as the moral sense: "in tropology we rise from the letter to greater things" and "interpret according to the moral place" (section 4). So the narrowing is visible inside one author, as de Lubac's notes imply; the letter makes it explicit, since its moral gloss is Jerome's own and de Lubac's note on the middle sense cites only Ezekiel. Which of these texts is earlier the shelf does not say. The census found four of the broad-sense passages and coded only the Zechariah preface as a statement of theory (F180, F184, F185, F186); de Lubac's list has two of them, Habakkuk and Zechariah.

The gloss. After Jerome, the Latin writers read in this article who define *tropologia* define it as moral. Cassian: tropology "contains the moral understanding". Eucherius: the soul is "in the moral sense, which is called tropic", copied by Heterius and Beatus. Isidore: "tropologically, according to moral knowledge". Bede: "tropological, that is, moral"; "according to tropology, that is, the moral sense" (sections 4–5). A Greek word in Latin needed a gloss; that the gloss is always the same word is this article's evidence that, for these writers, the moral meaning had become the word's fixed meaning. Gregory, the other root, does not use the Greek word in the passages read here; he says *moralitas*.

One translator. PG 13 prints Origen's commentary on Matthew in three layers on one page: the Greek, a Latin facing it, and beneath both the ancient Latin version, headed *vetus interpretatio*. On the epileptic boy of Matthew 17 the Greek says, "let us see, tropologizing, whom we can say the lunatic is". The facing Latin writes "tropologically". The ancient Latin writes: "let us see *morally* first whom we can say this lunatic to be".[93] A few pages earlier, where Origen says he has "not yet troubled to tropologize" the Transfiguration but has examined it "as to the letter", the ancient Latin has "since we have not yet touched any *moral* sense of this place, but have followed the simple understanding of the words".[94] The study's script, re-run for this article, finds the pattern across the span where the three layers stand together: the ancient translator never writes *tropologia* or *anagoge*, and writes *moral-* on fourteen of the eighteen pages where the Greek has τροπολογ-, while the facing Latin keeps *tropologia* and never writes *moral-*.[95] That is a finding about one undated translator. It is not how *tropologia* got its moral meaning: the translator never writes the word, and Jerome's letter and Cassian's chapter already gloss it as moral. What the layers show is a Latin reader of Origen taking his tropologizing as moral reading, as Jerome's letter and Cassian define the word. Rufinus's Latin of the Genesis homilies is a second witness of another kind: there the moral reading is added "now also" as a third, after history and the mystical sense, and it is not called tropology (section 4).

8. Migne's Latin and de Lubac's Greek

De Lubac read the Greek Fathers in Migne, where the Greek is printed beside a Latin version, and for most of the Greek works the Latin is not ancient: where an ancient version survives, as for Origen on Matthew, the page prints it separately (section 7). The dates of the modern versions were not established from the files for this article. The study placed 68 of de Lubac's Patrologia Graeca references on pages where Migne prints both, and had each read with the Greek and the Latin of the page and its neighbours, by Claude Opus 5.5 readers

93. Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* XIII, on Matt 17:15, PG 13:1101–2 (Kraken, origen-pg013 p-0577; OCR): «ἰδωμεν τροπολογοῦντες τίνα δυνάμεθα εἰπεῖν τὸν σεληνιαζόμενον εἶναι». Migne's facing Latin, and the *vetus interpretatio* below it (Tesseract OCR of the same page): «videamus quemnam esse lunaticum, proque eo rogantem illius patrem tropologice dicere possumus»; «videamus moraliter primum quem esse lunaticum hunc dicere possumus». Columns from the running-head map, `patrologia/data/pg-heads/013.tsv`.

94. Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* XII, on the Transfiguration, PG 13:1077–8 (Kraken, origen-pg013 p-0565; OCR): «Ἐπεὶ δὲ μηδέπω περιεργασάμενοι τροπολογεῖν τὰ Σ κατὰ τὸν τόπον, ὡς πρὸς τὸ ῥητὸν βασανίζοντες» (the Σ is a stray of the OCR). *Vetus interpretatio* (OCR): «Quia necdum moralem aliquem hujus loci contigimus sensum, sed simplicem verborum» (the next word, *intelligentiam*, is broken by the OCR).

95. `scriptura/studies/sensus/scripts/matthew_parallel.py`, run read-only on 2026-11-25 over PG 13 pp. 521–830 (293 pages; Greek 82,744 words in Kraken, facing Latin 66,451 and *vetus* 87,872 in Tesseract): Greek τροπολογ- 21, on 18 pages; facing Latin *tropolog-* 17, *moral-* 0; *vetus tropolog-* 0, *anagog-* 0, *moral-* 26, of which on 14 of the 18 pages. Page-level counts, not aligned passage by passage; the figures agree with STUDY §11.

working only from those pages; these are model readings of OCR text, and the article reports them as such. Where his point could be tested, it holds on the Greek in 43 references, holds partly in 7, and holds only on the Latin in 2; at 5 the cited column does not contain what he cites it for. Migne's Latin was judged faithful in 34 places, loose in 20, and to shift the sense in 5.[96]

His Greek is good. Where he quotes the Greek, the Greek bears him out, as at *Contra Celsum* IV.49 (n. 73) and the Dionysian scholia (n. 84). The two references that hold only on the Latin deserve care, and the reading here qualifies the study's account of both. In the *Selecta in Jeremiam* the facing Latin turns the neutral "those who hold other opinions" (τῶν ἑτεροδόξων) into "those who think perversely in faith".[97] De Lubac quotes the Latin phrase, but he also gives the Greek it translates in the same note (*EM* II/1 107 n. 1), so the reader is warned. The second case is the homily on the witch of Endor, where Origen says: "if it has something useful according to the anagoge, God knows … and if you inquire according to the history, what use to me is the history of Lot and his daughters?" Migne's Latin renders the pair as "by the mystical and hidden sense" and "by the series of the history".[98] De Lubac cites the column among "Origenian expressions passed into the Latin of Rufinus" (*EM* II/1 342 n. 4), in a note that cites the Greek homily together with *De principiis* IV, which is Rufinus's text.[99] Whether the Latin printed beside the homily is Rufinus's or a later version the files read here do not say, and the study's reading of the point as resting on the Latin is not confirmed here as a mistake of de Lubac's. What the page does show is that the Greek has neither "series" nor "mystical": it has the plain κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν and κατὰ τὴν ἀναγωγήν.

The wider pattern is the one the census predicted, but it holds place by place, not across the corpus. Migne's Latin sometimes makes the Greek "anagoge" into the Latin "spiritual sense". On Lot's daughters in *Contra Celsum* IV.45, "neither according to the letter nor according to the anagoge" becomes "with neither the literal nor the spiritual sense investigated", and the "tropology of the passage" becomes "this history taken in the tropological sense", two different Latin adjectives for two Greek near-synonyms.[100] In the Endor homily anagoge becomes the "mystical and hidden sense" (n. 98). But on Matthew X, John VI and John XIII, and in the Dionysian scholia, the facing Latin keeps *anagoge* (nn. 69, 70, 74, 84). So a reader of Migne's Latin will sometimes find the Latin "spiritual sense" in the Greek Fathers ready-made, and sometimes the Greek word in Latin letters, depending on the translator of the volume. The one place on this shelf where the three Latin senses are laid over Origen in plain Latin is the editors' own: a synopsis printed in the front matter of PG 12 opens, "The sense of Scripture is threefold: literal, moral, and mystical or allegorical", and then reads Origen's

96. `ledger/pg-greek-check.tsv`, 68 rows: column `lubac_on_greek` (holds 43, partly 7, holds-on-latin-only 2, not-found 5, n/a 11) and column `rendering` (faithful 34, loose 20, shifted 5, n/a 9). Method in STUDY §13. These are model readings, not checked passage by passage for this article except at the places quoted in nn. 97–99.

97. Origen, *Selecta in Jeremiam*, on Jer 3:6–7, PG 13:545–6 (Kraken, origen-pg013 p-0279; OCR): «τῶν ἑτεροδόξων οἱ λόγοι, καλλος ἐχοντες πιθανότητος, οὐ τῶν ἀκουόντων ἐπιστροφὴν». Facing Latin (`pg013-latin.txt`, OCR): «quibus verba perverse in fide sentientium assimilantur, pulchritudinem probabilitatis, nen audientium conversionem habentis.» (*non*). *EM* II/1 107 n. 1 (OCR): «perverse in fide sentientium» «(traduisant : t@v étepoë6éuv,» where the OCR has garbled his Greek.

98. Origen, *Homilia in 1 Reg.* 28, PG 12:1014B (Kraken, pg-012 p-0524; OCR): «Εἰ μέντοι κατὰ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἔχει χρήσιμον, Θεὸς οἶδε, καὶ ὧ ἂν χαρίσηται τοὺς λόγους ἐκείνους ἐξετάζειν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν ζητήσαις ἄν, τί γὰρ ὄφελός μοι ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ τοῦ Λωτ καὶ τῶν θυγατέρων αὐτοῦ;» Facing Latin (OCR of the same page): «Si sensu. mystieo, ac recondito, aliquam pre se fert utilitatem, Deus novit,» «Si vero secundum bistoriz seriem perquires,» (*mystico*, *historiae*).

99. *EM* II/1 342 (OCR): «des expressions origéniennes passées dans le latin de Rufin»; n. 4 cites «In Reg., h. 2, n. 19 (PG, XII, 1014 B). De princ., 1. 4, c. 2, n. 5 et 9 (314, 322)» (the OCR has "1." for *l.*). The study's reading (`ledger/pg-greek-check.tsv`, em3-p346-n04-4) codes the point as holding only on the Latin.

100. Origen, *Contra Celsum* IV.45, PG 11:1101, Migne's facing Latin (`pg-djvu/011.txt`, OCR): «nec litterali nec spiritali sensu investigato, illud» «nihil necesse est nunc dicere, quid hzc historia $968 sensu tropologico accepta doceat;» (*haec*; the "$968" is a page number run into the line). Greek in n. 72.

101. Editors' preface to a tome of the Benedictine Origen, reprinted in the front matter of PG 12 (`pg012-latin.txt`, OCR; no column read off a page marker): «Triplex est scripturae sensus, litteralis, moralis, et mysticus seu allegoricus,» «Hic corpus et anima unum eumdemque sensum, nempe litteralem, designant». The study names Delarue as its author (STUDY §11); the hunter reports that the passage itself cites Delarue's preface to tome IV, so its writer is probably not Delarue, which is left open here.

body and soul as "one and the same sense, namely the literal", to make his three fit.[101] That is apparatus, an editors' grid laid over Origen's pair.

9. The Eleven He Does Not Cite

Of the census's 132 statements of theory, eleven have no citation in de Lubac's apparatus at the column or within ten columns, and their authors are not among those he cites for theory without a column (Stage A). The study listed them as candidates and warned that the anonymous ones might sit in his notes under another name or edition.[102] The hunter read all eleven in context, searched the whole Latin shelf for earlier texts sharing their distinctive phrases, and checked the ledger for the same author or passage elsewhere. None is a false hit. The verdicts are in Table 1.

Census id	Author and place	Senses	Verdict
F002	Bruno the Carthusian, *Exp. in Ps.* 67:14, PL 152:957C	letter / mystical (= "anagoge")	uncited, no earlier source found
F006	Radulfus Ardens, *Homiliae*, PL 155:1899A	history or morality / allegory	uncited; image from Gregory
F022	Hildebert (attributed), sermon 70, PL 171:681A	history, allegory, tropology, anagoge	uncited; a cited twin at 171:634
F039	*Posteriores excerptiones* (Hugh?), PL 175:664B	history, allegory, tropology, anagoge	same work cited at 175:661 for another point
F080	anonymous sermon, PL 177:1196D	history, allegory, tropology, anagoge	abridges Bede's table (cited)
F094	Wolbero, *In Cant.*, PL 195:1035D	history, allegory, morality	uncited, no earlier source found
F095	Wolbero, *In Cant.*, PL 195:1036D	history, allegory, morality	uncited, no earlier source found
F097	Wolbero, *In Cant.*, PL 195:1150D	history, allegory, morality	uncited, no earlier source found
F195	anonymous (Cassiodorus?), *In Cant.*, PL 70:1077B	letter, allegory, morality, anagoge	the same sentence as Haymo, PL 117:321 (cited)
F217	Sedulius Scotus, *Collectanea*, PL 103:155D	allegory, tropology, anagoge, history	copies Cassian XIV.8 (cited)
F269	Atto of Vercelli, *Exp. epist. Pauli*, PL 134:433C	allegory against history and morality	uncited, no earlier source found

Table 1: The census's statements of theory that de Lubac does not cite (Stage A), with the reading's verdicts.

Four of the eleven are explained by copying. The anonymous sermon in PL 177 abridges Bede's table, which de Lubac cites in five places (Stage A; n. 63). Sedulius on 1 Corinthians 14:6 is a four-line digest of Cassian's Pauline mapping, same words, same examples, compressed (n. 64), and de Lubac cites both Cassian's page and, for the same mapping, Rabanus and the PL 59 text (n. 65). The honeycomb sentence printed under Cassiodorus's name in PL 70 is word for word the sentence of the Song commentary printed as Haymo's in PL 117: Scripture "is understood in many ways and set out in various senses: now according to the letter, now according to allegory, now according to morality, now according to anagoge, that is the higher sense".[103] De Lubac cites the Haymo text (*EM* I/2 602 n. 1, under the name Aimon); which of the two is the original the text cannot say. The TEI file heads the work "Haymo Halberstatensis"; the Auxerre alternative is de Lubac's, who elsewhere names Aimon of Auxerre (*EM* I/2 383 and 443), and this article does not decide between them. The fourth, the *Posteriores excerptiones* on the table of shewbread, gives the four senses as the four supports by which Scripture "is raised up and lifted from earthly things"; de Lubac cites the same work three columns earlier, for the tabernacle (*EM* II/1 417 n. 7, Stage A), and the passage compresses Bede's figure.[104] So the absence of these from his notes is not a gap in his history. Each is a witness to a text he cites.

102. `ledger/formulas-vs-lubac.tsv`, kind *theory*, `lubac` = not cited (11 rows); STUDY §10.

103. Anonymous, *Expositio in Cantica*, PL 70:1077B–C: «Recte ergo divina Scriptura favus distillans vocatur, quia multipliciter intelligitur, et variis sensibus exponitur, nunc juxta litteram, nunc juxta allegoriam, nunc juxta moralitatem, nunc juxta anagogem, id est superiorem sensum.» Haymo, *Commentarium in Cantica*, PL 117:321B–C: «Recte ergo divina Scriptura favus distillans vocatur, quia multipliciter intelligitur et variis sensibus exponitur, nunc juxta litteram, nunc juxta allegoriam, nunc juxta moralitatem, nunc juxta anagogen, id est superiorem sensum.» The two differ by a comma and *anagogem/anagogen*. *EM* I/2 602 n. 1: «AIMON, In Cant.»; I/2 383: «par Aimon d'Auxerre»; I/2 443: «Aimon d'Auxerre déclare».

104. *Posteriores excerptiones* c. 11, PL 175:664A–B: «Quatuor epistylia mensae, quatuor sunt sensus Scripturae, historia, allegoria, tropologia, anagoge, quibus ipsa erigitur, et a terrenis elevatur.» The attribution to Hugh of St Victor is queried by Migne.

The other seven are the article's new texts. Six have no earlier source on the shelf; the seventh, Hildebert's sermon 70, is built from two received images and has a cited twin (below). What they show is how little of what the census calls "theory" is a grid. Bruno the Carthusian, on the dove with silvered wings and golden back in Psalm 67, reads the silver as "the understanding according to the letter, which is bright as silver", and the pale gold as "the mystical understanding, which the Greeks call anagoge", more perfect than any other gold.[105] The pair is the Greek pair, and Bruno knows its Greek name; *anagoge* names the whole higher reading, as in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, not the fourth of four. Radulfus Ardens takes Gregory's image of Scripture as a river in which the lamb may walk and the elephant swim and makes it a pair of levels: "in it the simple are fed by the outer history or morality, and the wise are exercised by the inner allegory".[106] History and morality are both outside; allegory alone is within. De Lubac cites Radulfus elsewhere for a fourfold (*EM* II/1 122 n. 1, Stage A), so this homily shows the same author working with two.

Wolbero of St Pantaleon, in Cologne, commenting on the Song, has three statements and all three are threefold, history, allegory, morality, with no anagogy. The first sorts the senses by readers: Scripture, the king's storehouse, "is divided threefold, that is into history, allegory and morality", so that "the strong might seek and the weak not shrink: many are delighted by history, many fed by allegory, some instructed by morality". But those the king admits to all his cellars pass "from historical knowledge into allegorical and from allegorical into moral".[107] The second allows the three to be taken "now separately, now together".[108] The third makes history the ground: wherever the historical is expounded, "it is resolved into one of these two parts, allegory or morality, and for the most part the understanding of one and the same history is brought back into the senses of both".[109] In one commentary, then, the three are a list for most readers, a sequence for the few, and a pair of offspring from one root. The third of these is close to de Lubac's own figure: allegory and morality both resolved out of the one history, as Gregory's fruits come from the root of history (section 10), and it is the nearest of the uncited texts to his organism. De Lubac collects Wolbero elsewhere for the shifting order of allegory and morality (*EM* I/1 167 n. 10, Stage A), which is what these passages also show.

Atto of Vercelli, on 2 Corinthians 3, gives a rule of choice and a warning against one sense: some things in the Law "are not to be examined other than as they are written down: like the Decalogue itself, which whoever examines allegorically opens the door to vices, because he destroys every advance of morality"; some are to be read only historically, and some both ways.[110] Here morality stands with the letter against allegory, which is not the order of any grid. De Lubac cites Atto for the other half of the rule, that some places must be allegorised

105. Bruno the Carthusian, *Expositio in Psalmos*, ad Ps 67:14, PL 152:957C–D: «scilicet intellectum ad litteram qui nitidus est ut argentum»; «Vos dico in pallore auri abundantes, id est in pallido auro, scilicet in mystico intellectu, quem Graeci anagogen dicunt, qui per pallidum aurum, quod reliquo omni auro perfectius est, designatur eo quod longe sit perfectior intellectu illo qui ad litteram est». De Lubac cites the same commentary for theory at PL 152:1043 (*EM* I/2 491, Stage A).

106. Radulfus Ardens, *Homiliae*, on John 16:29, PL 155:1899A: «Sed Scriptura sacra ita est temperata, quod in ea potest et parvulus ambulare, et gigas natare. In ea per exteriorem historiam vel moralitatem pascuntur rudes, et per interiorem allegoriam exercentur sapientes.» Gregory, letter to Leander, PL 75:515A: «Quasi quidam quippe est 6 fluvius, ut ita dixerim, planus et altus, in quo et agnus ambulet, et elephas natet.» The «6» is a Migne note number kept in the TEI.

107. Wolbero, *Commentaria in Canticum*, on Song 1:3, PL 195:1035D–1036A: «Haec autem in trifariam dividitur, hoc est historiam, allegoriam et moralitatem.» «Multi enim historia delectantur, plerique allegoria pascuntur, nonnulli moralitate instruuntur.» «ut videlicet de historica scientia intrent in allegoricam et de allegorica in moralem,»

108. Wolbero, PL 195:1036D–1037A: «Cum ergo haec omnia, alia quidem historialiter, alia allegorice, alia vero moraliter, nunc quidem separatim, nunc insimul, hoc eodem triplici modo legeris et intellexeris,»

109. Wolbero, on Song 4:2, PL 195:1150D–1151A: «Nam cum triplex sit sensus in toto corpore divinae Scripturae, historicus scilicet, allegoricus et moralis, ubicunque historicus exponitur, in aliquam istarum duarum partium, allegoriam scilicet aut moralitatem resolvitur, plerumque in utrarumque partium sensus, unius ejusdemque historiae redigitur intellectus, ita ut nonnunquam quod historia sonat, non nisi mystice intelligi debeat.»

110. Atto of Vercelli, *Expositio in epistolas Pauli*, ad 2 Cor 3, PL 134:433C: «Illud quoque sciendum, quia sunt quaedam in lege, quae non aliter discutienda sunt quam scripta habentur: sicut ipse Decalogus, quem qui allegorice discutit, ostium vitiis pandit, quia omnem profectum moralitatis destruit: quaedam vero sunt, quae tantum historialiter; quaedam autem utroque modo discutienda sunt.»

(Stage A records other Atto citations, among them *EM* II/2 66 n. 5).[111] The one fourfold among the seven is the sermon for St Peter in Chains printed among Hildebert's: "Sacred reading is like a four-legged table in the house of the Lord. It has history, allegory, tropology and anagoge," with a Jerusalem verse for each.[112] It is Bede's table and Cassian's Jerusalem in one sentence, and it is one of four fourfolds of the monk's day (reading, prayer, meditation, work). De Lubac cites its twin in sermon 60 six times and assigns that sermon to Peter Comestor (*EM* I/1 152 n. 10, Stage A); whether sermon 70 belongs with it was not tested.[113]

So the uncited statements do not change de Lubac's history so much as test its claim of unity. The copies confirm that the fourfold travelled as Bede's and Cassian's text. The original statements are, for the most part, pairs (Bruno, Radulfus), threes (Wolbero), and a rule of restraint (Atto), and only one is a fourfold, built from the two received images. The census counted them as theory because they name three or more terms near one another, and they do state a theory; but the theory they state is a flexible one, in which the senses are present or absent, joined or separate, as the passage and the reader require.

10. The Order of the Movement, and Where the Unity Lives

De Lubac's unity is not a fiction, and the shelf shows where it lives. Among the notes to his paragraph on the organism of the four senses (*EM* I/2 650), the early witnesses are Gregory's figures and a sentence of Heterius and Beatus. "Through the letter we tend to allegory", which he cites for each sense tending "to the other as to its end", is Gregory on the two thresholds of Ezekiel's gate.[114] Heterius and Beatus say of the creed that "the history is Christ the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate ... It is not an allegory. It did not signify another Christ, as the patriarchs and prophets signified him".[115] Christ is the turn: the histories before him signify, his own history does not signify another, and the senses after him run inside one mystery, "because Christ has been carried over to the Church", in the Paschasius that de Lubac cites for the "passage of the one into the other".[116] Here de Lubac's eschatological reason for the split of the spiritual sense, the gap between the two comings, is closest to the texts: Bede's three loaves distinguish allegory and anagogy as present grace and future beatitude (n. 58), and Cassian's anagoge carries speech "to things invisible and future" (n. 33). The split into present and future is there in the definitions of the senses.

The four stated as one movement

The early texts state threes as a movement (Jerome, Isidore, Bede's loaves, Origen's levels), and the copied fourfolds of sections 4 and 5 are lists. The four themselves are stated as one movement on this shelf, and the

111. Atto, same work, PL 134:367D–368A: «ostenditur sacra Scriptura partim allegorice esse discutienda, partim historiae veneratio servanda.» A citation of this place at *EM* I/2 678 n. 1, reported during the search, could not be found in the ledger rows or in the OCR of *EM* (Appendix A). Stage A records Atto cited for theory at PL 134:351 (*EM* II/2 66 n. 5).

112. Hildebert (attributed), *Sermones* 70, PL 171:681A: «Lectio enim sacra est sicut mensa quadrupes in domo Domini. Historiam habet, allegoriam, tropologiam et anagogen.»

113. Sermon 60, PL 171:634B–C: «Ad hunc modum quatuor sunt in sacra Scriptura, [sicut] sunt quatuor pedes in mensa Domini, historia, allegoria, moralitas, anagoge.» Stage A, em1-p158-n10-11 (*EM* I/1 152 n. 10) and five further rows.

114. "Because we tend through the letter to allegory, we come as from the threshold that is outside to that which is inside." Gregory I, *Homiliae in Ezechielem* II.3.18, PL 76:968A: «Limen quippe Scripturae sacrae exterius, littera; limen vero ejus interius, allegoria. Quia enim per litteram ad allegoriam tendimus, quasi a limine quod est exterius, ad hoc quod est interius venimus.» Rabanus copies it in his commentary on Ezekiel, PL 110:898D–899A: «quia enim per litteram ad allegoriam tendimus, quasi a limine quod est exterius venimus». *EM* I/2 650 n. 7 cites Gregory (Stage A, em2-p286-n07-7).

115. Heterius and Beatus, *Ad Elipandum* I, PL 96:958D: «Historia est Christus Dei Filius, natus de virgine Maria, crucifixus sub Pontio Pilato.» «Haec pro se stat sicut auditur. Non est allegoria. Non significavit alterum Christum, sicut patriarchae et prophetae hunc significaverunt et praedicaverunt esse venturum.» *EM* I/2 650 n. 1 (Stage A, em2-p286-n01-1).

116. *EM* I/2 650: «Le passage d'un sens à l'autre est plus précisément passage de l'un dans l'autre, devenir de l'un par l'autre»; «Translatus est Christus ad Ecclesiam», with n. 4, «PASCHASE, In Lam., l. II (PL, CXX, 119 A)». The TEI has the sentence at PL 120:1119A: «Sed quia translatus est Christus ad Ecclesiam, in ea fideles devoti sua offerunt vota». The column in the OCR of *EM* lacks a digit; the page image was not checked.

first text to read is the prologue of the *Allegoriae in universam sacram Scripturam*, which the census codes as theory. It opens with an order of inquiry: whoever would come to know Scripture must first consider "when it weaves its narrative historically, when allegorically, when anagogically, when tropologically". It then names the four "history, allegory, tropology, anagogy" and calls them "the four daughters of mother Wisdom". Wisdom feeds her adopted sons by stages: "to beginners and the tender a drink in the milk of history; to those advancing in faith, food in the bread of allegory; to the good, who work hard at good works, fullness in the savoury refreshment of tropology; to those, finally, who are lifted from the depths by contempt of earthly things and carried to the heights by heavenly desire, the sober drunkenness of theoretical contemplation in the wine of anagogy." That is a graded ascent of four, one sense to each grade of reader. A few lines later the four become a building: "In the house of our soul history lays the foundation, allegory raises the walls, anagogy sets on the roof, and tropology paints it with various ornaments", both within, by affection, and without, by good work. The building reorders the terms. Anagogy moves to third, as the roof, and tropology to last, as the ornament, which is Gregory's colour on the walls (section 5) put on a four-storey house. De Lubac saw this: he quotes the house sentence as Adam Scot's preface, among building figures in which he finds Gregory's letter to Leander "down to the words", and he gives the same building in other orders, with "some variants".[117] And the same prologue then makes all four optional: the reader must consider "when [Scripture] wishes to be understood according to one alone, when according to two, when according to three, when according to all four together".[118]

The prologue is held twice on the shelf, in `8928.xml` under "Rabanus Maurus 780-856" and in `8925.xml` under "Auctor incertus (Rabanus Maurus?)", and the census coded it in both (section 2). Its date is open. Migne prints it among Rabanus's works; de Lubac writes that the *Allegoriae*, "long attributed to Rabanus", date "surely only from the second half of the twelfth century", that their author "has every chance of being Adam Scot himself", and also that the four-sense theory is "not, as several have believed, a sufficient sign of this late date".[119] Adam Scot's *De tripartito tabernaculo* has the feeding sentence nearly word for word, with *modo … modo* in place of the prologue's datives: Scripture, one and unchanging, "brings forth diverse understandings according to the capacity of readers", now giving beginners the milk of history, now the bread of allegory, now the solid food of tropology, now the wine of anagogy.[120] De Lubac cites the column in the same paragraph, as

117. *Allegoriae in universam sacram Scripturam*, prologue, PL 112:849A–C, `8928.xml` (the same text in `8925.xml`): «Quisquis ad sacrae Scripturae notitiam desiderat pervenire, prius diligenter consideret quando historice, quando allegorice, quando anagogice, quando tropologice suam narrationem contexat. Has namque quatuor intelligentias, videlicet historiam, allegoriam, tropologiam, anagogiam, quatuor matris sapientiae filias vocamus» «Mater quippe Sapientia per hos adoptionis filios pascit, conferens insipientibus [incipientibus] atque teneris potum in lacte historiae; in fide autem proficientibus, cibum in pane allegoriae; bonis vero et strenue operantibus, et operibus bonis insudantibus, satietatem in sapida refectione tropologiae; illis denique qui et ab imis per contemptum terrenorum suspensi, et ad summa per coeleste desiderium sunt provecti, sobriam theoricae contemplationis ebrietatem in vino anagogiae.» «In nostrae ergo animae domo historia fundamentum ponit, allegoria parietes erigit, anagogia tectum supponit, tropologia vero tam interius per affectum quam exterius per effectum boni operis, variis ornatibus depingit.» The bracketed *incipientibus* is Migne's correction, kept in the TEI. De Lubac, *EM* II/2 57, quotes the house sentence («In nostrae ergo animae domo, historia fundamentum ponit») from Adam's «préface aux Allegoriae in universam Scripturam sacram», after calling the abbot of Kelso's letter to Adam «une paraphrase de la Lettre de Grégoire à Léandre»; in all these texts one recognizes, «jusque dans les mots, la doctrine formulée jadis par saint Grégoire». His notes give the building in other orders: Peter Comestor, «Tropologia, doma culmini superpositum»; Peter of Poitiers, «tectum tropologiae, id est moralis vel anagogici»; Alan of Lille, «prima sit historica, secunda tropologica, tertia allegorica. Prima fundamentum, secunda paries, tertia culmen» (PL 210:209C, census F146, coded L-T-A). His summary, II/2 58: «moyennant quelques variantes, avec les trois ou les quatre sens».

118. Same prologue, PL 112:850A–B: «nobis considerandum est quando secundum unam solam, quando secundum duas, quando secundum tres, quando etiam secundum omnes simul quatuor intelligi velit».

119. *EM* I/1 152: «Tel aussi l'auteur des Allegoriae in universam Scripturam, qui a toutes chances d'être Adam Scot lui-même»; n. 2: «PL, CXII, 849-50. Longtemps attribuées à Raban, ces Allegoriae ne datent sûrement que de la seconde moitié du» (the century is garbled in the OCR and was read from the page image of the printing as the twelfth) «Toutefois la théorie des quatre sens n'est pas, comme plusieurs l'ont cru, un indice suffisant de cette date tardive.» He quotes the prologue again under Adam Scot's name at *EM* II/2 37 n. 11. The decision letter cited this note as "158 n. 2"; 158 is the PDF page, and the printed page is 152 (`ledger/pages.tsv`).

120. Adam Scot, *De tripartito tabernaculo*, PL 198:630A: «diversas pro captu legentium, parit intelligentias: et modo incipientes, et teneros lacte quodam potat historiae; modo autem, in fide proficientes, pane cibat allegoriae. Modo etiam, bonis operibus strenue insudantes, solido reficit cibo tropologiae; modo denique ab imis per contemptum terrenorum suspensos, et ad summa, per coelestium desiderium, provectos,

a witness to the classic order. Which text borrows from which is not on the shelf, and nothing below depends on the prologue's date.

Other statements of the four as a movement are graded in the same way, and de Lubac has gathered nearly all of them. A chapter amalgamated into the *De S. Anselmi similitudinibus*, which de Lubac gives to Alexander of Canterbury (section 3), sets four casks in the king's cellar: "simple history, allegory, morality, anagoge", ordered from the door to the corner, each drink sweeter than the last, and poured by the cellarer to the simpler, the more capable, the more perfect and the most perfect in turn.[121] Honorius, in the *Gemma animae*, gives the four senses to "four kinds of faithful, the simple, the intelligent, the advanced, the wise", through the four lessons of Holy Saturday.[122] And Richard of St Victor ranks them. History holds the first place; "the mystical understanding is certainly threefold: the tropological holds one place, the allegorical the middle, the anagogical the highest", because tropology "deals with what anyone easily grasps" and "has settled in the lowest place".[123] In another chapter of the same work Richard states the four as one speech of one Scripture: it often happens "that one and the same Scripture, while it is expounded in many ways, says many things to us as one: morally teaching us what our beloved wishes us to do, allegorically reminding us what he has done for us by himself, anagogically setting before us what he still disposes to do with us".[124] That is de Lubac's hiatus in a sentence: what is to be done now, what has been done, what is still to come. It is one of his witnesses for the unity of the senses (*EM* I/2 650 n. 8), and for Richard's order (n. 123).

The texts de Lubac gathers in the same pages for the movement between the senses were read as well, and none states the four as a movement: Honorius on the Song gives a list,[125] the *Scala claustralium* a chain of the monk's exercises,[126] the *Moralitates in Cantica* a three,[127] and John of Salisbury the functions of the senses.[128]

in sensu anagogico, vino theoricae contemplationis inebriat.» Census F104. *EM* I/1 151 n. 10: «Trip. tab. (PL, CXCVIII, 630, 697, 743 B)», for Adam's use of the classic order, two lines before «Tel aussi l'auteur des Allegoriae» (I/1 152).

121. *De S. Anselmi similitudinibus* (TEI header: Eadmerus Cantuariensis), PL 159:707D–708B: «In hac cella quatuor habentur dolia mellifluae dulcedinis plena, quorum ista sunt nomina: simplex historia, allegoria, moralitas, anagogen, id est intellectus tendens ad superiora. Ista quidem dolia modo quo superius diximus sunt ordinata. Primo namque loco in Scriptura sacra, tanquam juxta ostium, est simplex historia, deinde allegoria, postea moralitas, novissime vero, quasi in angulo, est anagogen, id est contemplatio. Valde dulcis potus est historia, sed et dulcior in allegoria; dulcissimus vero in moralitate, longe autem incomparabiliter dulcior in anagogen, id est in contemplatione.» «simpliciores namque et rudes in fide ac ejus amore, de primo dolio solet potare, id est de historia; capaciores vero de allegoria; perfectiores autem de moralitate; perfectissimos autem de anagogen, id est de contemplatione.» Census F013–F014. De Lubac quotes the passage at *EM* I/2 637–638 (section 3), and at I/1 150 lists «Alexandre de Cantorbéry» with Honorius and Adam among the witnesses of the classic order (n. 15).

122. Honorius, *Gemma animae*, c. 104, PL 172:669B: «quatuor genera fidelium, scilicet simplices, intelligentes, provecti, sapientes, quatuor nominibus erudiuntur, videlicet per historiam, per allegoriam, per tropologiam, per anagogen erudiuntur». Census F033–F034. De Lubac does not cite the *Gemma* there, but names Honorius's liturgical writings among the witnesses of the classic order and adds «Honorius compte toujours quatre sens» (*EM* I/1 150 and n. 2).

123. Richard of St Victor, *Benjamin major*, on the table of shewbread, PL 196:199D–200A: «In Scriptura sacra primum locum tenet historia. Mystica vero intelligentia pro certo est tripertita. Tropologica tenet locum unum, allegorica medium, anagogica summum.» «Tropologia de his agit quae quisque facile capit et unde et in imo resedit.» Census F101. De Lubac, *EM* I/1 165–166, says that Richard keeps the tropology-first order «dans le Benjamin major et, sauf une exception, dans la dissertation qui» «en forme l'appendice», and his notes cite both passages read here: «Benj. maj., 1. IV, c. xiv (PL, CXCVI, 151 C)» and «PL, CXCVI, 199-200».

124. Richard of St Victor, *Benjamin major*, PL 196:151C: «Et saepe fit ut una eademque Scriptura, dum multipliciter exponitur, multa nobis in unum loquatur, moraliter nos docens quid dilectus noster facere nos velit, allegoriter admonens quid pro nobis per semetipsum fecerit, anagogice proponens quid adhuc de nobis facere disponit.» *EM* I/2 650 n. 8 cites «Benj. major., 1. IV, c. xiv (PL, CXCVI, 151 C)».

125. The nuptials are read in four senses, each in two modes. Honorius, *Expositio in Cantica*, PL 172:349A–B: «Hic liber agit de nuptiis quae fiunt quatuor modis, scilicet historice, allegorice, tropologice, anagogice. Juxta historiam fiunt nuptiae duobus modis». *EM* I/2 645 n. 1 (Stage A, em2-p281-n01-1).

126. Four degrees, reading, meditation, prayer and contemplation, are linked so that "those that go before profit little or nothing without those that follow"; de Lubac borrows the image for the unity of the senses, but the chain is of the monk's exercises, not of the senses. *Scala claustralium* (TEI header: Auctor incertus (Guigo V prior?)), PL 184:481C–D: «Hi autem gradus ita concatenati sunt, et vicaria ope sibi invicem deserviunt, quod praecedentes sine subsequentibus aut parum aut nihil prosunt: sequentes vero sine praecedentibus aut raro aut nunquam haberi possunt.» *EM* I/2 648 n. 3 (Stage A, em2-p284-n03-3).

127. The preachers pass "from history to allegory, and from allegory to morality". *Moralitates in Cantica canticorum*, PL 203:550D (TEI header: Philippus de Harveng; the Stage A summary of de Lubac's note names Luke of Mont-Cornillon): «sic ipsi rationabiles et gratos sensus proferunt, dum de historia ad allegoriam, et de allegoria transeunt ad moralitatem.» *EM* I/2 648 n. 5 (Stage A, em2-p284-n05-6).

128. Allegory builds faith, tropology morals, anagoge leads upward, and the four are joined only as many mysteries under one surface. John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, PL 199:666B: «Licet enim ad unum tantummodo sensum accommodata sit super ficies litterae, multiplicitas

A keyword search of the census's 68 four-family statements of theory then found no graded movement beyond the five texts above, though it searched model summaries and could miss one they do not describe.[129] On the census's own dates the five are of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, apart from the *Allegoriae*, whose date is open.

The order of the movement

Set side by side, the texts read in this article that state the senses as one movement give the following orders.

No.	Text and place	Figure of the movement	Order stated
1	Origen, *De principiis* IV.2.4–6, PG 11:363–368	levels of reader; flesh, soul, spirit	letter; "soul" (moral example); spiritual (good things to come)
2	Jerome, ep. 120 q. 12, PL 22:1005	ascent: "we rise", "we pass over"	history; tropology (moral); spiritual θεωρία (beatitude to come)
3	Jerome, *In Ezech.* V, PL 25:147C–148A	ascent: "in the middle", "more sublimely"	letter; tropology; mystical (Christ and the Church)
4	Gregory, letter to Leander, PL 75:513	building: foundation, walls, colour	history, type, morality
5	Isidore, *Sententiae* I.18, PL 83:578–579	dependence: "so ... that"	history, tropology, mystical
6	Bede, *In Samuelem* II, PL 91:562	Law, then Christ's dispensation	history; allegory and anagogy
7	Wolbero, *In Cant.*, PL 195:1036A	from cellar to cellar	history, allegory, morality
8	*Moralitates in Cantica*, PL 203:550D	passage from vessel to vessel	history, allegory, morality
9	*Allegoriae*, prologue, PL 112:849A–B	feeding by grades of reader	history, allegory, tropology, anagogy
10	*Allegoriae*, prologue, PL 112:849C	house of the soul	history, allegory, anagogy, tropology
11	Adam Scot, *De trip. tab.*, PL 198:630A	feeding by capacity	history, allegory, tropology, anagogy
12	*De S. Anselmi similitudinibus*, PL 159:707D–708B	cellar; sweeter by degrees	history, allegory, morality, anagoge
13	Honorius, *Gemma animae*, PL 172:669B	four kinds of faithful	history, allegory, tropology, anagoge
14	Richard, *Benjamin major*, PL 196:199D–200A	rank: one, middle, highest	history; tropology, allegory, anagogy
15	Richard, *Benjamin major*, PL 196:151C	what to do, what he did, what he will do	moral, allegory, anagogy

Table 2: Statements of the senses as one movement read in this article: threes (1–8) and fourfolds (9–15), with the order each states. Cassian's kinds and Jerusalem and Eucherius's example, which section 4 reads as kinds, a performance and a list, are left out.

History comes first wherever it is named, and allegory comes before anagogy wherever both are named. What moves is tropology. Among the fourfolds, four keep the classic order, tropology after allegory and before anagogy: the *Allegoriae*'s feeding, Adam, the cellar and Honorius, two of which are one sentence in two places. Two depart from it: Richard, who in both passages names tropology first, and the *Allegoriae*'s house, which puts it after anagogy. (The inquiry with which the prologue opens names the four in the house's order, but it is an order of questions, not a figure of movement.) Among the threes, Jerome, Isidore and Origen's "soul" put the moral sense second, before the mystical; Gregory's building, Wolbero and the *Moralitates* put it last; Bede's loaves name no moral sense. The base is small: four statements agree, two of them one sentence, and two texts depart, Richard's in two passages. The census's coding, which records the order in which a passage first names the senses, gives a wider measure. With the *Allegoriae* counted once and copies and repeats counted separately, allegory is named before anagogy in 67 of the 74 statements of theory that name both, and tropology before

mysteriorum intrinsecus latet. Et ab eadem re saepe allegoria fidem, tropologia mores variis modis aedificat. Anagoge quoque multipliciter sursum ducit, ut litteram non modo verbis, sed rebus ipsis instituat.» (*super ficies* so the TEI.) Census F116. De Lubac quotes the same sentences at *EM* I/1 152.

129. `ledger/formulas-coded.tsv`, kind *theory*, rows whose `scheme` contains L, A, T and N: 68 (67 distinct texts, F236/F239 being one; 26 twelfth-century, 8 thirteenth, 9 undated by the `century` column). Search, run on 2026-11-25, of `summary` and `definitions` for *ascen-, ladder, step, stage, grade, degree, climb, progress, sweeter, capacity, milk, beginner, advanced, ranked, depend-, presuppos-, chain, foundation, first place, passes from, leads from*: 11 rows, F013, F033, F034, F101, F104, F189, F202, F236, F239, F252, F253. Read: F013 (cellar), F033–F034 (Honorius), F101 (Richard), F104 (Adam), F236/F239 (*Allegoriae*) state a graded movement; F189 (Cassian), F202 (Bede, "graded fitness" in the summary), F252–F253 (Paul of Burgos, PL 113) do not: Cassian, Bede and two scholastic passages on which texts admit how many senses are false hits. So seven rows, five texts, state the four as a graded movement: the *Allegoriae* prologue (two rows, one text), Adam Scot, the cellar, Honorius's *Gemma* (two rows from one chapter) and Richard's table. A statement of ascent that the summary does not describe would be missed.

allegory in 26 of the 120 that name both.[130] The census's codes are model readings and an order of first naming is not always the order of a movement; the counts measure how often tropology is named before allegory, and they test no single passage.

None of this is new to de Lubac as a matter of history, and most of the table is his. He finds the order with allegory first "the most frequent", as the census does; he lists the authors of the four fourfolds that keep it among its witnesses, records Richard's, quotes the house with its variant buildings, and records changes of order within one chapter or paragraph, "not always with any particular intention" (nn. 117–123, 131). What the reading adds is narrower. De Lubac sets the two formulas against each other as two forms of unity. The classic order, allegory before tropology, is "the formula of the doctors", which satisfies "minds concerned with synthesis and with well-balanced architecture"; the other, tropology first, "perhaps better translates the mystical impulse by marking the degrees of the soul's ascent".[131] On these texts the forms and the orders do not line up. Among the fourfolds, the grades of readers, which are the soul's ascent if anything is, keep the classic order: the feeding, the cellar's drinkers from the simpler to the most perfect, Honorius's four kinds of faithful. The buildings vary: Gregory's three, Peter Comestor's and Peter of Poitiers' in the classic order, the *Allegoriae*'s house in neither, Alan of Lille's in the other. Among the fourfolds only Richard's ranking fits the pairing; among the threes, Origen's levels of reader and Jerome's two ascents (rows 1–3) fit it. De Lubac's "perhaps" is a suggestion, not a thesis, and the evidence against it is texts he gathered himself.

"To the other"

De Lubac judges the classic order "the true formula": "that which puts allegory immediately after history expresses the authentic doctrine at once in its fullness and its purity. It alone is adequate to the Christian mystery." The reason he gives is doctrinal: according as the moral sense "precedes or follows the allegorical sense", it is independent of the mystery of Christ or dependent on it, and only in the second case is it Christian. And he adds a measure: it is "that which is in fact the most frequent".[132] The frequency is borne out by the census. The doctrine is his, and it is not a claim this article can test. What the article can test is whether the texts that state the four as a movement carry that order as the order of the movement. Four do; two do not, and de Lubac recorded both. Richard of St Victor, one of the three twelfth-century minds he says kept an instinctive preference for the other formula, ranks tropology lowest and names it first. The *Allegoriae* prologue's house follows neither order a few lines after its feeding has followed the classic one, a change within one text of the kind he records in the Caroline Books and in Ratherius (n. 131).

His sentence on the organism does not need them to agree. "Each sense tends to the other as to its end": the sentence says *l'autre*, not *le suivant*, and its note is Gregory's threshold, "through the letter we tend to allegory", a pair. On the same pages he joins the senses by pairs: "So for anagogy and tropology", the soul entering itself and entering the heavenly Jerusalem; "so again for allegory and anagogy", the Church of time and of eternity;

130. `ledger/formulas-coded.tsv`, kind *theory*, column `scheme` (the senses "in the order the passage first names them", `ledger/FORMULAS.md` §3), counted once with F236 dropped: allegory before anagogy 67, after 7; tropology after allegory 94, before 26; tropology before anagogy 67, after 5. The 26 count copies and repeats separately: Richard and Absalon three times each; Cassian, Rabanus, Thomas the Cistercian, Paul of Burgos and the Laon school twice each; and Heterius beside the Eucherius he copies (F208, F192). Of the seven rows with anagogy named before allegory, two are Eucherius and Heterius's copy of him, whose allegory is the appended fourth (section 4), and one is the cellar's second window, which opens on *anagogen* (F014).

131. *EM* I/2 416: «Si la formule classique est celle des docteurs, de ceux qui ont mission d'enseigner, si elle satisfait davantage les esprits soucieux de synthèse et d'architecture bien équilibrée, l'autre attire davantage les contemplatifs»; «l'autre traduit peut-être mieux l'élan mystique en scandant les degrés de l'ascension de l'âme». He names Richard among three twelfth-century minds who kept «la préférence instinctive» for the threefold formula: «Richard de Saint-Victor». On changes of order, *EM* I/1 158: one author uses both orders «sans mettre toujours à ce changement aucune intention particulière»; I/1 166: «Dans un même chapitre, les Livres carolins énuméraient» first allegory, anagogy and tropology, then tropology, allegory and anagogy, and Ratherius of Verona «changeait également l'ordre à l'intérieur d'un même paragraphe». The building orders are in n. 117.

132. *EM* I/1 169 (the sentence begins on 168): «celui qui met l'allégorie aussitôt après l'histoire, exprime la doctrine authentique à la fois dans sa plénitude et dans sa pureté. Seul il est adéquat au mystère chrétien.» «C'est donc lui qui livre la formule véritable, celle qui est en effet la plus fréquente.» I/1 168: «selon qu'il précède ou qu'il suit le sens allégorique».

and the passage from one sense to another is "passage of the one into the other, becoming of the one through the other". His summary is "unity of source and unity of convergence".[133] This is a reading of de Lubac, not a correction of him. A unity of that kind does not require a single sequence of four, and the texts read here supply its warrant in the same form: pairs and threes that tend into one another (Jerome's history and tropology, "each needing the other"; Gregory's root and fruit; Richard's "many things as one"), and fourfolds whose order of statement varies. The reading that the shelf does not warrant is the stronger one, which his "succession temporelle, déroulement logique" invites: that the four form one ladder with one order. Where the time of salvation is stated, it fixes allegory (what Christ did) before anagogy (what is still to come), and the census's codes show that pair stable. It does not fix where the moral sense stands, because what is "to be done now" can be put before the mystery, as the purification of the one who reads, or after it, as its fruit in the soul; and the texts do both.

Three kinds of unity

Read across the shelf, the texts that state a movement, as distinct from a list, carry three kinds of unity, in pairs and threes as well as fours.

Figures of passage. Gregory's building (foundation, walls, colour), his root and fruit, his threshold; Wolbero's cellars; the honey in the wax of the letter in the Song commentaries. These are the figured schemes the census cannot see and de Lubac can (section 3). Most of them have two terms, or three. The movement they figure is from the letter inward, and they say little about how the spiritual sense, once reached, divides.

The reader's ascent. Cassian's practical life before the theoretical (n. 30); Origen's simple, progressing and perfect hearers (n. 75); Gregory of Nyssa's hand-guidance of the more fleshly toward the spiritual condition of the soul (n. 80); Wolbero's elect who pass from cellar to cellar (n. 107). Here the unity is a life that grows, and the senses are what a reader at each stage can receive. This is close to de Lubac's own account of tropology and anagogy as the spiritual life, and it is the deepest kind of unity on the shelf. It is also not the same thing as the formula's four: Origen's three levels and Cassian's ladder are not the four senses of one verse.

Christ as the turn between the Testaments. Bede's three loaves, Heterius's history of Christ that is not an allegory, Gregory's threshold: the texts read at the head of this section, where the split of the spiritual sense into present and future is closest to de Lubac's reason for it.

So the four are stated as one movement on this shelf, in grades of readers, a ranking and a house: the *Allegoriae* prologue, Adam Scot, the cellar, Honorius and Richard, nearly all of them gathered by de Lubac. Apart from the *Allegoriae*, whose date is open, the census dates them to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; this article draws no chronology from that. The unity they state is real, a unity of grades, of a house, of times. The graded ascents mostly keep the classic order; Richard's ranking and the house do not. De Lubac's organism is assembled from the three kinds of unity above and from these fourfolds, and his sentence on it claims a tending of each sense to another. That claim has its warrant on the shelf. A single ladder of four in one order does not.

ii. The Question Not Answered

Everything above concerns the senses as stated: what writers say Scripture's senses are. It does not show how often a writer actually reads one verse in all four senses, one after the other, as Cassian reads Jerusalem and Hildebert's sermon reads it again. De Lubac's history could be right about practice even where the statements are lists: a commentator who says "either … or" might still, verse after verse, give all four. The opposite could

133. *EM* I/2 650: «Chaque sens tend à l'autre comme à sa fin», with n. 7, «per litteram ad allegoriam tendimus»; «Succession temporelle, déroulement logique, c'est encore développement vivant.»; «Unité de source, et unité de convergence»; «Ainsi pour l'anagogie et la tropologie». I/2 651: «Ainsi encore pour allégorie et anagogie».

also be true. Two performances are in hand, and they point both ways. Cassian, who states the spiritual kinds in one order, performs Jerusalem in another (section 4). Eucherius, who states three senses and reports the fourth as others' addition, performs all four on the heavens and the waters at once (section 4). In both, what the writer does with a word differs from what he says the senses are, and in both the performance runs to four. Two cases bound nothing, and they are offered as the evidence in hand, not as a result. The census's 62 "applications" (60 distinct) are places where three or more sense-words fall near a verse, but they are not a measure of performed fourfold exegesis, because the test was a vocabulary window, not a reading of exegetical moves.[134]

The question is therefore open, and this article does not answer it. Answering it would mean coding, commentary by commentary, which senses a writer gives each verse he expounds, across the whole of a defined corpus rather than a sample: a separate and priced piece of work.

12. Conclusion

De Lubac's history of the four senses holds in most of its particulars, and in more of them than the census alone could show. The credits of section 1 stand, and three more belong with them: Aldhelm's canonical order, which the census missed and he had; Jerome's threefold with its eschatological third sense, which he quoted; and the figures that carry schemes without naming them, which no count can find. Where he quotes the Greek, he quotes it rightly, and where his point rests on a modern Latin version he sometimes says so himself.

This article tested the warrant for his structure, not its necessity, which no reading can test. The warrant is real, and it has a form. The texts that state the four as one movement (the *Allegoriae*'s feeding and house, Adam Scot, the cellar, Honorius's four kinds of faithful, Richard's ranking and his "many things as one") do not agree on its order, and de Lubac had gathered nearly all of them. History comes first and allegory before anagogy; the moral sense moves. Four of these statements keep the classic order and two depart from it, Richard's and the house, which in one prologue moves tropology from third to last within a few lines; in the threes, Jerome and Isidore put the moral sense before the mystical and Gregory's building puts it last. What the article adds is narrower: his suggested pairing of the classic order with architecture and of the other with the soul's ascent does not hold on the fourfolds, though Jerome's threefold ascents fit it, and the census gives a measure, tropology named before allegory, counting copies separately, in about one in five of the statements of theory that name both. De Lubac's sentence, "each sense tends to the other as to its end", asks for no more order than that, and his own illustrations of it run by pairs. What the shelf does not carry is a single ladder of four, or a warrant from the texts of movement for his judgment that the classic order alone is "the true formula"; that judgment is doctrine, borne out by frequency, and it is his.

Two further findings belong with this one. *Tropologia* narrowed in Latin from the figurative reading in general, which is what it is in Origen and often in Jerome, to the moral sense, which it is in Jerome's letter, in Cassian and in every Latin gloss read here; de Lubac noted the narrowing, and the article has added the gloss and its steadiness. And in the Greek windows read, the upper term is not split: Gregory of Nyssa names three of its names in order to refuse to choose, as de Lubac also saw, and Migne's modern Latin, place by place, sometimes supplies the "spiritual" and "mystical" sense that the Greek does not have. Whether medieval readers performed the four, verse by verse, as often as they stated them is a question this article leaves open.

134. `ledger/formulas-coded.tsv`, kind *application* (62 rows). The study's plan names this "stated versus performed" as a separate test requiring a coding of exegetical moves across whole commentaries (its stage C), not done.

Sources

Primary sources

Patrologia Latina, edited by J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844–64), in the TEI transcription of the Corpus Corporum (Zurich). Files by volume, as named in the notes: Adam Scot, *De tripartito tabernaculo* (vol. 198); Aldhelm, *De laudibus virginitatis* (89); Alcuin, *Confessio fidei* (101); *Allegoriae in universam sacram Scripturam* (112, two files); Amalarius, *De ecclesiasticis officiis* (105); Ambrose, *De Isaac et anima* and *Enarrationes in XII psalmos* (14), *Expositio in Lucam* (15); anonymous, *Expositio in Cantica* (70) and *Sermones* (177); Atto of Vercelli, *Expositio epistolarum S. Pauli* (134); Augustine, *De utilitate credendi* (42), *De Genesi ad litteram* and *liber imperfectus* (34); Bede, *De schematibus et tropis* (90), *De tabernaculo*, *Hexaemeron*, *In Samuelem*, *In Cantica* (91); Bruno the Carthusian, *Expositio in Psalmos* (152); Cassian, *Collationes* (49); Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalterium* (70); *De S. Anselmi similitudinibus*, under Eadmer (159); Eucherius, *Formulae spiritalis intelligentiae* (50); Gregory I, *Moralia* with the letter to Leander (75), *Homiliae in Evangelia* and *in Ezechielem* (76); Haymo (of Halberstadt or Auxerre), *Commentarium in Cantica* (117); Heterius and Beatus, *Ad Elipandum* (96); Hildebert (attributed), *Sermones* (171); Honorius Augustodunensis, *Expositio in Cantica* and *Gemma animae* (172); Isidore, *Etymologiae* (82), *Sententiae* (83); Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* (161, checked for one column); Jerome, *Epistolae* (22), *Commentaria in Isaiam* (24), *in Ezechielem*, *in Abacuc* and *in Zachariam* (25); John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus* (199); *Moralitates in Cantica canticorum*, in the volume of Philip of Harvengt (203); Paschasius Radbertus, *In Lamentationes* (120); Paulus Alvarus, *Epistolae* (121); *Posteriores excerptiones* (175); Rabanus Maurus, *Commentaria in Exodum* (108), *in Paralipomena* (109), *in Ezechielem* (110), *Allegoriae in universam sacram Scripturam* (112); Radulfus Ardens, *Homiliae* (155); Richard of St Victor, *Benjamin major* (196); *Scala claustralium* (184); Sedulius Scotus, *Collectanea in omnes B. Pauli epistolas* (103); Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica* (206, checked for one column); Wolbero of St Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum* (195).

Patrologia Graeca, edited by J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1857–66), Greek text in Kraken OCR (`patrologia/raw/kraken/`), facing Latin in Tesseract OCR (`scriptura/studies/sensus/sources/editions/ocr/`) and in the archive.org djvu text of PG 11: Origen, *De principiis* (PG 11, Greek of the *Philocalia*), *Contra Celsum* (PG 11), *Homilia in 1 Reg.* 28, the *Homiliae in Genesim* in Rufinus's Latin and the editors' preface (PG 12), *Selecta in Jeremiam* and *Commentarii in Matthaeum* with the *vetus interpretatio* (PG 13), *Commentarii in Joannem* (PG 14); scholia on the Dionysian letters printed as Maximus's (PG 4); Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* (PG 21); Gregory of Nyssa, *In Canticum* and *De vita Moysis* (PG 44); *Contra Judaeos, in serpentem aeneum* (PG 61, among the Chrysostom spuria).

Modern works

Lubac, Henri de. *Exégèse médiévale: les quatre sens de l'Écriture*. 4 vols. Paris: Aubier, 1959–64. Cited as *EM* by part and page; quoted from an OCR text of the printed volumes, with three readings checked against page images of the printing.

Pruitt, Wilson, et al. *Scriptura*: studies `sensus` and `usus`, with scripts, census tables and site. github.com/wilsonpruitt/scriptura; scriptura.wrootpress.com. The counts in this article are re-derived from its files; its tables are not reproduced. The ledger of de Lubac's apparatus is kept locally because *EM* is in copyright.

Earlier article in this journal

"What God Does Not Do: Abelard's Actualism, Its Medieval Answer, and John Milbank's Genealogy of Possibility". *Journal of Machine Theology* 1, no. 1 (2026). Cited as JMT 1.1 (section 1).

Appendix A: Method and Verification

The question and the hunt. The question was put by Wilson Pruitt, who asked that the de Lubac argument of his Scriptura `sensus` study be made the fourth article of this volume. The scope and the hunt brief were written by Claude Opus 5.5, under orchestration by Claude Fable 5.2. Three instances of Claude Sonnet 5.5 searched the shelf under the brief, one shelf each: the birth of the Latin formula (24 findings), the Greek windows and Migne's facing Latin (19), and the eleven uncited statements of theory (11, with three neighbours). Each reported, for every passage, the senses in the author's words, whether they are presented as a movement or a list, what they are for, the voice, de Lubac's use of the place from the ledger, and a verbatim run. The 127 Latin and Greek runs in the three reports were tested by `scripts/check_hunts.py` against the files named beside them: 127 exact. The article was written by Claude Opus 5.5, which re-read in its file every passage the argument uses, read de Lubac's own text at the places where his claims are tested, and added Aldhelm (PL 89), Gregory's *Moralia* VI and *Homilies on Ezekiel* with Rabanus's copy, Heterius on the history of Christ, and the three layers of Origen on Matthew at PG 13:1077–8 and 1101–2. It was then reviewed by an editor-in-chief (Claude Opus 5.5) and two blind readers (Claude Sonnet 5.5), and revised by Claude Opus 5.5 against the editor's decision letter and a second read; the texts the revision added are named in the provenance box, and the places of de Lubac's text read are cited in the notes. The thesis direction of the revision was chosen by Wilson Pruitt. The translations are the author's working translations.

The shelf. Latin: the Corpus Corporum TEI of the *Patrologia Latina* (`patrologia/sources/pl/tei/`, 5,276 files), normalised by its makers to classical orthography; volume numbers from the file headers, columns from the page markers. One work, the *Allegoriae in universam sacram Scripturam*, is held in two files (`8925.xml`, `8928.xml`) with different author headers and the same text. Greek: Kraken OCR of Migne's PG pages (`patrologia/raw/kraken/`); PG columns from the running-head maps in `patrologia/data/pg-heads/`. Facing Latin: Tesseract OCR (`scriptura/studies/sensus/sources/editions/ocr/`) and the archive.org djvu text of PG 11. De Lubac: an OCR text of the four printed volumes of *Exégèse médiévale* (`scriptura/studies/sensus/sources/exegese-medievale/text/`), quoted only in phrases; printed pages from `ledger/pages.tsv`; where the OCR is garbled (the century in *EM* I/1 152 n. 2, the verb on Jerome in I/1 213, the volume in I/2 638 n. 1) the page image of the printing (`exegese-medievale/pdf/`) was read. Kraken, Tesseract and the *EM* text are OCR and are quoted as they stand; their errors are corrected in the notes, not in the runs.

The numbers. Every count in the article was re-derived on 2026-11-25 from the study's files, not taken from its prose: `census/formulas.tsv` (269 places, 85 with all four families); `ledger/formulas-coded.tsv` (kind, scheme, figure); `ledger/formulas-vs-lubac.tsv` (de Lubac's use of the 132 theory statements); `ledger/lubac-theory-vs-census.tsv` and `ledger/lubac-theory-misses.tsv` (his 1,843 theory citations and the 218 misses); `ledger/pg-greek-check.tsv` (68 PG references); `census/gr-formulas.tsv` and `census/gr-terms.tsv` (the Greek windows and word count); `census/classical-kwic.tsv` (τροπολογ-). The revision added three computations: the order relations in the `scheme` column (n. 130), the keyword search of the 68 four-family statements of theory (n. 129), and a re-run of the study's `scripts/matthew_parallel.py`, read-only (n. 95); and one check of its own, ἠθικ- near the higher terms in Origen (n. 88). Numbers drawn from the coding of de Lubac's notes are a model's (Claude Opus 5.5, codebook R1–R7) and are marked "Stage A" where they are used; so are the 68 PG readings and the coding of the 269 formulas. The death-years marked `hand` in the study's author table were not used; the dates given are the Corpus Corporum's (Aldhelm, 709), the census's century column, or de Lubac's, and are named as such. The printed *EM* page of every citation was taken from the `page` column of `ledger/claims-all.tsv` or from `ledger/pages.tsv`, not from a ledger id, whose number is the PDF page.

The duplicate. The census counts the *Allegoriae* twice, at three places in each file (n. 9). Counted once: 269 places become 266; 85 with all four families, 84; 132 statements of theory, 131; 62 applications, 60; the

canonical scheme 34 of the theory statements and 66 of all, 33 and 63; the Jerusalem figure 16 and 27, 16 and 26; the 68 four-family statements of theory, 67; de Lubac's citations "within ten columns", 5 to 4. The 68 lists, the 5 quotations, the 2 false hits, de Lubac's 96, 12, 8 and 11, and his Stage A totals are unchanged. Where the article prints a count that changes, it gives both. The two copies of the farthing (n. 66) were coded as different kinds.

The check. `check_quotes.py` (adapted from JMT 1.3, with the Greek normalisation of `scripts/check_hunts.py`) tests every run set between guillemets against the file or files its note is mapped to in `notefiles.txt`. Source texts are NFC-normalised, TEI tags removed (both as a space and as nothing), line-end hyphens rejoined and whitespace collapsed. A run passes *exact* if it occurs as it stands; *loose* if it occurs only after folding case, accents and breathings, final sigma, u/v, i/j, ae/oe and punctuation, which is accepted only when the mapped file is OCR; a loose match against TEI fails. A run containing a guillemet fails, so that Migne's own quotation marks cannot cut a run short. The checker also requires every note marker to have one definition and every definition a marker, numbered in order of first appearance. In the final run of the second round the article has 134 notes, 112 of them quoting, with 288 runs: all 288 exact; each of the 134 markers occurs once in the prose. The checker was extended for the revision with the files of the new sources (`check_quotes.py`, dictionary `F`), and `notefiles.txt` was regenerated for the new numbering.

Corrections to the study and the census. The census's statement that the canonical order is first stated by Bede (STUDY §9) is not shown: Aldhelm states it, and the priority of the two is not settled on the shelf (section 3). STUDY §9′s counts of the commonest scheme and of the Jerusalem figure are superseded by the counts in n. 8. The *usus* essay §6 gives nine Greek windows, eight in Origen or Eusebius; through PG 82 there are twelve, eight of them in Origen or Eusebius (n. 68). The census counts one work in two files (above). The ledger's "Ivo" at PL 161:707 follows a slip in one note of de Lubac's (*EM* I/2 638 n. 1), who cites the cellar at PL 159 elsewhere (*EM* I/1 150 n. 3); the cellar is at PL 159:707–708 and is in the census as F013–F014, so at least one of the 64 "no-terms" places is a locator error (section 3). The ledger's "Thomas the Cistercian reporting Origen" at PL 206:343 does not match the column (n. 15). De Lubac's Paschasius at "119 A" (OCR) is at PL 120:1119A in the TEI (n. 116).

Not verified, or not on the shelf. Evagrius, from whom Courcelle and de Lubac derive Cassian's division of knowledge, was not searched. Andrew of Caesarea and Maximus, *Ad Thalassium* 37, to which de Lubac points, lie outside the Greek range read; so do most of the eleven unread tomes, among them parts of Cyril of Alexandria (n. 68). Migne's Latin facing Gregory of Nyssa (PG 44), Eusebius (PG 21) and the PG 61 sermon is not on disk. Whether the Latin facing the Endor homily at PG 12:1014B is Rufinus's or a later version was not established (section 8). Rufinus's Latin of *De principiis* IV could not be quoted continuously from the djvu OCR. The date of Bede's *De tabernaculo*, and so the priority of Aldhelm, is not given by any file; nor are the dates of Jerome's letter 120 or of the *vetus interpretatio* of Origen on Matthew. Which of the *Allegoriae* prologue and Adam Scot's *De tripartito tabernaculo* borrows from the other was not tested. The attribution of the Dionysian scholia in PG 4 is Migne's and was not checked against any other source. The dates of Migne's translators of the Greek and of the Benedictine preface in PG 12 were not established. Augustine's *Contra Faustum*, the probable frame of Atto's rule, is not on the shelf in a form the hunter found. Whether sermon 70 in PL 171 belongs with sermon 60, which de Lubac gives to Peter Comestor; which of PL 70:1077 and PL 117:321 is the original; and whether the Haymo of the attribution is of Halberstadt or of Auxerre, are all open. The 64 places where de Lubac reads a figured scheme, and the 68 PG readings, are model readings that were not re-read here beyond the places quoted. A citation of Atto, PL 134:367, at *EM* I/2 678 n. 1, reported during the search, was not found in the ledger or the *EM* OCR (n. 111). No passage of the Greek was checked against a critical edition.

Appendix B: Verification Table

Every note that quotes is listed with the file or files its runs were tested against. “Script” means every run in the note was found verbatim in a mapped TEI file; “script, OCR (exact)” that at least one mapped file is OCR text and every run was found in it as it stands. In the printed table “PL/” abbreviates `patrologia/sources/pl/tei/`, “KR/” `patrologia/raw/kraken/` and “SS/” `scriptura/studies/sensus/sources/`, all in the author’s home folder.

Note	Source file	Checked by
1	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
2	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
3	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
6	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
14	PL/6956.xml	script
15	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em4.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
17	PL/8342.xml	script
18	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
19	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
20	PL/7132.xml	script
21	PL/7132.xml	script
22	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
23	PL/21347.xml	script
24	PL/8910.xml	script
25	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
26	PL/6965.xml	script
27	PL/6949.xml	script
28	PL/6965.xml	script
29	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
30	PL/7530.xml	script
31	PL/7530.xml	script
32	PL/7530.xml	script
33	PL/7530.xml	script
34	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
35	SS/editions/ocr/pg012/p-0148.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg012-latin.txt	script, OCR (exact)
36	PL/7530.xml	script
37	PL/7549.xml	script
38	PL/7549.xml	script
39	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
40	PL/7549.xml	script
41	PL/7549.xml; PL/7530.xml	script
42	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
43	PL/8577.xml; PL/7549.xml; PL/9151.xml	script
44	PL/7447.xml	script
45	PL/7310.xml	script
46	PL/21404.xml; PL/8903.xml; PL/8178.xml	script
48	PL/7302.xml	script
49	PL/21427.xml	script
50	PL/21427.xml	script
51	PL/8053.xml	script
52	PL/8218.xml	script
53	PL/8463.xml	script
55	PL/8447.xml	script
56	PL/8455.xml	script
57	PL/8466.xml	script
58	PL/8459.xml	script
60	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
61	PL/8847.xml	script

Note	Source file	Checked by
62	PL/8893.xml	script
63	PL/11103.xml	script
64	PL/8761.xml	script
66	PL/8928.xml	script
67	PL/8688.xml	script
68	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
69	KR/origen-pg013/text/p-0456.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg013-latin.txt	script, OCR (exact)
70	KR/origen-pg014/text/p-0110.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg014-latin.txt	script, OCR (exact)
71	KR/pg-011/text/p-0351.txt	script, OCR (exact)
72	KR/pg-011/text/p-0556.txt	script, OCR (exact)
73	KR/pg-011/text/p-0559.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg011/p-0559.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
74	KR/origen-pg014/text/p-0219.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg014-latin.txt	script, OCR (exact)
75	KR/pg-011/text/p-0187.txt; KR/pg-011/text/p-0188.txt	script, OCR (exact)
76	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
77	KR/pg-011/text/p-0189.txt; KR/pg-011/text/p-0187.txt; KR/pg-011/text/p-0188.txt	script, OCR (exact)
78	KR/pg-044/text/p-0488.txt	script, OCR (exact)
79	KR/pg-044/text/p-0488.txt	script, OCR (exact)
80	KR/pg-044/text/p-0487.txt	script, OCR (exact)
81	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
82	KR/pg-044/text/p-0191.txt; KR/pg-044/text/p-0192.txt	script, OCR (exact)
83	KR/pg-021/text/p-0051.txt	script, OCR (exact)
84	KR/pg-004/text/p-0290.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg004/p-0290.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
85	KR/pg-061/text/p-0688.txt	script, OCR (exact)
87	KR/pg-011/text/p-0352.txt	script, OCR (exact)
88	KR/pg-011/text/p-0351.txt	script, OCR (exact)
90	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
91	PL/7170.xml; PL/7181.xml; PL/7174.xml; PL/7132.xml	script
92	PL/21347.xml	script
93	KR/origen-pg013/text/p-0577.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg013/p-0577.txt	script, OCR (exact)
94	KR/origen-pg013/text/p-0565.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg013/p-0565.txt	script, OCR (exact)
97	KR/origen-pg013/text/p-0279.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg013-latin.txt; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em3.txt	script, OCR (exact)
98	KR/pg-012/text/p-0524.txt; SS/editions/ocr/pg012/p-0524.txt	script, OCR (exact)
99	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em3.txt	script, OCR (exact)
100	~/patrologia/raw/pg-djvu/011.txt	script, OCR (exact)
101	SS/editions/ocr/pg012-latin.txt	script, OCR (exact)
103	PL/7914.xml; PL/9076.xml; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)
104	PL/11052.xml	script
105	PL/10473.xml	script
106	PL/10558.xml; PL/21427.xml	script
107	PL/11512.xml	script
108	PL/11512.xml	script
109	PL/11512.xml	script
110	PL/9440.xml	script
111	PL/9440.xml	script
112	PL/10940.xml	script
113	PL/10940.xml	script
114	PL/21412.xml; PL/8910.xml	script
115	PL/8577.xml	script
116	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt; PL/9116.xml	script, OCR (exact)
117	PL/8928.xml; PL/8925.xml; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em4.txt	script, OCR (exact)
118	PL/8928.xml	script
119	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
120	PL/11569.xml; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
121	PL/10652.xml; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
122	PL/10990.xml; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
123	PL/11527.xml; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt	script, OCR (exact)
124	PL/11527.xml; SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt	script, OCR (exact)

Note	Source file			Checked by
125	PL/10988.xml			script
126	PL/11276.xml			script
127	PL/11638.xml			script
128	PL/11585.xml			script
131	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt; em4.txt	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt;	SS/exegese-medievale/text/	script, OCR (exact)
132	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em1.txt			script, OCR (exact)
133	SS/exegese-medievale/text/em2.txt			script, OCR (exact)